



SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW

VOLUME 1

Edited by:

Chris Landsberg and Jo-Ansie van Wyk

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South African Foreign Policy Review – Volume 1

Edited by Chris Landsberg and Jo-Ansie van Wyk



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Preface

The Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) has taken a timely and invaluable initiative to produce a series of volumes on 'The Review of South African Foreign policy'. The first volume largely deals with foreign policy since 1999.

Since the establishment of the first democratic government in 1994, many experts and academics in South Africa and internationally have written about South Africa's foreign policy. Unfortunately, most of these articles were based on wishful thinking about some 'unique non-western foreign policy' that was expected from a democratic South African government. Much of the criticism was based on the government's failure to sustain a 'human rights perspective' on foreign policy.

A lot of the analysis was done too early and was not based on policy documentation of the African National Congress (ANC). An ANC-led government's foreign policy could not suddenly appear in 1994; it has its roots in the history of the ANC since its formation in 1912. These documents will help to explain why our foreign policy since 1994 is driven by an Africanist, anti-colonial and anti-imperialist perspective.

It is also unfortunate that very little reference was made to documents in the archives of the then Department of Foreign Affairs and little, if any, interviews were conducted with people involved in foreign policy formulation and implementation, as these would have helped to explain why, in relation to specific country issues whether bilaterally or multilaterally, the government took the positions it took, which were always driven by our perspective of 'A Better South Africa, A Better Africa and A Better World'.

There was also little attempt to analyse South Africa's foreign policy in the context of the fundamentally transformed international relations environment, largely characterised by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a unipolar world dominated by the US. The foreign relations of all countries had to grapple with this reality. South Africa was no exception.

Twenty years into our democracy, experts and academics have access to ANC and foreign affairs documentation and can interview many role players. This provides an opportunity for a constructively critical analysis and review of South African foreign policy.

Volume I deals with important subjects in foreign policy, including foreign policy-making and stakeholder interface; soft power and diplomacy; diplomacy of provinces and municipalities; economic diplomacy and negotiations; peace diplomacy; South Africa and the Middle East and North Africa; South Africa and Asia; South Africa and the global North; South

Africa and the global South; South Africa and key African countries; and South Africa in Africa multilaterally. It also considers what the insights from these thematic assessments tell us about future prospects of South Africa's foreign policy.

Many of the contributors have done postgraduate work relating to their respective chapters and have been involved with government and with non-government Organizations in the formulation and implementation of policy. They cover very complex and constantly changing subjects affecting foreign policy. Volume I will undoubtedly provide the impetus for more informed discussions on South African foreign policy since 1999. It must also lay the foundations for other volumes to further develop these themes and continuously assess developments in these areas.

Aziz Pahad

Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in South Africa, 1994–2008

July 2012

Acknowledgements

The Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) has produced several publications aimed at gaining better insights into the dynamics that shape the foreign policy of South Africa and the implications for broader South African society, African society and beyond. After the publication of its widely read *In Full-Flight: South African Foreign Policy after Apartheid* in 2006, and to respond to the need for a systematic and planned regular appraisal of changes and continuities in South African foreign policy, the IGD decided to produce a series of volumes under the title *South African Foreign Policy Review*. This first volume, put together over a period of over two years, and which involved a protracted process that put a diverse team of analysts through a methodological workshop and a symposium where draft chapters were presented and discussed, would have been impossible without the contribution of various people and institutions.

The IGD would like to acknowledge the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) for providing the funding for the development of initial foreign policy papers, the hosting of the methodology workshop and the co-hosting with the University of South Africa (Unisa) of the foreign policy symposium where draft chapters were subjected to detailed discussion with the broader South African foreign policy community of scholars.

The authors of individual chapters put up with entreaties and prodings by the IGD staff and editors during the long process of preparing a manuscript for publication, while the peer-reviewers provided many useful outsider perspectives to ensure that this was an academically sound, but still accessible, review of South African foreign policy. Ms Jo-Ansie van Wyk and Professor Chris Landsberg did a magnificent job of providing critical commentary and guidance to the revision of chapters and the preparation of the manuscript for publication.

As the publisher chosen for its excellent understanding of the intellectual value of publications on various aspects of African studies and its large distributional networks, the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA) oversaw the technical process of publishing this important contribution to foreign policy discourse.

Institute for Global Dialogue

June 2012

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Abbreviations and acronyms

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
Asgisa	Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa
AU	African Union
BRICS	Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa
CLGF	Commonwealth Local Government Forum
Comesa	Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa
Cosatu	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DA	Democratic Alliance
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DoD	Department of Defence
DPLG	Department of Provincial and Local Government
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
FDI	Foreign direct investment
GNU	Government of National Unity
GPA	Global Political Agreement
IBSA	India-Brazil-South Africa
IDP	Integrated development plan
IGD	Institute for Global Dialogue
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMC	International Marketing Council
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRPS	International Relations Peace and Security
IT	Information Technology
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MEC	Member of the Executive Council
MIR	Municipal International Relations
NAM	Non-aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCOP	National Council of Provinces
Nedlac	National Economic Development and Labour Council
Nepad	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NGP	New Growth Path
NOCPM	National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODA	Overseas development assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCRD	Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Programme
PEC	Provincial Executive Council
PPCFA	Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs
Renamo	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
SACC	South African Council of Churches
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADPA	South African Development Partnership Agency
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SALGA	South African Local Government Association
SALO	Southern African Liaison Office
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SASS	South African Secret Service
SEZs	Special Economic Zones
SPLM	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement of South Sudan
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TDCA	Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement
TIDCA	Trade, Investment and Development Cooperation Agreement
TIFA	Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
UNAMID	United Nations Africa Union Mission in Darfur
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Unita	União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
WTO	World Trade Organization
Zanu-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front

Towards a post-apartheid South African foreign policy review

Chris Landsberg

Foreign policy objectives constitute a fundamental aspect of the study of foreign policy analysis (FPA), contributing to a vision policy-makers have of influencing the behaviour of another state or of non-state actors.¹ They may be concrete, or vague and abstract, with realists stressing the immediate military-security dimension while downplaying the economic one, and liberals emphasising longer-term economic goals and the welfare of society.² For radicals, foreign policy is a tool for promoting the interests of the ruling classes.³ However, more specifically, it was Kal Holsti who reminded us about the importance of goals in foreign policy,⁴ identifying primary objectives shared by most states as: (1) security; (2) autonomy; (3) welfare; (4) status; (5) protection of ethnic, ideological or religious friends; and (6) world reorganization or redistribution of global power.⁵ States search for both internal and external security, and the ability to determine and implement their domestic and foreign policies according to their own priorities, without prescription or coercion from abroad. Achieving a basis of social welfare or prosperity in wealth and economic efficiency is a key goal, and states are keenly aware of their status and prestige, constantly seeking to enhance their international standing, something which has run through South Africa's post-settlement foreign policy for the past two decades. For reasons of traditional and historical loyalties, they are keen to protect and defend friends in governments abroad, hence the final goal of universalisation of the political values of a particular state or group of states, for example communists, socialists, liberal democracies, and Islamic friends.

When applying foreign policy analysis theory it is important to go beyond a focus on the grand stated goals of states to an assessment of the links between them and actual output (diplomacy) and outcomes (the tangible results achieved). Foreign policy analysis involves scrutinising foreign policies and placing them in the broader context of academic knowledge,⁶

so it should be used to explain how and why certain decisions were taken and to examine the relationship between intention and consequence.⁷ In South Africa, there is a tendency on the part of many analysts and scholars to ignore implementation and operationalisation, but a more serious weakness is a frequent engagement in deductive approaches through which they remind us of *what is wrong* with foreign policy before telling us *what the actual policy is*. They are often unfamiliar with the goals and intentions of policy as they refuse to consult primary texts, often because they are removed from the behind-the-scenes reality, and too lazy to familiarise themselves with primary information and to engage with decision-makers.⁸

South Africa's post-settlement foreign policy has shifted in fundamental ways from the external strategies pursued by white minority governments of the pre-1994 age.⁹ No longer a 'skunk'¹⁰ among nations, the post-settlement government has adopted highly ambitious foreign policy strategies and goals, of domestic, sub-regional, continental, global South, industrialised North, and global governance dimensions.¹¹ International and domestic policies have been pursued with the aim of affecting the shape and direction of the country's domestic order and overcoming the legacies of the apartheid era, including poverty, inequality and social dislocation.¹² The politicians have been determined that their priorities, interests and values would be antithetical to those of the apartheid regime; they were keen to show that they are good world citizens in contrast to the rogue international behaviour of the apartheid regimes.¹³

Research has produced differing perspectives on the various genres of foreign policy to have emerged.¹⁴ Much of the analysis over the past eighteen years has tended to focus on attempts to deconstruct the meta-narratives of the new republic's foreign policies and international strategies, but it is surprising, given the attention paid to these after 1994, that a comprehensive review of their actual details has not yet been undertaken. Analysts have not yet read the scripts or interpreted the actual decisions taken by the Republic's foreign policy executive – the inner coterie – in light of the rationale that underscores them. The closest to reviews of foreign policy have been a Ten Year Review (2003), and Fifteen Year Review (2008) by the Mbeki government, and National Development Plan: Vision 2030 (2011), commissioned by the Zuma government. This speaks volumes about the use of information and analysis in decision-making during that presidency, and the relative lack of it since.

Much of the work that has been done has been deductive and devoid of inductive, grounded theoretical approaches, failing to engage with decision-makers and primary material or to draw conceptual and theoretical conclusions. Few scholars have analysed South African foreign policy within the context of the changing dynamics and realities of the post-Cold

War world. Nor has there been research into the gap between implementation or operationalisation and the issue of continuity and change between the different administrations: Mandela (1994–1999); Mbeki (1999–2008); Motlanthe (September 2008–May 2009); and the unfolding Zuma years starting in 2009. The closest we have to such a review was the volume *In Full Flight: South Africa's Foreign Policy After Apartheid*, commissioned by the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) in 2004.

As editors and members of the organising committee which conceptualised the idea behind the *South African Foreign Policy Review*, we have challenged authors to engage with primary and secondary literature and tease out the goals that various post-apartheid governments have set for themselves, probing into whether there are any gaps between the stated goals and the outcomes. We are interested in the input–output dimensions of South Africa's foreign policies, followed by the continuities and change, the similarities and dissimilarities that have developed between the orientations of the different administrations. This review represents the first of an ongoing series, biennially or every three years at the most.

The Mandela government was determined to find its feet and adapt to the challenges of a rapidly changing global order in the aftermath of the Cold War. South Africa's own transition from apartheid to democracy coincided with the dissipation of the East–West bipolar order and a reconfiguration of global power, and South Africa saw its role as being to try and help shape a new world order. Seeing major opportunities deriving from this unfolding global reality, Mandela said, in an address to the United Nations World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, 'The irony of democratic South Africa's late entry into international affairs is that we can reap the fruits of a world redefining itself.'¹⁵ The view from the infant government was that South Africa occupied a unique position in the new North–South configuration, somewhere between the industrialised nations and the underdeveloped regions of the world. Coupled with the euphoria of universal suffrage and the end of isolation, South Africa grasped the new-found opportunity to flex its new muscles, at once promoting the interests of Southern Africa, the broader African continent, and even the entire southern hemisphere.¹⁶ Just as the policies of the previous regime had been detrimental to relations with the outside world, so those of the new should be beneficial, particularly if geared to the republic's progress and stability in the economic sphere.¹⁷

But the infant has now reached adolescence and, nearly two decades later, the transition from the Mbeki to the Zuma administration has ushered in some subtle yet significant changes of emphasis in foreign policy practice.¹⁸ While the erstwhile push for global values and common interests remains strong, the rhetoric has changed to cooperation and national

interest, including domestic imperatives such as, ostensibly at least, the creation of decent jobs, improved social and economic development and a fight against crime and corruption.¹⁹ There has, however, been a noticeable absence of debate and analysis on current foreign policy practice and its direction, as Pretoria engages with both state and non-state actors in a changing international environment. Against this background, the IGD proposed to undertake an appraisal of South Africa's foreign policy from the mid-1990s to date.²⁰

CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

In 2003, the IGD was commissioned by the Presidency to conduct a ten-year review of South Africa's role in global governance, international development forums and environmental governance.²¹ It described the role that South Africa has played in a number of bodies,²² especially its attempt to promote the agenda of Africa and Southern Africa, noting how many achievements had been made and challenges encountered. The study also pointed out the absence of a thorough appraisal of South Africa's role regionally, continentally and globally, one that could be used as a reference guide for regular assessment of its role in specific geographical and thematic areas. It found no suitably scientific basis for a prognosis of the country's influence on future regional and continental developments. Recent controversies, such as that over the republic's voting positions at the UN, seen by some as a retreat from a human rights-based foreign policy, as well as uncertainty about long-term commitment to stability and democratic transition in Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Madagascar, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi, all point to a shift in the government's view of its international role. This short and thematic review, coupled with discussions with government officials and foreign policy observers, therefore suggests to us that there remains a pressing need for a thorough review and prognosis of South Africa's international role.

The Zuma presidency also evoked fear in many quarters that South Africa's interests in international affairs and its strong regional leadership would wane. Was this fear based on a correct reading of reality or was it based on alarmism and anti-Zuma sentiments? This review probes these and other assumptions. If the country is to maintain and strengthen its catalytic role in the region and continent it needs to take stock of how it has conducted itself internationally so far, and determine how it can improve on a number of fronts. These include regional leadership, balancing human rights and national interests, and championing democracy. The resolutions of the Polokwane conference of the governing ANC in 2007 also suggested

a stronger focus on the domestic agenda,²³ contributing to another fear, namely that South Africa would become increasingly insular, thus reneging on its obligations to use its esteemed international status and access for the good of the region.

A number of related problems inspired this proposed project. The first was growing uncertainty about the meaning of the motto 'continuity and change' in reference to the transition from Mbeki to Zuma.²⁴ Whether such a change would bring an end to active engagement internationally and regionally is something that needs to be probed. Another issue for investigation is whether South Africa would continue to prioritise democratisation, peace and security and, above all, the development of Africa, or whether it would succumb to the temptation to pursue economic self-interest and a utilitarian strategy. The project also considers the fallout over South Africa's Libya vote in 2011 that helped pave the way for the military assault of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against the Muammar Gaddafi dictatorship, and which ultimately resulted in a regime change in that country, followed by South Africa's angry distancing of itself from NATO's action.²⁵

During the South African elections in 2009, ANC president Jacob Zuma made great capital of the notion that policy-making in general, and foreign policy in particular, would become democratised, and that civil society would press for better outcomes in the country's interventions in regional hotspots and international engagements.²⁶ But did it? Have we seen a greater opening up of decision-making processes and deliberative opportunities for civil society to influence foreign policy and diplomatic processes? Then there is the persistent and vexing question of the tensions between economic self-interest and the republic's values and principles: would self-interest in the form of economic dividends come to trump the importance of human rights, justice and principles in foreign policy?

In the Department of Foreign Affairs 1995 Foreign Policy Guidelines, the former minister of foreign affairs, Alfred Nzo, stated that 'the great challenge of our age ... is to answer the question, given the interdependence of the world, what is it that we can and must do to ensure that democracy, peace and prosperity prevail everywhere?'²⁷ It was a question which, even then, was suggestive of the need for a review.

As part of the next year's Foreign Policy Review, he noted, just two years into the new democratic order, that:

There is general agreement that South Africa's democratic transformation and the change which came about in the world around us at the same time, require a drastic reshaping of our foreign policy. Some will argue that it is not only the

policy itself which is in need of overhaul, but also the process whereby, and within which, it is formulated and executed which stands in need of change.²⁸

In that commentary, the minister noted that:

South Africa's foreign policy is predicated upon its national interests, which has as basic tenets, the protection of the sovereignty of our and also served by promoting the political, economic and social well-being of southern Africa and interaction with the international community, particularly Africa.²⁹

Other considerations which also served South Africa's national interest and that were elucidated by the minister were:

... the promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance. In addition, active involvement in crucially important issues such as the protection of the environment, arms control, the elimination of drug trafficking, the status of women, refugees, mass migration, disease control, drought and the promotion of economic intercourse with the widest possible range of other countries.³⁰

This is quite an eclectic set of challenges identified as part of South Africa's posture, but they were also suggestive of confusion, and the desperate search for a national interest compass and rationale, by the new post-settlement government.

Poignantly, Nzo was of the opinion that there was a need to 'carefully analyse the global environment with a view to defining both the opportunities which exist for the advancement of South Africa's national interests and the threats that we should strive to counter'.³¹ 'We are not,' the minister hastened to add, 'a great power, and therefore our foreign policy costume, as it were, should be cut according to our cloth.'³² This implied that 'we should take stock of our resources, whether these be physical or figurative'.³³

The minister was zeroing in on a debate about the gap between stated policies and the capacity of the new government to execute such policies. From very early on, the new government harboured concerns about the demands placed on it in its international relations, and its capabilities and capacities to turn its goals into tangible outcomes. Nzo then made the crucial point that any national interest doctrine must necessarily take into account the 'society's values', which should be 'reflected in the stance which we assume on certain issues', and 'we have responsibilities and obligations flowing from our bilateral relations and our membership of international Organizations'.³⁴ From the onset of the post-apartheid period, therefore, the new ANC-led government felt the need to articulate a new foreign policy orientation, based on a new national interest doctrine,

and one that would help the republic find its role and place in a radically changing global order.

In his concluding remarks at a foreign policy workshop held in Pretoria in September 1996, the deputy minister of foreign affairs, Aziz Pahad, made the unequivocal statement that Africa 'is our national interest' and stated that the idea of an African Renaissance could not remain a romantic concept' and that the 'rife notions of African pessimism' needed to be challenged.³⁵ For him, there was little doubt that 'South Africa's future is inextricably linked to that of Africa'. While the new government was mindful that 'a leadership role was imposed on South Africa', the new foreign policy executive was sensitive about hegemonic perceptions about itself and wished to shun the 'Big Brother or Big Sister syndrome' while it realised that it could not afford to 'sit on the sidelines'. In terms of national interest in relation to the continent, argued Pahad, there was 'need to clarify it further and understand how we can integrate it with our neighbouring states and further afield in Africa'. Just as Minister Nzo had expressed concern about the gap between ambition and capability on the part of the post-settlement republic, so Deputy Minister Pahad was also of the view that 'the international community has great expectations from South Africa's role, expectations which exceed our capacity'. 'We in South Africa,' he advised, 'need to prioritise and address expectations.'

These views by Nzo and Pahad went to the nub of a review as they continued to refer to the tensions between ambition and expectation on the one hand, and capability and capacity on the other. The Republic felt a sense of burden and duty to respond to expectations, but did not always have the wherewithal to address needs and expectations.

The issue of the role and place of values in South Africa's foreign policy is a vexing one that has preoccupied successive decision-makers. Pahad stated that the 'values entrenched in the constitution is an overall framework, but there are many to South African values'. 'We start from the premise,' said Pahad, 'that South Africa is committed to human rights. The problem we face in this regard is the issue of possibilities and limitations on South Africa in the real world. How do we get human rights enforced and implemented in the international environment?' Pahad even conceded that 'there must be a possible contradiction between South-South cooperation and the values which we may want to project. There has to be interaction between theory and practice.'³⁶ For him, in areas such as China, Iran, Libya, Nigeria and Cuba, where South Africa was accused of 'muddling through', there was room for different interpretations on the human rights front.

There was also alignment in thinking between Nzo and Pahad in terms of the need to situate and locate South Africa's foreign policy in a global context. For Pahad, '... with regard to the global context' we had to 'accept

that the global nature of the economy is a reality. Irrespective of what the world order is called, new or old, is the fact that there has been a fundamental transformation at the international level.³⁷ As early as 1996, therefore, he raised two important questions that are pertinent to a review: How does South Africa react to this changing global reality? And how should South Africa go about mobilising and cooperating with other states in strategic alliances to transform certain international rules?

Eight years later, in 2003, government conducted another policy review, including an assessment of foreign policy, in order to take stock of governance during the first five years of the Mandela government, and the first three of Mbeki's. The Ten Year Review of 2003 tried to respond to the challenge raised by the minister by stating that 'some of the most significant changes in government policy since the inception of democracy in 1994, have occurred in the international relations, peace and security (IRPS) functions of the state'. The document reminds us that

... government set out to achieve the following broad objectives through the functions and activities of various departments:

1. Transform the foreign, defence and intelligence Organizations and functionaries, including appropriately training and equipping South Africa's diplomats to promote the country's IRPS priorities;
2. Ensure South Africa's acceptance into the community of nations and establish relations with other countries;
3. Image, brand and market South Africa;
4. Expand and diversify trade relations, and attract FDI;
5. Promote and deepen international cooperation in Science and Technology;
6. Promote international respect for human rights and democracy;
7. Promote peace, security and stability (including international crime prevention and management);
8. Prioritise commitment to the interests and development of Africa;
9. Promote South–South cooperation and the transformation of North–South relations;
10. Reform and strengthen the multilateral rules-bound political, economic, security and environmental Organizations in order to advance the interests of developing countries.³⁸

The Ten Year Review of 2003 concluded, '... while South Africa has made significant progress in international relations since 1994, some objectives have been difficult to promote, while others need greater effort if they are to be fully realised'.³⁹

The performance and success of a country's international policies, those of South Africa too, asserted the review, 'are contingent upon a range of

other actors and variables in the international arena, including states and non-state Organizations, of which the latter are often better resourced than smaller countries'.⁴⁰

Challenges notwithstanding, the Ten Year Review determined that there was, however, '... a general agreement that South Africa is playing a leading role, especially in advancing the interests of developing countries. This derives from, among other factors, the geographic location of the country, the policy challenges facing South Africa at the confluence of global socio-economic challenges, the nature of our history and transition to democracy, and the quality of the country's leadership'.⁴¹

The challenge was thus '... to use this influence to promote South Africa's international relations and domestic objectives'.⁴²

Did government make any mid-term corrections and refinements to policy in the five years that followed? Did it learn important lessons? In 2008, days after Thabo Mbeki was recalled as head of state by the ANC, the Presidency released a Fifteen Year Review. This built on the findings of the preceding Ten Year Review and stated that, 'After the attainment of democracy, assimilating the country into the global setting became a preoccupation. It was also necessary to transform the foreign, defence and intelligence Organizations and those engaged in the country's foreign economic relations'.⁴³ The Fifteen Year Review echoed the view that after emerging from decades of ostracism and international banishment through the normalisation of diplomatic relations and participation in regional, continental and multilateral Organizations, the Republic had emerged to 'play a critical role – well beyond its capacity and resources – in advancing its own interests and those of developing countries, especially in Africa'.⁴⁴ It set out to contribute to realising domestic goals of growth and development, with a particular emphasis on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the continent, and strengthening relations across the globe and marketing South Africa. These goals were translated into the following broad contours:

1. Consolidation of the African Agenda
2. Strengthening and deepening relations with countries from the South
3. Transforming relations with developed countries from the North
4. Pursuing economic diplomacy
5. Participating in the global system of governance.⁴⁵

The Fifteen Year Review did detect a policy–outcomes gap and found that 'some objectives were not fully achieved'. It highlighted a number of challenges, including a need to focus more clearly on foreign policy goals; the need to effectively respond to shifts in global power; new attention to be paid to strategic partnerships as initial factors enhancing South Africa's status; weaknesses in public diplomacy to be rectified; and meeting the

challenge to align political and economic diplomacy. Meanwhile, as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) became the point of reference in Africa and the world, there were serious new challenges around implementation and partnership commitments in addition to the existing ones of regional integration, peace and stability.⁴⁶

Given the fraternal struggles, *broedertwiste*, between the then president Mbeki and the former ANC deputy president Zuma, and the fallout at Polokwane in December 2007, during which the leadership changed,⁴⁷ the new crop of leaders at party headquarters in Luthuli House, Johannesburg, did not even bother to familiarise themselves with the lessons outlined in the Fifteen Year Review or other initiatives embarked upon by the Mbeki government. They seemed too distracted by leadership squabbles and jockeying for positions, so the reviews were put on the shelves to gather dust and they entered a frantic phase of trying to reinvent policy in general, foreign policy in particular, all the talk of 'continuity' notwithstanding. As the new Zuma-led government promised that the long-awaited Foreign Policy White Paper would eventually see the light of day, we saw in 2010 the emergence of the newly re-baptised Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), formerly the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), and yet another document, the Draft Discussion Document, South Africa's Foreign Policy: Meeting the Challenges of the Future. This made the case for regular reviews when it observed that, 'in a fast-changing interdependent world, it is essential for South Africa to regularly make an evaluation of its foreign policy and the benefits that could be derived from it, to ensure that its national interests are maximised'.⁴⁸ There would henceforth be emphasis on the domestic-foreign policy nexus as 'foreign policy is not an abstract matter separate from domestic policies and as such South Africa ensures that these inform its foreign policy'.⁴⁹ Just as the former deputy minister of foreign affairs, Pahad, made reference to great international expectations that the 'new' South Africa had to grapple with, so the new minister of international relations and cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, re-emphasised the need for the Republic's foreign policy to be 'assessed against the weight of rising expectations' and the need to help in 'meeting the current domestic priorities' as determined by the new government.⁵⁰ The 2010 Draft Discussion Document stressed that 'South Africa's foreign policy prioritised the Southern African region and Africa, based on the belief that South Africa could not prosper in isolation from the rest of the continent'. As in the past, the 'Africa first' policy was thus reinforced. In engaging the continent, South Africa would reinforce 'the principles of equity, mutual benefit and peaceful cooperation' and it would avoid 'taking a position of power' vis-à-vis states in the region. It would also 'resist any pressure or temptation or pursue its own interest at the expense of the sub-continent'.⁵¹

With Africa as the focus of foreign policy, South Africa would continue to emphasise 'partnerships' through South–South and North–South cooperation. The Draft Discussion Document stated that 'South Africa's foreign policy evolved to adopt a leadership approach in various multilateral institutions championing the cause of the developing countries' and it 'prioritised African interests'. The ANC-led government furthermore 'embraced a multi-lateral approach to solving critical challenges confronting the international community'. Linked to the pro-multilateralism approach, is the perceived 'leadership role that South Africa played in global governance'. Here the 'leadership role, based on the promotion of its national values, included active involvement in advocating the African agenda; championing the cause of the South; building bridges between South and North; multilateralism; and the fostering of major international conferences'.⁵²

In 2011, the National Planning Commission (NPC) released its National Development Plan (NDP): Vision 2030. This document comments on foreign policy, but is highly economic-centred in its outlook, hinting strongly at the newfangled idea of Africa as the new frontier in world affairs. It asserts that 'international and regional developments affect South Africa's fortunes in complex ways' and states that 'South Africa's policy-makers did not adequately account for the effects that the world economy would have on the domestic environment'. Its analysis is that 'the emergence of fast-growing developing economies, particularly China and India, has already changed global trends and investment patterns, and is reshaping international politics'. The relative decline in the economic power of the US, Europe and Japan will have negative effects on the economies and militaries of these countries. With the industrialisation of China and India, the demand for natural resources will remain and Africa will obviously be a target of such resource needs. According to the NDP, 'South Africa will have to manage the risks that flow from greater complexity and recognise that emerging powers may seek to exploit our vulnerabilities'. On a more positive note, the Vision 2030 is of the view that the 'growth and development increases' in the continent's economic performances could '... provide Africa with a greater voice in global political and economic institutions'. A strong self-interest and utilitarian note also emerged and the unashamed view surfaced that 'strong growth on the continent has opened up major opportunities for South African firms and industries, which have contributed to development by investing in telecommunications, banking, mining, construction and retail', a view that is likely to be interpreted by some critics as neo-imperialist tendencies on the part of the Republic.

The foregoing reveals that the different post-apartheid governments had developed a habit of developing discussion documents and reviews almost on a biannual basis but the extent to which these strategic documents are

actually being implemented and put into effect is not always clear. Now that government is opening up to scrutiny and dialogue with non-state actors, this lacuna can be filled by researchers and academics prepared to engage officialdom and examine the strategic documents more closely. The problem remains, however, that because all reviews to date have been driven by government itself, civil society has no point of reference. This is so serious that it is fair to state here that, during the past six years or so, most of the civil society-government engagement has been initiated by the former DFA and its successor DIRCO, and in particular the Diplomatic Academy and its Policy Research and Analysis Unit (PRAU). This is not a good reflection on civil society or its efforts at deliberative foreign policy-making. It suggests that the non-state sector has become very reactive and poorly organised, and is thus not in a good position to influence foreign policy or the direction of the Republic's international relations.

One of the modest aims of this project is thus to provide an academic account – on behalf of the civil society of which we count ourselves part – of the international journey travelled by South Africa since the dawn of democracy in 1994. The review will evaluate the extent to which government has achieved its foreign policy objectives during the past two decades. Apart from investigating the gap between stated goals and outputs and actual foreign policy outcomes, it will point to possible future foreign policy trajectories and challenges, thus providing evidence-based analysis of, and reflection on, the Republic's conduct internationally. We shall probe the goals various governments set for themselves, and judge whether they have been achieved.

APPROACH AND CONTENT

If civil society is to become better at engaging government and, more importantly, influencing foreign policy, it will have to do so on the basis of grounded, policy-oriented and evidence-based research. Such interpretations should help to empower civil society actors to become better at engagement, lobbying and advocacy.

This edited *South African Foreign Policy Review* takes stock of the Republic's post-apartheid policy, and is based on comprehensive research conducted outside government. It includes topics ranging from foreign policy decision-making and para- or sub-national diplomacy; strategy towards anchor states in Africa; stratagems in relations to North Africa and the so-called 'Arab spring' or 'Arab awakening'; positions vis-à-vis African multilateral institutions; South Africa and emerging power blocs, including the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) trilateral forum, and the

Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) constellation; relations with the industrialised North and with Asia; economic diplomacy tactics; and global governance strategies. Conducted essentially by researchers outside government (with the exception of Brendan Vickers), some who have been in government previously but who are now on the outside, and many who already critically engage government, the book mainly adopts an outsider-in approach. We encouraged the authors of the various chapters to base their work on sound empirical research and inductive analysis, as they remind the reader of the goals stated by the governments and highlight the achievements, and the failures.

Two authors tackle the institutional and coordinating framework of South African foreign policy in the past two decades. The first, Lesley Masters, tries to penetrate the 'black box' of South African foreign policy decision-making and find out who is behind it. She considers the personal diplomacy of presidents Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma, and gives us a sense of the people who formed part of the foreign policy executives, or inner coterie, of these governments, including deputy presidents, ministers of foreign affairs (or, of late, international relations and cooperation), trade and industry, deputy ministers, directors general, and special advisers. She also focuses on the role of the Department of Defence, Parliament, and NGOs.

The second, Siphamandla Zondi, places the focus on the neglected issue of para-diplomacy, or the diplomacy of provinces and municipalities. Since 1994, we have seen a steady growth in the diplomatic roles and international relations of these sub-national actors, as many engaged in trade missions, international cooperation agreements, participation in international Organizations, and international development cooperation. Zondi looks at some of the problems encountered in this area, including in the realms of protocol and legal requirements; intergovernmental relations; coordination and alignment; tensions with national priorities and foreign policy; and poor coordination at provincial and local levels.

After the institutional and coordinating framework, we move to three chapters which deal with the orientation and practice of the Republic's foreign policy and diplomacy. Karen Smith considers soft power as an instrument of South African diplomacy as the post-settlement Republic has tried to become a 'good world citizen'. This instrument, according to Smith, was a once powerful tool used by government in the immediate post-apartheid period but, she argues, South Africa's image has become gradually tarnished because of lack of use, or incorrect use, of soft power tools. She considers the controversies surrounding the visa issues for the Dalai Lama; quiet diplomacy vis-à-vis Zimbabwe; voting in the United Nations Security Council concerning Myanmar; and the handling of the Libya crisis in 2011, all of which served as setbacks to soft power.

Anthoni van Nieuwkerk considers the challenges, opportunities and constraints that have confronted the country's peace diplomacy, which he defines as peace making, peace keeping and peace building, all under the multilateral auspices of the AU and the United Nations Security Council. Like Karen Smith, Van Nieuwkerk also considers the personal diplomacy of Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma. This chapter delves into some familiar case studies, including South Africa's role in the making of Nepad; quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe, and the painstaking negotiation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA); and peace making in the Comoros, the DRC, South Sudan, and elsewhere.

Brendan Vickers reviews South Africa's economic diplomacy since 1994, with emphasis on negotiating in multilateral economics and trying to tap into the opportunities of the world economy, on bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. Vickers considers South Africa's roles in a series of multilateral bodies, including the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), as well as the AU, SADC and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). The chapter also considers the Republic's roles in the IBSA trilateral forum, and the BRICS consortium as it searched for foreign direct investment (FDI), positioning the country as a preferred tourist destination, and it examines commercial diplomacy.

The *Review* then proceeds to area issues as it addresses challenges around South Africa in Africa, and the idea of the Republic's South–South and North–South strategy. David Monyae examines post-apartheid foreign policy from an essentially Afrocentric and multilateralist perspective. Based on empirical evidence, the chapter considers efforts to transform SADC; Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as 'building blocks'; the transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the AU; and South Africa's role in negotiating Africa's socio-economic blueprint, Nepad, as well as the continent's innovative governance promotion tool, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

In addressing South Africa's bilateral relations with African 'anchor states', Nomfundo Ngwenya contends that the challenge of African consensus requires the building of conscious collaboration between African states and well-calculated management of relations at the bilateral level. She sets out to develop a conceptual framework for anchor states and seeks to place the debate within the context of strategic objectives and national interests, including a typology and evaluation of South Africa's policy related to them since 1994.

Iqbal Jhazbhay looks at six years of South Africa and the Arab Maghreb, a region that has been transformed from stability under autocratic regimes to the combustible events of the 'Arab spring' or 'Arab awakening'. In the

Middle East-North Africa (MENA) region, South Africa had particularly close ties with Algeria and volatile ties with Muammar Gaddafi's Libya. Jhazbhay unpacks the consequences of the Arab spring and the NATO-led invasion of Libya in 2011, focusing on South Africa's intercessions. Jhazbhay considers policy under Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma, and the spillover effects of the instability and volatility in the Horn of Africa. He raises the question of whether the unfolding events in the MENA region will result in a democratic order or whether the end result will be perpetual instability that will force South Africa and other states to engage in crisis management.

With particular emphasis on the New Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership (NAASP), the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), and of course IBSA and BRICS, the chapter by Francis Kornegay focuses on South Africa's strategies towards emerging powers, dovetailing well with Vickers's paper. He subscribes to a simple definition of emerging powers by referring to non-Western powers, and examines South Africa's role in emerging power constellations and the way they attempt to transform the global political and economic balance of power while ensuring that the world order caters better for the interests and concerns of Africa and the global South. He also examines the relations between Africa's 'great powers', including South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, Senegal, and others.

In his chapter, Garth Shelton focuses on South Africa's strategies in relation to East Asia as a direct response to the global reality that the region was becoming the centre of global manufacturing and economic growth. By 2012, he reminds us, some 40 per cent of South Africa's trade was with Asia, suggesting that the republic's national interests in Asia are primarily economic and commercial. Shelton contends that South Africa has not focused closely enough on economic opportunities, rendering its 'look East policy' as essentially a series of missed opportunities. He makes the case for a 'comprehensive look-east policy' in an attempt to help it to address its goals of overcoming poverty and inequality. South Africa, he argues, urgently needs to engage East Asia and the Asian Tigers.

Gerrit Olivier considers South Africa's relations with the global North – that is, North America and Europe – and, like Kornegay, postulates that the post-apartheid, ANC-led government sought to challenge the Western-centric global order. Unlike the apartheid governments' foreign policies, which boiled down essentially to relations with the West, Olivier contends that post-1994 foreign policy towards Africa and the global South has sought political autonomy from the West but also retained economic and commercial closeness, while trying to navigate the new dictates of universal morality. In short, South Africa sought to continue to relate to the West on largely economic terms as it remained determined to move away from a Eurocentric foreign policy.

We conclude the *Review* with a chapter on South African global governance and multilateralism by Mzukisi Qobo, who unpacks South Africa's policies in relation to the system of global economic governance. The author interrogates South Africa's normative approach to global governance and critiques its lack of domestic anchoring. He analyses South Africa's negotiating approaches vis-à-vis the G20, the Uruguay and Doha rounds of trade negotiations, and its partnering with emerging powers such as Brazil, Russia, India and China. Finally, all the chapters are pulled together by Jo-Ansie van Wyk as she reflects on, and evaluates, two decades of South Africa's foreign policy.

Taking South Africa's overall foreign policy agenda as its organising framework, the *Review* seeks to provide an in-depth analysis of the past eighteen years of South Africa's foreign policy. The publication aims to stimulate debate on the challenges faced by South Africa as it navigates its way through a turbulent and ever-changing global order. We strive for an understanding of the rationales behind foreign policy decisions, international actions, and individual and collective decisions taken by the various post-apartheid governments. It is our belief that this *Review* comprises rigorous but concise analyses by experts on South Africa's international relations and foreign policy, especially its leadership role in and for the region. The analyses, we are convinced, provide an assessment of what has been done, what has not been done and the implications of this for the republic's international relations. The analysis will be thematic and the methodology will focus on the gap between policy and outcomes. Authors were encouraged to apply their own analytical frameworks and raw thoughts and to integrate them with empirical information.

Specifically, the *Review* will consider the continuity and change in foreign policy focus and decision-making; it will highlight and assess the role that the country has played in the changing geopolitical order; and it will address shortfalls, achievements and lessons from the country's engagement in international affairs.

This *Review* brings into focus the first two decades of post-apartheid governance, with specific emphasis on foreign policy. It draws on a wide range of researchers, and uses a cumulative body of primary and secondary texts relating to South Africa's diplomacy and foreign policy. It is about highlighting achievements in the realm of foreign policy as much as it is about identifying shortcomings and challenges, and mapping recommendations on how to improve the Republic's foreign policy efforts. This volume is presented mainly as a review of South Africa's foreign policy on the basis of a gap analysis. We trust that this *Foreign Policy Review* will initiate debate on South African foreign policy among students, scholars, practitioners and interested observers more generally.

NOTES

- 1 Russett, B., H. Starr and D. Kinsella, 2010. *World Politics, The New Menu for Choice*, 10th ed., Boston MA: Wadsworth, p. 135.
- 2 Op. cit., p. 136.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Holsti K.J., 1995. *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 4th ed., Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall, pp. 83–114.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 B. Russett, H. Starr and D. Kinsella, op. cit., p. 133.
- 7 Op. cit., p. 135.
- 8 See for example Chris Landsberg, 'South African foreign policy formulation, 1989–2010', in Venter, A. and C. Landsberg (eds), 2011, *Government and Politics in South Africa*, 4th ed., Pretoria: Van Schaik, p. 254.
- 9 See in this regard the edited volume by Elizabeth Sidiropolous, *South Africa's Foreign Policy 1994–2004, Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future*, South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004.
- 10 This is how Les de Villiers, a former head of South Africa's propaganda arm, the South African Information Service, used this term. See Les de Villiers, 1975, *South Africa: A Skunk Among Nations*, London: Universal Tandem.
- 11 For an assessment of post-apartheid foreign policy see for example Carlsnaes, W. and P. Nel (eds), 2006, *In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy after Apartheid*. Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue; also see Chris Landsberg, 2010, *The Diplomacy of Transformation, South African Foreign Policy and Statecraft*, Johannesburg: Macmillan, Johannesburg, and in particular sections 3, 4 and 5.
- 12 For an assessment, see Landsberg, op. cit., pp. 3–7.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Again, see Carlsnaes, W. and P. Nel, op. cit.
- 15 President Mandela, Address to the UN World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen, 12 March 1995.
- 16 Department of Foreign Affairs, Discussion paper on South Africa's Foreign Relations, Fourth Draft, 16 January 1996, p. 7.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 For an assessment of the issue of continuity and change in the Mbeki and Zuma foreign policies, see Chris Landsberg, 2012, Continuity and change in the foreign policies of the Mbeki and Zuma governments, *Africa Insight*, Vol. 41, No. 4, March 2012, pp. 1–16.
- 19 See Chris Landsberg, *The Diplomacy of Transformation*, Chapter 11, pp. 196–218.
- 20 See Siphamandla Zondi and Lesley Masters, 2010, *The Future of South Africa's Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change*, Midrand and Pretoria: Institute for Global Dialogue and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Many other think tanks and individual researchers have been commissioned to investigate aspects of the Republic's post-isolation foreign policy, including an African agenda; South–South cooperation achievements; and North–South dialogue engagements. Some of the civil society entities commissioned include the Centre for Policy

Studies (CPS); the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA); the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA); the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD); the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC); and the Institute for Security Studies.

- 23 See Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, Post Mbeki, post-transition: South Africa's foreign policy in a changing world, *South African Yearbook of International Affairs* 2008–2009, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.
- 24 For a perspective on the Mbeki–Zuma continuity and change debate, see Chris Landsberg, Continuity and Change, pp. 1–16; also see Chris Landsberg, The Jacob Zuma government's foreign policy: Association or dissociation?, in *AUSTRAL, Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan–June 2012, pp. 125–164.
- 25 See Chris Landsberg and Candice Moore, South Africa's Libya vote: How is foreign policy decided?, *New Agenda*, Issue 44, Fourth Quarter 2011, pp. 72–81.
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- 47 Chris Landsberg, 'South African foreign policy formulation, 1989–2010', in Venter, A. and C. Landsberg (eds), 2011, *Government and Politics in South Africa*, 4th ed., Pretoria: Van Schaik, p. 246.

- 48 Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Draft Discussion Document, South Africa's Foreign Policy: Meeting the Challenges of the Future, Pretoria-Tshwane, 2010, p. 4.
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Opening the 'black box'

South African foreign policy-making¹

Lesley Masters

INTRODUCTION

The question of who shapes a country's foreign policy is often posed, and it is a particularly salient one in the South African context, as the country moved from isolation to integration on the world stage. This chapter considers the role of agency, or 'who' plays a key role in shaping South African foreign policy decision-making in the post-1994 period. Early analyses highlighted the central role of the president in giving shape and direction to the 'new' South Africa's foreign policy. In particular, the role of President Nelson Mandela and his successor Thabo Mbeki, fulfilling the position of international statesmen, underpinned the idea of the president as the locus of foreign policy. Reality is, however, more complex. Identifying 'who' shapes foreign policy decision-making, or prying open the so-called 'black box', is an extraordinarily complex process and one which highlights the numerous interlinkages between those seeking to influence foreign policy decision-making.

A review of developments in South Africa post-1994 demonstrates that the foreign policy process, including the actors that seek to influence decision-making, is in a constant state of flux. Rather than focusing on the ridged concentric circles of decision-making set out in foreign policy analysis, this chapter highlights the roles of myriad actors and their diverse interests in shaping the country's foreign policy approach.

THE CONCENTRIC CIRCLES OF DECISION-MAKING

The field of foreign policy analysis identifies multiple levels of players seeking a role in shaping foreign policy decision-making. At the centre is the political leader and key officials, while radiating outwards are the lower-level

officials followed by the media, nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), and the public who occupy positions in the outer circles.² In the South African context what is immediately apparent is the central role assumed by the president – both historically during the apartheid era and over the course of the first decade and a half of the ‘new’ democratic South Africa. Yet this focus on the executive obscures the role of other foreign policy stakeholders as they move between the centre and the periphery in their efforts to inform foreign policy decision-making.³ In other words, the position of these stakeholders within these concentric circles does not remain static. From the South African experience it is clear that, while some may be located on the periphery, they have the potential to move towards the centre of the decision-making process, and even to supplant those traditionally occupying a prominent position, as a result of their financial resources, their expertise, and whether there is a particular interest at stake.

AT THE CENTRE: FROM MANDELA TO ZUMA

The executive continues to play a central role in international relations, a point sharpened by the burgeoning popularity of summit diplomacy. South Africa is no exception. Since 1994, South Africa’s presidents have continued, to varying degrees, to occupy the central position in the foreign policy machinery. This has seen arguments that during Mandela’s incumbency foreign policy followed the president’s public statements ‘rather than the other way round’.⁴ Thabo Mbeki frequently came under fire, with reference to an ‘imperial presidency’, for his centralised position in foreign policy.⁵ What is not often considered is that this position, at the centre of the foreign policy decision-making process, is supported by an enabling framework within which a predominant president can exist. This includes not only the president’s personal interest in international affairs, but also a historical tradition of a strong presidency in South Africa, the nature of the African National Congress (ANC) as a liberation movement, the country’s Constitution, and the capacity of the country’s foreign policy bureaucracy, as well as wider international dynamics.

In the first instance, both Mandela and Mbeki demonstrated a natural predisposition towards international relations. Mandela’s international status saw him overshadow other foreign policy stakeholders, blurring the lines between the individual, the ruling political party and the state. Discussions surrounding Pretoria’s approach to international relations were linked to Mandela’s presidential visions and initiatives, focusing on the values of democracy, respect for international law and the protection of human rights.⁶ In practice, Mandela faced criticism for his predominant position,

despite input from advisers and discussions in Parliament, on decisions relating to Nigeria following the execution of the Ogoni 9, as well as the one-China policy.

While these high profile interventions certainly attracted attention, Mandela's role in foreign policy decision-making was neither sustained nor disciplined. Increasingly, questions arose concerning the locus of foreign policy decision-making following the growing role carved out for the office of the deputy president, occupied by Thabo Mbeki.⁷ Indeed, Mandela is noted as saying that 'the *de facto* ruler is Thabo Mbeki. I am shifting everything to him'.⁸ As deputy president, Mbeki was actively involved in international engagements, undertaking over twenty foreign visits over the course of a year and a half from January 1997 to July 1998.⁹ In addition, Mandela's frenetic international schedule saw key advisers drawn into playing a more central role in the foreign policy machinery. They included the director general in the Presidency, Jakes Gerwel, who 'had a strong hand in foreign policy as well as government policy more generally'.¹⁰ It also saw a more prominent role for the deputy minister of foreign affairs, Aziz Pahad, 'who was one of the most influential players in foreign policy-making given his closeness to Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, his experience and his foreign policy acumen'.¹¹

During his tenure as president, Thabo Mbeki faced criticism for his tendency to micromanage the country's international relations, adopting a position as an 'imperial president' in foreign policy. Like Mandela, Mbeki was at the centre in defining the focus of South Africa's foreign policy. As 'foreign-policy-maker-in-chief', Mbeki's own presidential initiatives, particularly the pursuit of an African agenda through the African Renaissance and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad), occupied a prominent position in the country's strategic international focus reflected in the foreign ministry's own strategic plans. For instance, the Department of Foreign Affairs *Strategic Plan 2003–2005* placed Nepad and the African Renaissance as 'tenets ... enunciated as guidelines to instruct our approach to foreign policy'.¹² In addition, as 'diplomat-in-chief', Mbeki conducted his own brand of shuttle diplomacy between South Africa and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi, Sudan, Liberia, Comoros, and Côte d'Ivoire.¹³

Yet to characterise Mbeki's position as an 'imperial presidency' suggests a president closed to all external influence in decision-making. This overlooks the role of a number of individuals who occupied a central position within the Mbeki administration, including legal adviser Mojanku Gumbi; government spokesperson Joel Netshitenzhe; special advisers to the president Titus Mafolo and Cunningham Ngcukana; economic adviser Wiseman Nkuhlu, the former deputy president, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka; the former

minister of finance, Trevor Manuel; the former minister of trade and industry, Alec Erwin, the deputy foreign minister, Aziz Pahad; Essop Pahad; and the Reverend Frank Chikane.

Mbeki was also responsible for the appointment of a number of presidential 'agents' to represent South Africa abroad. For instance the Reverend Frank Chikane accompanied Mbeki and Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to the 57th United Nations General Assembly. Chikane was also appointed as the contact person for South Africa's submission process to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Essop Pahad was equally engaged at the international level, addressing numerous forums on South Africa's foreign policy and leading a delegation to Bolivia, while it was rumoured that Intelligence Minister Ronnie Kasrils had been selected by Mbeki for a mission to Zimbabwe.¹⁴ In addition, despite Mbeki's own prominence on the continent, key advisers such as Ambassador Welile Nhlapo were engaged in support of South Africa's conflict resolution in Burundi, Lesotho and the DRC. The idea that advisers would play a key role in foreign policy decision-making was underpinned by the formalisation of the Advisers' Forum. Led by the former minister in the Presidency, Essop Pahad, the Forum included 'advisers of the political principles, parliamentary counsellors, and senior staff of the Presidency'.¹⁵

Under Mbeki, business groups were also drawn into the centre of the concentric circles of foreign policy decision-making, with consultations held with business groups and technical advisers. In reaching out to stakeholders, Mbeki also took the unprecedented step of opening up consultations with civil society at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002.¹⁶ As Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk indicate, under Mbeki's tenure there was a growing number of structures representing foreign policy stakeholders, including consultative groups which represented non-state sectoral interests such trade unions, black business, big business, agriculture, youth, academia, and a national forum of religious leaders. In addition to consultative groups, groups such as the President's International Investment Advisory Council and International Advisory Council on the Information Society and Development also advised Mbeki on foreign policy matters.¹⁷

Mbeki's approach was thus more nuanced than the idea of an 'imperial president' captures. While he remained at the apex of decision-making structures, the changing nature and demands of international relations saw other technical and senior advisers having the ear of the president. This points towards what may be called a 'presidential foreign policy', or one that is led by the executive, drawing senior advisers and selected consultants into the inner circle of decision-making. This being said, there were, however, particular issues where Mbeki gravitated towards an imperial

presidency. This was evident in the case of Zimbabwe and HIV/AIDS where Mbeki maintained his primacy despite pressure from within the tripartite alliance. Yet even here, it has been suggested that pressure from Joel Netshitenzhe and presidential spokesperson Bheki Khumalo saw Mbeki 'disengage from the debate' on HIV/AIDS.¹⁸

While both Mandela and Mbeki had a significant interest in foreign affairs, the opportunity to occupy the apex of the decision-making process is supported by the role ascribed to the president by the Constitution. In other words, by virtue of his (or her) position as head of government, the constitutional functions attributed to the president include developing and implementing national policy and coordinating the functions of state departments and administrations.¹⁹ According to the articles in Chapter 5 of the Constitution, the president is not only responsible for the development and implementation of national policy, but for the appointment of ambassadors, diplomatic and consular representatives, and the deputy president and ministers (significantly, he is also responsible for their dismissal).²⁰

In addition to the legal framework that gives centrality to the role of the president, there is often a general expectation from domestic constituencies, as well as the foreign policy bureaucracy (whether rightly or wrongly), that the president *should* play a leading role in foreign policy decision-making. In terms of agency, there are continued expectations by stakeholders of the central role of the president in foreign policy decision-making. For instance, analysts noted the need for Mbeki to 'address [the] problem of policy drift or incoherence' as incoming president in 1999.²¹ Similar emphasis was given prior to Zuma's incumbency where the leadership role of the president was highlighted in providing direction on 'moral authority' and building support for policies.²²

Following the ANC's 52nd National Conference in Polokwane in 2007 and the decision to recall Mbeki from the presidency in September 2008, questions were once again raised on where foreign policy decision-making would be located. Under the brief tenure of President Kgalema Motlanthe, South Africa's international relations continued pretty much as they had. Part of this was down to the fact that Mbeki's second term had seen the foreign ministry consolidate its position and pursue a more active international role. It has also been argued that this was due to the anticipation that incoming president Jacob Zuma would pursue his own style in shaping South African foreign policy. During this period, as president of the ANC, Zuma was already actively engaging the international community through his high-profile visits to key partner states such as the United States and the United Kingdom.

Whether the president would continue to occupy a central position in foreign policy decision-making became *the* question among foreign policy

analysts as Jacob Zuma was sworn in as South Africa's fourth democratic president. This came against the background of his predominantly domestic policy focus on the creation of decent jobs, education, health, rural development and land reform, and fighting crime. Indeed, although Zuma had been engaged on the international stage in his position as deputy president, particularly in the country's bilateral commissions and the negotiations in the Great Lakes region, he has not assumed the same leadership role in foreign policy as his predecessors. This has been patent in the continued questioning of South Africa's arms sales to states such as Libya, Syria and Venezuela; its voting record on Zimbabwe and Myanmar within the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member in 2007–2008 and again on Libya during its second term as a non-permanent member 2011–2012; and failure to effectively manage the decision to deny a visa to the Dalai Lama to attend a peace conference with fellow Nobel Laureates, FW de Klerk and Archbishop Desmond Tutu in 2009, and again for Desmond Tutu's 80th birthday in 2011.

President Zuma may have adopted a low-key role in foreign policy, but this conceals the number of international engagements that have seen the strengthening of relations with key partner states including Angola and the emerging powers of Brazil, Russia, India and China.²³ Over the course of his tenure, Zuma has travelled extensively, more often than not accompanied by a large business delegation. Nevertheless, questions have been raised as to whether this reflects a deeper and sustained engagement on foreign policy issues. Certainly, the omission of any discussion on South Africa's international relations in the 2012 State of the Nation address raises questions regarding the president's own leadership within the foreign policy decision-making circles. Much of what is set out by Zuma on aspects of South Africa's foreign policy is a continuation of emphasis from the Mbeki administration including a regional focus on, for example, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Africa, South–South relations, and the importance of multilateralism, economic diplomacy, and questions concerning global governance reform.²⁴

As did Mandela and Mbeki, Zuma remains at the centre of the foreign policy circles, continuing the culture of drawing on key advisers in decision-making, such as Lindiwe Zulu as international relations adviser, Mandisi Mpahlwa as economics adviser, the former transport minister Mac Maharaj as Middle East adviser, and Mbeki's minister of defence and his minister of safety and security, Charles Nqakula, as political adviser.²⁵ Nevertheless, when it comes to foreign policy decisions, questions remain concerning the actual role played by these advisers. For instance, while the central role of Ambassador Welile Nhlapo as adviser on peace and security matters has been highlighted, it has also been questioned whether he was brought into

the decision-making process concerning South Africa's vote on the UN's Resolution 1973 on Libya.²⁶

Zuma's role in South Africa's foreign policy mirrors that of Mandela's in terms of his more ad hoc approach to engagement. On the one hand he will actively engage with the other leaders of emerging powers in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) grouping and undertake direct meetings with Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai as part of a SADC mandate, further noting that he will 'not rely solely on reports from his ministers'.²⁷ On the other hand, he will set out the general framework while delegating to his ministers, remaining 'hands-off' on the day-to-day processes of foreign policy decision-making.

PARTY POLITICS: THE ROLE OF THE ANC

In addition to a personal predisposition towards foreign affairs and the legal framework that supports the role of a predominant president, decision-making traditions within the country's governing party further shore up the role of a predominant president at the centre of the concentric circles of foreign policy decision-making. This was particularly apparent during Mbeki's incumbency where William Gumede posits that the centralisation of power, emphasis on party discipline, the pre-ordained election of leaders and the closing down of democratic space, are attributes from the legacy of the ANC in exile, aspects which have subsequently 'become the mantra of the ANC in government'.²⁸ In addition, the 'electoral process discourages dissent in party ranks, as members of parliament are appointed from party lists rather than being elected on an individual basis. This strengthens Mbeki's hand in maintaining party discipline, as he can strike names off the list at will or redeploy fractious members of parliament'.²⁹

While foreign policy decision-making may have been dominated by the presidency during South Africa's first decade of democracy, as president, Zuma has indicated a greater role for Luthuli House (the ANC's headquarters, previously known as Shell House) in guiding the policy processes, both domestic and international. The Freedom Charter of 1955, in particular, is singled out as the basis of current foreign policy.³⁰ In addition, it has been noted by senior staff within the Foreign Ministry, that foreign policy was developed by the ANC, along with the decision to change the name from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). The ANC's International Relations Policy Discussion Document of March 2012 highlights the increasingly blurred distinction between the ANC and the state while clearly indicating an active role for the ANC in shaping the country's international relations.

This includes, for instance, 'assist[ing] in building better alignment between Pan-African Parliament and the AU [African Union] as well as SADC and the SADC Parliamentary Forum'. The document also indicates the importance of building a competent diplomatic service in order to fulfil the ANC's mandate, necessitating that the ANC deploy carefully selected competent comrades into the diplomatic service, especially in areas of priority like Africa and the global South.³¹

In an effort to secure its position on foreign policy issues, the ANC has established a subcommittee on International Relations of the National Executive Committee and an International Relations Rapid Response Task Team. Yet, while the party has the opportunity to play a central role within the country's foreign policy decision-making structures, in practice its role has been more limited. The ANC National General Council has lamented the insufficient capacity of the subcommittee, which has had a negative effect on the ability of the party to play a key role in foreign affairs.³² Moreover, while it has been suggested that the creation of the Rapid Response Task Team shows greater engagement in the policy process, it is composed of the same key advisers who play their own roles individually in shaping decision-making.³³

THE FOREIGN POLICY BUREAUCRACY

With the president occupying a predominant role in the concentric circles of foreign policy decision-making the question remains: What is role of the foreign policy bureaucracy? Here, as Graham Allison has pointed out, 'where you stand depends on where you sit'. In other words, different departmental perceptions, aims and objectives have a role in defining their positions and interests in foreign policy decision-making.³⁴

FROM DFA TO DIRCO

As indicated, the space in which an actor can occupy a central position in foreign affairs is influenced by resources, interest and the opportunity to occupy such a position. During Mandela's incumbency, the former DFA's necessary preoccupation with internal reforms contributed to a more central role of the president in foreign policy decision-making. From the outset, the DFA faced the enormous task of integrating six different sections (the existing department, the ANC, the former Bantustans or the TVBC [Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei] states) with very different levels of training, experience and perceptions, within one department.³⁵

Indeed, having left the Commonwealth in 1961 and having been suspended from the UN in 1974, the foreign affairs ministry of the apartheid government had very little experience in multilateral diplomacy and engagement with Africa, despite Vorster's 'outward movement'.³⁶ In contrast, the work by the ANC in building support for the anti-apartheid movements had given those in exile exposure to, and experience in, multilateral forums. The inward focus on rationalisation and reform created a void as attention turned towards changing the internal structures and composition of the ministry.

Relations between the minister and the department have also had an impact on the ministry's engagement in foreign policy decision-making. For instance, as minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma at times overshadowed the DFA as she sought to carve out her own position near the centre of the foreign policy process. Her imprint can be found in her active role in directing a foreign policy focus on Africa compared to directors general who have focused on economic diplomacy. She was instrumental in seeking to strengthen relations with Africa, with a number of missions opening, importance allotted to learning French in an effort to build relations with Francophone Africa, as well as contributing to conflict resolution efforts on the continent.³⁷ Moreover, she was part of the peace initiative to Burundi and occupied the position of first chair of the African Union's Peace and Security Council in 2004.³⁸ Nevertheless, while this 'ministerial diplomacy' may have had the advantage of its senior level in negotiations, it also undermined the positions of the ambassadors and negotiating team in the field.

The first few years following South Africa's democratic transition saw a remarkably high turnover in the position of director general. This fed perceptions of conflicts between personalities and uncertainty regarding the capabilities of the DFA, particularly following Jackie Selebi's move to the role of police commissioner. His successor, Siphosiso Pityana, only served to support the assumption that the president should take the leadership role in foreign policy.³⁹ During this period, the DFA remained largely on the periphery of international relations while Mbeki pursued the high-level negotiations for the launch of Nepad, the transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), as well as the pursuit of an African Renaissance. Nevertheless, despite the department's initial inward focus, under the guidance of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, deputy ministers Sue van der Merwe and Aziz Pahad, and director general Ayanda Ntsaluba, its internal capacity was strengthened.

The appointment of Maite Nkoana-Mashabane as foreign minister in 2009 came as something of a surprise, as expectations had been that the post would go to someone who already held a ministerial position. With the appointment of the new foreign minister along with deputy ministers

Ebrahim Ebrahim and Marius Fransman, and the subsequent renaming of the department to DIRCO in 2009, the emphasis has been on public diplomacy and outreach in facilitating domestic constituency engagement with the department. This saw efforts to include consultation with civil society, business, academia and labour on the development of a draft White Paper on Foreign Policy, which was approved by Cabinet and put before Parliament in the second half of 2011.

While this may be seen as an opening up of the decision-making processes, the document has been criticised for not going much beyond what have already been set out as South Africa's existing priorities and international focus.⁴⁰ In addition, although efforts by the minister to explain the country's international relations and foreign policy to stakeholders through a countrywide 'roadshow' to a number of universities could be construed as an effort to engage a broader cross-section of society, the level at which these talks were held only contributes to the idea that foreign policy is an elite process. Communication and engagement is not only about 'what' is said, but also 'how' it is said and to 'whom'. This has been a particular challenge in the case of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya, where questions continue to be raised on South Africa's position in support of the resolution.

In addition to the draft White Paper, DIRCO has set out to establish a Council on International Relations (SACOIR) which Cabinet approved in 2011. The aim of SACOIR is to involve members of civil society, academia, business, labour and other national departments to

- provide a platform for the generation of public debate on foreign policy,
- provide a consultative forum for the regular review of South Africa's foreign policy, and
- advise the minister.⁴¹

While this may be a step forward in opening up access to the foreign policy bureaucracy, whether it will translate into constructive engagement is yet to be determined as the Council itself develops and evolves. This will depend on whether it is given the appropriate support by the ministry to facilitate sustained engagement.

THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY (DTI)

South Africa's multidimensional foreign policy priorities create the scope for the participation of other government departments. During the DFA's

period of internal transformation it was the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) that occupied a prominent position in the country's international trade and economic relations, partly as a result of former trade and industry minister Alec Erwin's own connection to the executive, as well as his enthusiasm for trade negotiations. Although there was concern following his departure that the DTI was not playing the central role it should be playing, the DTI has maintained a prominent role in guiding South Africa's economic diplomacy approach. This has seen the appointment of approximately twenty-four overseas representatives in strategic trade and commercial centres, the appointment of an ambassador to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva, and the active contribution by the DTI to the discussions on the economic dimensions of the draft White Paper on Foreign Policy.

Under the Zuma administration, the DTI has consolidated its central position in guiding the economic elements of foreign policy. What has supported the central role of the Department has been the effectiveness of the South African delegation in the international trade negotiations through the clear indication that the DTI is the lead department on this particular issue. The cross-cutting nature of economic and foreign policy has also seen the DTI being drawn into negotiations across spheres. This has been especially true of the climate-change negotiations where the DTI was a key member of the negotiating team along with the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) and DIRCO, particularly as the focus moved towards concerns of international economic competitiveness and issues such as green protectionism and non-tariff barriers.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE (DoD)

South Africa's commitments to international peace and security, and particularly in supporting peace-keeping efforts on the African continent (and UN ambitions), have seen the Department of Defence (DoD) drawn into the inner circles of foreign policy decision-making. However, just as DIRCO faced internal challenges during the period of transition in the 1990s, so too did the DoD, resulting in their limited scope in shaping foreign policy decision-making.

There was also evidence of a shortfall in communication between the executive and the DoD, particularly relating to the request for South Africa to contribute troops in support of the negotiations in Zaire/DRC in 1996, and the decision to intervene in the Lesotho crisis in 1998. Yet key members of the DoD have played a central role in South Africa's international relations in line with foreign policy ambitions – these members included the

chief of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) at the signing of the cease-fire agreement between Angolan armed forces and the minister of safety and security, Charles Nqakula, serving as a facilitator in the Burundi peace process. In 1997, the White Paper on Defence saw the creation of the National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) housed within the DFA's Africa Multilateral Desk. Yet it was the DoD that played the more prominent role in the NOCPM.⁴² As minister of defence, Mosiuoa Lekota went as far as highlighting the importance of defence in 'military diplomacy' in achieving conditions of peace and security and the development of 'democratic defence forces'.⁴³

South Africa is extensively engaged in peace keeping on the African continent through the UN. Following the transition to democracy, the defence force was framed in the context as a means to support democracy, peace and development. Nevertheless, while the DoD may have had the opportunity to carve out a central role in the foreign policy process as a result of its contribution to the peace and security agenda, it has faced a number of restrictions on its ability to assume such a role in terms of human capital, infrastructure and budget. Questions of bureaucratic coordination continue to plague the inter-governmentalisation of decision-making, as was particularly apparent in the presence of the SS Drakensberg of the South African Navy off the West African coast following the disputed Ivoirian elections. That it was there to provide a neutral platform for diplomatic talks (reminiscent of those that took place on the SS Outeniqua during the presidency of Nelson Mandela to resolve the crisis in Mobuto-led Zaire) was denied by the Presidency, and DIRCO seemed to be surprised that it was there.

The role of the DoD in contributing to foreign policy decision-making has also seen a setback following tensions within the Ministry of Defence as well as questions on the morale of troops, with angry demonstrations and protests taking place in 2009 at the Union Buildings as members of the armed forces protested against the DoD over wages. The minister of defence, Lindiwe Sisulu, also came under pressure for not engaging the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence. The DoD, as such, remains on the periphery with the acknowledgement that, in the current circumstances, including capacity constraints, South Africa's international engagement in military operations is unsustainable.

While the DTI and DoD (although less so) have been engaged at the centre of the foreign policy process, other government departments have an increasing stake in international affairs. For instance, the DFA has assumed the lead role in negotiating the future of the international climate change regime through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). By 2000, the importance of facilitating coordination between

government departments was reflected in the 'modification' of the DFA's mission statement to reflect the idea of 'integrated governance' and the need to assist 'partner departments in navigating complex international dynamics' was included in the DFA's annual report.⁴⁴ The original Coordination and Implementation Unit within the Presidency was transformed into the Policy Coordination and Advisory Service (PCAS) with the aim of supporting the 'Presidency and Cabinet with regard to such issues as the coordination of the processes of policy formation, programme design and implementation'.⁴⁵ The problem was that while the 'cluster' system allowed for greater coordination, chief directors were accountable only to Mbeki.⁴⁶ PCAS may have provided the platform for further contention between departments, particularly following the rationalisation of the five subcommittees to just two: the economic development committee headed by the representative from the DTI, and the peace security and stability committee headed by the South African Secret Service (SASS).⁴⁷

Under Zuma, the cluster system saw a reOrganization, with the original International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS) cluster renamed the International Cooperation, Trade and Security cluster. However, as Landsberg points out, '[e]vidence suggests that even with the Zuma government's approach to the cluster system, the trajectory was continuity not change, just as the Mbeki government struggled with the issue of departmental coordination and departmental interchange'.⁴⁸

PARLIAMENT

In addition to government departments, Parliament has the opportunity to engage near the centre of the foreign policy decision-making processes through its mandate to ratify treaties, evaluate policy documents and appropriate funds to the DFA.⁴⁹ In the main, however, it has been singled out for its limited role, consigned to the periphery of foreign policy decision-making circles. During Mandela's incumbency the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs (PPCFA) played a role closer to the centre of the decision-making process under the leadership of its first chairperson, Raymond Suttner. Since then it has increasingly found itself on the margins. In this regard, Bischoff indicates, '[d]espite the fact that parliament is meant to be the ultimate arbiter of whether or not to deploy peacekeeping missions, it was not involved in the decision to send troops to Burundi. This was taken by the Presidency with little input from other government departments, parliament, and civil society'.⁵⁰

There has been growing public scepticism concerning parliament's role in foreign policy through lack of debate in a parliament dominated

by the ANC that has been accused of its own democratic deficit, as well as a number of scandals – from sexual harassment of staff to MPs engaged in travel-related corruption (the so-called 'travelgate'). The ANC itself has taken issue with the lamentable performance of Parliament in international relations and has called for a focus on 'parliamentary diplomacy' something that has yet to be adequately developed. The cluster system developed during Mbeki's tenure has also served to marginalise the role of Parliament in shaping foreign policy. Indeed, Parliament has no oversight over the cluster system. During Zuma's tenure, Parliament has not sustained an active role in shaping foreign policy decision-making. On particular issues, such as the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17) climate change negotiations held in Durban in 2011, Parliament was visible at a broad level in encouraging participation and engaging with visiting parliamentarians; however, on issues such as South Africa's voting in the UN Security Council on Libya, its role in shaping decisions has been limited.

DOMESTIC NONGOVERNMENTAL SOURCES OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING

The idea of a 'professional' foreign policy-maker has increasingly unravelled following greater interdependencies, advances in information and communication technology, and improving public awareness and knowledge of international relations. Actors that may have once been consigned to the periphery of foreign policy decision-making have an increasing stake in the shape and direction of foreign policy and thus seek an active role in the decision-making process.

The analysis of the role of domestic sources of foreign policy is complicated by the plurality of actors, not just across sectors (business, NGOs, academics, research Organizations and the media) but within these sectors – each with their own range of perspectives, interests, and capacities. When it comes to policy decision-making, as the elected representative of the people, government will inevitably take the final decision; however, there are a number of opportunities for wider stakeholder engagement near the centre of the decision-making process. While this has raised questions concerning the distinction between participation and influence, in practice this distinction is not so clear cut, as participation may ultimately influence decisions, even if indirectly. For this analysis, the significance is that these actors are drawn into the centre of the policy process based on interest, capacity and Organization.

South Africa's own domestic constituency has a mixed track record of engagement in international relations. On the one hand, during the

liberation struggle, civil society groups took an active role in international affairs. Pressure on government to oppose the apartheid regime came from civil society groups such as the South African Council of Churches (SACC), the Black Sash, and organised labour such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). In the transition to an inclusive democracy, civil society groups found themselves at the centre of the transformation process as they were relatively more developed in terms of capacity than the new government departments. As Habib points out, government itself was willing to partner with NGOs in both policy formulation and implementation.⁵¹ This was clearly visible in the policy workshops held by the DFA on the formulation of the South African foreign policy discussion document released in 1996. A further example of a foreign policy success included the role that the South African campaign to ban landmines played in pressurising government, which ultimately led to South Africa's taking a more active role in the international process, resulting in the banning of landmines. In addition, civil society played a central role in drawing together international actors and the government in the establishment of the Kimberley Process Verification Scheme to terminate the global trade in so-called 'blood diamonds'. The role of blood diamonds in maintaining civil conflicts within Africa was originally highlighted by the NGO Global Witness in 1996. The Kimberley Process also called for a particularly close interaction between business, especially South African mining giant De Beers in its unique position as the world's leading diamond supplier, the foreign ministry, and the former Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs.⁵²

However, there has not always been a cordial relationship between government and civil society. This was demonstrated in Mandela's sporadic condemnation of civil society's role as 'critical watchdogs'.⁵³ One of the challenges to engagement at the centre of foreign policy decision-making has been government's perception of civil society as 'implementers' of policy rather than contributors to the decision-making process.⁵⁴ From the initial position where members of civil society were drawn into the processes, there has been a move towards 'outsourcing' aspects of foreign policy implementation. This coincided with a period in which the focus moved from policy formulation to one of 'implementation and service delivery' under the Mbeki and Zuma administrations.⁵⁵

As the ANC-led government consolidated its position it became increasingly difficult to criticise it without being classed as 'unpatriotic' or 'racist'. Nevertheless, government has continued to espouse its commitment to the *idea* of a democratic foreign policy in the rhetoric. This includes Mbeki's indication that wide-ranging participation is needed in government initiatives such as Nepad. The foreign ministry too, under DG Jackie Selebi, committed itself to broader participation from academics,

business, media and NGOs, while Cheryl Carolus, then South African high commissioner to the UK, welcomed the views of civil society on her diplomatic role.⁵⁶ The problem is that within South Africa there has been a general apathy towards international relations, a position that has contributed to the central role adopted by the president. Nevertheless, there are still a number of domestic foreign policy constituencies that actively seek a central position in the concentric circles of foreign policy decision-making. Their different interests, objectives, perspectives and capacity create different opportunities for being drawn into the centre of the decision-making process.

Participation near the apex is not, however, a constant. Government-civil society relations are always changing, with some domestic constituencies taking a role closer to the centre than others, depending on the issue, on capacity and on ability to organise in support of a position. For instance, South Africa's research institutions have played a role in a number of international engagements. The think tank, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) has, for example, been involved in programmes for disarmament and demobilisation in Africa. The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) played a part in the mediation efforts in Burundi in the 1990s, while the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) has been active in conflict management in the Congo and Sudan. The Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) played a part in the democratisation processes in Nigeria and in engaging Lesotho's civil society actors in constructive dialogue following South Africa's military intervention in 1998.⁵⁷

In some respects, South Africa's civil society Organizations have done more on the ground in cultivating relations within the immediate region. The SADC-Water Division (SADC-WD), for example, turned to NGOs in its formulation of policies appropriate to shared watercourses within the region. These NGOs included the World Conservation Union (IUCN), the Southern African Global Water Partnership (GWP), the International Water Management Institute (IWMI), the Namibian-based Desert Research Foundation (DRFN), and the Johannesburg-based Group for Environmental Monitoring (GEM).⁵⁸ This hands-on engagement feeds back into the policy process in terms of experience and best practice through engagement in stakeholder dialogues. What has emerged from the interactions between government and domestic foreign policy constituencies is that these Organizations are increasingly developing their own foreign policy niche with expertise and capacity within a particular field.

Elements within South Africa's civil society have thus been actively engaged in South Africa's international affairs. However, in terms of their position in the making of foreign policy, there has been mixed success. While research institutions like the South African Institute of International

Affairs (SAIIA), the ISS and the IGD have been singled out for their contributions to the foreign policy debate, and the SACBL succeeded in steering South Africa's policy on landmines, other groups like the National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac) have found themselves insulated from the foreign policy process. On issues such as HIV/AIDS and Zimbabwe where the Presidency has been more insular, domestic constituencies have mobilised from outside the formal decision-making processes, bypassing government completely and presenting them with new challenges of coordination in international relations. This has seen some success for the role of civil society but this should not be overstated as these groups often suffer from a lack of coordination as well as pursuit of parochial interests rather than a focus on national priorities.

Business interests are generally more organised and better financed than those of civil society. The result is that this sector has frequently been in a position near the centre of the foreign policy circles in seeking to influence the decision-making processes. With the increased emphasis on economic diplomacy under Mbeki's administration, and the focus on meeting the domestic development imperative by Zuma, South African Big Business has been drawn into the centre of the foreign policy process. The Big Business Working Group (BBWG) was singled out as consulting frequently with Mbeki on issues such as investor perceptions, while large business delegations have accompanied Zuma on his international engagements, particularly in his interactions with the other BRICS countries.⁵⁹ As departments struggle with budget restrictions, the capacity and resources offered by business provide opportunities for collaboration. In addition, South Africa's business networks across Africa and further afield offer a means to build on networks between countries – for example, business has a strategic interest in the immediate region, which is seen in a number of South Africa's bilateral relations with Mozambique (through the Maputo Development Corridor), Lesotho (tourism, infrastructure and mining), and Botswana (tourism, financial agreements and infrastructure).

Yet business also faces challenges of engagement on the international stage. In the first instance, there is deep-seated suspicion surrounding South Africa's corporate 'neocolonial' intentions from within the region and the continent. This follows a growing presence of South African companies in Cameroon, Mali, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana and Swaziland. As Handley points out, 'business is also handicapped by its profile and political past (specifically its association with the political and economic programme of apartheid). The racially exclusive nature of the business community, historically at least, continues to affect its broader political legitimacy and policy profile.'⁶⁰

CONCLUSION: A MULTISTAKEHOLDER FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS?

The idea of a multistakeholder foreign policy decision-making process in South Africa opens up the space to consider the role of networks and interlinkages between multiple actors. It allows scope in taking into account the presence of a number of actors and networks (with varying degrees of participation) within the 'black box' of foreign policy decision-making. As international relations becomes increasingly complex and diffuse, the number of actors with a stake in foreign policy decision-making has increased accordingly. As the analysis in this chapter indicates, not all actors play a central role in foreign policy decision-making all the time. While the president continues to occupy a prominent position at the centre of the concentric circles of decision-making, there is a fluid movement of other actors between the periphery and the central decision-making structure, varying in accordance with the issues being raised, the capacity and resources, and even the time frames in which decisions need to be made.

Under the Zuma administration the focus put forward by the president on domestic priorities may serve to shape a more proactive engagement by stakeholders in foreign policy decision-making. This is further supported by the increased role assumed by DIRCO, under the leadership of Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, to engage with both governmental and non-governmental actors on foreign policy. Indeed, the new draft White Paper highlights that '[t]he business of national interest cannot be the purview of the state alone, but it can encourage an enabling environment of dialogue and discourse among all stakeholders to interrogate policies and strategies, and their application in the best interests of the people'.⁶¹ For government to meet its aim of ensuring the link (and benefits) between domestic and international policy, foreign policy will not only need to be *for* the people, or strategic and responsive to the interests and needs of its multiple stakeholders – it will also have to be *by* the people, ensuring engagement between state and non-state actors in a multistakeholder approach.

NOTES

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The international relations of South African provinces and municipalities

An appraisal of federated diplomacy¹

Siphamandla Zondi

INTRODUCTION

Since 1994, South Africa has seen dramatic growth in international engagements by provinces and municipalities. But there has been only a slight improvement in policy coordination and alignment, because neither authorities nor civil society have taken much interest in the subject. As a result, notwithstanding the growth in paradiplomacy (as these activities are known), and in spite of the evidence of their misalignment with foreign policy, the scholarly literature on international activities by South African provinces and municipalities remains scant.² While there are media reports on international visits, there is hardly any public discussion of this growing driver of South Africa's international relations. Governmental coordination processes, especially after 2004, have not stimulated serious interest in debating the role and impact of South African provinces and municipalities in international relations.

Increasingly, sub-national governments such as provinces and cities, and transnational actors such as global regions are playing an active and strategic role in the conduct of international relations, previously considered the preserve of national governments.³ These activities take the form of sub-national fraternity, solidarity, visits and strategic relationships and partnerships. They are sometimes guided by twinning agreements and other inter-province/inter-city agreements. They may take loose forms of constant visits designed to explore economic and other opportunities; fact-finding and lessons-sharing exercises; investment promotion expos; or wide-ranging economic cooperation guided by a twinning agreement. Often, these international engagements offer direct economic, political and social benefits to the provinces and municipalities involved⁴ and have the potential to contribute to the greater good of a nation, especially when they are properly managed and given a strategic thrust of some kind – but

they may also complicate intergovernmental relations between spheres of government. While the mapping of the growth in paradiplomacy in South Africa is yet to be fully done, we know enough about the extent of this growth to assess the nature and quality of paradiplomacy and the bearing that it has on the coherence of South Africa's foreign policy broadly, including the impact of political transitions such as that from Mbeki to Zuma.

This chapter attempts a comprehensive and holistic appraisal of shifts in paradiplomacy on the basis of the theory of perforated sovereignty. It suggests that while the federalisation of international relations by growing paradiplomacy should worry those concerned about coherent state behaviour in international relations, this development also signifies maturity in South Africa's foreign policy and diplomacy. Yet while there is inter-sphere consensus and understanding on the need for greater coherence, coordination and alignment (if subordination) of paradiplomacy with national government-controlled foreign policy, the contradictions are far from over. This chapter, therefore, suggests that the very process of a continuous search for inter-sphere consensus on paradiplomacy will reduce these tensions and deepen coherence in South Africa's international diplomacy.

PERFORATED SOVEREIGNTY AND THE FEDERALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The state-centric approach to the international system propagated mainly by the realist school during the Cold War period intensified during the 1960s.⁵ It intensified further through the growth of neoliberal institutionalism from the early 1980s, in spite of the growing evidence of the ascendance of sub-national and non-state actors in international affairs that can be traced back to the 1920s.⁶ The statist bias in the analysis of international relations continues to dominate social dialogue, policy thinking and academic discourses. However, we know that sub-national governments have, for a long time, been negotiating and signing international agreements, conducting diplomatic and trade missions, seeking foreign investment, and cooperating with counterparts in a broad range of areas including capacity building, education and health. They have even formed international Organizations of their own to influence international decision-making.⁷

Although there is a growing realisation among scholars and diplomats alike that states do not enjoy a monopoly of space, voice and influence in international affairs, there has been limited growth in the literature on the growing role of South African non-state actors, particularly its multinational corporations, public enterprises, universities, nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and sub-national governments.⁸ In particular, there

is very little written on the role of the governing party, major multinationals, civil society and ideational networks on the trajectory that South Africa has taken in international relations.

Globally, the activities of non-state and sub-national governments are said to have weakened the solid lines on maps that represent the era of unrivalled status of national governments in international relations. It is suggested that the intensity of activities by actors other than the nation-state raises a need for dotted lines, which are more 'in sync with the interconnected existence of the twenty-first century'.⁹ The changing nature of global power relations is linked to a swing between unipolarity and multipolarity.¹⁰ It is also linked to the rise of emerging powers and the growth of interdependence in the international system.¹¹ Another explanation is the growing role of sub-national governments as economic and political actors on the world stage.¹² It has also been linked to globalisation (with the growing importance of supranational institutions, increased incidence of sub-state nationalism and fast circulation of goods, persons, images and ideas across national boundaries) that blurs the distinction between 'national' and 'supranational' spheres of politics and economics.¹³ These phenomena have helped change our understanding of the idea and principle of national sovereignty as activities of new actors helped to generate what has generally been termed 'perforated sovereignty' or what Thomas (2004) calls 'cosmopolitan sovereignty'.¹⁴ Perforated sovereignty has enabled South African provinces and municipalities to deepen their engagements internationally.

THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF SOUTH AFRICAN PARADIPLMACY

South African paradiplomacy takes various forms, and as it has grown it has become more and more sophisticated as provinces and municipalities have learnt, from their counterparts, new means of international engagement. The most prominent types of paradiplomacy by sub-national spheres of government are categorised below.

INTERNATIONAL VISITS AND TRADE MISSIONS

These are usually exploratory in nature with provinces and municipalities undertaking such visits and missions to look for opportunities for investment and trade, or for strategic partnerships. They often involve delegations comprising government officials and, increasingly, delegates from organised business and an Organization such as the South African Local

Government Association (SALGA). While it is difficult to ascertain the exact volume of this interaction, it suffices to say that the visits had become so frequent by 2004 that national government became concerned about the value gained for money spent on trips and the pressure these largely un-coordinated visits put on diplomatic missions abroad. The large number of delegates, and the fact that they are increasingly dominated by politicians – with fewer and fewer technocrats involved – raised suspicions that the visits are mere excursions.

Also of concern is that different sub-national governments visit the same counterparts several times in close succession, sometimes more than once for the same purpose, when they could instead share information gathered from exploratory visits to arm each other with ideas for concrete cooperation. The national government has received complaints from host countries about perpetual exploration of opportunities leading to no concrete cooperation.¹⁵ There have been a number of instances where visits by a province or a municipality to a foreign country took place at the same time as an official state visit. When this happened during President Mbeki's visits to China and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2007, it caused a major embarrassment.

Officials involved in coordination work take the view that in the post-2004 period there has been a conscious attempt to reduce the number of visits and the size of delegations, and to improve prior planning, including the provision of travel calendars to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) well in advance. There has been a growing focus on trade exposition and missions in which sub-national governments showcase their economic potential to investors in other countries. It is thought that this has lowered tensions between officials in different spheres of government over the manner in which international trips are undertaken. In the period after 2007, guidelines to reduce the number of international trips by sub-national governments have been adopted with some success.¹⁶

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGREEMENTS

Although agreements signed by sub-national governments are not binding, they represent a commitment to deepen and concretise relations on the part of signatories, and they thus carry some moral and legal authority. To the extent that the signatories abide by them, these agreements have the potential to benefit them through concrete programmes of economic and social cooperation as well as helping to elevate the signatories' stature in international relations.

Municipalities frequently sign twinning agreements that commit them to share information and expertise, to attract incoming investments, to establish mechanisms for business-to-business interface, and to get involved in capacity building. This usually covers sectoral areas such as trade and investment, agriculture, education and training, town planning and institution building. The bigger the municipalities, the more elaborate the agreement, as is demonstrated by agreements signed by the capitals of all South Africa's provinces, except the Northern Cape where research shows some inability to negotiate with counterparts.¹⁷ The agreements signed by the big metropolitan authorities provide for greater detail on the exact nature of cooperation than the broad statements of intent that often appear in the municipal agreements. There is great detail in agreements on the responsibilities of specialist units on both sides, and the role of institutions such as chambers of business, colleges and universities, and science laboratories.

Detailed agreements signed by urban provinces that have at their disposal sophisticated skills to negotiate complex deals tend to lead to what are referred to as strategic partnerships. These begin when certain relationships are elevated to the level of absolute importance for political and economic reasons. They are partnerships that seek to deepen broader relations, with a special focus on sectors considered catalytic to the growth of a comprehensive relationship between counterparts and are often linked to, or seek to harness, sound relations between countries. They are particularly useful when aimed at the broader objectives of international co-operation such as strengthening the role of international Organizations, including those in which provinces and municipalities participate. For instance, Mpumalanga's partnership with Maputo province in Mozambique, Gauteng's cooperation with Shanghai in China, Limpopo's relationship with Gaza province in Mozambique, and the Western Cape's cooperation with Bavaria in Germany all constitute strategic partnerships. The level of cooperation is intense and is limited to a few major areas. The partnerships involve regular interaction at the highest levels in these provinces. It appears that such cooperation contributes some concrete benefits for South African provinces, mainly in the form of access to cross-border markets, people-to-people interface and cultural integration across borders.¹⁸

PARTICIPATION IN, AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Membership of international Organizations is an important platform for the pursuit of paradiplomacy and a terrain that has been used by major cities like Johannesburg and Durban to position themselves favourably in

international economics. They have been active in the Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF) and the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) platforms that have given these and other municipalities access to thousands of counterparts in other parts of the world for the exchange of ideas, exploratory discussions, awareness of strategic opportunities for partnerships, space for trade exhibitions and investment opportunities and for building awareness of the common challenges and opportunities facing local governments. Participation in these Organizations has enabled many municipalities to build a strong network of potential partners. They also use regular Organizational conferences to hold side-meetings for regional and bilateral negotiations. Annual meetings provide a rare opportunity for poorer municipalities like Mafutsanyane in the Free State, Taung in the Northwest, Joe Gqabi in the Eastern Cape and Mkhanyakude in KwaZulu-Natal to meet many counterparts through a single trip. They report benefits such as exposure to new ways of achieving local economic development, technology transfers, lesson-sharing and broader economic cooperation.¹⁹ This approach has grown since 2004.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

South African sub-national governments also enter into partnerships in order to attract development support, donor funding and technical assistance from their counterparts. This type of cooperation is quite common in sub-national governments marked by high levels of poverty. They target their counterparts in major donor countries in the hope that cooperation will lead to transfer of skills and resources to help overcome poverty and underdevelopment. This partly explains why, in spite of an intention by national government to grow relations with African countries, most paradiplomacy is targeted at counterparts in the West and in Asia. It also partly explains why many partnerships are largely one-sided, with South African sub-national governments looking for benefits more than investment opportunities.

There are moves to change this approach. Both the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, for instance, have started rewriting their international relations policies to encourage partnerships rather than relationships based on dependency. In Gauteng, Limpopo and Mpumalanga, there are moves to distinguish between hunting for overseas development assistance (ODA) and building strategic partnerships.²⁰ Until 2006, the Western Cape's international relations function focused exclusively on political and economic relations, while ODA coordination took place elsewhere.²¹ Indications are that the integration of ODA coordination with international relations policy work will deepen, and will spread to all provinces.

INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

The use of international engagements to help brand a province or a municipality as an attractive destination for trade and investment is now common practice. This includes jostling for opportunities to host major international events, attending international trade fairs, and the distribution of own marketing media internationally. South African provinces are, increasingly, working closely with the government-led International Marketing Council (IMC), which is concerned with ensuring the alignment of messages that South Africa communicates to the world. In 2010, for example, the wine industry in the Western Cape, the service industry in Gauteng and the tourism industry in KwaZulu-Natal showcased their potential in Germany and at the Shanghai Expo in China.²²

WHY DO PROVINCES AND MUNICIPALITIES UNDERTAKE PARADIPLMACY?

Taking advantage of democratic transformation, and inspired by the discourse of globalisation to open space for sub-national governments and non-state actors to play an active role in international relations, South Africa's provinces and municipalities relate their success to their active pursuit of international cooperation. A number of provinces whose international relations documentation was accessed in the course of the research for this chapter expressly refer to space for non-state actors to rationalise their consolidation of international engagement.

CHANGING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

It is very clear, by the manner in which leaders and officials in provinces and municipalities explain their involvement in paradiplomacy, that they see it as a response to opportunities that growing globalisation has raised for them. The majority of provinces, which are African National Congress (ANC) controlled, are encouraged by the decisions of the ANC to strengthen the involvement of provincial structures in its international relations thinking and coordination. This has been particularly the case after the ANC's 2002 national conference where it was resolved that the party would ensure the development of 'a clear policy on twinning agreements and address the coordination of visits and signing of twinning agreements.'²³

To underline the fact that provinces have also been encouraged by the discourse of perforated or shifting sovereignty and the changing nature

of statehood in international affairs, the Western Cape's strategy in 2006 provided the following justification for its international relations strategy:

The loss of sovereignty to multi-nationals, increasing regionalisation, and interdependence between states and individuals alike, has led to a proliferation of international actors. Within decentralised or federal states, sub-national governments (e.g. provinces) have to a varying degree also become role-players in the international arena.²⁴

GLOBAL AMBITIONS

The strategic visions of most provinces have, in the past six to eight years, taken on an internationalist orientation, projecting them as active role-players in international affairs. In 2006, Gauteng, for example, unveiled a new policy framework in which it perceived itself expressly as a 'globally competitive city region', and envisaged a greater integration of the province within the global economy on the basis of its own geoeconomic profile as the fourth largest economy in Africa. The Western Cape developed a similar framework around the same time. This self-perception of sub-national governments has encouraged an escalation of international activities.

GLOBAL MEGACITIES

Research by Udesch Pillay (2003), Boraine (2002), Brenmer (2003) and others suggest that as South Africa's urban geography has changed, bigger cities have become interested in playing some role on the global level. Johannesburg is home to about 7 million people, followed by Durban and Cape Town at about 3.5 million each, and Port Elizabeth at about 2.5 million. These cities also play host to numerous international migrants and foreign businesses.

Together, South Africa's three big cities account for 50 per cent of the country's gross domestic product. They also face challenges of poverty and underdevelopment, further complicated by large in-migration from the countryside and other African countries. They have a metropolitan outlook and strong international ambitions. They have benefited immensely from their global linkages through secondary and tertiary industries, technology, tourism, finance and business services. Their paradiplomacy is generally geared towards maximising economic opportunities. The newer metros like the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality in Gauteng, the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality in the Eastern Cape and Mangaung Metro Municipality in

the Free State, as well as the growing cities of Polokwane in Limpopo and Mbombela in Mpumalanga, are clawing their way up the ladder of this geopolitical hierarchy on the basis of their ambitious international relations, among other strategies.²⁵ Like their bigger counterparts, they are focused on relations with megacities in the West and Asia. There is a particular focus on cities in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, China, Singapore, South Korea and Japan.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND CROSS-BORDER EXPANSION

The provinces and municipalities bordering neighbouring countries link their paradiplomacy to growing regional integration. South Africa's strong emphasis on regional integration has inspired the provinces of Mpumalanga, North West, Limpopo and Free State, and their municipalities. The first three have been particularly active in the pursuit of economically beneficial relations with their respective counterparts in Swaziland, Botswana, Mozambique and Lesotho. They have consciously taken advantage of South Africa's major regional initiatives such as the Maputo Development Corridor, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project and the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park to benefit concretely through paradiplomacy.²⁶

Speaking in July 2007 during a discussion with the Gaza province of Mozambique, the then premier of Limpopo, Sello Moloto, said:

In this regard, the upgrading of Maputo port in neighbouring Mozambique would give Limpopo and other provinces in South Africa, the opportunity to easily access world markets. Maputo is much closer to Limpopo than more distant South African ports where congestion often hampers trade. It is being estimated that Limpopo-based exporters can save about one third of their transportation costs by using the facility. Linked to Limpopo by road and rail, Maputo port is situated 300 and 400 kilometres from the main mining and agricultural centres of Limpopo. The traditional port of Durban, for example, is 1 000 kilometres from these areas.²⁷

Linking the relationship to transnational challenges of poverty and under-development, Moloto continued:

Whilst bilateral trade with SADC countries has increased dramatically over the last few years, our government is fully aware of trade imbalances that exist between and amongst countries of the region hence we are actively promoting mutually beneficial trade. Closely allied to the promotion of trade and investment, is the promotion of economic routes and regional tourism.²⁸

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND THE IDEA OF RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF SUB-NATIONAL ENTITIES

A constitutional framework that bestows relative autonomy on provinces and municipalities, an autonomy that these sub-state entities guard jealously, both encourages and enables these sub-national governments to conduct international engagements without too much concern about the impact of their activities on foreign policy, the constitutional mandate of national government. At the heart of the 1996 Constitution (Act 198 of 1996) are the ideas of cooperative governance and intergovernmental coordination and the devolution of some powers to sub-national political entities (Rapoo 1995). There was a conscious avoidance of the concept of 'tiers', which is associated with a strong hierarchy in which sub-national entities are fully subordinate, lacking original constitutional powers. This was seen as wise in order to strengthen checks and balances in the system and to encourage cooperative governance for faster delivery of development on the ground. As a consequence, provinces and municipalities in the new constitutional dispensation have original powers and functions that they did not have previously. These powers overlap with those of national government as 'distinct, interdependent and interrelated' spheres of government (Rapoo 2000).

Accordingly, Chapter 3 of the Constitution distributes powers and functions across a range of public policy areas among the three spheres of governance, requiring inter-sphere cooperation through mutual respect of the constitutional status, powers and functions that each sphere has. It also requires each sphere to fulfil its respective mandates in a manner that 'does not encroach on geographical, functional and institutional integrity of government in another sphere'. It goes further to direct spheres to foster a spirit of cooperation by maintaining friendly relations by 'informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters of common interest'. It expressly advises against using legal proceedings to resolve matters arising from encroachment or failure to cooperate.²⁹ As others have found, this sometimes encourages provinces to see more autonomy in areas of public policy than they actually have.³⁰

It is on this basis that Rapoo (2000:21) concludes that the 1996 Constitution, unlike any before, 'goes a long way towards providing more constitutional security for the political integrity and autonomy of the provinces', while it contains provisions that 'ensure that the national government retains overall constitutional supremacy over the provinces'. In addition, national government retains residual power, as the national Parliament has a duty to pass any legislation on any functional areas listed under Schedule 4 (Concurrent Functions) and it specifies the powers

over which provinces can exercise legislative responsibility either exclusively or concurrently with national government. Yet, this does not undo the notion of decentralised authority, which gives provinces relative autonomy.

Immediately after the 1996 Constitution was adopted, Rapoo (2000) found, provinces began testing the extent of their authority *vis-à-vis* that of central government by advocating for a speedy devolution of power across a range of functional areas to give effect to their relative autonomy. This helped accelerate the death of the Senate and its replacement by the National Council of Provinces in which provinces pressed for greater decentralisation of authority. While in respect of financial affairs, provinces' advocacy failed, in matters of setting policy and control over their functional and grey areas it seems to have succeeded.

One of the grey areas is that of international engagements by provinces and municipalities. While there have been some serious political battles between national and sub-national governments over fiscal authority or Schedule 4 functional areas, national government has not been enthusiastic about enforcing its exclusive mandate over international relations. Consequently, provinces and municipalities have made their autonomy in this area *de facto*, especially after the watershed intergovernmental battles of 1997 and 1998.

Chapter 6 of the Constitution on the powers of provinces provides for provincial governments to develop their own provincial policies in their functional areas. Schedule 4 lists functional areas in which national government and provinces have concurrent competencies. These do not include the conduct of international relations, but do include sectoral matters that could be included in provincial international relations: industrial promotion, trade, tourism, agriculture and so forth. Provinces have taken advantage of this permission to aggressively pursue international economic relations almost independently of supervision by national government, and beyond mere consular assistance by DIRCO, even though the Constitution allocates foreign policy as a function exclusively for national government.

Chapter 7 of the Constitution defines the powers and functions of municipalities as including the promotion of economic development. In respect of cooperative governance, the Constitution only provides for national and provincial government to support and strengthen local government's capacity to perform its functions. While its functioning is subject to national and provincial legislation in terms of section 151(3), 151(4) directs that national and provincial government shall not impede or compromise the municipality's right and ability to exercise its powers and functions. This is read by municipalities to mean relative autonomy

to look for economic opportunities where they can be found, including internationally.

INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE BUREAUCRACY AND PARADIPLOMACY

While the creation of a single public service began in 1996 with the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service, followed by the Public Service Act and its subsequent amendments (Act 30 of 2007), provincial and local government civil service remained largely separate. A National Assembly Bill designed to effectively align national, provincial and local government civil services into a single public service was summarily withdrawn after five years of gestation following the sudden change of government in 2008 due to the recall of President Mbeki. This means that, effectively, sub-national bureaucracies see themselves as sufficiently semi-autonomous to drive their own policy agendas in areas where national government does not demand its right to coordinate. This is how the bureaucrats have crafted a niche for provinces and municipalities in international relations, and it encourages paradiplomacy.³¹ The influence of the bureaucracy on the choices of political authorities at sub-national level requires deeper analysis.³²

The promulgation of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (Act 13 of 2005) in 2005 helped to provide a legal basis for inter-sphere co-ordination on international relations. The formalisation of the intergovernmental structures happened early in President Mbeki's first term in office and intensified during his second term. They were badly tested during the dramatic transition from Mbeki to Zuma. Weak planning, poor preparation in many cases, lack of careful and strategic setting of the agenda and the dominance of service delivery concerns meant that the growth of inter-governmentalism, and the coordination of international engagements by provinces and municipalities, did not significantly improve.

As a result of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, all provinces established inter-governmental forums with national departments and municipalities in most sectors of government. They had become platforms for discussing experiences of paradiplomacy and the assistance provided by the then Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), where a small desk comprising no more than four officials was responsible for coordinating consular services for international visits by provinces and municipalities.³³ The Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) would beef up its international relations unit by the end of 2005. By 2007, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape had inter-governmental forums for international relations.³⁴

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOREIGN POLICY AND PARADIPLOMACY

Van Wyk (1997) suggests that sub-national governments' increased involvement in international engagements was made possible by what can be called the permeable nature of South Africa's foreign policy, a policy that has enabled provinces to enter international diplomacy with great intensity. She found that provinces grew their 'external relations' dramatically in the period 1994–1997 and became actors in what she calls 'symbolic foreign policy', while they also formed new sources of influence on foreign policy decisions.

The permeable nature of South African foreign policy can be linked to the thinking of the ruling ANC. Its foreign policy document of 1994, *Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa*, celebrates the role of non-state actors during the struggle and affirms their role in a democratic South Africa.³⁵ It implied that the foreign policy of the new South Africa would not fully be a preserve of the state or of national government. The document states that 'government to government relations alone are not adequate in terms of attaining our international objectives'. The party's 2002 discussion document on international relations sees the role of the sub-national governments as critical in advancing foreign policy. It says:

Involvement in implementing the ANC international programme has largely been limited to headquarters and to the Department of Foreign Affairs and other national departments such as Trade and Industry, Defence, Finance and Public Enterprises. Provincial governments have also been involved in the development of intra-governmental and trade relations, not only with neighbouring countries with whom they share a border, but also with countries further afield with which they have established cultural or economic ties. Several local councils have also built relations with counterparts across the world.³⁶

The document also explicitly suggests that paradiplomacy is a positive new development in the country's international relations. It states:

Approaches and relations develop among the world municipalities, between cities, towns and provincial governments in the world that leads to twinning agreements. South Africa did not benefit much from this long-standing practice during the apartheid era, due to its exclusion, sanctions and international isolation in the international body politic. With the democratic changes in our country and our integration into the world community, many of the cities, towns, municipalities and provinces have entered into governance cooperation or twinning agreements in areas of economic development, exchange programmes in arts, culture, science & technology, development, education, human resource, sports, safety & security (policing) etc.³⁷

The national government has been less enthusiastic about paradiplomacy. It has, since 2004, reminded provincial and municipal governments from time to time that foreign policy is a national government's competence. Whereas legal and policy frameworks confirm the national government's responsibility for foreign policy, they do not explicitly preclude provinces and municipalities from exploiting opportunities created by globalisation, fluid international relations and South Africa's rapidly growing international engagements.

TOWARDS A POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR SOUTH AFRICAN PARADIPLMACY

The coordination and alignment of paradiplomacy and national efforts at international relations including foreign policy cannot be achieved merely through the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act and informal mechanisms for inter-sphere dialogue. It requires a policy framework to guide the growth, character and impact of sub-national governments' international relations by clearly interpreting the responsibilities and roles of various spheres, and by outlining key ingredients of effective South African paradiplomacy. This is because both technocrats and politicians are accustomed to responding to policy frameworks or laws rather than mere expectations and informal protocols.

Indeed, a review commissioned by the DPLG in 1998 recommended the development of a provincial and municipal international relations (PMIR) policy framework. In 1999, another project of the DPLG, whose report remains confidential, outlined what such a framework would entail. It envisaged a policy framework that would be guided by the constitutional provisions on the powers of sub-national governments, concurrent functions and cooperative governance. It would link all PMIR policy to the country's foreign policy and its international economic agenda, especially trade and investment promotion. It would clarify the roles and functions of various spheres and mechanisms for coordination and continuous policy dialogue. It was also thought that the policy would provide space for international relations conducted by provincial and municipal agencies and Organizations such as higher education institutions and Chapter 9 (of the Constitution) platforms. The planned policy would formalise the establishment of inter-governmental structures on international relations.³⁸

Another document that circulated in the same year focused exclusively on municipal international relations (MIR). It underlined the need to align this activity with foreign policy and national priorities. It advised against the spontaneous growth of paradiplomacy for fear that municipalities might not have sufficient resources to service these commitments and that

the establishment of relations with all and sundry might suggest weak strategic thinking on the part of municipalities.³⁹ It advised municipalities to develop strategies or policies to guide these activities and to ensure that they help to achieve objectives set out in the integrated development plans (IDPs). It called for a stronger emphasis on Africa and developing countries; the need for these activities to enhance successful implementation of local and provincial priorities; and also the need for relations to be developmental and outcomes-oriented in their nature and impact.

Both documents cautioned sub-national governments against the rush to sign twinning and other cooperation agreements. It also advised sub-national governments to restrict memoranda of agreement or twinning agreements to strategic counterparts, rather than engaging with every potential partner that is visited or that visits a South African province or municipality. Thirdly, although not binding, such agreements still needed to be noted by both municipal councils or legislatures and higher authorities. The inter-sphere discussions and consultations on the best policy framework for coordination started in 2004, but at the time of writing in mid-2012 there is still no finality.⁴⁰

The cabinet lekgotla of July 2007 decided to commission its international relations, peace and security (IRPS) cluster of ministries to draft a proposal 'on how to align and coordinate international activities between all spheres of government'.⁴¹ A proposal that covered both coordination of processes and alignment of policy content would have helped develop a basis for comprehensive coordination among spheres of government. Very little, however, is known to have come out of this. A statement by the minister of international relations and cooperation in 2011 confirmed the slow progress in this process. Speaking at an outreach meeting in Mbombela, Mpumalanga province, on 10 September 2010, Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane said:

The principal departure point is that South Africa's foreign policy is an external emulation of what we espouse for South Africa and its people. The values and objectives of South Africa's foreign policy should thus inform the various forms of international engagement practised by all spheres of government and other institutions of state.⁴²

She went on to say:

I am confident that this province is privy to a cabinet document entitled, 'Measures and Guidelines for the Enhanced Coordination of South Africa's International Engagements'. I wish to reiterate the centrality of this document to our practice of international relations. In view of the fact that our biggest

challenge to the conduct of South Africa's international relations is the lack of coordination amongst the various role-players involved.

The minister suggests that the national government recognised the fact that paradiplomacy was critical in providing means by which foreign policy would meet domestic socio-economic interests. In reference to a guidelines document on coordination she suggested the need for the alignment of paradiplomacy with foreign policy.⁴³

While she recognised the crucial benefits of paradiplomacy for various spheres of government, the minister underlined that: 'the common constraint to gaining the maximum benefit from South Africa's international interaction should be and is effective coherence and political accountability for international relations activities'. Therefore, both the reinvigorated national and provincial coordination forums, on the one hand, and the guidelines document, on the other, were designed to deepen coherence of action and political accountability between the two spheres of government. The municipalities are accountable to the Provincial Executive Council (PEC) through the Office of the Executive Mayor, while provinces are accountable to national government (both the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, and DIRCO) through the Office of the Premier. The document also recognises the roles of municipal managers and speakers, local government departments in provinces, provincial directors general, provincial departmental heads, and provincial legislatures.

As the guidelines document is unavailable to the public we can only glean from the minister's speech and conversations with departmental officials the following facts: the then DFA undertook extensive and broad consultation with various role-players, especially units and officials responsible for paradiplomacy in all nine provinces and in most municipalities during 2007 and 2008. This consultation process took the form of bilateral conversations between DFA officials and their counterparts in each province before national consultative workshops were convened in which all provinces and most municipalities participated. The consultations focused on the nature and extent of involvement by each stakeholder in paradiplomacy, coordination mechanisms and processes, information sharing and accountability within and between spheres, synergy with foreign policy, implementation tracking, and reporting.

As Minister Nkoana-Mashabane stated, the DIRCO hoped to get more involved in the way provinces and municipalities planned and monitored the implementation of their international obligations. She suggested that while information on travel schedules was crucial for smooth logistical coordination, it was information about goals and strategic intents that was

of greater importance. In this sense, the diplomatic missions abroad would be useful not just for visas and setting appointments, but also for advising on choices made.

The guidelines document provides for a so-called consultative forum on international relations which came fully into operation under the Zuma administration and has become a platform for all responsible officials in all spheres to meet regularly to share plans, exchange information, monitor activities and undertake joint strategic planning of the country's international programme. DIRCO looks to the forum to provide foreign policy guidance for the coordination process and the annual joint programme.

KEY CHALLENGES FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S PARADIPLOMACY

ALIGNMENT WITH NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND FOREIGN POLICY

There is no consistent alignment between the national policy's focus on the primacy of the African agenda and the tendency for paradiplomacy to focus on relations in the global North predominantly. While there has been a growing focus on Asia, especially China, Japan and South Korea, there is a general neglect of relations with Latin America and India. There has been only limited interface with the former – visits by provinces to Brazil in 2001 and 2003, following high profile interactions between the Mbeki and the Lula governments. There is no indication of past attempts to explore opportunities and partnerships with India, although India and Brazil are South Africa's strongest allies in international affairs in the context of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum.

While the revised policies and strategies that have come up since 2007 remedy the problem of misalignment between national and sub-national international relations by mentioning foreign policy as a guiding policy framework, the alignment ends there. There is generally no synergy on priorities.

WEAK COORDINATION AT NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL LEVELS

There are concerns about the impact of poorly coordinated international engagements on South Africa's bilateral relations which harm the country's image and prestige. This is partly due to weak training of provincial and municipal officials in protocol and etiquette, and partly an outcome of poor planning on the part of sub-national authorities.

As the ANC review document of 2002 quoted above suggests, the general guidelines regulated sub-national international relations at the then DFA

but these tended to be procedural, focusing on consular procedures – in spite of the party's 1997 call for a policy on coordination. The policy was still not in place by the end of 2011.

It seems that the proliferation of provincial and municipal international relations policies in the period 2000 to 2004 was inspired by the decision of the ANC in 1997. All provinces, except Northern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, also developed a detailed international relations strategy, suggesting ways in which the policies would be implemented. Most provinces would revise these policies in the period 2007 to 2009. It seems that, again, this was inspired by the discussions in the coordinating forum that started meeting regularly in 2006. The policy frameworks generally cover the following issues:

- The economic interests and development needs of provinces and municipalities are linked to the objectives for paradiplomacy.
- There is a situational analysis sketching the political and economic situation in the relevant province or municipality, to identify ways in which paradiplomacy could help address them.
- There is usually a constitutional/legal context section that explains the constitutional mandate of sub-national governments and the intergovernmental relations framework.
- There is also a section that explains the approach to international engagements including international visits, trade shows and exhibitions, exchange programmes, and membership of international forums.
- On coordination, the policies generally refer to reporting lines that converge on the Office of the Premier and the Office of the Mayor.⁴⁴

Larger provinces have elaborate details and guidelines for paradiplomacy. The strategies of KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape, the Western Cape, North West and Limpopo, for instance, provide detailed guidelines on options to be used in choosing strategic partners in international cooperation, detail on the roles and functions of various stakeholders, coordination within the province, resource requirements, and monitoring, evaluation and reporting guidelines. Similarly, the Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, Durban and Nelson Mandela metropolitan municipalities have detailed strategies following the same pattern.⁴⁵

Partly as a result of new policy frameworks and inter-sphere discussions on coordination, most provinces established consultative forums on international relations in which municipalities and provincial departments account for their paradiplomacy in terms of the implementation of commitments and of impact on provincial and local government priorities. These forums are in most cases convened by the Office of the Premier, which also

acts as a secretariat that puts together progress reports for consideration by the PECs. By 2009, most of the provinces had functioning forums, yet the quality of coordination remains inadequate because of staff shortages and unstable international relations units in most provincial departments and municipalities.

The National Consultative Forum is meeting more regularly now than was the case in the mid-2000s. The Forum has not merely helped to build some common understanding among provinces and municipalities about the value of coordination of activities and alignment of policies and strategies, but it has also led to the development of further guidelines on the preparation of cooperation agreements, negotiations and implementation tracking. It is anticipated that out of this development there might emerge a fully-fledged national policy or strategy on paradiplomacy.

WEAK ALIGNMENT BETWEEN PARADIPLMACY AND PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES

While policies and strategies suggest otherwise, the actual conduct of paradiplomacy in most cases is marked by a poor alignment between strategies of provinces and municipalities and national policy. Most provinces, and a growing number of municipalities, have developed international policies and/or strategies designed to guide and manage each province's or municipality's growing portfolio of international engagements in the form of agreements, cooperation programmes and international visits. The policies and strategies fail to link sub-national international relations with South Africa's foreign policy and do not explain how this activity is coordinated with those undertaken by national government through DIRCO. Gauteng has a particularly ambitious strategy through which it positions itself to become a globally competitive city-region through targeted partnerships, commercial ventures and other international activities. This self-definition helps to define the province and separate it from the rest of South Africa, and encourages a competitive rather than cooperative spirit.⁴⁶

There are challenges with regard to coordination within provincial governments and within municipalities that result in overlapping international engagements and even in competitiveness. As the number of international activities increased, with municipalities and provincial departments undertaking international trips with a view to building partnerships with counterparts in other parts of the world, the challenge of poor coordination has become bigger. It became so serious that in 1998 Cabinet directed the DPLG to develop a policy framework to regulate MIR. The framework was duly approved in 1999. However, the challenges continued, leading to an

ongoing process of strengthening the 1999 MIR framework. In July 2007, Cabinet again noted with concern the continued disruptive nature of MIR in South Africa and called for greater coordination with DPLG and provinces providing leadership respectively.⁴⁷

The challenges of coordination suggest that the intergovernmental relations framework is not working as well as expected. National government, especially the DIRCO, has not been successful in ensuring harmony in international relations plans and activities by provinces and municipalities. It has tended to limit its roles to organising paperwork and occasionally setting up appointments abroad through the diplomatic missions. The Consultative Forum on International Relations that it convenes regularly to receive reports from international relations officials in provinces and municipalities has not worked particularly well.

Provincial governments and SALGA also seem to have failed to provide guidance, advice and direction to municipalities in their conduct of international relations. This may result from an insufficient strategic framework to guide the province itself and difficulties in establishing a strong national policy framework on MIR as indicated above.

International engagements, being generally poorly planned, are undermined by weak implementation of international commitments. While sub-national entities are quick to establish cooperation agreements, they are much slower in developing action plans and implementation guidelines to ensure that engagements result in specific activities on the ground. This leads to a failure to translate a hive of international activities into new development and economic dividends in the provinces and local areas.

STATIST CHARACTER OF PARADIPLMACY

Sub-national international relations are predominantly dominated by sub-national governments with limited involvement of business and civil society, which are generally excluded from the planning, execution and evaluation of paradiplomatic activities. Notwithstanding the culture of consultation and inclusion in public policy, the area of international relations is treated as the preserve of state officials. In spite of the fact that civil society and businesses often have active international programmes, provincial and municipal governments do not engage and cooperate with them on international engagements.

There is weak monitoring, evaluation and reporting on international activities. Paradiplomatic activities are largely not monitored, making it difficult for the provinces and municipalities to measure the extent to which they meet strategic intentions. These activities are rarely integrated into internal monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems. They are also,

generally, not entered into databases and other information management mechanisms, resulting in a lack of systematic information and data on international engagements and their impact on public policy programmes.

There is weak oversight by provincial legislatures and municipal councils of the costs and impact of this growing area of public policy. Provincial governments and municipalities generally avoid reporting in detail to legislatures on the impact of monies spent supporting international engagements, and there could be what might be called 'bureaucratic capture' of the legislature, as bureaucrats have succeeded in causing legislators to ignore the oversight of international commitments.

FEDERAL POLITICAL PORTFOLIO ON PARADIPLMACY

Until 2009, the general tendencies in paradiplomacy have remained largely the same, mainly because these have been informed by similar political thinking, that of the ANC which governed all provinces. But with the ascendancy of the Democratic Alliance (DA) in the Western Cape, there are nuances that appear in that province that are not mirrored in other provinces. The DA has generally sought to distinguish itself from ANC-controlled provinces and municipalities in many ways. The premier of the Western Cape designated the member of the Executive Council (MEC) for Cultural Affairs and Sports, Mr Ivan Meyer, as provincial minister of international relations, suggesting an intention to elevate provincial international relations a key political portfolio. It is a significant difference that in all ANC-governed provinces, paradiplomacy is part of the coordinating function of the Office of the Premier, but does not have a dedicated political principal to drive it. The DA approach helps to elevate paradiplomacy by giving it a political champion who takes up issues of coordination at the highest political level in the province, the PEC. This enables the province to foster harmony of thinking about paradiplomacy and reduces unnecessary diversity and competition for space in paradiplomacy. The Department of Cultural Affairs and Sport has become a centre of gravity in the bureaucratic coordination processes.⁴⁸

It is likely that there will be a shift towards stronger formalisation of paradiplomacy, including its elevation to a full political portfolio in all South African provinces. This is not because the lessons being learnt in the Western Cape are likely to be taken up by other provinces, but rather because paradiplomacy has grown so much that it will soon require more than coordination by a sub-unit of the Office of the Premier. Provinces and large cities such as Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban have become more and more aware of their ability to grow their own revenues through international engagements. The release of a new strategic outlook for the Ekurhuleni metropolitan municipality, projecting itself as an aeropolis, suggests that

other urban centres are moving in the same direction. Sub-national governments' push for greater and greater policy autonomy will further inspire this federalisation tendency. The ANC's provincial structures have already taken greater responsibility for overseeing paradiplomacy, mostly seeking to enhance and promote rather than constrain it. The federalisation of international relations will, therefore, intensify in the coming decade or two.

Further analysis is required in order to determine whether this approach overcomes the problem of coherence of priorities and complementarity of engagements across provincial governments. What is emerging in the Western Cape suggests a possible future of paradiplomacy as alternative parties wrestle provinces and municipalities from the governing ANC. The exact nature of such a possibility requires close scrutiny, especially as there are indications that the ANC may lose control of one or two more provinces in the coming decade.

CONCLUSION

This chapter suggests that, in keeping with trends elsewhere, changes in the character of global power and international relations have led to a growth in paradiplomacy by South African provinces and municipalities looking for space and benefits in the globalising world economy. This spread of paradiplomacy in the case of South Africa is also an outcome of domestic politico-legal contexts in which sub-national governments are encouraged to express their relative autonomy without undermining national government's roles including the responsibility to ensure policy coherence in the country's engagement with the world. Research conducted suggests that there is a close correlation between internal ANC thinking about the management of foreign policy, or international relations broadly (which is permissive of the relative autonomy of sub-national entities) and the growth of paradiplomacy. This chapter also suggests that international engagements by provinces and municipalities have grown in frequency and in extent since 2004 and the manner in which they are conducted continues to improve as a result of greater national attention to paradiplomacy since then. There has been more continuity than change in South Africa's paradiplomacy between the Mbeki and Zuma administrations.

With the governing party's discussion document on foreign policy released early in 2012 explicitly asking provinces to intensify international engagements under the guidance of an envisaged national coordination policy, there is likely to be continued growth in paradiplomacy in the years leading to a new government in 2015. The elusive formalisation of the co-ordination of paradiplomacy will most likely happen before then, and this

will enhance the influence of sub-national governments on the country's economic diplomacy and foreign policy in general.

Paradiplomacy is also set to grow more complex as sub-national governments respond to the need for sophistication in their international engagement as a result of changes in paradiplomacy globally. The meaning of the concept of relative autonomy as it relates the constitutional and political status of sub-national governments in South Africa will continue to be expanded with the result that there will be further federalisation of international relations. Further research will be needed to shed light on the dynamics of coordination between provinces and municipalities, on the actual implementation of policies and strategies, and on a prognosis of the national management of paradiplomacy.

NOTES

- 1 The idea of federalised international relations is borrowed from a growing body of literature that suggests that paradiplomacy can have the effect of federalising a country's international relations. See Michelmann, H. and P. Soldatos, (eds), 1990. *Federalism and International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- 2 For a quick review of the limited analytical literature on the subject, see Cornelissen, S., 2006. Entrepreneurial regions? The foreign relations of South African cities and provinces, in Carlsnaes, W. and P. Nel, (eds), *In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy after Apartheid*. Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue.
- 3 By 'sub-national governments' we refer to constitutive units of unitary or federal nation-states such as provinces, regions, municipalities or cities. In the literature on paradiplomacy, they are also called sub-national states, sub-national units/actors, sub-states, and non-central governments. See Lecours, A., 2002. Paradiplomacy: Reflections on the foreign policy and international relations of regions, *International Negotiation* 7.
- 4 Lecours, A., 2008. Political Issues of Paradiplomacy: Lessons from the Developed World, Discussion Papers on Diplomacy. Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, December.
- 5 See Martin, L.L., 2007. Neoliberalism. In Dunne, T., Kurki, M. and Smith, S. (eds). *International Relations: Theories, Discipline and Diversity*. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 109–126.
- 6 One of the prominent thinkers to suggest that the emergence of international public unions posed a serious challenge to the authority of the nation-state and the notion of national sovereignty is Harold Laski in 1921. See Laski, H.J., 1921. *The Foundation of Sovereignty and Other Essays*. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- 7 This point is elaborated in greater detail in Soldatos, P., 1990. An explanatory framework for the study of federated states as foreign policy actors, in Michelmann, H.J. and P. Soldatos, *Federalism and International Relations: The Role of Sub-National Units*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 34–53.
- 8 On South African corporations, see Bond, P. and T. Kapuya, 2006. Arrogant, disrespectful, aloof and careless – South African companies in Africa', *OSISA Openspace*, 1(4), 16

- July; and Daniel, J., Naidoo, V. and S. Naidu, 2004. The South Africans have arrived: Post apartheid corporate expansion into Africa. In *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003–2004*. Cape Town: HSRC Press. On public opinion, see Van Nieuwkerk, A., 1994. Where is the voice of the people? Public opinion and foreign policy in South Africa, *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 1(2), pp. 98–109. On the role of parliament, see Van Wyk, J., 1997. Parliament and foreign affairs: Continuity or change, *South African Yearbook of International Affairs*, 1997, pp. 189–213. On sub-national states, see De Villiers, B., 1995. Foreign relations and the provinces: An internationalist perspective. Pretoria: HSRC; and Van Wyk, A., 1998. External relations of selected South African sub-national governments: A preliminary assessment, *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 5(2), pp. 21–59.
- 9 This is the point made by Mathew Mingus in Transnationalism and subnational paradiplomacy: Is this perforated sovereignty or are democracy and civil society just reaching across borders? Paper presented to the 16th Annual Conference of the Public Administration Theory Network, Alaska, 20 June 2003.
 - 10 Many analysts, while finding fault with the manner in which the US used its power after the 1990s – be it its reluctance or its over-enthusiasm – have moved from a premise that a unipolar global system was in place after the collapse of the Soviet Union. See, for instance, Bert, W., 1997. *The Reluctant Superpower: the United States Policy in Bosnia, 1991–5*. New York: St Martin's Press; Conversino, M.J., 1997. Sawdust superpower: Perceptions of the US casualty tolerance in the post-Gulf War era', *Strategic Review*, 25(1), pp. 15–2; Hoffman, F., 1995. Decisive force: A new American way of war? *Strategic Review*, 23, pp. 23–34 and Huntingdon, S.P., 1993. 'The clash of civilizations', *Foreign Affairs*, 72, pp. 22–49. For a sound critique of this, see Cox, M., 1995. *The US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: A Superpower Without a Mission*. London: Royal Institute of International Affair.
 - 11 Boswell, T., 2004. American world empire or declining hegemony, *Journal of World Systems Research*, 10(2), pp. 516–24.
 - 12 Lecours, A., 2002. Paradiplomacy: Reflections on the foreign policy and international relations of regions, *International Negotiation*, 7, p. 92.
 - 13 See various chapters in Reiffer, T. (ed.), 2004. *Globalisation, Hegemony and Power: Antisystemic Movements and the Global System*. New York: Greenwood Press; Catt, H. and M. Murphy, 2002. *Sub-state Nationalism: A Comparative Analysis of Institutional Design*. London: Routledge.
 - 14 Steinmertz, G. (ed.), 1989. *New Approaches to the State in the Social Sciences*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. See in particular the chapter by Meyer, J.W., 1989. The changing cultural content of the nation-state: A world society perspective.'
 - 15 Personal communication with a former senior staff member of the Policy Coordination and Analysis unit in the Presidency, 3 March 2008, Pretoria.
 - 16 This information is gleaned from media reports on visits and personal communication with government officials in all spheres.
 - 17 Author's discussion with one official from a local government department in the Northern Cape in Pretoria, 18 November 2010, and with two former senior officials at the Department of Provincial and Local Government in Pretoria, 8 October 2010.
 - 18 This is gleaned from discussions with provincial officials referred to above.
 - 19 This is gleaned from the outcomes document of the local government audit that was circulated and discussed during national consultative workshops in August 2009.

- 20 This information is gleaned from annual reports of premiers' offices for the period 2004–2009. See www.info.gov.za [Accessed 18 October 2010].
- 21 Western Cape Government, International Relations Directorate Profile, Office of the Premier, at http://capegateway.gov.za/xho/your_gov/139005/E [Accessed 5 May 2006].
- 22 Personal observation.
- 23 ANC, The 51st National Conference Resolutions, 20 December 2002, Stellenbosch, at <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=2495> [Accessed 15 July 2007].
- 24 See a copy of the international relations strategy at http://capegateway.gov.za/xho/your_gov/139005/E [Accessed 5 May 2006].
- 25 A quick glimpse of international relations strategies and growth and development strategies of these major cities suggests a strong ambition to use IR to enhance their economic competitiveness among other cities of the world.
- 26 The information is gleaned from fifteen year review reports and hand-over reports of all provinces mentioned. For copies, see www.info.gov.za.
- 27 Speaker's notes for Limpopo Premier, Mr Sello Moloto, during a bilateral workshop with the province of Gaza in Mozambique, Magoebaskloof, Mopani District, Limpopo province, 19 July 2007 at www.limpopo.gov.za [Accessed 20 July 2007].
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
- 30 Besdziek, D., 2006. Provincial government in South Africa, in Venter, A. and Landsberg, C. (eds.), *Government and Politics in the new South Africa*. Pretoria: Van Schaik, pp. 102–130.
- 31 Author's discussion with officials in Departments of Local Government and Traditional Affairs and Office of the Premier in the Eastern Cape, June 2009; and the Departments of Finance, Local Government and the Office of the Premier in Gauteng, April 2009.
- 32 There is a growing literature on the bureaucratic dominance of the state as opposed to earlier writings that saw the bureaucracy as a subordinate actor in a polyarchy. See, for instance, Hill, H.L., 1991. Who governs the American administrative state? A bureaucratic-centred image of governance, *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 1(3), 261–94.
- 33 Author's discussion with two former senior officials at the Department of Provincial and Local Government in Pretoria, 8 October 2010. By June 2010, the number had remained under six officials in the unit responsible for this coordination.
- 34 This is gleaned from discussions with provincial officials referred to above.
- 35 ANC, Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa, 1994 at www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=230 [Accessed 30 March 2010].
- 36 ANC, International Relations, 2002, in *Umrabulo* at <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pubs/umrabulo/umrabulo16/international.html> [Accessed 8 September 2010].
- 37 ANC, International relations, op. cit.
- 38 The draft document was available for reading only in the library of the Department of Provincial and Local Government in June 2006.
- 39 A draft document came from the then Department of Provincial and Local Government to coincide with the formal launch of local government in 2000.
- 40 Personal communication with a former senior staff member of the Policy Coordination and Analysis unit in the Presidency, 3 March 2008, Pretoria.
- 41 Background notes on the 2007 Mid-Year Cabinet Lekgotla, 29 July 2007, in www.info.gov.za/speeches/2007/07073009371001.htm [Accessed 29 January 2008].

- 42 Speech by Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane at a gala dinner in Mbombela, Mpumalanga, on 10 September 2010 at www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2010/mash0910.html [Accessed 11 September 2010].
- 43 Personal communication with members of the Coordinating Forum on International Relations, 10 March 2008, Pretoria.
- 44 Own analysis of copies of policy and strategy documents from all provinces and selected municipalities as well as the data from the local government audit by SALGA.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 This federalist self-definition is evident in the statement by the former premier, Mbhazima Shilowa, during the launch of the strategy. See Address by Premier Mbhazima Shilowa at the launch of the strategy to build Gauteng as a globally competitive city region, 29 August 2006, Gauteng Legislature, Johannesburg. www.gpg.gov.za/about/index.html [Accessed 30 August 2006].
- 47 Background notes on the 2007 Mid-Year Cabinet Lekgotla, 29 July 2007. www.info.gov.za/speeches/2007/07073009371001.htm [Accessed 29 January 2008]
- 48 Research on this should build on the analysis provided in a master's degree dissertation by Marlise du Randt entitled 'The Representation and Participation of Provinces in International Relations in South Africa: Western Cape Case Study,' Stellenbosch University, March 2011.

Soft power

The essence of South Africa's foreign policy

Karen Smith

INTRODUCTION

... we should not overestimate ourselves as a small middle-income country. Neither should we ignore the relative influence we enjoy coming from our widely respected transition to democracy ... Small as we are, but because of our international image, we are able to 'punch above our weight' whilst at the same time ensuring that we act in concert with others.¹

The above statement would seem to indicate that the importance of soft power was recognised early on in the new democratic dispensation.² According to Carlsnaes and Nel,³ the goodwill that accompanied South Africa's re-entry into world affairs was regarded as an opportunity and was consciously used by subsequent administrations. The new leaders realised the benefits of positioning South Africa as a good global citizen – not only to advance global normative goals but also to advance South Africa's national interest. This was recognised in the African National Congress (ANC) 1997 discussion document, which stated that a focus on the principles outlined in the 1994 document on international affairs, including the promotion of democracy and human rights, 'cannot be considered idealistic which shifts our focus away from the harsh realities of "national interest"'. Rather, the identification of such principles should be seen as an essential part of defining the national interest.⁴ This important realisation appears to have been sidelined in recent years. Instead, the idea that the pursuit of national interest and an idealistic foreign policy are irreconcilable has taken root in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)⁵ and other government departments. Policy-makers need to be reminded of the former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans's point that 'a country's interest in being seen as a good international citizen is as important a national interest as the traditional national interest goals of security and economics'.⁶

While many commentators on South Africa's international relations discuss soft power as being a part, or even an important part, of our foreign policy, it is argued in this chapter that most underestimate the centrality of soft power: South Africa's foreign policy is overridingly driven by ideational rather than by material forces. In the absence of significant military and economic power, soft power is the preferred instrument of foreign policy-makers, and coercive strategies have been largely absent in South Africa's international relations since 1994. Not only has soft power been *a* component of our foreign policy, it has been *the* central component. This has enabled South Africa to play a much more important role in international relations than its material power would suggest. In recent years, however, and largely due to a mismanagement of soft power and lack of a conscious strategy to harness it effectively, South Africa's international image has become somewhat tarnished.

The objective here is not to provide a detailed account of how soft power has been used in South Africa's foreign policy since 1994. Instead, the focus is on providing a brief critical analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the government's use of soft power since 1994, and to provide some recommendations as to the way forward, and specifically with regard to DIRCO's role. First, however, it is important to briefly situate this chapter in the framework of international relations theory, and engage with the meaning of the slippery concept 'soft power' and related terms such as 'public diplomacy'.

THE SOFT SIDE OF POWER

The theoretical framework of this chapter is based on the constructivist notion that the world is socially constructed, and that material factors are given meaning through intersubjectively held meanings. Furthermore, if we start from the assumption that identities and interests are constituted by ideas, then the beliefs that states hold about themselves and, perhaps more significantly, the beliefs that others hold about them, become essential factors in understanding foreign policy. This is where the influence of soft power – which helps to shape the identity of a state in the minds of other states – becomes important to explore.

While the traditional indicators of power (population, military might, economic strength) remain important elements of a state's power in the international system, most governments now recognise that what has been called 'soft power' can be equally important, especially in promoting recognition by others. As Nye notes, 'sometimes countries enjoy political clout that is greater than their military and economic weight would suggest

because they define their national interest to include attractive causes such as economic aid or peacemaking'.⁷ Middle powers such as Canada and Norway, which exemplify this type of power, exercise political influence on the basis of their moral authority and their promotion of global causes. Despite the importance of soft power being so obvious, many governments continue to sideline it.

Although the term 'soft power', coined by American political scientist Joseph Nye, only gained prominence in the 1990s, Melissen notes how image cultivation is nothing new in international relations.⁸ Since becoming popularised by Nye, the term has become overused and underdefined. This leads to much confusion when it is used in practical discussions about foreign policy, and often results in its being dismissed on the grounds that it is not tangible. As expected, this also holds true for South Africa's foreign affairs practitioners. In informal discussions with DIRCO staff, the lack of consensus on what exactly soft power entails, and how much attention should be paid it, was painfully obvious. One of the underlying reasons for this confusion is, of course, that soft power is an aspect of *power* which, although it forms the core of the study of international relations, remains a complex and highly contested concept. It falls beyond the scope of this chapter to engage in a discussion of power, but it is necessary to briefly outline what is meant by the particular form of power that constitutes the object of this study.

According to Nye, soft power is the influence that enables a state to achieve the outcomes it wants in its international interactions, not through coercion or rewards, but through its attractiveness.⁹ A state's attractiveness, which is closely linked to its reputation and image, is a complex mixture of perceptions, history, current events, consumer goods, and so forth. A positive image can be conveyed by various instruments or drivers of soft power, from popular and elite culture, public diplomacy, business actions abroad, international perceptions of a government's policies, and the attractiveness of a state's economic strength.¹⁰ In terms of behaviour, hard power involves coercion or inducement, while soft power involves attraction and cooption. This focus on behaviour is an important one, for policy-makers often mistake power for resources. It allows us to see how military and economic force, although generally regarded as hard power, can be used to attract and co-opt (in other words, to generate soft power). An example would be the use of military power for purposes of peace keeping or humanitarian assistance.

So while soft power is often conflated with related yet distinct concepts such as public diplomacy, or cultural diplomacy, in this chapter it is regarded as an overarching term, which is the result of the effective use of potential soft power resources generated by both state and non-state actors.

This also means that we should take a more encompassing view of the instruments that can create it. Broadly, these instruments can be divided into the following categories: formal/traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy, culture (including values) and economic activities. Formal diplomacy can include the effectiveness and professionalism of a state's diplomatic corps, its involvement in conflict resolution, and support for multilateral institutions (a signal to the international community that a state is a responsible actor which can play by international rules). Public diplomacy¹¹ refers to government-funded programmes and official communication aimed at influencing public opinion abroad, and includes educational exchanges and effective communication with the foreign media. It encompasses cultural diplomacy, which refers to government actions specifically aimed at showcasing and exporting a country's culture – such as, for example, the Chinese government's Confucius institutes in a number of countries. Arguably, economic diplomacy is also a part of public diplomacy, as it is the promotion of a state's economy and businesses abroad. Other economic instruments that can build soft power include trade, aid, investment, and the appeal of a state's economic development.

When discussing soft power resources, it must be emphasised, as Nye reminds us, that these do not automatically constitute soft power, which is determined by how these sources are utilised and perceived and ultimately how they impact on policy outcomes. Soft power can thus be regarded in a broader sense as the outcome of *how* a state utilises its resources – both material and ideational.

Attractiveness in itself does not equal soft power, but if it is harnessed effectively it can be an important source of soft power. Of course, the opposite is also true: just as a country's positive values can be a soft power resource, so too can negative factors and poor policy-making undermine its soft power. The steep decline in the United States' popularity resulting mainly from unpopular foreign policies – which some saw as contradicting the values espoused by the US – are a clear case in point.

THE RETREAT OF HARD POWER?

While the focus of this chapter is the continued importance of soft power for South Africa, it must be pointed out that this is not meant to minimise the continuing importance of hard power in international politics. It is especially important to note the constraining and enabling effects those material forces such as natural resources and the distribution of material capabilities can have, especially in terms of defining the physical limits of possibility.

For those who reject soft power as unimportant, it is significant to stress the point that to disregard soft power threatens the legitimacy of the exercise of hard power, and raises the costs of achieving policy objectives. The two forms of power are closely interrelated and interdependent, and the loss of soft power can be costly for hard power. As was seen in the case of the US, a state's hard power can often undermine its soft power and make it far more difficult to achieve certain foreign policy aims.

Just as hard power can undermine soft power it can also be employed with the aim of generating soft power. While economic power is usually associated with hard power and the use of inducement, it can also be a powerful source of soft power, contributing to a state's reputation and attractiveness to other states. This has been evidenced by the spread of American influence and values through its economic exports and prowess. In addition, the economic success of a country engenders admiration among other states that want to emulate its economic growth. Having sufficient economic resources is also crucial to effectively employing soft power instruments such as public diplomacy. Ultimately, both hard and soft power are means to the same end: to influence the behaviour of others. The interdependent nature of these two types of power is emphasised by Nye who states: 'Hard power has not become irrelevant, but leaders must develop the contextual intelligence that allows them to combine hard and soft power resources into a "smart power" strategy'.¹²

Reference to 'smart power' (also coined by Joseph Nye, and referring to this mix of hard, or coercive, and soft, or attractive, power) is increasingly made by policy-makers, especially the Obama administration. A combination of the two forms of power is therefore now regarded as the ideal situation. In the absence of significant elements of hard power, however, South Africa will have to work much harder at increasing its soft power influence in the world, especially if it wants to compete with other emerging powers that are encroaching on its neighbourhood.

We now turn to a brief discussion of the role of soft power in South Africa's foreign policy since 1994.

SOUTH AFRICA'S POST-1994 FOREIGN POLICY AND SOFT POWER

Prior to 1994, South African foreign policy in the region was largely driven by hard power through the use of economic and military power in a mainly coercive way. After 1994, the new democratic government under Nelson Mandela realised the need to improve relations with the rest of the world, partly to attract investment to the country, but also to enhance its international prestige. South Africa also relished its new-found international

popularity, largely based on the moral high ground held by then president Nelson Mandela. As a result, the country's post-1994 foreign policy, particularly under the Mandela and Mbeki administrations, has relied heavily, almost exclusively – with a few exceptions such as the botched attempt at using military power to 'restore order' in Lesotho in 1998 – on soft power. South Africa presented itself to the world as the newest 'good international citizen' on the block.¹³ As noted in the introduction, being a good international citizen is not entirely a selfless enterprise. This stated willingness to work towards global welfare rather than simply to promote its own national interest earned the newly democratised state valuable points among its international counterparts.

A countless number of factors have arguably contributed to building South Africa's soft power since 1994. These include, but are not limited to, the international status and influence of Nelson Mandela; South Africa's struggle history; its 'miracle' transition; its bridge-building role between North and South; peacemaking and mediation in Africa; the values enshrined in our Constitution and foreign policy principles (such as respect for human rights and democracy, striving towards global justice, the alleviation of poverty and the equality of all people); the hosting of media-attracting events (such as multilateral conferences and global sports competitions);¹⁴ popular culture (for example, the popularity of South African soap operas in Africa, actress Charlize Theron and the film *Tsotsi*'s Oscars, JM Coetzee's Nobel Prize for Literature); providing resources to other African states to enable them to meet their international and domestic responsibilities (such as the African Renaissance and Cooperation Fund); being seen as a model African state by the international community; the promotion of rules-based multilateralism as the most appropriate vehicle for conducting international relations; our status as a liberal democracy; the ability to create economic opportunities for other states; the image of South Africa as a champion of the causes of Africa and the developing world; the instrumental role that it played as norm entrepreneur in a number of multilateral initiatives such as the creation of the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the international treaty to ban landmines, the conditional extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1995, the formulation of the Pelindaba Treaty on a nuclear weapon-free Africa (1996), and outlawing child soldiers.

This role of norm entrepreneur in a multilateral context has been of particular importance, and shows how soft power – and what a state can achieve through its application of soft power – can be mutually reinforcing. By drawing on its soft power, South Africa was able to become an international norm entrepreneur and, in turn, as a result of its success as norm

builder, its global reputation was enhanced even further, resulting in even more soft power.

Furthermore, the leadership it exercises in multilateral fora on behalf of its region, Africa, and the developing world, has become a characteristic of South Africa's foreign policy. Geldenhuys analyses the nature of this ideological or soft power leadership using Riddell-Dixon's typology, which differentiates between intellectual leadership, entrepreneurial leadership and implementation leadership, all of which are clearly evident in South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy.¹⁵ Besides the leadership roles already mentioned above (intellectual leadership through the promotion of democracy and the idea of an African Renaissance; entrepreneurial leadership through South Africa's role in norm creation), South Africa has been leading by example (implementation leadership) by becoming a party to all major global human rights instruments and being one of the first African countries to submit itself to review by the APRM.

Despite these initial successes, South Africa's soft power has taken some serious knocks that, in the words of Geldenhuys, have 'undermin[ed] its credibility as a model African state'.¹⁶ The country's social, political and economic challenges such as high levels of crime, unemployment, poverty, poor education and health care, are all contributing to the tarnishing of its image. Besides these domestic factors, a number of international actions and decisions have contradicted and undermined the country's moral leadership. These have included continued foreign arms sales to states known for their human rights abuses, an inability to bring about effective political change in Zimbabwe through its quiet diplomacy strategy, and its military intervention in Lesotho in 1998.

Under the Zuma government we have witnessed a rapid decline in the country's soft power currency, with what purportedly is the guiding light of the country's foreign policy – human rights – being relegated to an apparently subordinate position. The contentious decision taken in 2009 to deny the Dalai Lama a visa to enter the country in order to attend a peace conference organised by South Africa's three Nobel Peace Prize laureates is a case in point. In 2011 the issue resurfaced when the Dalai Lama called off a visit to South Africa to attend Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu's birthday celebrations because he had not received a visa. In both instances, the South African government was slammed by the national and international communities for privileging its economic relations with China over human rights concerns.¹⁷ Despite protestations by foreign affairs officials (which were not clearly communicated via the media), these incidents were interpreted by many in South Africa, and throughout the world, as evidence of the government's increasing disregard for human rights.

Decisions taken during South Africa's first term as a non-permanent member on the United Nations Security Council (such as not supporting a resolution to end human rights violations in Myanmar, and attempting to block a resolution calling for further sanctions on Iran) arguably did serious damage to the country's international reputation and moral authority. Despite the government's belated explanations that it acted out of principle (for example, by claiming that the Myanmar issue should have been discussed in the Human Rights Council, and not the Security Council), it managed to 'inadvertently project the image of a state willing to undermine the prevention of human rights abuses'.¹⁸ In international relations, as in everyday life, perception is often more important than substance, a lesson which South Africa appears to have forgotten. This also plays out in South Africa's relations with the states in its region.

THE REGIONAL DIMENSION

In light of South Africa's stated commitment to the African continent as a foreign policy priority, this chapter contends that the role of soft power in the region should be afforded special attention. This is in line with an earlier paper in which I argued that South Africa needs to focus more on increasing its soft power in its immediate region, as this can be an important foreign policy tool in the country's quest to 'win over' its neighbouring states,¹⁹ essential not only for the role of regional leadership but also for the level of global influence which South Africa can exert.

Under the apartheid government, regional policy was marked by militarisation and destabilisation. With the transition to democracy came a new approach, one of cooperation and engagement, emphasising South Africa's integral role in the region. Given South Africa's unique history and the legacy of the apartheid government's relations with the region, the government has to be particularly sensitive in its dealings with the region to avoid any behaviour reminiscent of the apartheid state's aggressive regional policies. By its nature, soft power is non-confrontational, non-threatening, and does not rely on 'sticks' or 'carrots' to gain influence. This type of foreign policy approach would seem to be most suited to building consensus and respect, and gaining legitimacy as a leader in the regional setting.²⁰ History has shown that South Africa did not make any friends through the use of military power in the region. Instead, the South African defence force's post-1994 efforts to help ordinary people during natural disasters in neighbouring countries (for example, assistance to flood victims in Mozambique in 1999) arguably earned the country much more respect than any show of military prowess could ever have done.

South Africa, particularly under the Mbeki administration, promoted the idea of itself as an African state, and made tremendous strides in re-engaging with Africa by spearheading the idea of an African Renaissance, establishing diplomatic missions in almost all African states, sending its peacekeepers into African conflicts, and leading the way with institutions like Nepad. While not officially framed in the language of soft power, this was essentially what the government's efforts came down to. According to Flermes, one way in which regional powers can gain acceptance by their neighbours is by offering material incentives and public goods, and allowing a certain amount of free-riding by others.²¹ In this regard, South Africa has practised policies of non-reciprocity with its neighbours through Organizations such as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC). It has also taken on a large part of the integration costs – for example, the maintenance of several pan-African institutions such as the Pan African parliament, the Nepad secretariat and contributions to the AU budget. South Africa's foreign direct investment is another crucial part of the country's influence in the region. In addition, South Africa appears to be willing to provide the public good of regional stability, through its peacekeeping and mediation activities.

South Africa has also effectively employed soft power in the region with regard to specific policy issues. Turton and Funke's study of trans-boundary water interaction, for example, shows how South Africa effectively employs soft power in its interactions with Lesotho and Namibia over the Orange River. This is in stark contrast to the pre-1994 apartheid regime, which used hard power and dominance in its relationships with neighbouring countries over various issues, including water. Turton and Funke claim that post-1994 South Africa's use of soft power can also be witnessed in the numerous treaties and agreements on water, and through the establishment of regional water management institutions.

South Africa's standing in the region is also closely tied to the role it has been able to play internationally. That South Africa has arguably been able to punch above its weight (relative to its material power status) is due to two reasons: the first is the fact that it held significant soft power currency (as discussed above) and the second is its position as (for the time being) the most powerful state in Southern Africa. Importantly, these two sources of South Africa's active involvement in global affairs are closely related, for while South Africa's (for the time being) dominant position is partly based on its material preponderance, the continued effectiveness of its leadership depends heavily on the extent to which it is able to exercise ideational leadership. This is underlined by Alden and Soko who state, '... without the power of ideas, South Africa's material expression of its hegemonic aspirations alone will remain an incomplete source of action in Africa'.²²

In light of the importance of the region to South Africa's foreign policy, it would be useful for DIRCO to assess the state of the country's soft power among its neighbours through a public opinion survey aimed at measuring perceptions of South Africa in the region. A similar study, which was conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, measured public opinion to evaluate soft power in Asia, and included questions on how states view each other's popular culture, commercial prowess and brands, intellectual influence and appeal, universities, diplomatic reputations and political systems.

In addition, besides the American example, DIRCO should also look to other states in the global South which have raised soft power to a strategic level in their respective foreign policies – China and India are prime examples. The Chinese strategy of initially concentrating its charm offensive on the South East Asian region in order to present itself as a non-threatening, benign regional actor may prove particularly instructive.²³ In addition, Beijing's use of regional soft power-based foreign policies aimed at counter-acting the influence of other external players such as the US is an important lesson for South Africa, which has to deal with ever-increasing competition from outside actors in its immediate neighbourhood, something which has to date resulted in the loss of numerous economic opportunities.

While certain actions may improve South Africa's soft power in the region, as I have previously argued, this may have the reverse effect at the international level.²⁴ An example is the Mbeki government's approach to the Zimbabwe crisis: adopting a quiet diplomacy approach and opting to go the route of African solidarity by supporting the African position (which was not to publicly condemn Robert Mugabe). It earned South Africa a number of soft power points at the regional and continental level. At the international level, however, this stance cost South Africa dearly, and it was severely criticised by the international community for not upholding its stated commitment to democracy and human rights. The foreign policies of regional powers like South Africa have to be especially nuanced in order to juggle the often competing demands of international and regional expectations and interests.

This brings us to the final section, which will highlight some of the challenges and opportunities facing South Africa in its quest to achieve its foreign policy objectives.

THE WAY FORWARD: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

International relations have become increasingly competitive, as states compete with one another for global recognition (which is associated with all kinds of benefits such as membership of certain exclusive clubs like

the Group of 20 (G20), the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa grouping (BRICS) and the UN Security Council, and for a greater share of the global economic pie. The impressions that both elites and ordinary citizens have of a state can play a significant role in relations between states. In addition, a favourable international image can lead to investment, alliances and political support against rivals. It is similar to the way things work in the corporate world. Image and reputation management are important aspects of modern statecraft. This will only become more pronounced for, as Nye predicts, '[t]he political game in a global information age suggests that the relative importance of soft power will increase'.²⁵

In spite of this, a view held by some policy-makers and analysts is that for South Africa to play a leadership role in Africa – and a more assertive leadership role – it should move away from soft power. In contrast, it is argued here that soft power is the only way in which South Africa will effectively be able to exercise a greater leadership role. That hard power equals leadership is a gross misconception – in fact, it can severely undermine a state's leadership potential. Similarly, there is a misconception that soft power is not directly related to a country's national interests – that it has no part to play in a pragmatic, interest-driven foreign policy. Ultimately, in achieving the national interest (what this is and who should decide it is beyond the scope of this chapter) a country needs to exert influence. For countries with significant traditional hard power (usually understood to be a combination of a large population, large land area, natural resources, military capability including nuclear capability, economic power and human skills) soft power forms an important but not overriding strategy in their overall foreign policy. For a country like South Africa, however, which lacks significant hard power, soft power becomes invaluable. The aims of soft power do not have to be soft: they include strong economic and political motives. With DIRCO's focus on economic diplomacy, for example, public diplomacy is an important part of creating a positive image of South Africa as a trading partner, investor and investment destination. The point is that when a country has a favourable international image, this helps it to achieve its foreign policy aims.

It cannot be overemphasised that the development and cultivation of soft power, especially in the absence of significant hard power capabilities, is strategically invaluable. However, it is important for such a strategy to be multipronged: a blanket soft power strategy will not have the desired effect, as what works in Africa won't necessarily work in Europe or the US, and vice versa. The benefits and drawbacks of certain foreign policy decisions also need to be weighed up more carefully with regard to their effect on South Africa's soft power – and the reasoning behind certain foreign policy decisions should be more clearly communicated by DIRCO to

the South African and the global media in order to avoid what Melissen calls 'negative branding'.²⁶ Ultimately, a country's image depends on what it does: we saw how the US's global popularity fell when it decided to invade Iraq, choosing to act against global opinion. In the same way, it is what South Africa does – how it behaves in the UN Security Council, what action it takes to address conflict and poverty on the African continent – that will be the biggest determinant of its soft power.

It is also important to re-emphasise that the government does not have sole control over soft power. A host of non-state actors contribute, or can detract from, a state's soft power. The former deputy minister of international relations and cooperation, Sue van der Merwe, has emphasised on numerous occasions that in order to effectively carry out its foreign policy government needs to cooperate with civil society and business, which can play an important role in promoting the country's image. In a 2006 speech she noted that '... business and other civil society players act in the international arena. What does become increasingly important is the coordination of our respective roles and a unity of purpose in the work that we do abroad as we all represent our country.'²⁷ She added: 'South African businesses have increasingly been involved in creating economic opportunities in Africa that have greatly enhanced our international standing ... rather than being threatened by the emergence of new actors on the foreign policy scene, we need to encourage the positive role that business can play in advancing our foreign policy objectives.'²⁸

In April 2009, Van der Merwe again argued that the South African government cannot pursue its foreign policy objectives on its own, and advocated the use of civic interest groups as a strategic tool of building soft power.²⁹ She used the case study of the South African Women in Dialogue (SAWID) initiative to show the potential influence that civil society Organizations can have on carrying out a country's foreign policy aims (for example, she looked at SAWID's influence on the Burundian electoral process). The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) is another example of a South African nongovernmental Organization which is playing an important role on the African continent, helping to implement the government's foreign policy objectives of peacebuilding and conflict resolution and shaping South Africa's image in the region.

DIRCO has a crucial role to play in developing a coordinated, coherent soft power strategy. While hard (military and economic) power are the purviews of the Departments of Defence and Trade and Industry respectively, the lifeblood of any diplomatic corps comes down to exerting influence through soft power. In a speech to graduates of the Diplomatic Training Programme in 2007, the then minister of foreign affairs, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, underlined the importance of image building as part of a

diplomat's responsibility: 'International perceptions play a critical role in all areas of international relations, from investment and tourism to culture and sport. As such our missions and our diplomats play a major role in branding South Africa.'³⁰ Such a focus requires concomitant changes in the training of diplomats for, as Melissen notes, public diplomacy requires different skills, techniques and attitudes to those found in traditional diplomacy.³¹ Ensuring that its diplomats are exceptionally well trained and professional is, of course, essential in building South Africa's reputation through formal and public diplomacy. The building of a core of area and language specialists (as the Chinese are doing) should also be a priority. In terms of public diplomacy initiatives, educational exchange programmes have long been recognised as a way to influence future global opinion leaders. China is currently leading the way. Kurlantzick notes that the number of foreign students studying in China has been increasing by around 20 per cent per year.³² Increasing the number of foreign students (especially from Africa) who study in South Africa will, of course, require targeted resources and, on a more practical level, a revision of the red tape involved in student and research visas. More generally, DIRCO should recognise the centrality of soft power to its broader mandate and day-to-day operations, to consolidate and wield potential sources of soft power in a strategic manner, and to ensure that government actions and policies serve to reinforce, and not counteract, such popular sources of soft power. This has critical implications for the direction of South Africa's foreign and domestic policy.

Of great concern is the fact that the country is starting to lose its moral authority and reputation as an international player following an independent foreign policy (which can score a state many soft power points). Too often it has been seen to succumb to Chinese pressure, the 2009 and 2011 Dalai Lama visa debacles being an obvious example. South Africa needs to be careful not to align itself too closely with a particular state, such as China, and, in so doing, damage its relationship with the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) powers, the European Union (EU) and the US, all of which remain important players for the foreseeable future.

With regard to domestic policy, the fact that South Africa is a democracy (albeit not yet a consolidated one) has earned it many soft power points. The appeal of the US's rights-based political system was perhaps the most significant component of its soft power, and a major shortcoming of Chinese soft power. South Africa's socio-political model, which promotes values that have wide appeal, is something on which we should capitalise. It is therefore of the utmost importance that our fragile democracy is safeguarded. Challenges to democracy, including poor service delivery, corruption, crime, and policies and legislation that are seen to undermine the principles of the Constitution, can easily taint South Africa's international image, and there

is no shortage of potential challengers waiting in the wings to take over the role as Africa's, or Southern Africa's, leader in the eyes of the world. Nigeria and Angola are threatening to overtake South Africa on the economic front, so in order to maintain its leadership position South Africa needs to build on its comparative advantage, which is its status as a liberal democracy, its reputation and its ideational power. By making official policies that are consistent with the values enshrined in our Constitution, South Africa will continue to build its soft power.

In conclusion, the main point this analysis has tried to make is that not only has soft power been an important aspect of South Africa's foreign policy since 1994, it has been the very essence thereof. This does not mean that it has always been harnessed or used consciously by the Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma governments. All of them have, however, relied heavily on South Africa's global standing in pursuing an active foreign policy often regarded as overly ambitious for a state with relatively limited material capabilities. Given the centrality of soft power in South Africa's foreign relations, what remains is for it to be elevated to a more strategic position within DIRCO.

NOTES

- 1 ANC, 1997. Developing a strategic perspective on South African foreign policy. <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?include=docs/discus/1997/foreign.html> [Accessed 3 November 2010].
- 2 A comprehensive conceptualisation follows below. In brief, soft power can be understood as power based on attraction rather than coercive attributes.
- 3 Carlsnaes, W. and P. Nel, (eds). *In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy after Apartheid*. Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue.
- 4 ANC, 1997. Developing a strategic perspective on South African foreign policy. <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?include=docs/discus/1997/foreign.html> [Accessed 3 November 2010].
- 5 Previously the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).
- 6 Geldenhuys, D., 2006. South Africa's role as international norm entrepreneur. In Carlsnaes, W. and P. Nel, (eds). *In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy after Apartheid*. Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue.
- 7 Nye, J.S., 2004. Soft Power: The means to succeed in world politics, *Public Affairs*: 9.
- 8 Melissen, J., 2005. Wielding soft power: The new public diplomacy. *Clingendael Diplomacy Papers* no. 2. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations *Clingendael*:1–2.
- 9 See Nye, 2004.
- 10 Kurlantzick, J., 2007. *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- 11 Melissen (2005) distinguishes between public affairs (aimed at domestic audiences) and public diplomacy (aimed at foreign audiences), pointing out however that they

are closely interlinked and often difficult to separate in practice. Curiously, the 'Public Diplomacy' section of the DIRCO is aimed at the domestic constituency – a bit of a misnomer, given that diplomacy by its nature involves relations with external actors. A more appropriate name for this section would have been 'Public Affairs' or 'Public Relations'. This still leaves a vacuum in the Department with regard to public *diplomacy*, however, an important role which should involve daily communications and explanation of policy decisions to foreign audiences. This is not something at which the South African government has excelled, and it has resulted in our reputation being severely damaged. Controversial decisions taken during South Africa's first two-year term (2007/2008) as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council provide a case in point.

- 12 Nye, J.S., 2008. Hard vs Soft Power: Contenders in the US Presidential Race Must Respond to a Changed World. Available online at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publications/18172/hard_vs_soft_power.html [Accessed 30 September 2010].
- 13 Graham, S., 2008. Gold star or bottom of the class: is South Africa a good international citizen? *South African Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 15(1): 87–97, for a discussion of the concept 'good international citizen'.
- 14 Van der Westhuizen (2008) explores how the state has appropriated major sports events and celebrity achievements in order to reconstruct the country's African identity, but also to create a narrative of exceptionalism, which adds to South Africa's soft power. He argues that states like South Africa, which do not have access to a wealth of resources to project their soft power (as do the movie and music industries in the USA, for example), tend to rely more on once-off events such as sports events, conferences, or celebrity achievements. He highlights three achievements by individuals (Mark Shuttleworth as the first African in space, Sibusiso Vilane as the first black African to reach the top of Mount Everest, and Charlize Theron as the first South African Oscar winner) that were appropriated by the state to signal a message about South Africa's exceptionalism and potential. See Van der Westhuizen, J., 2008. Popular culture, discourse and divergent identities: reconstructing South Africa as an African states, *African Identities*, vol. 6(1): 45–61.
- 15 Geldenhuys, D., 2010. South Africa: the idea-driven foreign policy of a regional power. In Flesher, D. (ed). *Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers*. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate.
- 16 Op. cit., p. 167
- 17 Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu called the visa refusal in 2009 'a total betrayal of our struggle history'. He claimed, 'We are shamelessly succumbing to Chinese pressure. I feel deeply distressed and ashamed.' With reference to the Dalai Lama's cancelled trip in 2011, again citing visa problems, Archbishop Emeritus Tutu went as far as accusing President Zuma's administration of being 'worse than the apartheid government' (quoted in 'Dalai Lama's South Africa conference ban causes uproar' in *The Guardian*, 23 March 2009). ANC City of Cape Town councillor and trade union leader Tony Ehrenreich joined the critical voices: 'Even though China is our biggest trading partner, we should not exchange our morality for dollars or yuan' (quoted in 'Dalai Lama's Visa Request Is Denied by South Africa' in *The New York Times*, 4 October 2011).
- 18 Graham, S., 2008. Gold star or bottom of the class: is South Africa a good international citizen? *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 15(1): 92.

- 19 Smith, K., 2010. Acceptance and legitimacy through soft power. Closing the gap between domestic and foreign policy: Conference proceedings of the 2009 DIRCO Annual Conference. Pretoria: Department of International Relations and Cooperation.
- 20 See Geldenhuys, 2010 for a detailed overview of how South Africa uses its ideational leadership specifically in relation to its regional power status.
- 21 Flesmes, D. and Wojczewski, T., 2010. Contested leadership in international relations: power politics in South America, South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Working Paper no.121. Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies p. 14.
- 22 Alden, C. and M. Soko, 2005. South Africa's economic relations with Africa: hegemony and its discontents, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43(3): 389.
- 23 That the Chinese government takes soft power seriously can be seen in government documents, policies, and the resources committed to it – with China reportedly currently spending six billion dollars on soft power initiatives. Besides its tremendous economic growth, China's soft power has been crucial in expanding the country's regional influence over the past decade. Li agrees that China's increased influence in East Asia over the past decade can be attributed primarily to its increased use of soft power use in foreign policy. He claims that although in some instances China has been assertive, in general it has been prudent in its exercise of power, and that this is the most important source of its soft power. See Li, M., 2009. Domestic sources of China's soft power approach. *China Security*, vol. 5(2): 34–49.
- 24 See Smith, 2010.
- 25 Nye, 2004, p. 31.
- 26 Melissen, 2005, p. 11.
- 27 Van der Merwe, S., 2006. Address at the Business Unity South Africa cocktail reception, 17 October. Available online at: <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2006/merw1017.htm> [Accessed 15 March 2010].
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 April, Y., 2009. Assessing South Africa's strategic options of soft power application through civic interest groups, *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, vol. 9(1): 123–144.
- 30 Dlamini-Zuma, N., 2007. Keynote address by the minister of affairs, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma at the graduation of diplomatic trainees, presidential guesthouse, Pretoria, 30 August 2007. Available online at: <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2007/dzum0830.htm> [Accessed 15 March 2010].
- 31 Melissen, 2005, pp. 7–8.
- 32 Kurlantzick, 2007, p. 108.

A review of South Africa's peace diplomacy since 1994

Anthoni van Nieuwkerk

INTRODUCTION: DEFINING PEACE DIPLOMACY

The focus of this chapter is on the identification of the broad challenges, opportunities and constraints that have confronted South Africa in the use of peace diplomacy as a diplomatic tool. A few assumptions require clarification at the outset. 'Peace diplomacy' is not an obvious or commonly used concept (despite the appearance of 'peace' and 'diplomacy' as separate themes in international relations textbooks). Conflict management seems to be the phrase in use today. Peace diplomacy can be seen as referring to the activities associated with peace making, peace keeping and peace building. This chapter defines the South African government's peace diplomacy as its involvement in continental peace making (diplomatic interventions in the form of mediation or negotiation processes), United Nations mandated peace-keeping operations (also known as multi-dimensional peace support), and peace building (in line with the African Union (AU) framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development). As will be demonstrated below, peace diplomacy can also be equated to the exercise of soft power. Such an approach is by definition driven by multi-actor coalitions of decision-makers and implementors in government and state structures. Key decision-making actors and processes relating to South Africa's peace diplomacy are located in the Presidency, Cabinet, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), and others related to the security sector. In addition, the African National Congress (ANC), in its capacity as ruling party, exercises decisive influence over the content of government's Africa policies and approaches.

The methodology of the chapter is primarily based on desktop research, and several restrictions apply. A comprehensive interview schedule with South African peace makers, peace keepers and peace builders was deemed to be beyond its scope as in-house departmental assessments of

peace making and peace keeping understandably carry restricted access. Fortunately, the chapter benefited from feedback at an author's workshop and a public symposium in Pretoria in May 2011. Furthermore, the academic literature on South Africa's 'peace diplomacy' – although scattered – is a growing area of interest. Apart from the regular journal articles, publications have recently emerged focusing in detail on South African peace diplomacy in Africa, especially in the Great Lakes region, but also in Zimbabwe and the Côte d'Ivoire.¹

The chapter is structured around four themes. The first focuses on 'peace diplomacy' by exploring peace making, peace keeping and peace building, including a brief examination of the roles of states, non-state actors, and structures. The second theme focuses on South Africa's experiences with continental peace diplomacy. It addresses the evolution of foreign policy approaches and implementation from 1994 onward and examines in some detail how the South African government applied 'peace diplomacy'. The third theme is an assessment describing policy continuity and change, and the development of trilateral development cooperation as a potentially important vehicle for sustainable peace diplomacy, and identifying key dilemmas in the exercise of peace diplomacy (including peace-keeping challenges, tensions between idealist and commercial interests, and domestic constraints). Finally, the chapter makes modest proposals for the future.

SOUTH AFRICA'S CONTINENTAL PEACE DIPLOMACY

South Africans share deep experiences of conflict and its resolution. After decades of brutalising colonial and apartheid violence, they were able to effect a relatively peaceful transfer of power from the white minority apartheid regime. Achieving this required a deep understanding of peace making, peace keeping and peace building – a project which is continuing.

As expected, in the wake of its transitional experiences the post-apartheid South African government incorporated some of these 'best practices' in its foreign policy posture – peace diplomacy – and soon developed a reputation as an able conflict mediator, particularly in Africa but also elsewhere, such as with the Lockerbie case, in Northern Ireland and in Timor-Leste. How can we characterise this 'posture'?

Between 1994 and 2008, South Africa, as an emerging middle power, followed a pragmatic, reformist foreign policy agenda.² This has not always been the case. South Africa's relationship with other African countries evolved over time – this is because material conditions changed, as did the decision-makers (the presidents Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma show that personalities matter). Furthermore, when interests of domestic actors

(government, political formations, business, civil society) overlap, it produced a convergence of views (the 'national interest') but this cannot be assumed to be static as it changes dynamically over time.

Two distinct post-apartheid phases in the South African government's relationship with the region and the continent can be distinguished. The first was the period between 1994 and 1998, aptly framed by Chris Alden and Garth le Pere as a human rights crusade.³ During this period, the government exercised a 'morally superior attitude' towards the continent. It was also the time when South African commercial interests started to expand into the Southern African region. The ANC-led Government of National Unity (GNU) took a strong stand on human rights abuses in Nigeria (under Abacha at that time) and elsewhere. Mandela lectured the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on the virtues of human rights and good governance.

African responses to South Africa's foreign policy and diplomacy demonstrated the limits of this approach, and by the time the 1998 crisis in Lesotho broke the government followed its peace-making efforts with military intervention. The politically controversial and poorly executed exercise became a turning point in South Africa's thinking about the management of its foreign policy. It was also the time of transition from Mandela to Mbeki, and so, apart from a 'software upgrade' (introducing centralised and harmonised decision-making structures), a new, less antagonistic approach became more apparent: multilateralism.

The impetus behind the next phase (1999–2008) was the decision-makers' realisation of the limits of unilateralism, the value of peer pressure (or peer recognition), and an understanding of the damage caused by corporate plundering in the region and beyond. The focus of government shifted to the strengthening of the tools of multilateral diplomacy such as SADC and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In operational terms, Mbeki's vision of an African Renaissance also became clearer and found expression in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad).⁴ A broad consensus emerged that South Africa's national interest – or more specifically its African interests – would be served through these policy instruments.

In the area of peace making and the promotion of governance and post-conflict reconstruction, South Africa also made an impact. Indeed, for African politicians and rebel leaders eager to cut deals, Pretoria became the interlocutor – and destination – of choice. These efforts included bilateral and multilateral South African involvement in peace making, governance and post-conflict reconstruction processes in some seventeen countries in Africa: Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia/Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe.⁵

FRAMING THE DEBATE: THE CONTESTED NATURE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The international environment is not always amenable to peace making. International relations scholars often argue that the world has followed two paths to peace; one pursues the use of *military* power, the other *political* solutions. A third perspective has also attracted attention: rather than seeing war and peace as a dichotomy, both exist along a continuum, with war as a long-term struggle for political ends. Optimists and idealists see political cooperation as the mark of contemporary international relations. Much of this cooperation is meant to address the big issues of peace and security, with the UN attempting to play an overarching role, from 1945 onward, in the maintenance of international security. Despite this liberal notion, competition and conflict characterise international relations as much as does cooperation – both impulses driven by the idea of the national interest – and therefore one should view approaches to peace with some scepticism. Motivated by Western notions of modernity, and instilled with capitalist and liberal democratic frames of interaction, a comprehensive security regime – values, structures and practices – arose in the attempt to maintain the key features of the dominant neoliberal world order. Where violent conflict interrupts its business, interventions (sometimes peaceful, sometimes forceful) take place to restore order (dominant powers often provoke violent conflicts in order to advance national interests).

One of the biggest drivers of the current global political economy, the global arms trade and the associated military-industrial complex, forms part of the foreign policy agendas of the rich and powerful. Hence peace (and disarmament) becomes a secondary objective – trumped by the notion of ‘stability’ and ‘order’. Taken together, the idea of a post-Cold War, post-ideological international system able to police itself to protect the vulnerable is, as Galbreath recently argued, an illusion.⁶ As Daley notes, peace negotiations ought to be seen, not primarily as attempts to end warfare and promote social justice, but as arenas of political struggles, beyond that envisaged between the belligerents, owing to the prevalence of a multitude of supporting actors seeking to promote vested interests.⁷

In pursuing peace, actors – typically states and collectives of states, but also non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society formations – resort to crisis management and conflict resolution, the latter involving conflict prevention, peace making, peace keeping and peace building. In this sense, a comprehensive global security architecture exists today, constructed and maintained primarily by the rich and powerful members of the international community, complemented by those aspiring to greater power status, all working through the UN family. Implementation

vehicles exist in the form of the premier collective security alliance of the rich North, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as a range of other alliances in the East, Latin America and Africa; the so-called Chapter 8 Organizations in the UN Charter lexicon. This international security regime with a global spread is, as earlier suggested, not without its problems, and seems trapped in the foreign and security policies and strategies of the United States (primarily, but not limited to, the 'war on terror') which means it has become entangled in the morass of war making and peace making in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Neither do the instruments of peace making and peace keeping always work to maximum effect – political interventions are seen by the hapless victims of violent conflict as biased or inadequate. Peace keeping in particular – currently a US\$7,8 billion annual affair, involving over 120 000 deployed personnel on fifteen missions – is in desperate need of revision (on the agenda at the moment but clearly an uphill struggle, given the lengthy recovery of the global economy).⁸ In addition, many argue that peace is an industry in the West whereby consultants, international NGOs and peace industry experts seek to manipulate the process for their own purposes.

These dynamics and contradictions continue. The tragedies of Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and parts of the Arab world provide, perhaps, the best illustration. Africa, too, faces these external forces, whereby national interests often drive the political economy of extraction and violence such as in parts of the DRC, Sudan and Libya. Combined with a broad range of intra-state drivers of conflicts, African peace and security remain an intimidating vision. This is not to say that Africa is unable or unwilling to explore the opportunities for conflict resolution. Collective African leadership infused with visionary roles by influential leaders can bring, and has brought, an end to various protracted conflicts in Africa.

Before an exploration of the application and impact of South Africa's peace diplomacy in Africa, a brief overview of the tools and techniques employed by those who pursue conflict resolution is presented.

CONFLICT, CONFLICT RESOLUTION TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES, AND THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE⁹

CONFLICT

Conflict refers to parties' attempts to pursue incompatible ends. Thus, conflicts are intrinsically non-violent. They may turn violent, but violence is not their inherent aspect, merely a potential form or means that conflicts may adopt. Internal conflicts, like interstate conflicts, can be political,

economic, social, cultural or perceptual, and structural, and they can move from normal politics to violence.

Internal conflicts can be centralist or regionalist. Centralist conflicts are disputes over the central authority. Insurgents fight either to replace the government or to be included in it, and governments fight back to resist being replaced or sharing power with the insurgents. Regionalist conflicts aim at self-determination through secession or regional autonomy.

Both centralist and regionalist conflicts involve high stakes. Left on their own, the parties strive mainly for zero-sum outcomes, usually attainable only at a very high cost. Both parties to a centralist conflict want to rule the state exclusively; both parties in a regionalist conflict want to rule a part of the state exclusively. It is within this zero-sum context that intermediaries try to intervene in internal conflicts. The objective of the intervention is not to assist either party to gain outright victory, but to break the impasse and bring the parties to a level where they would be able to settle for a compromise or a win-win outcome.

PEACE MAKING

Peace making is typically divided into three major phases. The first is the preparatory phase. Its main objective is to create an environment through which conflicting parties can be brought to the negotiating table. In negotiation theory this is referred to as diagnosis, pre-mediation, or pre-negotiation. It can also be referred to as entry, gaining access or, simply, 'getting into' mediation. The second is the mediation phase in which parties to a conflict are involved in the actual substantive negotiations with the help of a mediator. The third phase is the post-settlement phase in which efforts are made to implement the mediated agreement. The peace-making approach (and language) complements the approaches and language of African security sector officials and policy-makers. They talk of conflict management, by which they mean some or all of the following: peace making, peace keeping/peace missions/peace support operations, and post-conflict reconstruction and development.

MEDIATION AND THE ROLE OF MEDIATORS

Mediation is one of the specific forms of the intermediary roles in the broader processes of negotiation. While negotiation refers to the peaceful means of resolving conflict through dialogue, mediation in its intermediary capacity facilitates the dialogue between the conflicting parties, particularly in a situation where they are unable, by themselves, to conduct the negotiations. This introduces an external component to the conflict.

Generally referred to as a 'third party' in the literature on the topic, the intermediary intervenes to shape, either by invitation or by other means, the relationship between cooperative and competitive interests. This refers to a situation where disputants are sufficiently cooperative to be willing to invite or accept the intrusion of one or more external (third) parties who may be able to break the conflictual stalemate.

Mediators are distinguished as those on 'track one', consisting of official mediators representing states and intergovernmental Organizations, and those on 'track two', constituting either NGOs or private persons. Across the two tracks, intermediaries can be discussed either as individuals or as institutions. All mediation – indeed all diplomacy – is done by individuals, and individual interaction is crucial to the practice and study of mediation. However, the institutions for which they speak make a crucial difference in their operation and effectiveness.

PEACE DIPLOMACY: THE RECORD

To what extent did these mediation techniques and peace process requirements inform South Africa's peace diplomacy? This is the question which is addressed below.

INTERVENTIONS WITH A LOW IMPACT

The South African government's exercise of soft power, understood as the ability to co-opt key interests in following the African Renaissance and Nepad agendas, can particularly be illustrated by reference to its peace-making efforts in Africa.¹⁰ Of course, not all its conflict resolution interventions can be regarded as successful. In what Peter Kagwanja called South Africa's 'age of unilateralism', its nose was bloodied on a number of occasions.¹¹ South Africa's mid-1990s foreign policy goals of contributing to stability and a return to democracy in, for example, Nigeria, initially produced negligible results – other factors contributed to a breakthrough in the crisis, including Abacha's (and Abiola's) unexpected deaths, events that opened the door for a reconfiguration of political relations and processes of bargaining and negotiation.

Elsewhere, the South African government failed in its attempts to persuade the Angolan, Mozambican and Congolese (DRC) governments to shift their approaches away from military confrontation with rebel movements to that of a negotiated settlement and the adoption of a government of national unity.¹² In the case of Angola and Mozambique, the liberation movements Unita (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola)

and Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) were defeated in the 1990s through a combination of warfare and political divide-and-rule tactics. At the same time, the South African government also failed to prevent its colleagues in the SADC from engaging militarily in the DRC war.¹³ Attempts to quietly influence the key players in Zimbabwe to adopt a power-sharing arrangement, initially showed no signs of success. As the deputy foreign minister, Aziz Pahad, said in 2003, '... our efforts at negotiations are not working but we don't have an option',¹⁴ and the South African government opted for 'quiet diplomacy'. At an Extra-Ordinary Summit in March 2007, SADC heads of state requested President Mbeki to continue to facilitate dialogue between the opposition and the government.¹⁵ This proved to be a controversial appointment, as he was seen by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) as pro-Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (Zanu PF). The 2008 elections in Zimbabwe were marked by high levels of violence and intimidation, more so than in previous rounds, and produced a stalemate, which opened the door to a negotiated power-sharing agreement and a halt to economic disintegration. The so-called 'inclusive government' was never a popular arrangement and over time it became less credible, given the nature of the struggle between the parties: a zero-sum, and often violent, contest for control over the state and its resources. By 2010, it became clear that despite the best efforts of the mediating team headed by Mbeki – and his successor, Jacob Zuma – the power-sharing agreement had reached the end of its usefulness. The internal parties, SADC, the AU and external interests are all nervously anticipating the forthcoming national elections, possibly in 2012, with or without the finalisation of a constitutional process.

To what extent can the South African government's intervention in the Zimbabwe crisis be regarded as successful – meaning ensuring peace and stability to enable economic recovery and good governance? Analyses and assessments are polarised. There are three broad interpretations. The first, from a liberal perspective, argues that liberation struggle politics (solidarity among Southern African liberation movements, apprehension of Western-backed popular opposition forces) displaced South Africa's foreign policy principles relating to the promotion of human rights and democracy, hence 'quietly' allowing the Mugabe regime to stay in power. More robust instruments (such as sanctions and other forms of intervention) could have been applied to resolve the crisis. The second, from a left perspective, argues that the South African government's policy on Zimbabwe flows from the interests of the new black bourgeoisie (which in turn are tied to the interests of the ruling ANC).¹⁶

Rather than seeing the South African government as fully captured by an economic and class project, it is worth exploring its role as

SADC-sanctioned mediator. In September 2008, the mediators brokered a power-sharing agreement, the Global Political Agreement (GPA), between Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai, in which Mugabe remained president and Tsvangirai became prime minister. However, owing to ministerial differences between their respective political parties, the GPA was not fully implemented until 13 February 2009, two days after the swearing-in of Tsvangirai as prime minister of Zimbabwe.

This achievement should also be seen in the context of regional diplomacy relating to the crisis in Zimbabwe. As noted by South African diplomats, SADC's shared interests have driven South Africa's intervention, and this united SADC framework will continue to inform South Africa's expected role. Foreign Ministry Director General Ayanda Ntsaluba explained the South African economic interest by noting that '... we would do everything possible to ensure we speed up the process of the Zimbabwean economy regaining its place because it is an important trading partner for South Africa and an economically viable and vibrant Zimbabwe is in the best interests of South Africa'.¹⁷

The GPA was the result of an enormous power struggle. As the Southern African Liaison Office (SALO) notes, '[o]n the one side is a violent militarised section within Zanu PF, an elite benefiting enormously from its ongoing hold on state power. On the other is a coalition of democrats, moderates and opportunists presented with little choice other than to accept the tenuous way forward presented to them by the SADC mediation intervention'.¹⁸ The analysis further notes that the stop and start manner in which the various clauses within the agreement are being implemented and violated illustrate its status as an ongoing site of contestation. Ultimately, the SALO analysis notes: 'Unless there is a blatant attempt at a military seizure of power – which SADC will not accept – diplomacy-driven attempts at stabilising Zimbabwe through a rebuilding of its economy and slow and painful efforts to democratise, will continue to be the order of the day'.¹⁹

An analysis of the role of SADC and South Africa in managing the crisis in Zimbabwe concluded with a comment on South Africa's motives.²⁰ It noted that the worst-case scenario – from the perspective of Zimbabwe's neighbours – would be a slide into civil war or anarchy, with the disintegration of the security services and the collapse of the state into warring factions. According to this analysis, South Africa will do everything in its power to prevent this – and it believes it has to deal with Zanu PF in order to do so. It rules out a military deployment, in the belief that South Africa (or SADC for that matter) does not have the capacity or political will to do so. The worst-case scenario is not a given, however. Several possible outcomes following the 2012 elections can be anticipated, including a renegotiated inclusive government.

INTERVENTIONS WITH A HIGH IMPACT

This apparent bleak record must be seen in the context of successful interventions elsewhere. The joint Botswana/South Africa military intervention – seemingly under the auspices of the SADC – in Lesotho in September 1998 is criticised by many as a failure. Despite the shortcomings of Operation Boleas, the fact remains that military action was taken after it became apparent that Lesotho was in the throes of a violent mutiny, and that the intervention (Zimbabwe declined participation on the grounds of commitments elsewhere) succeeded in stabilising the situation in order for a process of political negotiations on a new constitution and voting system to take off.

In the case of the DRC, the South African government's persistence in playing the role of peace maker also paid off. As Southall notes, 'South Africa has played a *major role in steering the peace processes* [own emphasis] in both Burundi and the DRC, while also strongly backing AU initiatives with regard to the implementation of the CPA in Sudan'.²¹ In the DRC, after a failed start by Mandela in 1997 to bring Laurent-Désiré Kabila and Mobutu Sese Seko together on the basis of a government of national unity, from 2000 onwards South Africa pursued a comprehensive strategy of peace making – drawn-out, costly and at times hovering on stalling, but nevertheless worthwhile. Despite ongoing violence in the east of the DRC, the Sun City talks in 2002 in South Africa and the subsequent Pretoria agreements of 2002 to 2003 laid the foundation for a credible peace and opened the door to the post-war reconstruction of Congolese society.²² South African soldiers made up a large contingent (also in leadership terms) of the UN Peace Mission in the DRC (MONUC). At the same time, the South African government has deployed personnel from seven different state departments to assist the Congolese with issues of governance and administration.

In the same Great Lakes region, following the Arusha Accord of 2000, war-torn Burundi became the recipient of the South African government's exercise of soft power. Under the leadership of senior government leaders Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and Charles Nqakula, peace processes were kept alive, leading to relative stability, boosted in no small measure by the presence of the South African National Defence Force (eventually assisted by other nations in the first AU peace mission). Kagwanja describes the inauguration in 2005 of President Nkurunziza as marking the high point in South Africa's peace diplomacy on the continent.²³

Khadiagala is similarly of the view that South Africa's 'bold and assertive leadership' role in the Great Lakes region helped to midwife the DRC's difficult transition; had carved itself a vital role in rule making and norm creation in the Great Lakes region; and now plays a key role as interlocutor between the Southern African and Eastern African sub-regions.²⁴

INTERVENTIONS WITH A MIXED IMPACT

An assessment of South African mediation and participation in peace processes elsewhere in Africa yields mixed results.

Coup-prone Comoros received South African attention when the AU mandated it to lead a diplomatic intervention. A series of peace-making sessions led to a new political dispensation and relative stability. In June 2007, individual island elections on Grande Comore and Moheli were held on schedule and judged to have been free and fair. On Anjouan, however, the island governor Mohamed Bacar refused to step down and held a sham election declaring himself island governor for another term. In March 2008, against President Mbeki's advice, Comorian and AU forces (800 troops from Tanzania and Sudan) restored constitutional rule on Anjouan. A new election for island governor was held peacefully in June 2008 even though prospects for peace and stability arguably remain bleak.

In the Côte d'Ivoire, as the political-military crisis was deepening and as sub-regional mediation efforts were continuing to fail, President Mbeki was appointed mediator of the AU in November 2004. Under his leadership, the country pulled back from the brink of war. Flowing from an April 2005 meeting in Pretoria between President Mbeki and the principal political leaders of the Côte d'Ivoire, the South African government undertook to support the admittedly unstable peace process in the areas of disarmament, the demobilisation and reintegration process, security, elections and ongoing consultations.

Despite initial diplomatic success, a range of factors conspired to bring Mbeki's role as mediator to a premature end. In an incisive assessment, Francis Akindes identified several weaknesses of the South African mediation: Mbeki's 'weak spot' for one side – President Laurent Gbagbo (which infuriated the opposition and led to it calling for the rejection of the mediator); the perception – and accusation by influential UN and AU voices – that the mediation lacked impartiality in its management of the conflict; Mbeki's partial interpretation of the causes of the conflict, displaying an anti-France sentiment (in the process undervaluing the regional dimension as well as identity issues). Finally, a belief among some is that the real motivation behind South Africa's mediation was to advance South Africa's economic interests.²⁵ Delphine Lecoutre adds a fifth weakness: despite carrying an AU mandate, Mbeki's preference was to work alone.²⁶ As she notes, during his mediation he made no attempts to marshal regional or continental resources in coherent response to the Ivorian crisis. At no time did he consult with the AU Commission in Pretoria. She suggests that he could have convened an experts' meeting to gather insights

into the crisis, and he could have consulted comprehensively with key regional actors.

PEACE DIPLOMACY: TOOLS OF THE TRADE

A good example of the South African government's exercise of soft power during the period under review relates to its capacity-building programmes which bring state resources into play by involving the non-state sector, from nongovernmental Organizations pursuing 'dialogue' and tertiary institutions providing management training, to big business exploring commercial opportunities. South Africa's Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) has become a popular strategic tool in the government's Africa policy. This broad approach was not new or original, but in the African setting its application by a local actor, with apparent peer acquiescence, was unique in its scope and breath: clearly a demonstration of soft power at work. As Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma remarked, '... it provides us with a great opportunity to carry the African Renaissance forward and to promote the advantages of peaceful transition'.²⁷

The principal mechanism for implementing this approach was via the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF). Established in 2001, the ARF replaced the Department of Foreign Affairs Technical Assistance Fund.²⁸ The aim of the ARF was described in the legislation as to identify and fund projects and programmes aimed at the promotion of democracy, conflict prevention and resolution, socio-economic development, humanitarian assistance and human resource development in Africa, by way of the granting of loans or rendering of other financial assistance. The ARF budget grew from R50 million in 2001/4 to R931 million in 2009/10 (dropping to R430 million in 2010/11).²⁹

South Africa's approach to the crises in Sudan and the DRC illustrated the application of this foreign policy tool. In the former, it was initially appointed by the AU as chairing a committee on the reconstruction of Sudan. However, the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) of 2004 required that the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement of South Sudan (SPLM) constitute a government for South Sudan and nominate members to form part of central government in Khartoum. The South African government calculated that a key ingredient of a successful transition would be the ability of the SPLM to take up the task of governing the South. It then invited the senior leadership cadre of the SPLM to Pretoria to engage with key South African institutions of governance and administration in a series of intensive, on-the-job training programmes. However, a more cynical interpretation of the

South African government's motives in supporting the South Sudanese is made by Laurie Nathan who argues:

'Although Pretoria's positive relationship with Sudan in the face of the Darfur catastrophe is inconsistent with a commitment to human rights and democracy it is not surprising or anomalous. It reflects many of the core economic, political and ideological elements of South Africa's foreign policy: growing commercial interests on the continent; a strategic need for oil; a desire to contribute to peace and stability in Africa, in this case by promoting the implementation of the CPA and the deployment of UNAMID [United Nations Africa Union Mission in Darfur]; and an anti-imperialist paradigm, which leads to solidarity with regimes that are under Western pressure, regardless of their human rights performance.'³⁰

The South African government has adopted a 'post conflict reconstruction and development approach' to the DRC. Informed by the AU's 2006 Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Programme (PCRD), up to twelve South African government departments were engaged in several projects to assist the DRC, mainly in the areas of institutional capacity building, security sector reform and economic development. In 2008, the ARF provided R101 million for projects in the DRC. Between 2008 and 2009, the ARF provided R613 million for projects in Zimbabwe.³¹

In the meantime, the South African government was using its elected position on the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member for two years (2007–2009) primarily to promote the African agenda. Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma noted that international support (particularly funding) for African conflict resolution and peace keeping was high on her government's agenda (although not necessarily on the P5's!), and as Deputy Foreign Minister Pahad remarked, the bulk of the Security Council's agenda was focused on African conflicts, and therefore:

We see our membership of the Security Council therefore allowing us to enhance the role that we are already playing in conflict resolution and peace building on the African continent.³²

South Africa has joined the Security Council for the second time, from 2011 to 2012 as a non-permanent member, together with Gabon and fellow Southern countries Nigeria, Brazil and India, which means the so-called Brazil-Russia-India-China and South Africa (BRICS) alliance has representation on the Security Council for a short period). South Africa also chairs the Council's Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention in Africa. The African agenda remains focused on the DRC, Sudan, Somalia, Côte d'Ivoire,

and the democratic revolutions in North Africa. To complicate matters, associated thematic issues relevant to Africa include peace-keeping reform as well as the complex interface between the UN and the AU and its regional economic communities, the internationalisation of conflict, the growing threat of terrorism, weapons proliferation, the increase in crime and drugs, and the impact of the global economic recession on human security.

CURRENT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

The South African government's view of the country's continental role, initially infused with notions of human rights activism, has been tempered by the realities of the African condition. This 'reality check' has hardly made the ANC leadership reactionary or its foreign policy schizophrenic, as critics claim.³³ Policy-making adjustments under the Mbeki administration allowed peace making, peace keeping, and post-conflict reconstruction to be implemented with modest, yet growing, success.³⁴ This has led one scholar to passionately declare South Africa an 'international norms entrepreneur'.³⁵ There is no doubt that under the Zuma administration, these strategic objectives remain key – although a new cast of characters usually brings new nuances to established approaches.

We are of the impression that despite current domestic and resource constraints, the current Zuma administration is not deviating from the Renaissance/Nepad template crafted by previous administrations. Despite Mbeki's recall, foreign policy-making and implementation is marked more by continuity than by change. This is demonstrated by DIRCO's strategic priorities for the period 2010 to 2013:

- Enhance African agenda and sustainable development
- Strengthen political and economic integration of SADC
- Strengthen South–South relations
- Strengthen relations with strategic formations of the North
- Participate in the Global System of Governance
- Strengthen political and economic relations³⁶

In addition, the minister of international relations and cooperation noted that the pursuit of South Africa's foreign policy objectives needed alignment and coordination of economic diplomacy across all spheres of government; strengthening economic diplomatic capacity in missions and improving efforts aimed at 'marketing the brand South Africa and Africa abroad.' She also noted the need to '... elevate our capacity to respond rapidly, effectively and timeously to the President's foreign policy needs'.³⁷

One priority of this foreign policy agenda relates to the idea of trilateral development cooperation in support of peace and security in Africa, to be pursued via a development partnership agency. We examine this development below.

PURSUING THE DEVELOPMENTAL AGENDA: TRILATERAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

The concept of trilateral development cooperation arose from the renewed interest among Western countries of the role of 'new', 'emerging' or 'non-Western' donors, meaning countries pursuing development assistance or aid programmes but who fall outside the ambit of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The current term for this collection is 'non-DAC donors' (NDDs).³⁸ The Group of Eight (G8), OECD and World Bank coined the term 'triangular cooperation' by which a DAC and non-DAC donor cooperate in development programmes in a third country.³⁹ Clearly, using the DAC as the point of reference to categorise and describe a wide array of 'other' donors – from China, Mexico, and Turkey to Saudi Arabia – needs critical appraisal which is beyond the ambit of this chapter.⁴⁰ Despite these reservations the essay considers South Africa to be a 'new' or 'emerging' cooperating partner and uses the term 'trilateral development cooperation' to distinguish it from the term 'trilateral cooperation' that is being used by the South African government to refer to cooperation between Brazil, India and itself.

Applied to South Africa, the 'cooperation' part of the newly named Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) is in line with the ANC's 2007 national conference (Polokwane) resolution which proposed a South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) which together with the recently established Pan-African Infrastructure Development Fund could be used as instruments to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).⁴¹

Indeed, the South African government's peace diplomacy – which we defined above as its continued involvement in continental peace making, multidimensional peace support, and post-conflict reconstruction and development (the exercise of its soft power) – is consolidated into a structure that will enable these diverse activities to be managed more holistically and professionally. In December 2009, the South African Cabinet approved the establishment of the SADPA. It is clear that the current ARF, its programmes and projects, implementing structures and staff, will have to be integrated into the SADPA. This process is located at DIRCO, yet the National Treasury, and in particular its international development cooperation unit, seems to be playing a critical role in providing systems for financial management and accountability.⁴²

There is much to be said for the South African government creating a structure and strategies for coordinating the planning, implementation and monitoring of the various ongoing development cooperation activities across departments and agencies. As discussed above, this includes the management of funding, whether from government as a provider of development assistance or via trilateral cooperation agreements involving International Cooperation Partners (ICPs) and/or other international agencies. Between 2008 and 2010, the South African government announced trilateral cooperation arrangements with the following 'partners': the Nordic countries (but also specifically with Sweden on Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Rwanda, DRC and Sudan, and with Finland on biosciences); with Cuba, on healthcare in Africa; with India, on business opportunities in Africa; with Germany, on the environment, culture and peace support operations in SADC; with the EU, on peace building, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction; and with the Netherlands, on SSR in the Great Lakes region. It remains to be seen, however, how this approach will overcome the inherent challenges of bureaucratisation, burden sharing, political manoeuvring around ownership, and the ever-present if not dominant influence of the so-called national interest. It is also unclear to what extent this structure and these strategies will incorporate the South African government's stabilisation agenda (peace making and peace keeping).

PEACE KEEPING: POLICY AND OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES

The motivation for South Africa's military involvement in peace diplomacy was cogently explained by Lindiwe Sisulu, the minister of defence, in Parliament in 2011.⁴³ In her view:

... the presence of our armed forces on the continent makes us one of the major role players ... Our armed forces have saved lives, prevented humanitarian disasters and degeneration into total anarchy in some areas of deployment by restoring state authority. Peace and stability of the African continent is in our best interest economically, politically, morally and socially. Our military deployments will continue, not only because they project our foreign policy objectives, but also because peace is the critical catalyst for enhanced regional, economic and political integration.

As of 2010, the SANDF participated in five so-called peace support operations in the DRC, Burundi, Sudan, Nepal and Uganda. It further participated in two general military assistance operations in the DRC and the CAR. On average, a total of 2 894 members, including 148 reserve members, were deployed in these external missions.⁴⁴ Operations in Burundi were completed and terminated at the end of 2009. Military assistance to the CAR

continues. In the DRC, operations were terminated in March 2010 after the integration of combatants into the defence force of the DRC.

Despite, or perhaps because of, this peace-keeping record, South Africans debate the question of the extent to which the South African security sector, and in particular the SANDF, is appropriately designed and equipped to undertake peace keeping. Nibishaka, for example, notes that: 'South Africa has no qualms about assuming a leadership role on the continent. In practice, however ... there is a plethora of serious problems. The military is ... shackled by redundant equipment, ineffective management, a lack of economic and human resources, poor discipline, and a serious dearth of political foresight, among others.'⁴⁵

In response, government is finalising several policy frameworks to deal with these and related questions. A revised White Paper on South African participation in international peace missions is intended to guide South Africa in this endeavour. Most of the preparatory work has also been undertaken by NGOs, although the final product is not yet public. The policy drafters define 'peace missions' very broadly to include preventive diplomacy, peace making, peace keeping, peace building, peace enforcement, post-conflict reconstruction and development and, finally, humanitarian assistance and intervention.

The rationale for the revised policy framework is in line with South African foreign policy (itself in the process of being codified in a White Paper) and is informed by an understanding of the nexus between peace, security and development. As such, the South African government has adopted a long-term peace-keeping vision. It believes that there are no quick solutions to resolving complex conflicts. Peace missions, in its view, should be viewed as long-term endeavours that seek to address the root causes of conflict and achieve human security. Such missions demand a significant investment in context-specific partnerships for conflict prevention, peace making, peace keeping, peace building and post-conflict reconstruction and development.

When it comes to policy implementation, the drafters of the revised policy seem to suggest clearer decision-making approaches and procedures. They also specify a range of principles that ought to guide decisions (drawn from UN policy frameworks), including a clear mandate, consent, impartiality, minimum use of force, credibility, legitimacy, promotion of national and local ownership, entry/transition/exit strategy, adequate means, transparency and unity of effort.

As before, the National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) at DIRCO remains responsible for coordinating all aspects relating to the country's response to a request for assisting or participating in a UN or AU-mandated peace mission. The president authorises deployment,

pending approval by Parliament. Parliament must also appropriate finances for deployments, with the understanding that the country will be reimbursed for deployment costs by the mandating authority.

South Africa's biggest challenge at the level of the AU remains the quest for a more effective, efficient and capable actor to undertake peace making, peace keeping and peace building. The continent's security policies, structures and practices – also known as the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) within which South Africa locates its peace support activities – is a critical pillar of the country's peace diplomacy. A robust and implementable APSA would inspire engagement by South African foreign policy and security decision-makers.

Some analysts interpret the emerging APSA as a continent-wide application of the responsibility to protect (R2P) principles of prevention, reaction and rebuilding.⁴⁶ Reflecting this approach, the building blocks of the APSA include the AU Commission, the AU Peace and Security Council, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force, the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund. However, when one analyses the APSA one finds a familiar lament: lack of political will, of coordination, and of financing.

Kristiana Powell recently wrote:

'The experience of AMIB and AMIS (African peace keeping in Burundi and Sudan respectively) demonstrate that the AU requires extensive financial, logistical and political support from the international community in order to fulfil its commitments to peace and security, including the protection of civilians. An examination of donor commitments ... also raises critical questions of how to appropriately sequence immediate relief and recovery activities, and longer-term strategies to reduce poverty and build a sustainable peace.'⁴⁷

The question remains: does Africa have the capacity to implement peace diplomacy? By employing insights from regime theory, Engel and Porto conclude that the future of the APSA will depend largely on a strong and effective AU (in concert with members and regional economic communities).⁴⁸ They downplay the role of 'dominant powers' (Nigeria and South Africa) in favour of what they call institutionalised behaviour, to be achieved when all members *internalise* the principles, norms and rules that underpin the APSA. This latter political process of 'cognition' and 'learning' suggests a rather slow evolution, and it is unclear, in light of the three challenges above, how Africa will manage in the interim – hence this chapter's argument in favour of South Africa's maintaining its 'hegemonic' (meaning leadership) role in Africa.

Finally, the shapers of the South African government's stabilisation agenda ought to reflect on a growing literature (well presented by, among

others, Alex de Waal) of the perils of peace making, especially when external actors naively misread conditions for intervention.⁴⁹ The argument is that well-meaning peace makers and peace keepers should understand the nature of the 'African political marketplace' prior to engaging parties to a conflict. If they do not develop a sufficient understanding of the ways in which states with weak institutions and strong patrimonial marketplaces function, they are likely to become entangled in a local and regional political dynamic which will not release them for years to come – conjuring up the spectre of endless peace keeping.⁵⁰

DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS

Despite these developments and potential improvements, the South African government remains hampered by a relatively weak domestic base. Even though South Africa's economy is much bigger than the combined economies of other Southern African states, resources are constrained by factors such as poverty and unemployment, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, a fragile racial reconciliation, and (more recently) the impact of the global financial crisis. Patrick McGowan captured this dilemma best when he argued that economic growth since the mid-1990s has not been strong enough to lower the unemployment rate (at least 30%), resulting in great (and perhaps growing) inequality (50% of the population lives in poverty); an HIV/AIDS pandemic affecting one out of every five adult South Africans, and emerging political and civil service corruption.⁵¹ This chapter does not allow a full exploration of the relationship between the domestic and the foreign, except to recognise the impact of 'the normalisation of uneven development' on policy choices.⁵² As Zwelinzima Vavi of the trade union movement the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) lamented, quoting Lenin, 'no amount of political freedom will satisfy the hungry masses'.⁵³

Additional problems relate to the quality of the South African government's foreign and security policy-making and the state's implementation capacities. Research and analysis by the government's National Planning Commission (NPC) suggested the state remains weak in several areas of policy-making and implementation – a legacy of disastrous educational practices and poverty and inequality profiles.⁵⁴ In 2003, in a comprehensive and penetrating analysis of the South African government's policy-making relating to peace operations, Kent and Malan have already found that 'success in peace keeping comes from carefully selecting which missions best reflect South Africa's national interests. Therefore, the decision to determine which mission to support requires consultation, coordination, and cooperation.'⁵⁵ This resonates with our research and findings relating to South African crisis decision-making and our conclusions, below, regarding

the need for the development of a long-term and coordinated foreign and security policy framework.⁵⁶

CONCLUSION: PEACE DIPLOMACY IN SERVICE OF THE NATION OR THE ELITE?

It is true that South Africa's emerging middle power role was exercised with the close involvement of external powers – part of Mbeki's Renaissance/Nepad approach. Whether this always happened to South Africa's benefit is hard to determine. On the one hand, a shifting focus from aid to dialogue and partnership in order to achieve poverty eradication and the MDGs played into South Africa's hands. If anything, the South African government is exercising a similar option with the establishment of the SADPA – potentially a key feature of its evolving foreign policy approach. On the other hand, external powers always pursue narrow political and economic interests in Africa, and the South African government's close association with Western powers (especially via the G8 and Davos meetings) has drawn criticism from many quarters.⁵⁷ The key critique is that close cooperation with Northern donors pushes South Africa to play the role as proxy for Western interests: a view that suggests that, far from reshaping the global order and the South's role in it, South Africa gets co-opted onto the Western agenda of regime change and acts to make the continent 'safe for international business'.

Stabilising the continent was thought by many commentators to be led by Nigeria and South Africa. However the notion of an Abuja–Pretoria axis is now passé. As with the African Renaissance and Nepad constructs, the axis idea depended to a large extent on the fortunes of two influential leaders – Obasanjo and Mbeki – both of whom are out of power. It remains to be seen to what extent the renewed focus by the South African government on key aspects of the current Nepad agenda will bear fruit. The promotion of an infrastructure project focusing on road and rail (the North–South corridor) looks promising, but can we also expect a revitalised Jonathan–Zuma continental leadership role?

Furthermore, South Africa's Africa role has been challenged, until recently, by Libya's Colonel Gaddafi and, closer to home, Zimbabwe and Angola. Based on their political rhetoric and military interventions in the region, Zimbabwe and Angola constitute an alternative or 'counter-hegemonic' pole to that of South Africa. Whether it continues to be in their interests to counter South Africa's regional and continental ambitions seems unlikely. On the contrary, strong bilateral relations with Angola and a future stable and recovering Zimbabwe will strengthen South Africa's role in the new BRICS alliance of Southern powers.

Is South Africa's emerging middle power role on the continent and in the global South sustainable? Its power and influence depend on a number of factors. There was, and is, an intimate relationship between its domestic base and foreign policy. The Zuma administration is attempting to harmonise domestic economic imperatives with its foreign policy posture – hence the emphasis on constructing a coherent concept of ‘national interest’ and prioritising economic diplomacy. This is partly based on the interdependent relationship between South Africa and Africa. Given its position in the global political-economic hierarchy, South Africa is in need of markets and credibility. The European Union was South Africa's biggest trading partner (by all accounts now overtaken by China) but Africa is its biggest export market. This is a key motivating factor for seeking to stabilise the continent. The continent in return benefits from South Africa as supplier of goods and services. As Daniel and Bhengu noted in 2009, ‘... the South African footprint in the African marketplace today remains considerable and grows each year’.⁵⁸

South Africa's corporate ambitions in Africa seem to be one of the key motivating factors explaining its forays into African peace making. Others talk of a policy ‘contradiction’ whereby involvement in peace making and peace keeping is motivated by a humanistic impulse in the ANC and government (to alleviate suffering on the continent) as well as expectations of economic payback (whereby investment in peace processes is expected to reap benefits).⁵⁹ Recall Laurie Nathan's impressions of the motivations behind the South African government's Sudan approach: growing commercial interests on the continent (and a strategic need for oil), a desire to contribute to peace and stability in Africa, and an anti-imperialist paradigm, which leads to solidarity with regimes that are under Western pressure, regardless of their human rights performance.

Our interaction with officials and others involved in South Africa's peace diplomacy leads us to conclude that these varied impulses all mark the South African government's decision-making processes and that choices are not easily constructed. In other words, the humanistic impulse is the default setting, moderated by an increasingly hard-nosed assessment of expected benefits to be gained following the initial peace-making and peace-keeping investment.

Are there avenues to pursue in order to break out of this apparent contradiction? For one, the creation of the SADPA as an instrument to give effect to the pursuit of trilateral development cooperation is a welcome development and holds much promise – but only if it can overcome the inherent bureaucratic and other obstacles identified in the discussion above.

South Africa also needs ‘peace diplomats’. The current pressing global dynamics of an economic and security nature, the urgent stabilisation and

developmental needs of the southern African region and continent, and the paradox of South Africa – a regional superpower, burdened by domestic inequality, poverty and unemployment – require its government to develop a new kind of diplomat: internationalist in outlook, but who understands globalisation from an African perspective; one who is skilled in balancing the demands of economic opportunity with facilitating peace making and recovery. Diplomats with these skills are hard to come by, and conducting 'African peace diplomacy' is not easily done.

Robust policy frameworks are required to guide the content and operationalisation of peace diplomacy. The evolving White Paper on International Relations and Cooperation will provide for pragmatic implementation instruments (a foreign policy advisory council and SADPA among others). The redrafted White Paper on South African participation in Peace Missions should allow for improved policy-making, as should the expected review of the country's defence policy (although it must be noted that an overarching national security policy framework and strategy is lacking). In addition, the country's evolving trade policy frameworks, as well as the NPC's highly anticipated national vision, ought to complement the approach to peace diplomacy.

It is critical for South Africa's foreign, security and economic objectives to be formulated and implemented holistically in the long-term pursuit of African peace and development – the keystone of its ambitious international relations posture. This requires a harmonised foreign and security policy framework that is complementary to government's emerging trade and economic policy frameworks.

POST-SCRIPT: THE LIBYAN CHALLENGE TO SOUTH AFRICA'S PEACE DIPLOMACY

To what extent do current areas of violent conflict such as Libya in North Africa and a threatening all-out war between Sudan and South Sudan expose the limits to African peace-making, peace-keeping and post-conflict reconstruction and development? Is the resolution of conflicts in these cases beyond South Africa's exercise of power and influence and should it rather pursue more modest approaches via the UN and the AU? We offer a brief analysis of South Africa's response to the Libya crisis.

Many have expressed disappointment at the South African vote in favour of Resolution 1973, the now controversial decision by the UN Security Council on 17 March 2011 'to take all necessary measures' to protect civilians 'under threat of attack', by establishing a no-fly zone, an arms embargo, and an asset freeze. The resolution, however, also expressly excluded 'a

foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory'. South Africa voted in favour, as did the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Non-permanent members Nigeria and Gabon also voted in favour. China and Russia abstained, as did non-permanent members Germany and Brazil.

UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was adopted after it became clear that Gaddafi was ignoring the requirements of Resolution 1970, adopted by the UN Security Council on 26 February 2011, which demanded an end to the violation of human rights in Libya.

The problem with the implementation of these two resolutions related to the extent to which the civilian population was to be protected. Was the bombing of Gaddafi's military hardware enough, or was it to be extended to the man himself, including active support for the rebel forces in the east? It seems the representatives of the global South on the Security Council preferred action to protect civilians under threat of violence, and not for the mandate to be interpreted in favour of removing the Gaddafi regime, and sponsoring the creation of an armed political opposition. However, the power politics of the Council overrode such considerations.

Subsequent events demonstrated that a regime change agenda, as articulated by the US, France and the UK, and faithfully implemented by NATO, was driving the international intervention, with scant attention to the African approach for a negotiated political settlement. A cover of the United States foreign policy soft-sell magazine, *Time*, puts it well: 'What if he doesn't go? The war against Ghaddafi'. Sadly, the AU intervention, by the ad hoc high level panel led by President Zuma, made little impact on the ground.

The key driver of regime change in Libya, as argued by Horace Campbell, was 'competition between American and European petroleum interests, who are keen on dividing up the territory of Libya to ensure access to its vast oil resources'.⁶⁰ As to the credibility of the so-called pro-democracy forces, the transitional authority of Benghazi continues to display political and ideological weaknesses, hence complicating prospects for Libya's post-Gaddafi recovery and stabilisation.

The South African vote in favour of Resolution 1973 appears in hindsight to have been an error of judgement, for the increasingly brutal bombing campaign and defiant rebel-supporting activities were perhaps not anticipated. A critical 'first-cut' analysis of the decision-making process relating to the Libya crisis was offered by Landsberg and Moore.⁶¹ In their view, the current Zuma administration was keen to distance itself from the style of decision-making exercised by the previous Mbeki administration by ensuring that policy-making would become more consultative, deliberative and decentralised. The Libya vote (in favour of Resolution 1973) shows little of

this, and instead can be understood to be the end result of a loose style of decision-making. In their analysis, it appears to have been a personal decision by the president and key advisors around him who were convinced by powerful overseas counterparts to vote with them. In the process, key players – the Cabinet, DIRCO, Parliament, the ruling party – were marginalised, leading to what they call ‘... decisions based on diffusion and drift brought about by the existence of multiple centres of decision-making’.⁶² Clearly, more research needs to be undertaken to verify the thrust of their findings, especially as they suggest perverted processes of decision-making.

Learning from this fiasco, we suggest the Security Council's heavy hitters representing the interests of the global South – China, Brazil, India, Nigeria and South Africa, working with Russia – must act together to counter future regime-change manoeuvres in the guise of humanitarian assistance or protection of civilians.

As for the quality and consistency of the South African government's decision-making, the Libya crisis is a forceful contemporary demonstration of crisis decision-making in the context of chaos (‘do we know what is happening, and why?’) and complexity (‘what are our options?’). It reveals the extent to which South Africa needs coherent, consistent and integrated foreign and security policy frameworks, capable decision-makers in defining the situation and making strategic choices, and experienced officials in implementing them.

NOTES

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- 2 An ‘emerging middle power’ refers to a country of the global South with the ability to exercise power and influence, through hard and soft power, in order to shape its immediate neighbourhood and provide continental leadership in the pursuit of stability, development and good governance.
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- 4 The ‘African Renaissance’, a philosophical and political movement associated with its key architect, former South African president Thabo Mbeki, aims to end the violence, elitism, corruption and poverty that seem to plague the African continent, and replace them with a more just and equitable order. Mbeki proposes doing this by, inter alia, encouraging education and the reversal of the ‘brain drain’ of African intellectuals. Mbeki was also a co-architect, with presidents Wade, Bouteflika and Obasanjo, of the

- 'New Partnership for Africa's Development' (Nepad), a business plan launched in 2001 for the implementation of the African Renaissance, so to speak. It exists today as an implementation agency of the African Union, focusing its energies on continental infrastructure development and economic integration programmes.
- 5 Burger, D., 2006. *South African Yearbook 2005/6*. Pretoria: Government Communication and Information System (GCIS).
 - 6 Galbreath, D., 2008. An anatomy of peace-making. *International Studies Review* 10: 615.
 - 7 Daley, P., 2007. The Burundi peace negotiations: An African experience of peace making. *Review of African Political Economy* 112: 334.
 - 8 UN peace-keeping statistics at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml> [Accessed 10 July 2011].
 - 9 Insights in this section are drawn from personal experience, but also from Crocker, C., F. Hampson and P. Aall (eds), 2005. *Turbulent Peace: The challenges of managing international conflict*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace.
 - 10 Soft power is a concept developed by Joseph Nye. As he describes it, power is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes you want and there are several ways one can achieve this: you can coerce them with threats; you can induce them with payments; or you can attract and co-opt them to want what you want. This soft power – getting others to want the outcomes you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them. It can be contrasted with 'hard power', which is the use of coercion and payment (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soft_power) [Accessed 10 July 2012].
 - 11 Kagwanja, P., 2006. Power and peace: South Africa and the refurbishing of Africa's multilateral capacity for peacemaking. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 24(2): 164.
 - 12 For an overview of the early post-apartheid attempts by the South African government at continental peace-making, see Bischoff, P., 2006. Towards a foreign peacekeeping commitment: South African approaches to conflict resolution in Africa. In Carlsnaes, W. and P. Nel (eds). *In Full Flight: South African foreign policy after apartheid*. Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue, pp. 147–163.
 - 13 Rogier, E., 2004. The inter-Congolese dialogue: a critical overview. In Malan, M. and G.J. Porto (eds). *Challenges of Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. Pretoria: Institute for Global Dialogue, pp. 25–42.
 - 14 The South African diplomatic intervention in the Zimbabwe crisis from 2000 onwards is described in detail in Van Nieuwkerk, A., 2006. South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy decision-making on African crises. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand.
 - 15 Van Nieuwkerk, A., 2010. SADC's common foreign policy. In Harvey, C. (ed.), *Proceedings of the 2009 FOPRISA annual conference*. Gaborone: Lightbooks.
 - 16 See for example McKinley, D., 2004. South African foreign policy towards Zimbabwe under Mbeki. *Journal of African Political Economy* 31(100).
 - 17 Quoted in the 2009 *Country Focus Paper: South Africa's relations with Zimbabwe*. Parktown: Southern African Liaison Office (SALO), p. 19.
 - 18 The 2009 *Country Focus Paper: South Africa's relations with Zimbabwe*. Parktown: Southern African Liaison Office (SALO), p. 23.
 - 19 Ibid.
 - 20 Cawthra, G., 2010. *The Role of SADC in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict: The Cases of Madagascar and Zimbabwe*. FES Peace and Security Series. Maputo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

- 21 Southall, R., 2006.(ed). *South Africa's Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
- 22 Rogier, E., 2004. The Inter-Congolese dialogue: a critical overview. In Malan, M. and G.J.Porto (eds). *Challenges of Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. Pretoria: Institute for Global Dialogue, pp. 25–42.
- 23 Kagwanja, P., 2006. Power and peace: South Africa and the refurbishing of Africa's multilateral capacity for peacemaking. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 24(2): 174.
- 24 Khadiagala, G., 2009. South Africa's role in conflict resolution in the DRC. In Shillinger, K., 2009. *Africa's Peacemaker? Lessons from South African Conflict Mediation*. Johannesburg: Fanele, p. 78.
- 25 Akindes, F., 2009. South African mediation in the Ivorian crisis. In Shillinger, K. 2009. *Africa's Peacemaker? Lessons from South African Conflict Mediation*. Johannesburg: Fanele, pp. 113–152.
- 26 Lecoutre, D., 2009. South Africa's mediation efforts in Francophone Africa. In Shillinger, K. 2009. *Africa's Peacemaker? Lessons from South African Conflict Mediation*. Johannesburg: Fanele, pp. 153–166.
- 27 Burger, D., 2006. *South African Yearbook 2005/6*. Pretoria: Government Communication and Information System.
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- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Nathan, L., 2008. Anti-imperialism trumps human rights: South Africa's approach to the Darfur conflict. Working Paper 31, Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2. London: Crisis States Research Centre, Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics.
- 31 See the published annual reports of the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund, available at <http://www.dirco.gov.za/department/report/index.htm> [Accessed 12 August 2012].
- 32 Van Nieuwkerk, A., 2007. South Africa's role on the United Nations Security Council. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, Vol 14(1): 61–77.
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- 36 Ntsaluba, A., 2011. Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Co-operation, Cape Town, 9 March.
- 37 Nkoana-Mashabane, M., 2009. (<http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=3573&tid=3718>) [Accessed 10 July 2011].

- 38 For discussion see Mawdsley, E., 2010. Non-DAC donors and the changing landscape of foreign aid: The (in)significance of India's development cooperation with Kenya. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, Vol 4(2): 361–79.
- 39 See Altenburg, T. and J. Weikert, 2007. Trilateral Development Cooperation with 'New Donors'. DIE Briefing Paper 5/2007.
- 40 This relationship structure is complex and perhaps problematic. Do OECD members regard NDDs as undermining their interests, and therefore to be brought in line with the DAC template? On what basis does South Africa as a 'new' donor or development partner, relate to both 'old' donors and the recipients of development aid? Why should this be more attractive than the standard bilateral approach? Is it able to undertake the coordination required for this kind of activity? Trilateral projects might remain small scale because donor countries will not release large funds without retaining control. For discussion of trilateral development cooperation, see Six, C., 2009. The rise of postcolonial states as donors. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 30(6): 1103–1122; Berger, B. and U. Wissenbach, 2007. *EU-China-Africa trilateral development cooperation*. Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik; and Mawdsley (ibid).
- 41 Informal discussions with Swedish development economist Tor Sellstrom reveals that the idea took root in discussions between former deputy minister Pahad, himself, and a range of Scandinavian diplomats. The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation subsequently provided wide capacity-building support for the initiative. See <http://www.norad.no/en/Countries/Africa/South+Africa>.
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- 50 The argument is put in such a way as to suggest ways around the problem and, indeed, De Waal provides 'three components to success' – a normative agreement, improvement in human security, and an elite bargain. He concludes his assessment by noting that the elite bargain is the first and most essential component. He also notes that '... today's policy frameworks for responding to fragile states are themselves too fragile to bear the weight of the interventions built upon them, and should be revisited.'
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- 56 Van Nieuwkerk, A., 2006. South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy decision-making on African crises. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand.
- 57 See for example Motsamai who undertook a critical examination of the role of the World Economic Forum and its meetings (the Davos process) in determining the global development agenda, including Africa. Motsamai, D., 2009. Epistemic communities and development: the Davos process and knowledge production. Unpublished MA dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand.
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- 60 *Pambazuka News*, 14.04.2011. According to the US Energy Information Administration, Libya, a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), holds the largest proven oil reserves in Africa, followed by Nigeria and Algeria. According to the *Oil and Gas Journal*, Libya had total proven oil reserves of 41,5 billion barrels as of January 2007. About 80 per cent of Libya's proven oil reserves are located in the Sirte basin, which is responsible for 90 per cent of the country's oil output. Libya remains 'highly unexplored' and only around 25 per cent of Libya is covered by exploration agreements with oil companies.
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South Africa's economic diplomacy in a changing global order

Brendan Vickers

INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews the performance of South Africa's economic diplomacy as an instrument of the country's foreign policy since the advent of democracy in April 1994. Economic diplomacy is about how states conduct their international economic relations, how they take decisions domestically, how they negotiate with each other internationally, and how these processes interact.¹ In this sense, economic diplomacy is a policy means for domestic power and wealth aggregation.

Conceptually, it is also possible to distinguish between 'economic' and 'commercial' diplomacy or, in another sense, the 'high' and 'low' politics of a country's international economic relations. In this chapter, economic diplomacy refers to the ways and means by which the South African government formally negotiates South Africa's place in the world economy at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. Economic diplomacy has clear political economy objectives such as increasing the country's relative power or influence in international bargains; improving the country's (or an industry's) competitive advantage relative to others; and using political tools to achieve economic ends, and vice versa. Economic diplomacy thus encapsulates global policy-making processes, for example, in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); as well as regional economic policymaking in the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).²

South Africa's economic diplomacy agenda comprises four core policy imperatives: to expand trade and investment links in Africa and advance regional integration in Southern and Eastern Africa; to consolidate links with traditional trade and investment partners in the North; to build

industrial complementarities with the dynamic emerging economies of the South; and to rebalance global trade rules in favour of developing countries through the WTO's Doha Round negotiations.³

By contrast, commercial diplomacy entails a narrower set of activities that include export development and export promotion, facilitating inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI), promoting technology sharing and cooperation, positioning South Africa as a preferred tourism destination, and marketing South Africa more widely abroad. The objective of commercial diplomacy is to support South African business to gain tangibly from the opportunities created by broader economic diplomacy processes.⁴

Since South Africa's economic diplomacy does not operate in a vacuum, this chapter first outlines the shifting global and regional contexts for economic diplomacy, which is followed by an analysis of the domestic drivers of the country's economic diplomacy. We then assess the key achievements and highlights of South Africa's economic diplomacy in relation to the developed world, still mired in economic crisis, and the South. Since multilateralism is a cornerstone of South Africa's foreign policy, the chapter also explores Pretoria's role in promoting a fairer and a more equitable world trading system. The chapter concludes with five challenges for South Africa's future economic diplomacy.

THE SHIFTING GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

The world economy is undergoing a profound structural shift in economic power, broadly from North to South and from West to East. The emerging economies, led by investment bank Goldman Sachs's BRIC quartet (Brazil, Russia, India and China), are the new sources of global economic growth, trade and investment flows. Economies of the South have become key players and the main drivers of recovery from the 2008/2009 'Great Recession'. While the global economic crisis has left most developed regions with high levels of debt and weakened competitiveness, the rising economies have emerged stronger from the crisis, with stable, sustainable debt levels and enhanced competitive positions.

Underpinned by strong growth, rapid capital accumulation and an expanding middle class, China is projected to become the world's largest economy before 2030, while India could surpass the United States by 2050. Collectively, by 2032 the BRIC economies could exceed output in the Group of 7 (G7) industrialised countries.⁵ The renewed dominance by 2050 of China and India reflects the rebalancing of the world economy to where it was in earlier centuries, before the Industrial Revolution.

Of all the BRICs, the pace of China's expansion has been the most spectacular. China has rapidly become the new 'workshop of the world': a high growth economy and investment behemoth with a powerful and competitive position in manufacturing. In 2009, China's total exports were more than US\$1,2 trillion, overtaking Germany as the world's largest exporter of goods. By 2010, China had surpassed Japan to become the world's second-largest economy.

As a small but relatively open economy, parts of South African industry have been buffeted by the vast scale of China's output. In particular, import-competing manufacturing interests and the trade union movement have been sharply critical of the Chinese government's currency peg, which has partly underpinned its rapid export growth and vast foreign exchange reserves. Notwithstanding these challenges, China's rapid growth presents an opportunity to restructure South Africa's trading relations through greater South–South cooperation. In 2009, China overtook the US to become South Africa's biggest trading partner, a pole position it has since maintained.

The remaining BRICs have also experienced exponential growth in their output and trade – India's exports of software and business services, Russia's sale of oil and natural gas, and Brazil's pre-eminent position in global agricultural and agro-industrial markets – which have ranked well above the world average. That said, Brazil and India still account for only 1 per cent and 1,5 per cent respectively of world trade, while Russia's share of world trade is closer to 2 per cent.⁶ Of the BRICs, only China and India were ranked among South Africa's top ten trading partners in 2011 (see table 1).

This shift towards a more multipolar world economy is reflected in changing patterns of global trade and investment. Developing countries' share of world trade is projected to double over the next forty years, from 37 per cent in 2007 to nearly 70 per cent by 2050.⁷ This growth in South–South trade will provide what economists call a 'vent for surplus' allowing developing countries and least-developed countries (LDCs) to take advantage of formerly underutilised production factors to expand output. This has, for instance, been the case for Africa's primary exporters. BRIC-Africa trade has increased eightfold, from US\$22,3 billion in 2000 to US\$166 billion in 2008. BRICS' share of Africa trade increased from 4,6 per cent in 1993 to 19 per cent in 2008. Although US trade growth with Africa has also been strong, China outpaced the US to become the continent's largest trading partner in 2009.⁸

These external developments suggest that while South Africa's economic links with traditional developed countries remain important, the country's prospects for growth and development will depend increasingly on diversifying and strengthening its economic links with the dynamic economies of the South. The inclusion of South Africa in the BRICS partnership mechanism in 2011 has indeed become a vital element of South Africa's global economic strategy, with South African private operators already driving

two projects, the BRICS Marine Cable and the BRICS Risk and Insurance Pool. Beyond the BRICS configuration, South Africa's economic and commercial diplomacy is focused also on the high growth markets in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, as well as other emerging economies such as Turkey, Indonesia, Chile, Vietnam and Thailand.

The rise of the South is accompanied by significant improvements in Africa's economic prospects and growth performance.⁹ Africa is already the second fastest growing continent in the world after Asia. In 2010, six of the world's ten fastest growing economies were in Africa and seven African countries are expected to be in the top ten over the next five years. Set against intensifying global competition for resources and markets, Africa is increasingly viewed as the frontier market of the future. Global consultancy firm Ernst & Young's 2011 Africa Attractiveness Survey forecasts capital inflows to reach US\$150 billion by 2015, creating 350 000 jobs per annum either directly or through local spill-over effects.¹⁰ South African firms are among the leading emerging market investors in Africa's manufacturing and services sectors, at times more directly invested than China.¹¹

Africa has also emerged as South Africa's most important market for its manufactured exports. Whereas South Africa's export profile to the rest of the world is dominated by minerals and commodities, its exports to Africa are mainly higher value-added manufactured goods. Beyond corporate South Africa's pragmatic view of the region's growing markets and consumption, there is a broader strategic narrative for the state, namely that South Africa's development and security are integrally entwined with the reconstruction and revitalisation of the Southern African region. It is an axiom that South Africa cannot hope to become an island of prosperity in a sea of poverty, a scenario that could lead to unfettered migration as well as traffic in illegal arms, contraband and drugs. For this reason, South Africa, particularly during the Zuma presidency, has sought to burnish its credentials as a 'donor-development partner' in Africa by investing significant resources in regional peace, stability, development and institution building, including driving an ambitious regional integration and infrastructure agenda.¹²

Having outlined the shifting global and regional contexts for South Africa's economic diplomacy, the chapter now explores the domestic drivers of Pretoria's external economic engagements.

THE DOMESTIC SOURCES OF SOUTH AFRICA'S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

Foreign policy involves the external pursuit and promotion of a country's domestic policies and interests. South Africa's national challenges could be seen as essentially twofold: consolidating and extending the country's

democracy, and advancing human security and development in the broadest senses, all contributing to the attainment of the 'national interest'.¹³ The economic challenge – promoting sustained and inclusive economic growth to address poverty, unemployment and inequality – is central to this. South Africa's Draft White Paper on Foreign Policy, *The Diplomacy of Ubuntu*, acknowledges the centrality of economic diplomacy and argues that the success of the latter will largely determine the extent to which South Africa can achieve these domestic priorities.¹⁴

As a comparatively small and open economy in global terms, South Africa accounts for only 0,5 per cent of world trade. Nevertheless, international trade in goods and services is important for South Africa's growth and development, contributing about 60 per cent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP). Although, having embarked on economic liberalisation during the 1990s the South African economy is today considerably outwardly oriented, some critics have called for more ambitious trade reform at home and abroad.¹⁵ South Africa's average tariff duty has declined from around 23 per cent in the 1990s to 7,7 per cent in 2011, while the proportion of zero-rated tariff lines now stands at 56 per cent.¹⁶ By international comparisons, the economy is only moderately protected by tariffs, which is partly due to the previous Uruguay Round (1986–1994) of multilateral trade negotiations in which South Africa adopted developed country tariff reduction commitments,¹⁷ and this 'historical injustice' of the previous trade round has prominently shaped South Africa's bargaining in the current Doha Round of the WTO.

Notwithstanding these reforms to restructure the economy, South African exports are still dominated by commodity- and resource-based manufactured products, while most imports are of advanced manufactures. South African exports of high value-added products, which can stimulate domestic employment and industrial development, have underperformed against the world average and that of other middle-income and resource-based countries.¹⁸ Import growth in South Africa also tends to outstrip exports resulting in a persistent trade deficit, which peaked at 7,4 per cent of GDP in 2008. This has become a source of macroeconomic vulnerability, deepening the economy's dependence on short-term, speculative capital inflows.

However, the country has also placed a premium on attracting longer-term and more productive FDI with a number of high-profile transactions in recent years in the mining, automotive, financial, information technology (IT) and retail sectors. These transactions have involved such major global operators as Britain's Barclays Bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Japan's Nippon Steel, US-based Walmart and leading automotive manufacturers from developed and developing countries.

In broad terms, South Africa is more open to FDI than are China, India and Russia. South Africa also tops the BRICS for ease of doing business¹⁹ and

scores third (after China and India) for its competitiveness.²⁰ Many investors regard South Africa as a 'gateway' into southern Africa and beyond for their operations, owing to the country's sound financial markets, regulatory regime and infrastructure.²¹ There has also been steady growth in outward investment from South Africa, especially into Africa. A recent study suggests that the country's FDI into the rest of Africa has increased at four times the rate of its global FDI, from R3,8 billion in 1994 to R115,7 billion in 2009.²² With the post-apartheid internationalisation of South African capital, the country boasts nine of the top hundred non-financial transnational corporations from the developing world, ahead of Malaysia, South Korea and Mexico.²³

Since the advent of democracy in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC)-led government has adopted a range of economic policies, including the Keynesian-inspired Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in 1994, the fiscally conservative Growth, Employment and Redistribution (Gear) macroeconomic strategy in 1996, and the hybrid Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (Asgisa) in 2006.²⁴ More recently, government planning has centred on the mixed economy New Growth Path (NGP) adopted in 2010, the diagnostic National Development Plan (NDP) released in 2011, and the massive infrastructure development programme announced by President Zuma in his 2012 State of the Nation address. It is hoped that the more than forty major infrastructure programmes underway will underpin and build South Africa's industrial base and its competitiveness.

The NGP attempts to set out an Asian-type heterodox growth policy combining public investment with institutional reform and macroeconomic stability. In so doing, it aims to accelerate growth to 7 per cent per annum and generate sustainable employment over the next decade.²⁵ The National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) and its action plan, the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP), are central components of this strategy. The NIPF seeks to encourage value-added, labour-absorbing industrial production and to diversify the economy away from its overreliance on commodities and non-tradable services and, in this way, catalyse employment growth.²⁶ For this reason, the South African Trade Policy and Strategy Framework (TPSF) casts trade policy as an instrument of industrial policy, particularly to support downstream manufacturing.²⁷

With these domestic policy drivers in mind, the chapter discusses the evolution and conduct of South Africa's economic diplomacy since 1994.

RECALIBRATING THE COMPASS: SOUTH AFRICA'S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

One of the recurring priorities since 1994 has been to diversify South Africa's trade and investment partners, anchored politically by a stronger

South–South axis of cooperation. In 1996, the government adopted a trade strategy premised on the metaphor of a butterfly. This conceived of Africa as the continental body of the butterfly, opening up its trading wings to the emerging growth poles of Asia in the East and Latin America in the West, while consolidating economic relations with the country's historical partners, the US, the European Union (EU) and Japan. In 2001, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) released its 'Global Economic Strategy' to provide greater strategic direction for the country's economic diplomacy. The strategy drew a conceptual, if not compelling, distinction between 'strategic' and 'priority' partners for allocating government's limited foreign policy resources. However, the TPSF, released in 2010, provides the clearest expression yet of South Africa's trade policy interests, which are focused increasingly on the emerging economies led by Africa and the BRICS.

The systemic shifts at the global level, accelerated by the global economic crisis since 2008/9, are reflected in the changed rankings of South Africa's top trading partners between 1994 and 2011 (see tables 1, 2 and 3). Collectively, the EU-27 remains South Africa's biggest trading partner, although its share of South Africa's total trade has declined, from 36 per cent in 2005 to 26,5 per cent in 2011. By comparison, the BRICS constitute a steady and growing share of South Africa's total trade, increasing from 10 per cent in 2005 to 18,6 per cent in 2011. India moved rapidly to South Africa's sixth largest trading partner in 2011. This trade growth has, however, been accompanied by a deficit trend with each of the BRICS, most notably China and Brazil. The challenge for South Africa's trade diplomats is thus to improve the country's terms of trade by focusing on value-added exports that support the country's industrialisation and employment objectives.

It is also noteworthy that whereas no African country ranked among South Africa's top ten import partners in 1994, Nigeria now occupies ninth position largely owing to imports of crude oil. During 2010, two African countries – Mozambique and Zimbabwe – also featured among South Africa's top ten export markets, especially for value-added products, with steady bilateral trade growth elsewhere in the continent.

We next review Pretoria's economic diplomacy since 1994, providing four brief case studies: the established partners centred on the EU and the US, followed by the emerging partners in Africa, Asia and Latin America. While the countries of the Middle East, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are prioritised increasingly by policy-makers (Iran, for example, is a major source of oil imports, the sovereign wealth funds of the Gulf wield considerable investment capital, and Indonesia is home to the world's largest Muslim population), we direct our attention specifically to Africa and the BRICS, since the latter constitute

the centrepiece of the government's global economic strategy. Indeed, South Africa's inclusion in the BRICS formation in 2011 marks the pinnacle of this post-apartheid recalibration of the country's economic diplomacy.

Table 1 South Africa's top trading partners in 2011

Rank 2011	Country name	Value ZAR	Proportion % total
1	China	188 427 457 787	13,3
2	Germany	120 430 995 623	8,5
3	United States	118 023 890 868	8,3
4	Japan	89 821 479 132	6,3
5	United Kingdom	57 825 561 711	4,1
6	India	53 528 002 082	3,8
7	Saudi Arabia	34 974 121 329	2,5
8	Republic of Korea	33 736 387 599	2,4
9	Italy	32 653 125 392	2,3
10	Netherlands	31 962 754 059	2,3

Source Quantec 2011

Table 2 Diversifying imports: South Africa's major import partners in 1994 and 2011

Top 10 partners in 1994			Top 10 partners in 2011		
Rank (Jan–Dec 1994)	Country name	Proportion of % total imports	Rank (Jan–Dec 2011)	Country Name	Proportion of % total imports
1	Germany	17,56	1	China	14,2
2	United Kingdom	12,28	2	Germany	10,6
3	United States	12,11	3	United States	8,0
4	Japan	10,54	4	Japan	4,8
5	Italy	4,16	5	Saudi Arabia	4,4
6	France	3,89	6	India	4,0
7	Taiwan	3,50	7	United Kingdom	4,0
8	Switzerland	2,62	8	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	3,7
9	Iran	2,60	9	Nigeria	3,1
10	Netherlands	2,57	10	Italy	2,7

Source Quantec 2011

Table 3 Diversifying exports: South Africa's major export partners in 1994 and 2011

Top 10 partners in 1994			Top 10 partners in 2011		
Rank (Jan–Dec 1994)	Country name	Proportion of % total exports	Rank (Jan–Dec 2011)	Country Name	Proportion of % total exports
1	United States	10,28	1	China	12,3
2	Switzerland	9,71	2	United States	8,6
3	United Kingdom	9,65	3	Japan	8,0
4	Japan	8,62	4	Germany	6,2
5	Germany	6,48	5	United Kingdom	4,1
6	Belgium	4,01	6	India	3,5
7	Zimbabwe	3,67	7	Netherlands	3,1
8	Netherlands	3,38	8	Switzerland	3,1
9	Taiwan	2,97	9	Republic of Korea	2,5
10	Italy	2,75	10	Mozambique	2,5

Source Quantec 2011

CONSOLIDATING HISTORICAL CONNECTIONS: THE EU AND THE US

Notwithstanding the prominence in South Africa's economic diplomacy of the emerging economies as both dynamic markets and alternative development models to the Washington Consensus, Pretoria has sought to consolidate its historical relationship with the EU and the US by building institutional platforms for enhanced cooperation and the deepening of economic relations. This reflects an appreciation that the advanced industrialised countries remain important markets for goods, services, investment and technology. However, the recession and sovereign debt crisis affecting some Eurozone economies, particularly Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, has potentially destabilising consequences for South Africa, including lower exports to the EU and a marked reduction in business confidence. More indirect effects include lower demand for South African commodity exports by China (a country heavily reliant on exports to Europe) and global risk aversion, implying lower investment in 'emerging markets' like South Africa. Nonetheless, a handful of European countries – Germany, the UK, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland – are still ranked among South Africa's top trading partners (see table 1).

Collectively, the EU-27 is still South Africa's single most important trade and investment partner, accounting for 80 per cent of the country's FDI stock, and providing significant development finance. As a measure of the

EU's significance, democratic South Africa's first trade negotiation resulted in the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) between the EU and South Africa, which was signed in 1999 and implemented in 2000. In terms of the agreement, the EU offered to liberalise 95 per cent of its duties on products originating in South Africa by 2010. In turn, South Africa offered to liberalise 86 per cent of its duties on EU-originating products by 2012. A free trade agreement (FTA) between SACU and the four non-EU European Free Trade Area (EFTA) members – Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland – came into effect in 2008, bringing trading relations with EFTA in line with the TDCA.

Currently, a review of the TDCA is underway, aimed at broadening the scope of product coverage. For South Africa, the priority is to negotiate improved TDCA access into Europe for its agricultural exports, which still confront barriers, while also harmonising the region's various trade arrangements with the EU. This is taking place under the auspices of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations between the SADC EPA configuration and the European Commission.²⁸

The US has historically been a major economic partner for South Africa, particularly as an export market. South Africa and its SACU partners launched FTA negotiations with the US in June 2003. The objective of these negotiations was to lock in the preferential market access that the US unilaterally grants under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) adopted in 2000, and the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). SACU members are the leading suppliers of non-fuel goods, mainly autos, clothing and textiles, to the US under AGOA I and II.

The FTA negotiations collapsed in April 2006 when SACU cried foul over Washington's inflexible negotiating template and unreasonable demands for 'competitive liberalisation' beyond trade in goods, overwhelming the region's institutional capacity. SACU and the US have since concluded a Trade, Investment and Development Cooperation Agreement (TIDCA) in lieu of an FTA while South Africa cooperates bilaterally with the US in terms of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). In addition, South Africa's economic diplomats are lobbying the US to extend AGOA's duration beyond 2015, to maintain South Africa's beneficiary status rather than graduating the country, and to broaden the product coverage to stimulate further economic diversification.

'LIONS ON THE MOVE': SOUTH AFRICA AND AFRICA

South Africa is the largest and most industrialised and diversified economy in Africa, accounting for over a third of sub-Saharan African GDP. The

country's structural preponderance is further amplified within its regional neighbourhood where it produces almost two-thirds of the GDP of the fifteen-member SADC. South Africa also accounts for the most diverse trade flows in Africa and is a leading exporter to the continent, particularly of value-added goods such as machinery, mechanical appliances, iron and steel products, transport goods, chemicals, and plastic and rubber goods. It is also significant that South Africa consistently runs a trade surplus in Africa, as this reflects structural factors such as South Africa's relative size, level of development and productive capabilities. It also reflects historical trade relationships that naturally cast the region in a 'hub-and-spoke' relationship to South Africa.

However, South Africa is also a major investor and development assistance benefactor in the continent.²⁹ The presence of heavily invested South African firms on the continent has led some analysts to depict South African capital as 'new exploiters', 'hegemons' or 'neocolonialists' that displace or crowd out local entrepreneurs, while others argue that these firms are the 'market developers' and 'market leaders' that increase competition and trade in underdeveloped markets.³⁰ Contrary to popular wisdom, South Africa – not China – was the biggest emerging market investor in Africa between 2006 and 2008 with US\$2,6 billion of average annual FDI flows.³¹ Compared to Brazil, China and India, outward FDI from South Africa is more diversified, with a strong presence in six sectors: mining, retail, construction and manufacturing, financial services, telecommunications, and tourism and leisure.³²

The country's status as Africa's continental colossus and SADC's economic powerhouse brings both advantages and disadvantages for Pretoria.³³ On the positive side, South Africa has used its regional credentials to press Africa's developmental interests including aid, trade, debt relief and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), particularly through the Group of 20 (G20) and Group of 8 (G8) outreach processes and, more recently, as an African member of the BRICS.³⁴ Inspired by former president Thabo Mbeki's reformist vision of an African Renaissance, South Africa has played an instrumental role in championing the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) within and beyond the continent. Although the normative economic contours³⁵ and operational efficacy³⁶ of Nepad and its steering body have been criticised by some scholars and analysts, Nepad continues to provide the strategic framework for Africa's engagement with the established and emerging powers, including the BRICS.

On the downside, South Africa's economic dominance in SADC fuels the perception that the country acts selfishly in its own national interests as a regional hegemon (in the negative critical sense, not as a 'benevolent' hegemon).³⁷ Pretoria's detractors point to the country's protectionist trade

and supposedly 'xenophobic' immigration policies, and the displacement of local business on other parts of the continent by South African capital. Pretoria has thus supported the adoption of a code of conduct for South African business operating in Africa. Although concerns about the destabilising impact of South African investment resonate in specific sectors, particularly retail, an alternative perspective points to the developmental dividends associated with South African operators. These include employment creation; the upgrading of existing and building of new infrastructure including investment in backbone services such as finance, transport and telecommunications; technology transfer through human resource development; increased tax revenues for the state; increased consumer choice; and boosting general investor confidence in host countries.³⁸

South Africa has consistently championed broader regional integration through SACU, SADC and the envisaged Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) that spans Eastern and Southern Africa in order to correct imbalances in inherited trade relations and generate growth and reduce poverty. In the immediate post-apartheid period, South Africa engaged in two important regional economic diplomacy processes, namely the renegotiation of the SACU Agreement and the adoption of the SADC Trade Protocol in 1996.

From South Africa's perspective, SACU remains the anchor for deeper integration in Southern Africa.³⁹ The new SACU Agreement between South Africa and Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) was renegotiated and concluded in 2002 and entered into force in 2004. The Agreement has a direct bearing on South Africa's economic diplomacy since SACU member states are enjoined to negotiate jointly with external trading partners. This presents its own challenges; for example, the smaller undiversified BLNS economies have few export interests in trade negotiations such as the SACU–India preferential trade agreement (PTA) negotiations and depend heavily on customs revenue for income.

Following the acrimonious experience of the SADC EPA negotiations, which threatened the institutional integrity of SACU, the world's oldest functioning customs union, South Africa has led a process to consolidate and strengthen SACU, a process which includes the innovation of summitry among heads of state.⁴⁰ On its watch as SACU chair (2010–2011), South Africa played an instrumental role in refocusing the customs union's work programme into five priority areas, namely regional industrial policy (specifically identifying sectors and interventions to promote a wider spread of industrial development among SACU members); review of the revenue-sharing formula; development of a trade facilitation programme to improve border efficiency; unified engagement in external trade negotiations; and establishing common institutions, such as the SACU Tariff Board and the SACU Tribunal.

At the SADC level, implementation of the trade protocol establishing an FTA began in 2000, spearheaded by South Africa and its SACU partners. Tariff liberalisation has taken place at different rates, with SACU removing most industrial tariffs in 2000 in the hope of stimulating regional production capacity and higher levels of intra-SADC trade flows. However, the failure over this period to grow more balanced intra-regional trade suggests that the majority of SADC countries (except for Angola and its exports of crude petroleum oil) have been unable to take advantage of their access to the South African market.⁴¹ The region's static trade pattern is symptomatic of three underlying challenges: an underdeveloped and non-diversified industrial manufacturing base in most SADC countries; inadequate infrastructure to support trade in goods; and the prevalence of non-tariff barriers (NTBs).⁴² South Africa has played a pivotal role in addressing these binding constraints by shifting SADC's focus from simple market liberalisation (as outlined in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Programme) towards 'developmental integration'.⁴³ The idea is to combine trade integration with cross-border infrastructural development and sectoral coordination to build and diversify the region's production structures.⁴⁴

In June 2011, South Africa also hosted the launch of the Tripartite FTA negotiations among SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC). Spanning the continent from Cape Town to Cairo, this 'grand' FTA will encompass twenty-six countries with a combined GDP of US\$860 billion and a combined population of nearly 590 million people. It is noteworthy that 'developmental integration' as proposed by South Africa is the overarching paradigm. The tripartite initiative thus comprises three pillars – market integration, infrastructure development and industrial development – which will be pursued concurrently in order to ensure an equitable spread of the benefits of regional integration. The FTA will, as a first phase, cover only trade in goods, with the target of concluding the negotiations by 2014; services and other trade-related areas may be covered in a second phase. In January 2012, the AU Summit launched further work towards the establishment of a Continental FTA (CFTA), with an indicative date of 2017. This will widen and build on the integration initiatives already underway.

Complementing this ambitious integration agenda is an extensive work programme on infrastructure development in Africa.⁴⁵ As far back as 1996, the DTI pioneered the Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) model, which has expanded across the region owing to strong backing from SADC, the AU and Nepad. The SDI model seeks to develop geographic zones with latent economic potential by attracting investment into 'anchor projects' such as ports, parks, tourist facilities, mining areas and major industrial developments. The idea is to stimulate economic densification activities within the

trans-boundary corridors.⁴⁶ The success of the model has led South Africa to prioritise five SDIs over the medium term, covering Angola-Namibia-South Africa (ANSA), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

More recently, the AU appointed President Jacob Zuma as the champion for the North–South Corridor, a massive project to rehabilitate road and rail networks across Southern and Eastern Africa. While the emerging economies, notably China, are invested heavily in many of these projects to correct Africa's vast infrastructure deficits, investments in Africa by South Africa's state-owned enterprises such as Eskom in electricity generation and distribution, and Transnet in logistics infrastructure and the development finance institutions such as the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) long predate this new 'continental scramble'.

SOUTH AFRICA AND 'ASIA RISING'

China and India are special cases in South Africa's economic diplomacy, given their rising power status in the world economy and growing commercial footprint on 'Africa's silk road' through resource extraction and related projects.⁴⁷ Through five summits of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) as well as the 2008 and 2011 India-Africa Forum Summits, African countries have sought to manage more strategically their engagements with these two emerging powers. The Chinese government has also launched the China–Africa Development Fund, a US\$1 billion venture capital fund with the potential to expand to US\$5 billion to finance the entry of Chinese firms into Africa, creating greater competition for South African operators. At the FOCAC Summit in July 2012, Chinese President Hu Jintao announced a further US\$20 billion in loans to African countries over the next three years.

In 2008, Pretoria and Beijing celebrated a decade of formal diplomatic relations, marked by the signing of an ambitious new Partnership for Growth and Development (PGD) which aims to shift the structure of bilateral trade onto a more sustainable path by increasing the value of South African exports to China, with a particular focus on beneficiated minerals, manufactured goods and processed agricultural products. In 2009, the PGD was incorporated into the broader China–South African Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement.

Since South Africa opted to establish diplomatic relations with mainland China instead of Taiwan in 1998, Sino–South African economic diplomacy has achieved several milestones. Total bilateral trade has grown exponentially, with China in 2009 ranking for the first time as South Africa's biggest

trading partner; investment by Chinese companies into the South African market and vice versa has increased, with several South African firms regarded as 'industry shapers' in the mainland's economy; and Beijing has provided development assistance for South Africa's human resource and technical skills base.

Even more significant, in 2007 China's biggest lender, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) bought 20 per cent of one of South Africa's largest banks, Standard Bank, for R36,67 billion, one of the biggest foreign investments yet in Africa. Together, they have embarked on sixty-five joint projects on the African continent, with more planned for the future. It is also noteworthy that South African companies invested in China are the only operators from Africa commercially contesting the Chinese market with investment valued at over US\$2 billion. South African investors in China include SABMiller (breweries); Naspers (media); Sasol (coal-to-liquid); Exxaro and Kumba Iron Ore (mining); and Standard Bank, First Rand, Old Mutual and Hollard Insurance (financial services and insurance).

In South Africa, trade growth has been accompanied by growing concerns over the adverse impact of China's vast scale and output on local industrial capacity and employment, particularly light manufacturing and labour-intensive sectors. South Africa's textile and clothing sector has been harshly buffeted by Chinese imports since the elimination of the Multifibre Agreement on 1 January 2005. The industry seems unable to compete against cheaper imports, even behind significant tariff protection. As a result, in 2006 the government announced that it would impose quotas on thirty-one categories of textile and clothing imports from China for a period of two years, which would allow the local industry to restructure and prepare for competition. Although there has recently been some recovery of manufacturing capacity and jobs in the clothing sector, the role and effectiveness of these voluntary export restraints are debatable.⁴⁸ China has recently also signalled a new import and consumption policy, which will facilitate greater exports of value-added products from South Africa.

Commercial relations between South Africa and India are also growing, underpinned by strong historical ties rooted in politics – Mahatma Gandhi lived in South Africa between 1893 and 1915 – the anti-colonial and apartheid struggles, and the Indian diaspora in South Africa. Reflecting the recalibration of South Africa's economic compass since 1994, India has rapidly moved into the ranks of South Africa's top ten trading partners and is the country's largest trading partner in the South Asian region. By 2011, India ranked simultaneously as South Africa's sixth largest export market and source of imports. Indian FDI into South Africa since 1994 has also grown and diversified through companies such as Tata Mahindra (automotive);

Aegis, Ranbaxy and CIPLA (pharmaceuticals); and the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI) and the State Bank of India (banking). South African companies with investment interests in India include, inter alia, SABMiller (breweries); Tiger Brands and Nando's (food); the Airports Company of South Africa (Acsa) and Bidvest (upgrading Mumbai International Airport); Murray and Roberts (construction); Sasol (coal-to-liquid); and First Rand, Standard Bank and Old Mutual (financial services and insurance).

South African business still confronts a significant number of trade barriers and NTBs in the Indian market. For example, India levies a 300 per cent import tariff on South African wines to protect its young viticulture industry. To improve these market access conditions, SACU and India are negotiating a PTA covering goods trade, and they also intend to establish a mechanism to resolve NTBs. The parties are in the process of exchanging tariff requests in areas that will build complementary trade.

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE 'LATIN AMERICAN JAGUARS'

Trade between South Africa and Latin America is still small, albeit growing steadily off a low base. Although Brazil, the regional economic powerhouse, does not rank among South Africa's top ten trading partners it has figured prominently in Pretoria's South–South diplomacy since 1994 in political and economic terms and reflected in strong cooperation in the G8 Outreach Process, G20 and the WTO.

In 2009, SACU and the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), consisting of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, signed a PTA, covering around 1 000 product lines on each side of the border. The PTA is currently in the ratification process and unlikely to enter into force before 2013. While the immediate commercial value of the SACU–Mercosur PTA may be limited, it creates an important legal and institutional framework for building complementary trade and deepening economic relations in the future.⁴⁹ To stimulate trade, the two countries have established a mechanism to identify and resolve NTBs and other market barriers such as, for example, the 'wine-for-swine' deal to improve access for South African wines in Brazil and Brazil's pork products in South Africa. However, the scale and competitiveness of Brazil's agro-industries have caused some trade frictions, as with Brazil's much publicised WTO challenge to South Africa's imposition of anti-dumping duties on poultry imports in June 2012.⁵⁰

Beyond Mercosur, the Zuma presidency has explored alternative commercial and cooperative ventures with countries like Bolivia, Cuba and Venezuela. In February 2012, for example, South Africa extended a R350

million economic assistance package to Cuba, including credit lines to stimulate greater bilateral trade.⁵¹ This aid initiative appears motivated less by narrow commercial gains and more by solidarity with the Cuban people for their decades-long support for the anti-apartheid struggle. As a mining and commodities economy, Chile is also viewed by policy-makers as an important partner, particularly to share mutual experiences, including diversification.

Brazil–Africa connections have grown in recent years too. Brazil is home to the second largest concentration of Africans outside the continent and is increasingly active in Africa, particularly through its Lusophone connections to Angola, Mozambique and the smaller Portuguese-speaking states in West Africa, as well as institutionalised cooperation with the AU in various sectors such as, for example, bio-fuels. Brazilian operators such as Petrobras (petroleum), Oderbrecht (construction) and Vale (mining) compete increasingly with other commercial players in the continent, including South African companies.

The IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) parties are also exploring modalities for a SACU-Mercosur-India Trilateral Trade Arrangement (TTA) in an attempt to develop trade convergence between the three parties. Collectively, this TTA could create a market of 1,2 billion people, US\$1,2 trillion of GDP and foreign trade worth US\$300 billion. Trade among the IBSA countries has increased substantially, from US\$3,9 billion in 2003 to just over US\$10 billion in 2008 (with a target of US\$25 billion by 2015). Since South Africa joined the BRICS in 2011, the TTA momentum has been eclipsed somewhat by attempts to build greater trade and investment linkages among the five countries.

MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

Multilateralism and the promotion of a fairer, more balanced and inclusive system of global governance have consistently formed the cornerstones of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy.⁵² Inspired by this vision, South Africa has played a leading role in advancing the trade and development objectives of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) in the WTO, as well as championing greater influence and participation by developing countries in shaping a new paradigm for global trade governance. Central to this paradigm is transforming the WTO from a mercantilist institution that serves narrow commercial interests to an Organization that promotes the objective of 'sustainable development', as outlined in the Preamble to the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO, which would ensure that trade opportunities are made available to developing countries, including

South Africa, on a more equitable basis and that trade rules do not subvert their development prospects.⁵³

The current playing field in world trade is uneven and biased against developing countries' interests. South Africa, therefore, played a key role in launching the WTO's Doha Round in 2001, which promised to place the needs and interests of developing countries at the heart of the Doha work programme. However, the past decade of multilateral negotiations in Geneva – the longest running trade round in history – has seen the gradual erosion of that developmental mandate.⁵⁴ Developed countries have had a strong market opening agenda directed at the emerging developing economies (including South Africa) in the areas of industrial tariffs and services, while seeking greater flexibility that would maintain high levels of protection in agriculture.

The role of developing countries in the current Doha Round has been unprecedented, with the building of powerful coalitions or alliances which have, for the first time, shifted the negotiating dynamic in multilateral trade negotiations in favour of developing countries. South Africa has built alliances with other like-minded developing countries to collectively pursue developmental gains. The most prominent include the G20 demanding fairer global agricultural trade; the eleven Non-Agricultural Market Access countries (NAMA-11), coordinated by South Africa, demanding greater policy space for industrial development; and the 'Friends of Development', which has championed a fair, inclusive and developmental outcome to the Doha Round and encompasses over a hundred countries.

The demands on South Africa during the Doha Round have been very onerous. Since South Africa and SACU, as a result of a common external tariff, undertook developed country tariff cuts in the previous Uruguay Round (1986–1994), the country's average bound tariff rates are almost half the average of comparable developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil and India. The legal basis for tariff negotiations in the WTO is the bound and not the applied rates, hence South Africa is left with little bargaining space. The technical parameters for the negotiations on industrial tariffs (the Swiss formula, its coefficients and flexibility) will result in South Africa and SACU undertaking deeper and wider tariff cuts than any other WTO member, while obtaining very little new market access for agriculture.

It is an achievement for the country's multilateral economic diplomacy that the WTO members have recognised SACU as a special case, requiring additional flexibility. However, progress on the latter is contingent on overall momentum in the trade round. In that regard, South Africa has consistently made the case that a development outcome to the Doha Round is more important than an early conclusion that does not deliver on the developmental mandate agreed to at Doha in 2001.⁵⁵ Meanwhile, with the

Doha Round at an impasse, there may be a proliferation of WTO disputes. With the WTO's legislative track stalled, South Africa is using the negotiating hiatus to develop the country's capacity and understanding of the dispute settlement game, whether in the role of plaintiff, defendant, or third party.⁵⁶

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There have been important elements of continuity in South Africa's economic diplomacy since 1994. One of the recurring priorities is to diversify South Africa's trade and investment partners with greater focus on Africa and the global South. Pretoria has steadily recalibrated its compass. During the Mandela presidency, South Africa's main priority was to consolidate its historical relationship with the EU by negotiating the TDCA but also to develop new partnerships with Africa and the South represented by the SADC Trade Protocol adopted in 1996 and recognising China (over Taiwan) in 1998. Since then, South Africa has sought a pragmatic balance between sustaining and maintaining economic ties with the North, now in crisis, while extending and deepening ties with the dynamic growth poles of the South. South Africa's inclusion in BRICS in 2011 has thus become a vital element of its global economic strategy and marks the pinnacle of this post-apartheid economic diplomacy recalibration.

Six challenges loom large for shaping the future direction and efficacy of South Africa's economic diplomacy, this key component of its foreign policy. These are briefly discussed below.

First, the success of South Africa's economic diplomacy in an increasingly complex world requires greater institutional coordination of actors and agencies.

This primarily involves improved coordination within government, particularly such key role players as the DTI, DIRCO, the National Treasury, the Department of Tourism, state-owned enterprises and development finance institutions, and between the three spheres of government, especially provinces and cities, which engage in their own economic diplomacy activities or compete for international investment. Given the strong impetus for economic diplomacy in South Africa's foreign policy, policy-makers should give consideration to establishing a joint DTI–DIRCO management mechanism in Pretoria that would oversee the development of work programmes, business plans, performance agreements and joint training for all South African diplomats performing economic diplomacy, particularly with respect to investment and export promotion.⁵⁷ DIRCO, supported by the DTI,

has already started regular training courses on economic diplomacy for a range of stakeholders in national, provincial and local government.

Second, promoting a 'Team South Africa' approach and greater synergies with all stakeholders is critical for achieving the country's economic diplomacy objectives.

At the multilateral level, South African delegations to WTO ministerial conferences are already inclusive of key stakeholders that have collectively championed a development agenda, including Parliament, business, labour and civil society. Given the historical misalignment between the South African state and private sector objectives and strategies in Africa (manifesting in serious perception deficits regarding the role of South African business), there is an urgent need to strengthen government–business relations, particularly for the conduct of effective commercial diplomacy. In addition to a code of conduct for socially responsible behaviour, some analysts have proposed the establishment of a consultative government–business forum on doing business in Africa. This could help to bridge the gap and to build trust between the predominantly black-led government and the predominantly white (multinational) corporate interests in South Africa. With greater mutual trust, the state could, through a range of support measures including commercial intelligence, more strategically assist the private sector's expansion into the continent's emerging growth hubs such as Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Rwanda (increasingly operating as 'gateways' too).⁵⁸

Third, South Africa should capitalise on its positive investment credentials in world markets, including BRICS status, its successful hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, and its winning bid for the bulk of the Square Kilometre Array (SKA) radio telescope project to attract FDI that supports the country's broader development objectives.

South Africa was recently ranked fourteenth with the Netherlands and Poland in the top prospective FDI host economies for 2012–2014.⁵⁹ The establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and manufacturing hubs in South Africa, as announced in 2012, could also be a boon for inward investment.

It is important, however, to recognise that FDI is only a means to an end – the productive expansion of the economy and employment growth. Not all inward FDI may support these objectives. For a developing country like South Africa, the government's investment promotion efforts should therefore focus on attracting FDI that contributes to the expansion of productive manufacturing sectors and not merely the mineral, energy and financial sectors which have traditionally attracted the bulk of capital inflows. FDI

should target employment creation, build backward linkages with domestic enterprises, support entrepreneurial or equity development through joint ventures, promote the spillover of technological and business expertise, and upgrade skills. Since South Africa's domestic market potential is relatively small to induce mass-production type investment projects, the key to the country's industrial performance is the ability to attract export-orientated FDI, which will reinforce the current momentum of export orientation. A good example is South Africa's success in attracting multinational corporations in the automotive industry to utilise the country's potential as a competitive assembly location for export.

Fourth, it is imperative that Pretoria pragmatically accommodates both Africa and the BRICS in its evolving global economic strategy, builds linkages between the two, and does not sacrifice the one for the other.

Some analysts have presented the state with a misleading 'either/or' choice between focusing South Africa's commercial strategy on Africa *or* BRICS.⁶⁰ However, it is important to view the rise of the emerging economies and Africa's economic renaissance as an integrated narrative of the shifting world order. Deepening South Africa's commercial connectivity with Africa, which remains the centrepiece of its foreign economic policy, and strategic engagement in the BRICS formation are not mutually exclusive exercises, given the tactical and strategic synergies between these economic diplomacy processes and their chief players. Instead, limited resources point to the need for a more targeted approach in both instances.

South Africa only joined the BRICS in 2011. It is still early days for South Africa, as the smallest partner in this club. Nonetheless, a process is underway within government to develop a strategy for engaging the BRICS politically and economically, particularly as South Africa prepares to host the 2013 Summit. In joining the BRICS at this early stage (particularly ahead of other potential candidates, such as Indonesia or Turkey), there is an historic opportunity for South Africa to define and shape the agenda for economic cooperation. As the only African country that is a member of the BRICS, South Africa should articulate and champion the continent's interests vis-à-vis the other BRIC partners, including support for regional integration, infrastructure investment and industrial development.

BRICS relations are still anchored largely at the bilateral level, which will be the main platform for driving intra-BRICS trade growth towards the target of US\$500 billion by 2015. However, the five countries have also strengthened coordination for global governance reform, including the WTO, World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Progressive reforms will contribute to the development of a more equitable world order,

where Africa as a growing and prosperous continent can assume its rightful place. There are also promising BRICS economic and commercial diplomacy propositions, which are not available bilaterally to Pretoria. Collectively, the BRICS are an important source of new investment capital, leading some members to propose a BRICS development bank as an alternative to the Washington-based international financial institutions. There is also an opportunity for the BRICS to pool their human, institutional, technological and infrastructural resources, such as the proposal for a BRICS-Nepad infrastructure development fund or support for the transition to the 'green economy' such as the South African renewables initiative. South Africa will also consider proposals to settle trade among BRICS countries in domestic currencies, reducing transaction costs and dependence on the US dollar. This pragmatic emphasis on BRICS economic diplomacy complements South Africa's strong commercial focus on Africa, since emerging economies have all forged new broad-based investment partnerships with the continent.

A fifth priority is to intensify efforts to strengthen and extend 'developmental integration' across Eastern and Southern Africa, especially in SACU, SADC and the T-FTA.

As previously noted, the development integration approach combines trade integration with infrastructural development (for example SDIs) and sectoral policy cooperation, particularly in industrial policy to support the development of regional value chains. Whereas South Africa's export profile to the rest of the world is dominated by minerals and commodities, the country's exports to the region and to Africa are mainly higher value-added manufactured goods. Deepening regional integration and improved access to continental markets is therefore vital to South Africa's industrial development objectives. The NGP also envisages creating a sovereign wealth fund-style African development fund to channel some of South Africa's capital inflows into the continent and to manage foreign reserves and the value of the currency.

Finally, Pretoria will need to strategically balance its various roles and interests in Africa, which range from norm entrepreneur and peace keeper, to investor and donor.

There is pragmatic concern within government and policy circles that South Africa's role as a development assistance partner, which involves substantial aid spending, is not delivering any commercial returns for the country. South Africa has underwritten the costs of peace, stability and post-conflict reconstruction in several African crises, only to have external players and business operators enter these markets and reap the rewards through investment projects, procurement offerings, preferential trade and

other lucrative commercial opportunities. Pretoria will need to lobby more vociferously for industry and provide financial support and other assistance for South African companies to tender on big projects.

The DRC provides a good illustration of this quandary. Notwithstanding South Africa's extensive engagement in the DRC's peace process, Kinshasa has yet to join the SADC FTA (which would provide improved market access for South African exporters) or offer procurement opportunities to the country's operators. In contrast, China successfully bid for access to ten million tons of copper and two million tons of cobalt in the DRC in exchange for a US\$6 billion package of infrastructure investments including mine improvements, roads, rail, hospitals and schools. India, Brazil and the Arab Gulf economies are also forging new broad-based investment partnerships in Africa, particularly where South Africa has helped to underwrite zones of peace and stability. This disjuncture speaks to the need for greater institutional coordination of the country's political, economic, security and developmental diplomacy in Africa, as well as some degree of inherent competition between South Africa and its BRICS partners. The role and activities of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), once established, should therefore be aligned to support South Africa's broader economic and commercial diplomacy objectives in Africa.

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The evolving 'doctrine' of multilateralism in South Africa's Africa policy¹

David Monyae

INTRODUCTION

South Africa has embraced multilateralism as an approach to solving the challenges confronting the international community. It took up a leading role in various multilateral forums, including the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU), the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), the Group of 77 and China (G77+China), the Commonwealth, and the United Nations (UN), championing the cause of developing countries in general, and Africa in particular. As a non-permanent member of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) from 2007 to 2008 and for the period 2011 to 2012, South Africa promoted peace and security with the emphasis on Africa and on improving cooperation between the UNSC and regional Organizations such as the AU Peace and Security Council.²

Eighteen years into democracy, South Africa's Africa policy has gained much attention in the public arena. There are numerous reasons that explain this unexpected rise of international affairs, especially African matters, within South Africa's body politic. In the first place, South Africa's politics appear to be maturing. There is a general shift from transitional matters: thus from the building of democratic institutions to rigorous scrutiny of leaders and their policies. Foreign policy is increasingly being liberated from its traditional labelling or 'turf of elites' to a common matter in which the general public has a direct interest. Secondly, the intrinsic link between domestic and foreign, and South Africa and Africa, has gained enormous pace in South Africa. The obvious reasons for this are many, and range from the rise of metropolitan culture in South Africa's major cities such as Johannesburg, Cape Town and Pretoria, where foreign nationals settle in large numbers, to the increased involvement of South African business in Africa. Finally, the political upheavals in countries such as Côte d'Ivoire and Libya, and South Africa's foreign policy positions, have raised debates

by the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) as to whether South Africa's Africa policy was in line with its African agenda. Given South Africa's position in the world as a middle power, the national refocus on foreign policy has triggered unprecedented scrutiny of the country's engagement in foreign relations. At the centre of such critical evaluation and analysis of South Africa's foreign policy is its 'doctrine' of multilateralism on matters of Africa. This will be the focus of this chapter.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In the run-up to South Africa's democratic transition in 1994, and afterwards, South African foreign policy in general, and towards Africa in particular, underwent radical transformation. South Africa was no longer a pariah. Now that a democratically elected and majority-ruled regime was in place in Pretoria, foreign policy began to undergo a remake as the ANC-dominated government and its supporters in civil society laboured to realign the country – from a Eurocentric, pro-Western, Cold War orientation to the Third World, non-aligned, pan-Africanist posture of the liberation movements. This was, however, attempted in an international atmosphere of universal goodwill joining West and non-West, given the iconic status of the country's first post-apartheid president, Nelson Mandela, and the much touted 'rainbow miracle' nature of the negotiated revolution. The new government embarked on a more or less universalist foreign policy of embracing all and sundry, Western and non-Western countries alike, although there was a clear bias towards the global South – and Africa in particular.

Since 1994, South Africa's foreign policy has generally become more predictable, more Africa-centred and more cooperative (thus multilateral) in nature. It has evolved from one that was firmly anchored in the apartheid doctrine of white supremacy and dominance to one which does not perceive the Southern African sub-region and the entire African continent in terms of a threat to its security but, rather, as a community in which it endeavours to play a leading role to secure shared peace and security.

South Africa pursues its Africa policy within multilateral structures. In this context, SADC is perhaps the greatest priority in the South African government's foreign policy considerations, because of geographic, historical, cultural, economic, social and political factors. The short- and long-term viability of South Africa's democratic dividends largely depends on the political and economic stability of its immediate region. Post-apartheid South Africa has generally challenged the traditional notion of separating domestic and foreign issues where national security is concerned. SADC's

integration cannot be divorced from South Africa's conception of its own sense of security. It was against this background that South Africa devised a clear foreign policy vision, namely the African Renaissance, to guide its interaction with the world.

SOUTH AFRICA AS A REALIST MIDDLE POWER

The other major focus of South Africa's Africa multilateral doctrine³ came about as a result of Pretoria's failure to secure the position of the AU chairperson for its minister of home affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, at the beginning of 2012. This focus of multilateralism on matters pertaining to the African continent raises the question of what South Africa's approach and strategy is towards Africa. Although South Africa's foreign policy under President Jacob Zuma has not fundamentally changed, its focus has shifted. Increasingly, President Zuma emphasises global multilateral structures as a vehicle to advance South Africa's national interest. Where President Thabo Mbeki emphasised peaceful resolution to Africa's conflicts through Pretoria's direct interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi, President Zuma's government appears to be advancing economic diplomacy.

Realist middle powers do not concern themselves much with international human rights issues. The argument is that this does not fall within the mandate of any state and accordingly what they do in their domestic environment should be up to individual states. It has been argued that the security of the state and its citizens is the state's primary concern, and the most important task of any state is to secure benefits for its citizenry. Morgenthau argues that 'a foreign policy guided by moral abstractions without consideration of the national interest is bound to fail. On the other hand a foreign policy derived from the national interest is superior to a foreign policy inspired by universal moral principles'.⁴ The pursuit of national interest is more important than the pursuit of international human rights where this is not in the national interest.

South Africa emerged from the process of colonisation as the most powerful country in the Southern African region with an economy three times larger than that of the other SADC countries combined.⁵ Schoeman argues that 'emerging middle powers are also regional powers: in their own regions, they are considered powerful irrespective of whether they represent regional relationships of enmity or amity'.⁶ Because of its powerful economy and the preponderance of its military in comparison to the rest of the region, those from the realist school would rather see that South Africa exercised hegemony over the region

In the 1980s, South African foreign policy towards Africa was one of antagonism and suspicion and was characterised by a siege mentality. Having effectively identified itself as a 'bastion of Western civilisation', South Africa was isolated by, and isolated itself from, the rest of the continent by pursuing policies that were detrimental to its neighbours and had a pro-Western slant. In the battle against communism during the Cold War era, South Africa placed itself squarely within the capitalist camp and sought to assist the West in defeating communism in sub-Saharan Africa.

It was against this background that South Africa became involved in the civil war in Angola, taking the side of the rebels headed by Jonas Savimbi and seeking to oust the pro-Moscow government of José Eduardo dos Santos. The South African government under President PW Botha supplied the rebels with 'material and strategic assistance' in order to destabilise Angola⁷ as part of a wider effort to destabilise the Southern African region – which stood in contrast to the efforts in the 1970s made by Prime Minister John Vorster to establish friendly diplomatic relations between South Africa and other states on the African continent.⁸

The period since 1994 has seen a significant change in South African foreign policy, which is now guided by human rights principles and has been reoriented towards Africa.⁹ Former president Nelson Mandela put it succinctly when he wrote: 'South Africa cannot escape its African destiny. If we do not devote our energies to this continent, we too could fall victim to the forces that have brought about ruin to its various parts.' The new policy of working with other countries in Africa signalled a shift diametrically opposed to the previous foreign policy which 'sought the domination of one country (South Africa) and incorporated others in subsidiary and dependent roles'.¹⁰ This was a policy in which Southern African countries were treated as provinces of South Africa and whose sovereignty was frequently violated.

The crucial question about the new policy is whether declarations made by the government have been put into practice. The new policy was challenged in 1998 when South Africa opted to send troops to Lesotho when the government of Lesotho was under threat. Although supposedly under the auspices of SADC, this incident revealed a rift between the principles and the practice of South African foreign policy. Sending troops to Lesotho was in direct contradiction to the peaceful and multilateral approach which South Africa had been advocating in the resolution of the DRC conflict.¹¹

This also demonstrated South Africa's willingness to use force where it perceived its interests to be under threat. The imminent takeover by the military of the Katse and Mohale dams which form part of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project has been cited by analysts as the reason South Africa decided to send troops to that country.¹² South Africa has spent

billions of rands on this project which is aimed at safeguarding its water supply, as Gauteng, in particular, relies heavily on these dams for its water requirements.¹³ Instability in Lesotho would have also led to many fleeing into South Africa, which could have resulted in a refugee crisis.

South Africa has also displayed signs of *Realpolitik* with the sale of arms to governments with distasteful human rights records in order to generate income for reconstruction within the country. This includes the proposed sale of arms to Rwanda in 1996, the proposed sale of tank firing systems to Syria in 1997, and the declared willingness to sell arms to Indonesia expressed by President Mandela in 1997.¹⁴ The fact that all the governments in question had tainted human rights records reveals backtracking by a government that had stated that it would engage with the international community on the basis of human rights principles. The transactions also disregarded efforts by the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) to block the sales. Batchelor argues that the sale of arms to such countries 'suggests that maintaining jobs in the defence sector is more important than the government's stated commitment to human rights principles and that the ANC's historical ties tend to override human rights concerns when it comes to approving arms sales'.¹⁵ It would thus seem that there are close ties between practical reality and the concept of the national interest and its interpretation.

SOUTH AFRICA AS A PLURALIST MIDDLE POWER

Pluralism presents a challenge to the realist orthodoxy which sees states as the only actors in the international system. In pluralism, the international system is seen as composed of different entities such as multinational corporations, interest groups and supranational bodies such as the AU, which all vie for influence in the international system. 'International activity is not just a matter of the behaviour of states but of other actors too. Domestically, pluralism tends to describe liberal democracies within which exist different interest groups which aim to influence government policy in different areas so that policies better serve the wishes of their formations. This presents a challenge to the view of the state as a unitary actor'.¹⁶

The defining feature of pluralist middle powers is that they recognise that they do not have the means and resources of the big powers and that they therefore choose their areas of engagement with great care. They prefer multilateral diplomacy through established institutions such as the UN, through regional Organizations, or through ad hoc forms of coalition and confidence building. Middle powers are also expected to practise a managerial role within the international system. Henrikson (1997) defines such

a managerial role as 'the practical ability to give direction and effect to international undertakings, especially in institutional settings'. In addition, the international manager must be a negotiator. The international system provides middle powers with opportunities to influence the international system. Pluralist middle powers, therefore, have an internationalist agenda, which is characterised by an ethos which seeks to change the world and make it a better place.

An important characteristic of middle powers is that they do not want to assume responsibility for the international system, as hegemonic powers do, but, rather, aim to exercise influence in certain specific areas, a characteristic known as niche diplomacy. In addition, the type of leadership that pluralist middle powers provide differs from the leadership exercised via hegemony in that it is based on consent as opposed to being imposed.

The distinction between leadership and hegemony goes to the heart of what Keohane calls 'legitimate domination'. Legitimate domination entails leadership, a 'conception of an international normative order. In this way, hegemonic power is based upon right as well as might ... the right to lead emanates less from economic and military power as such and much more from the willingness of smaller nations to buy into and internalise the norms and principles set forth by the hegemon'.¹⁷ Under legitimate domination, a superior military force and bigger economy are less important than they are in a situation of naked domination. Smaller nations follow the leader state willingly because of their belief in the righteousness of the ideas expressed by their leader. This willing follower base makes it easy for the leader to establish a just order, as the other countries are able to identify with what the leader seeks to achieve and also see the desirability of the project that is being initiated, even if it sometimes goes against their own national instincts.

Having recently exited the wilderness of apartheid isolation, the Government of National Unity (GNU) that came to power in 1994 sought to craft a foreign policy which would avoid many of the mistakes that had been committed in foreign policy under the apartheid state. To achieve this end, the Department of Foreign Affairs published the South African foreign policy discussion document, which defined how South Africa would engage with the outside world. The most notable of the guiding principles that were contained in the discussion document was the principle of human rights as the main guiding tool of South Africa's foreign policy. As early as 1993, former president Nelson Mandela, then president of the ANC, wrote that the new South Africa would be guided by principles of human rights in its interaction with the international community and would not be doing business with human rights violators.

Internationally, human rights had gained currency as an instrument of foreign policy. In the early 1980s, international relations theory increasingly

began to take cognisance of human security¹⁸ and it was propounded as something for which states needed to strive. Taking into consideration human security, which is concerned with the welfare of human beings' as opposed to the security of the state, meant that states had to move away from an approach in which military security was valued over human security, and to engage creatively with human rights violators.

According to Pratt, 'there is broad international acceptance of the view that states have the right and indeed the obligation to rebuke, and to apply pressure upon states which are severe human rights violators'.¹⁹ Vincent holds the same view and argues that 'it is no longer enough for a state to be, and to be recognised as sovereign. Nor is it enough for it to be a nation-state in accordance with the principle of self-determination. It must also act domestically in such a way as not to offend against the basic rights of individuals and groups within its territory.'²⁰ However, with regard to popular practice in international relations, Vincent argues that 'maintaining good relations with foreign governments becomes the prime objective rather than one among many. To meet it, there is the temptation to overlook or to downplay or to make excuses for the domestic failings of clients in regard to the observation of human rights.'²¹

The desire to pursue a human rights approach on the part of South Africa arises out of the unique experience of being South African. The majority of South Africans were subjected to inhumane treatment by the white minority over a long period of time and the experience of being oppressed means that they are well able to empathise with others living in similar circumstances. They are acutely aware of the suffering felt by those who live under oppressive governments.

The promotion of human rights also follows logically from the ANC's experience of help from countries and Organizations overseas during the struggle years. Worldwide, countries united to impose sanctions against the South African government of former president PW Botha – even where this resulted in losses on their part – to speed up the decay of the government and weaken the resource base of the National Party. African people, especially the people of sub-Saharan Africa, suffered immensely because of the support they were giving to the liberation movements of South Africa. The 'total strategy' of the 1980s killed thousands and displaced millions in the region whose only crime was sympathy with the suffering in South Africa.²²

The human rights policy also arises from the fact that South Africa today has one of the most liberal constitutions in the world, with human rights protected in terms of Chapter 2. The Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic and there is a duty on the government to follow its provisions, in terms of which any policy which has the effect of violating human

rights, whether in South Africa or abroad, is unconstitutional. Domestic and foreign policy must both comply with the provisions of the Constitution and therefore it is partly in the context of the Constitution that South Africa's militancy in international human rights issues since 1994 should be understood. As was stated above, there have been problems with the application of the human rights principle in foreign policy when it clashed with the economic benefits that the government has sought to gain from non-democratic countries.

South Africa demonstrated its middle power credentials by playing a pivotal role during the 1995 negotiations on the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). When the Cold War came to an end, the United States sought the indefinite extension of the NPT but some countries were trying to strengthen their military forces by acquiring nuclear weapons.²³ The extension of the NPT in 1995 was meant to guard against such events. South Africa was one of the countries which demonstrated political will with regard to the banning of nuclear weapons by becoming the first country to dismantle its nuclear weapons unilaterally and sign the NPT shortly before it was up for review in 1995.²⁴

During the 1995 Review and Extension Conference (RevCon) of the NPT, South Africa argued that the NPT should be extended indefinitely, and won over those who resisted by coming up with a proposal which was satisfactory to all. The South African proposal included the establishment of review mechanisms between the five-year review conferences and the adoption of a set of principles which took account of the international situation and contained specific goals so that it could serve as a yardstick against which governments could measure their state of non-proliferation and disarmament. This was enough to win over those who had been sceptical about the indefinite extension, and helped to resolve the impasse between the US and those who opposed the extension.²⁵

South Africa received worldwide acclaim for the role it played during these negotiations and has since been involved internationally in dispute resolution, especially on the African continent. South Africa was responsible for the resolution of the impasse between the US and the UK on the one hand, and Libya on the other, over the Lockerbie bombing of a Pan Am flight in which citizens of both the US and the UK were killed in 1999.²⁶ South Africa has also been a voice for the underdeveloped countries on the reduction of the debt burden on African countries and the campaign to reform the international political economy.²⁷

However, South African foreign policy since 1994 has been characterised by inconsistencies which have threatened to undermine the country's influential position, particularly in Africa. This derives from the difficulty of implementing a human rights foreign policy, coupled with the South

African government's reluctance to assert itself more vigorously on the continent, a reluctance which has resulted in doubts being raised about South Africa's commitment to democratisation and human rights advancement in Africa. Internationally, South Africa's commitment to human rights is questioned because of the relations that have been fashioned with undemocratic regimes such as the Cuban government. These relations undermine the image South Africa projects in the eyes of the international community as a champion of the oppressed.

Domestically, South Africa's foreign policy approach deprives the country of revenue. For example, the country has a highly developed defence industry but has to choose very carefully to whom manufactured arms are sold, to ensure they are not used for repressive measures. This limits the foreign currency that South Africa could earn through international arms sales, which in turn translates into a lower gross domestic product (GDP) than would otherwise be derived – and that means less money for social investment. The question is whether the country should look after its own citizens first, or strive for the greater good.

TRANSFORMING SADC

'Coming in from the cold', the 'new' South Africa set about joining or re-joining the governance institutions of the international community: the UN first and foremost, along with the Commonwealth, the NAM, and the G77+China. South Africa's integration into the inter-African system triggered a process of transition and transformation in the system itself. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)-Frontline States (FLS) alliance aimed for the 'economic liberation' of the Southern African region from dependency on the economy and infrastructure of the apartheid regime, and supported the liberation struggle waged principally by the ANC, now transformed into a post-liberation development integration platform under SADC.

The transformation from a regional 'economic liberation' struggle to a regional cooperation for development agenda was accompanied, at a later stage, by the transformation of the FLS into a security-oriented, conflict mediation and resolution management mechanism vested in the SADC Organ on Peace, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). However, the fact that the OPDSC was attached as an arm of SADC (under the Heads of State and Government Summit) rather than retaining the FLS's autonomy as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-type structure, belied a regional power struggle triggered by South Africa's transition that reflected major ambivalences about post-apartheid Pretoria among the region's

neighbouring states – and leadership ambivalences by South Africa's new regime.

The enduring reality was one of South Africa's continuing overwhelming dominance of the region; a reality wherein fear of the racist white regime and its military aggressions was replaced by resentment of a new black-ruled regime flexing its regional muscle as a 'beacon of democracy' threatening the status quo in a region that was anything but a bastion of liberal democracy. With the iconic Nelson Mandela at the helm of the new post-apartheid regime, South Africa's overwhelming dominance represented something of a 'revisionist' challenge to its neighbours within SADC and beyond, as the country's early foreign policy identity was one characterised by a devotion to human rights and the 'moral high ground' in contradistinction to the less lofty *realpolitik* of authoritarian regime maintenance and survival of much of the rest of the region and the continent. It was not uncommon among neighbouring states to regard South Africa as 'the America of Africa'.

If South Africa's neighbours felt threatened by its hegemonic revisionism, the new ruling group in Pretoria and in Shell House (the ANC's headquarters) had its own doubts about how to proceed in inter-state relations within SADC and, further afield, within the Organization of African Unity (OAU) system. In effect, the new non-racial ruling class within the ANC assumed the guilt of the erstwhile apartheid oppressors who had ruthlessly destabilised the region in the interest of maintaining the apartheid system. Thus, the very liberators of South Africa decided to take it upon themselves to absorb responsibility for the depredations of an enemy they had fought; one that had done grievous harm to the rest of the region and for whom the post-apartheid elite felt they must atone. This meant bending over backwards to not appear hegemonic (in spite of the objective hegemonic reality) while stressing the importance of multilateralism in seeking consensus, as opposed to exerting leadership. At least this reflected the proclivities of many in civil society espousing an idealistically progressive, non-hegemonic vision which, to some degree, may also have been coloured by deep ambivalences about a world dominated by a hegemonic America emerging triumphant from a Cold War that had decimated a Soviet Union with which many in the new post-apartheid regime had had intimate ties. Thus, to appear hegemonic was to risk seeming like the world's lone superpower – an impression South Africans did not want to convey in their relations with their suspicious neighbours. Neither did they want to be seen as a proxy for the seemingly victorious West coming out of the Cold War and imposing a pro-Western sub-imperium on Africa.

The intersection of these sensitivities between South Africans and their neighbours, and the restructuring of SADC and the OPDSC, generated

tensions that have remained part of the fabric of the Southern African regional political landscape to this very day. A divide opened up between South Africa and Zimbabwe as the latter's once supreme regional leadership vested in Robert Mugabe became eclipsed by South Africa's rise under Mugabe's elder, Nelson Mandela. The South Africa–Zimbabwe fault line overrode what had been a working 'troika' between South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana in presiding over regional peace and security affairs, as the three had essentially established an informal SADC 'protectorate' over the Kingdom of Lesotho.

Indeed, the priority that South Africa gave to SADC and the region created other contradictions as well. Pretoria championed SADC over the former Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa which became the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) backed by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Repeated attempts to harmonise SADC and COMESA met with resistance and failure as South Africa opposed any form of merger until, in recent years, the emphasis on rationalising and strengthening Africa's regional economic communities (RECs) has been conducive to the current tripartite arrangement between COMESA, SADC and the East African Community. President Zuma's main focus has been to shift away from the conflict resolution focus of the former president Mbeki to a more economic diplomacy. The main task has been to champion infrastructure development through the use of its Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). Currently, President Zuma is the chair of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) infrastructure cluster. The main task is to champion the North–South Corridor which runs from Durban in South Africa to Mombasa in Kenya.

THE OAU-AU TRANSITION AND NEPAD'S EMERGENCE

Perhaps this was an inevitable outcome of South Africa's expansion of its African diplomacy beyond the confines of Southern Africa motivated by President Thabo Mbeki's 'African Renaissance' bid for continental leadership in tandem with other major actors – principally Nigeria but also Algeria, Senegal and Egypt. But the fault lines emanating out of the South Africa–Zimbabwe leadership power struggle would reassert themselves at the continental level in Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi's 'US of Africa' bid which propelled South Africa and Nigeria into leading the OAU's transformation into the AU accompanied by its incorporation of what was widely considered Mbeki's pet project, the Nepad and its spin-off, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

The Nepad/APRM developments also reflected South Africa's broader foreign policy engagements in North–South diplomacy revolving around influencing a more sustained Group of 8 (G8) commitment to Africa. Thus, as South Africa has broadened its foreign policy reach into the realms of global governance, it has assumed something of a default leadership of the continent at this level. First, the Outreach Five of the G8 along with India, Brazil, China and Mexico; now the lone African member of the Group of 20 (G20). As such, the basic objectives of South Africa's Africa policy have been to

- integrate South Africa into Africa in a manner that emphasises Africa's development as a top priority security and economic interest of South Africa
- prioritise an African peace and security agenda as preconditional to generating African developmental and economic growth momentum
- emphasise as a corollary to peace and security, effective 'good' governance by African governments
- link Africa with a South–South cooperation agenda so as to ensure that Africa, as an integral part of the global South, benefits from the economic emergence of the South and is integrated into the global economy within an emerging market context
- ensure that an African peace and security and developmental agenda is integral to North–South dialogue as reflected in the G8's Africa Action Plan as a response to Africa's Nepad initiative.²⁸

South Africa's promotion of Nepad as the AU's economic developmental blueprint for the continent embodies all of these objectives in the emphasis placed on peace and security and on good political and economic governance. However, these key outlines of South Africa's Africa policy have not been without their tensions. Inasmuch as the emergence of an African majority-ruled South Africa triggered backlashes of resentment and resistance within SADC, similar tensions over South Africa's dominance in continental affairs have accompanied Pretoria's diplomacy.

The tug of war between the Addis Ababa-based AU Commission and the Midrand-based Nepad secretariat revolving around the issue of 'ownership' of Nepad has been indicative. And, although closer to home South Africa has sought to placate its neighbours, external powers have been able to exploit regional tensions over Pretoria's dominance in a manner that has complicated South Africa's regional integration agenda. The divisions within the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) between South Africa (and Namibia) on the one hand and Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland on the other are testimony to this continuing ambivalence in regional relations as Pretoria increasingly emphasises the importance of 'economic diplomacy'.

CONCLUSION: CHAIRING THE AU AND THE IVOIRIAN AND LIBYAN DILEMMAS

Although South Africa has achieved most of its Africa policy strategic objectives in Africa, many obstacles remain. President Jacob Zuma's Africa policy objectives appear to be either misunderstood or not fully articulated. The classical example has been Pretoria's flip-flop position on the Libyan turmoil. When the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi confronted stiff rebellion, South Africa pursued a policy that sought a peaceful resolution to the conflict. While maintaining this policy position in line with the AU, South Africa failed to convince the Western countries, especially NATO members that pursued a 'regime change' strategy through active support of the rebels. As a non-permanent member of the UNSC, South Africa made a drastic change of foreign policy, without proper reasons given, in endorsing UNSC Resolution 1973, which called for the use of the famous 'all means necessary' cover for regime change in Libya. As a direct result of this, NATO was given the green light to bomb strategic military assets of Gaddafi's regime, bringing it to its knees and leading eventually to his assassination. President Zuma has been at pains to explain the changing position on Libya to no avail. Although there are many reasons that could be given as to why South Africa changed its policy, the perception remains that Pretoria failed to provide leadership at a time when foreign troops invaded African soil.

NOTES

- 1 David Monyae would like to thank Christopher Maroleng, Francis Kornegay and the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS).
- 2 Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu, White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy, Final Draft, 13 May 2011, pp. 7–8
- 3 According to Elena Lazarou et al., doctrine as a concept is a set of principles that guides the behaviour of states and international actors in formulating and negotiating multilateral relations solutions to global, regional or individual issues. See Elena Lazarou et al., *The Evolving 'Doctrine' of Multilateralism in the 21st Century*, Mercury: Multilateralism and the EU in the Contemporary Global Order, E-paper No: 3, February 2011.
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South Africa's relations with African anchor states¹

Nomfundo Xenia Ngwenya

INTRODUCTION

Following more than six decades of apartheid, during which the regime systematically destabilised independent African states, South Africa's project since 1994 has been to reconstruct its terms of engagement with other countries on the continent. Since rejoining the international community of states, South Africa has made unequivocal statements about prioritising the stability and development of Africa in its international relations. In order to do this, South Africa has invested substantial financial and human resources in the building of continental institutions that can accelerate the continent's pace towards development. While there remains no doubt that a strengthened and more efficient continental infrastructure is critical to attaining stability and development in Africa, the building of continental consensus on how to attain this requires conscious collaboration between states.

Throughout the history of post-independence Africa, there have been key states that drive thinking and influence developments in regional and continental structures. Against this background, South Africa's economic and political stature since 1994 has seen it emerge as one of these key countries. However, South Africa has not played this role alone and as the country continues to place the 'African agenda' at the top of its foreign policy priorities, the importance of strengthening its relations with key African countries – referred to in this chapter as 'anchor states' – becomes ever more apparent. This requires a well-calculated management of relations at the bilateral level.

While it would have been ideal to make reference to an existing policy document on anchor states and to evaluate how that policy has been implemented, it must be noted from the outset that since 1994 South Africa has never had such a written policy, although the process of compiling such a document has been under way since 2009. Nonetheless, the absence of a

policy in writing does not mean that the concept of cooperating with anchor states has also been absent in practice. This chapter analyses trends across the various post-1994 presidencies and how South Africa has forged stronger alliances at different times to achieve specific foreign policy objectives.

The chapter presents four key arguments. First, it develops a conceptual framework for anchor states, culminating in a typology of four categories of African anchor states. Second, it argues for the location of the anchor states debate within South Africa's strategic objectives and national interests. The third element of the chapter provides an evaluation of how South Africa has identified and partnered with anchor states since 1994, even if it was not consciously referring to them by that term. Finally, the chapter suggests some guiding principles on how South Africa should review its engagement of anchor states in Africa.

THE CONCEPT OF ANCHOR STATES

As mentioned, South Africa does not currently have a policy document on anchor states so there is no official definition to which the government can transfer a singular meaning of what is meant by 'anchor states'. In 2009, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) conducted a fifteen-year review of South Africa's foreign policy which 'assessed progress made, but also identified shortcomings and challenges in order to enable the Department to contribute more effectively to government initiatives'.² One of the initiatives that followed the review was the 'anchor states project', under the leadership of the deputy director general for Africa bilaterals, to identify African states with which South Africa could partner in pursuit of its African agenda objectives. This was born out of a realisation during the review that South Africa would need to sharpen its strategy for engaging the continent. While a draft document exists, officials in DIRCO have indicated that it is still an internal document and was scheduled to go to the ministerial committee for discussion in April 2012.³ At the time of writing, the paper was still not available for public discussion and citation. Nevertheless, the government's thinking on African anchor states is captured in the White Paper on South Africa's foreign policy: '... in the next fifteen years the resource-fuelled growth in a number of African countries will create both opportunities and challenges for South Africa in terms of new markets and political influence. African economic growth centres are taking advantage of this potential. South Africa should therefore continue to develop partnerships with key countries on the continent as a mechanism for mutual advancement'.⁴

The term 'anchor states' is often used interchangeably with such terms as 'pivotal states' and 'driver countries'. In their article on pivotal

states and United States strategy, Chase et al. refer to such states as those '... whose future will profoundly affect their surrounding regions'.⁵ The German Development Institute identifies anchor countries as 'leading regional economic powers ... essential partners for solutions in global structural policy questions based on their economic weight, their political influence and their increasingly [sic] determination in participating in international processes'.⁶ This is echoed by Altermann who writes that anchor states are 'influential economic and political actors in the[ir] respective world region or even at a global scale'.⁷ The concept of driver countries is often associated with 'Asian drivers', referring to those countries whose economic processes 'are likely to radically transform regional and global economic, political, and social interactions and to have a major impact on the environment'.⁸

Although the above definitions are focused at the global level, what they all have in common is that they look at the economic prospects of a country, its current and its potential future political role, and its relations with other countries in its region and the international system. This then raises the question of what is meant by African anchor states.

TYPOLGY OF AFRICAN ANCHOR STATES

There are identifiable similarities and differences between global and African anchor states. Clearly, given their relative economic size and the limitations of their political influence in global economics and politics, African states do not have the type of leverage that some Asian drivers such as China and Japan enjoy. Nonetheless, African anchor states have a role to play within their respective regions. Accordingly, there are four identifiable categories of African anchor states.

CATEGORY 1

The first category consists of countries that already wield a lot of influence in their regions. This influence can be political or economic, based on the following considerations:

- The extent to which the country is able to diplomatically steer the direction of debates, decisions and actions taken by the collective in the affairs of the regional economic communities (RECs)
- The ability of the country to lead and make substantial ideological, political and financial contributions towards the running of continental Organizations such as the African Union (AU)

- The extent to which the international community engages with the country

If the country is seen as a key actor and is consulted by the international community for leadership on issues relating to its region, such as security and economic stability, then it is considered an anchor country. This also includes the role that the country plays in international multilateral institutions and how it projects its influence on the international scene, as well as the extent to which it is considered a strategic partner in its bilateral relations with both traditional and emerging global major powers. The obvious candidates in this category include South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya.

CATEGORY 2

In the second category are countries that can influence cooperation in their regions by not necessarily holding sway in the entire region but within a bloc of countries in the region or continent, based on various historic points of similarity or affinity. Examples include blocs of French-speaking countries; Muslim-majority states and Arab countries; countries of Southern Africa governed by former liberation movements (Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique) that can invoke this history to build consensus on an issue; and non-Southern African countries that had close links to South Africa's liberation movements (Zambia, Algeria and Libya).

CATEGORY 3

In identifying anchor countries, it is important to not only look at the status quo in Categories 2 and 3, but also to consider constantly evolving social, political and economic dynamics in regions and blocs. To this extent, projections of each country's future socio-economic and political performance requires a forward-looking assessment of which countries are likely to make future economic and political progress that could ultimately have a significant impact on their respective regions. Examples in this category include Angola and Ghana.

CATEGORY 4

Although the concept of anchor states focuses on the positive capabilities of countries, it is equally important to look at countries whose destabilisation and backward slide could have a destabilising effect on their regions. In other words, these are countries that are not necessarily positive influences but remain significant in their ability to stall regional stability, integration

and development. Resources from the international community, and in this case particularly from South Africa, ought to be prioritised for democracy support through reform, building and strengthening of domestic institutions. Examples in this category include Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

STRATEGIES FOR SOUTH AFRICAN ENGAGEMENT PER CATEGORY

CATEGORY 1

To step up its bilateral relations with Category 1 countries, South Africa should focus on the diversification of economies by encouraging and promoting investment by each other's private sectors, thus avoiding the charge that South Africa seeks access to, but blocks other African states from, its markets. Secondly, South Africa should build rapid response task forces into bi-national commissions so that South Africa and the anchor countries can lead the search for resolutions to conflict instead of waiting for external powers to set the agenda. In the third instance, South Africa and these anchor states should hold frequent consultations between each other's representatives in multilateral bodies. Finally, South Africa should increase civil society exchange to strengthen democracies in these states.

CATEGORY 2

In order to engage with countries in this category, South Africa should embark on a charm offensive that looks for areas of commonality, no matter how small, and incrementally builds on them. Secondly, South Africa should begin to demonstrate that these countries matter – for example, where state visits have not taken place since 1994, the president should pay a visit. In the third instance, student, public sector and civil society Organization exchanges should take place, including learning the languages of those countries that do not have English as an official language. It does not strengthen ties when, as is currently the case in some countries, ambassadors and embassy staff in South African missions do not speak the official languages of their host countries.

For Categories 2 and 3, development cooperation is critical and should be well targeted at achieving what South Africa wants from each country. Although concerns have been expressed that the increasing domestic socio-economic pressures may lead to factions of the ruling party demanding a decrease in development cooperation,⁹ the outcome of the ruling party's Polokwane conference in 2008 is nonetheless encouraging as they call for

'national budgetary processes [to] commit the necessary resources to such a developmental partnership' in the establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA).¹⁰

CATEGORY 3

The SADPA development funding used in this category should go towards the strengthening of institutions that support democracy. In addition to the development funding assistance that is allocated under SADPA, South Africa's development finance institutions such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) should work closely with their counterparts in these countries. Current trends among a number of Category 3 countries indicate growth on the back of single commodities and resources. To assist these countries in their diversification and industrialisation efforts, South Africa should leverage its advantage of experienced companies in a range of sectors. With the current jostling by emerging powers to expand their business interests in Africa, one can be certain that these countries will seek to make even deeper inroads into African economies, and where industrial capacity is identified they will occupy any space that South Africa is too slow to fill.

CATEGORY 4

The bulk of SADPA funding should be spent in anchor states in this category, focusing on conflict resolution. Secondly, South Africa should make use of special envoys that frequently operate within these countries and liaise with Pretoria. Finally, the South African government should increase its diplomatic and intelligence presence in these countries.

Adebajo provides a number of well-considered suggestions for the countries South Africa should prioritise in its bilateral relations, using a hub (a regional power that is a key strategic partner) and two spokes (influential but less dominant powers) in each region.¹¹ This chapter concurs with some of Adebajo's suggestions while it also proposes alternative suggestions based on the importance of diversifying South Africa's partners.

GENERAL FACTORS SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD CONSIDER WHEN ENGAGING WITH AFRICAN ANCHOR STATES

It will be noted from the categories above that the definition of these countries places emphasis on the role they play in their respective regions. This is because, despite the continued challenges that regional economic

integration has faced in Africa, it remains considered by African leaders as 'a viable strategy to pursue with a view to uniting the continent both politically and economically'.¹² As a result, regional integration within and among various African regions remains a clearly stated objective of the AU. The White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy echoes this sentiment: '... [r]egional and continental integration is the foundation for Africa's socio-economic development and political unity, and essential for our own prosperity and security'.¹³ However, although cooperation requires a collective effort, some countries have greater capacity – often accompanied by political, economic or military capacity – than others to flex their diplomatic muscle to convince others to assume a certain position on issues affecting the region and continent.

ACCEPTANCE OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION AS A COMMON OBJECTIVE

Since the beginning of the post-independence integration debates, countries have been identifiable according to the ideological 'camps' to which they belong. From the early days of the Monrovia and Casablanca groupings in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the twenty-first century 'instantist' and 'gradualist' distinctions within the AU, the national (and at times individual) leaders of countries' interests have informed the positions they assume on integration.¹⁴

Changing economic and political conditions will inevitably, in future, influence a country's orientation to its region. Sometimes, improved political and economic conditions can lead to a country identifying greater involvement in its region as being in its interests. Angola, for example, has enjoyed double-digit growth since the mid-2000s, leading some observers to argue that it may end up playing a more active regional role in either Central or Southern Africa.¹⁵ Angola has, since the end of its civil war in 2002, been 'eager to extend its influence and play a bigger peace keeping role in the region'.¹⁶ Signs of this include the government's September 2010 announcement that it would be sending its troops to help stem the tide of coups in Guinea-Bissau by reforming the army. Similarly, the announcement by Angola in 2011 that it had signed an agreement with the Republic of Congo for joint oil exploration along their shared maritime borders, together with the intention to sign a similar agreement with the DRC, indicates that it identifies its stability as inextricably linked to that of its neighbours, hence the need to ensure access to economic spoils and associated stability.¹⁷ It is therefore anticipated that greater economic performance may increase the imperative to be politically active in the region as the interests of a country become more intertwined with the welfare of the region.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS

The characteristics of an anchor state are shaped by internal and external factors. Internally, the calculated choices, and at times the accidental spin-offs derived from these choices, can lead to increased or decreased capacity for any given country. It is for this reason that rigorous assessments of where a country is headed, politically and economically, have to be conducted by the policy and research unit at DIRCO, in partnership with the relevant directorates in all the departments that deal with the International Cooperation, Trade and Security (ICTS) cluster. At the economic level, for example, the plethora of studies that define African growth and development projections have provided a basis for discussion on how individual countries are likely to perform in future. Some prominent examples of these studies include McKinsey's study which projected the political, economic and social trajectory of African countries until 2030.¹⁸ Another example is the 'Next 11' study by Goldman Sachs, which identified Egypt and Nigeria as the only two African countries whose growth and investment potential could place them among the largest economies of the twenty-first century.¹⁹ A third study is the World Bank's 'Global Economic Prospects' annual report, which identified the fastest growing African economies.²⁰ These studies should be read critically, bearing in mind that future projections are by their very nature subject to unforeseen factors that could derail such projections, most notably natural disasters or dramatic changes in a country's politics. While not much can be done about the former, the potential for political change can be evaluated through ongoing research and empirical assessments.

The upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East since 2011 have brought to the fore the importance of political future projections, in particular the imperative for democracy. A number of those countries were considered stable and appeared to be strong, centralised security states. They were also performing well economically, and some regularly featured among the top performers of the region. The sense of worsening socio-economic conditions was ascribed to ineffective governance by dictatorial regimes, and what this demonstrates is that when selecting an anchor state the economic success of a country cannot be considered in isolation from its political and social conditions. The manner in which a country's political systems reflect a commitment to democracy and an acceptance of such democratic standards by the country's people has an influence on the extent to which that country can be considered as a key player in its region. A country like Ghana, for example, despite not having the biggest economy, or as much influence as its neighbour Nigeria, warrants attention. In April 2012, Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe travelled to Ghana to secure access to that country's oil, following the United States' pressure on South

Africa to reduce its imports of Iranian oil.²¹ Political stability in Ghana, coupled with its oil reserves, could make it a more attractive source of oil than a number of other African oil producers.

MAKING ROOM FOR MALLEABILITY

A third factor to consider when discussing anchor states is that the word 'anchor' suggests a sense of permanence. However, to use the international cliché first articulated by the eighteenth century English statesman Lord Palmerston, 'there are no permanent allies or permanent friends, only permanent interests' in international relations. Emphasis on which national interests to pursue may vary depending on who governs, and their leadership style, as well as socio-economic and political needs at the time. As a result, it cannot be assumed that there cannot be new anchor states emerging and older ones receding. The emergence of oil and the consolidation of democracy in Ghana, for example, have led to questions being asked about the potential for that country to play an increasing role in its region, despite the potential for Nigeria to grow ever stronger economically.

THE IMPORTANCE OF EXTERNAL POWERS

It is unavoidable that the ability of a state to play an influential role is guided by its proximity to global major powers. This is of course not unique to Africa, for all countries in the world that seek to wield influence measure themselves against their mutual dependence on major powers for various needs. Influential global major powers range from traditional powers such as the US and European countries to emerging actors such as China, India, Brazil and some of the Gulf States. The South African government is well aware of the influence of these countries. In its discussion of emerging economic opportunities in Africa, the DIRCO White Paper states: '... [b]oth traditional and emerging powers are taking notice of these new opportunities and are therefore increasing economic and diplomatic activities on the continent'.²² The South African government's outcry over France's influence in the demise of Muammar Gaddafi's and Laurent Gbagbo's regimes is an example. The division between African countries on these two issues was seen as a by-product of French and other western countries' influence. By virtue of being considered influential in their respective regions, anchor states forge strategic alliances with various countries from within and outside the continent. South Africa therefore has to identify the relative strength that would allow it to bring some influence to bear.

SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERESTS AND THE ROLE OF ANCHOR STATES

Although South Africa has not finalised its anchor states policy, there are nonetheless some noteworthy observations to make from the manner in which the process has unfolded. First, under President Mbeki, and in keeping with his orientation of South Africa's foreign policy towards an African Renaissance, South Africa set out to establish embassies in every African country. The objective behind this was to demonstrate that the South African government considers all African countries to be equal in importance to its foreign policy, but the decision by DIRCO to identify anchor states attributes greater *de facto* importance to some countries than others. DIRCO remains concerned that the process should not be seen as an elevation of some countries over others – hence the reluctance to open the document up for public scrutiny. DIRCO officials have repeatedly stated that they do not want the anchor states paper to strain relations with fellow African countries.

The second observation is that in 2010 DIRCO temporarily suspended work on identifying anchor states, significantly because the government had begun embarking on the development of a 'national interests' project. The project was led by the then director general of the South African Secret Service (SASS), Mo Shaik, and was tasked with compiling a document that would define South Africa's national interests and would guide government's foreign policy conceptualisation. This on its own is noteworthy since, from the beginning of the democratic dispensation, discussion on national interests was not limited within the South African government. By placing the anchor states project on hold while the national interest definition was refined, South Africa acknowledged the important link between its foreign policy and its domestic policies and needs. By extension, the move was an acknowledgement that the selection of African anchor states with which South Africa should partner has to be influenced by South Africa's domestic policies and needs.

One of the most succinct definitions of national interests is offered by Nuechterlin.²³ He identified five elements of national interest: defence interests (primarily concerned with protecting the territory and citizens of a state from physical threat, from other states or non-state actors); economic interests (the use of trade and investment to enhance the economic well-being of the nation); world order interests (the state's maintenance or promotion of a political and economic system from which the state's citizens can derive benefits); and ideological interests (promoting the values that are considered universally good by the citizens of the state).²⁴ This definition is taken further by Thomas Robinson, who identifies primary interests, secondary interests, permanent interests, variable interests, general interests and specific interests.²⁵

Although there has yet to be an official definition of South Africa's national interests, the definitions above capture the universal interests of states.²⁶ What differs is how each state prioritises these interests and what strategic objectives it sets in pursuit of them. Therefore, the answer to the question of what it is that key African states ought to anchor in South Africa's foreign policy can be found in the strategic objectives that are set under the 'African agenda'. For the period 2011 to 2014, South Africa has identified the following strategic objectives:

- The promotion of security, stability and development on the African continent through processes, debates and resolutions in the organs of the UN, the AU and SADC
- Strengthening bilateral relations on the African continent
- Contributing to the entrenchment of good governance, democracy and human rights on the African continent
- Contributing to the strengthening of the AU and its structures
- Promoting the accelerated implementation of Nepad programmes related to priority sectors nationally, regionally and globally²⁷

In addition to these, South Africa has broader objectives such as the promotion of South–South cooperation, North–South cooperation, and transformation of the international system of governance. These objectives have remained consistent under the ruling party.

DIVERSIFICATION OF STRATEGIC POWERS

In identifying anchor states, South Africa should aim to diversify its influence across a range of countries, including those which do not appear to be natural allies. The guiding principle should be threefold: to strengthen ties with old friends; to build new friendships with countries that have not enjoyed historically strong ties with South Africa; and to create an understanding among allies that South Africa will still keep channels of communication open with others even if there is rivalry among them. Based on the above categories and considerations, a number of countries are worth considering for each of the five African regions. It must be emphasised, however, that not every region will have an anchor country that demonstrates all the above qualities. Similarly, some regions like North and Central Africa are facing several political uncertainties. Thus, the categories of anchor states require partnerships that are targeted at the resolution of those political complexities.

AN EVALUATION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S ANCHOR STATE ENGAGEMENT SINCE 1994

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Southern Africa is the most critical region for South Africa and the weight of its words, continentally and globally, will depend on its successes or failures in the region. Besides South Africa itself, there is no Category 1 anchor state in this region. Under President Zuma, South Africa has prioritised the relationship with Angola, the first destination for a state visit after Zuma was elected in 2009.²⁸ However, despite its economic growth and emergence as a potentially important economy as a result of its oil exports, Angola has yet to reach Category 1 status, one key reason being that it has been consumed with the domestic challenges of post-war reconstruction and has yet to play a prominent role in global multilateral institutions. Angola is therefore a Category 2 and Category 3 country. However, it remains influential among countries that are governed by former liberation movements (Namibia and Zimbabwe in particular). It could therefore be useful in developing consensus where South Africa might be concerned about looking as if it is playing 'big brother'. Under Category 3, the fact that Angola's changing economic fortunes require a greater involvement in regional security issues could bode well for South Africa's attempts to deal with conflict resolution in the region.

Mozambique is also both a Category 2 and Category 3 country and an important success story for South Africa's bilateral relations in the region. In addition to sharing the historical liberation movement affinities that make it a Category 2 country for South Africa, Mozambique is also an outstanding example of translating liberation movement ties to strong political and economic state relations. Under presidents Mbeki and Chissano, Mozambique and South Africa signed a number of important agreements which have led to mutual development. Mozambique has been particularly welcoming of South Africa's investment, and South Africa has become Mozambique's main trade and investment partner in the region.²⁹ This was achieved largely through the Heads of State Economic Bilateral Forum which was created in 1997. Through its regular quarterly meetings, which included the presidents, ministers and officials from each country, many of the spatial development initiatives such as the Maputo Development Corridor, the Beira SD, the Limpopo Valley, Zambezi Valley and the Nacala Development Corridor have made significant progress.³⁰ Under the government of President Zuma, the progress in the relationship has been recognised by the elevation of the relations to a BNC that will go beyond economic issues into cooperation on political, social and security issues.³¹

Zimbabwe is a clear Category 4 country as it has proved to be central to much destabilisation in the region and has often undermined South Africa's foreign policy attempts in international forums. In keeping with requirements for this category of countries, South Africa should continue focusing resources on conflict resolution and humanitarian aid, while simultaneously making use of special envoys to frequently operate between Zimbabwe and South Africa, as well as increasing its diplomatic and intelligence presence in that country.

WEST AFRICA

Nigeria is in Category 1 as a key economic, military and diplomatic power in the region, as well as because of its history of cooperation with South Africa, especially during the Mbeki-Obasanjo presidencies. It is well-recorded that this relationship played a critical role in the reformulation of the continent's institutional architecture, particularly in the transition from the OAU to the AU and the creation of Nepad.

Nonetheless, the losses made in the relationship since the departure of President Obasanjo (largely due to the illness of the late President Yar'Adua) require an immediate engagement at the level of President Zuma and President Jonathan. The deterioration of relations between South Africa and Nigeria since 2009 is instructive in understanding what can be achieved and lost, based on how relations with anchor states are managed. Nigeria's failure to support South Africa's nomination of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as chairperson of the AU to succeed Jean Ping is a particular example. President Zuma's last-minute visit to President Goodluck Jonathan did not deliver the desired result – this was a result of, among other irritants in the relationship, Nigeria's perception that it was undermined in its own backyard when South Africa supported Laurent Gbagbo after the 2011 election in Côte d'Ivoire. The lowest ebb of these strained relations was when South Africa was forced to apologise to Nigeria for refusing entry to Nigerian citizens who had been accused of carrying falsified yellow fever certificates.³²

The relationship had been strengthened through the BNC which was established in 1999. But as the BNC reduced the frequency of its meetings, so too the relations weakened. The Nigeria–South Africa relationship therefore demonstrates the importance of frequent dialogue and engagement between South Africa and Category 1 anchor states, which should be led by regular communication at heads of state level.

Under Category 2, contrary to Adebajo's dismissal of Senegal on the basis that at the time of writing his article it was led by a 'delusional'

president, Senegal ought to be considered as an anchor for South Africa's strategy in francophone West Africa. The subsequent election of President Mackie Sall and the manner in which Senegalese society removed Wade from power through the ballot, despite a clear indication that he was not ready to go, is a strength of democracy upon which South Africa should lay its foundation for engaging coup-prone French-speaking countries. It is of course not a straightforward task to identify which francophone country holds sway within the bloc, since many of them have dealt with France directly. However, Senegal emerges as a particularly strong candidate. The fact that it is the only West African state never to have experienced a coup since independence, and its continued influence through its universities that lead intellectual thought in francophone West Africa, make it important. Economically, despite not being resource-rich, Senegal has a vision of using its strategic geographic position to strengthen its economy. Since it is positioned on the western tip of Africa, Senegal is the nearest point of the Atlantic Ocean to the western hemisphere while its positioning above the equator makes it close in proximity to Europe and the Middle East. The country's vision, therefore, is to create a travel hub, around which other infrastructure would have to be built. Already the exodus of multilateral institutions and multinational company headquarters from Côte d'Ivoire, exacerbated by the continuing instability in that country, mean that Senegal may yet fulfil its ambition with the right planning and partnerships. Senegal is also increasingly positioning itself as a political bridge between influential partners in the North and South. It continues to have close relations with the US, and it hosted the Organization of the Islamic Conference and used it to tap into the sovereign wealth funds of the Gulf States.

Regardless of the above, the francophone sphere seems to have been left to the French, despite signals from a number of francophone countries that they are eager to diversify their partnerships and end reliance on France. Instead of lamenting French influence, South Africa should be proactive and make a more calculated, aggressive entry into Senegal. This should begin with a presidential visit to Senegal, which no South African president has undertaken since 1994.

Ghana falls into Category 3, as it does not necessarily wield much influence currently but its economic trajectory (it has been identified by the World Bank as one of the six fastest growing economies in Africa for the period 2011–2013) and improved democratic credentials make it a potential active partner to promote South Africa's African agenda. Côte d'Ivoire falls into Category 4 since, although it has been the most developed francophone country in West Africa, it remains unstable and requires much assistance to reverse the losses made during the stand-off of the past decade.

EAST AFRICA

Adebajo suggests that Ethiopia should be a key partner for South Africa in East Africa which, in terms of the typology, would place it under Category 1. However, Ethiopia lacks the economic muscle required to place it in this category and its influence in East Africa is less significant than that of Kenya. Kenya falls into Category 1 for a number of reasons. East Africa continues to pose some of the most worrying challenges to South Africa's security, particularly the developments in Somalia with their associated piracy, terrorism, and other security threats. Through institutions like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Kenya has played a critical role in facilitating dialogue between warring factions in Somalia and the Sudan. South Africa's efforts in Southern Sudan will inevitably have to be conducted in partnership with Kenya, given the role that Kenya has historically played in that country.

The importance of Kenya to South Africa is not just in terms of the troubles in that region, but also the opportunities that the success of the East African Community (EAC) poses. The EAC has made the greatest amount of progress in regional integration, as noted in the African Economic Outlook (2011). Within this community, Kenya accounts for most of the EAC's trade, and Kenyan businesses have the largest footprint in the region. Moreover, South Africa's commitment to the Trilateral Free Trade Area (T-FTA) will require close cooperation with Kenya. These are the key reasons why, despite Kenya's lacking the types of fraternal ties that South Africa has enjoyed with neighbouring Tanzania, it becomes important to step up relations with Kenya. There has indeed never been a state visit in either direction since 1994. The South African government appears, however, to have realised the need to improve relations between the two countries. In 2010, Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe became the most senior member of the South African government to pay an official visit to Kenya. It was further announced that he had gone to lay the foundation for President Zuma's visit to Nairobi, which was scheduled for sometime in 2011, but never took place.³³ The two countries intend to step up their relationship towards a more robust bilateral agenda under the framework of an expanded Kenya-South Africa Joint Commission for Cooperation.³⁴

Tanzania falls into Category 2. Adebajo rightly notes that Tanzania can act as a bridge between East and Southern Africa, especially given the role it has played in supporting the liberation movements of the South. For that reason, it can be an ally in South Africa's efforts to steer the agenda among countries that are governed by former liberation movements. The credibility of its democracy also makes it amenable to supporting South Africa on issues of governance and accountability on the continent.

Ethiopia, which is also facing improved economic prospects and is identified by the World Bank as one of six African countries likely to experience growth above 6,5 per cent between 2011 and 2013, should be placed in Category 3. It has also demonstrated its willingness and ability to deploy its army where requested by the AU. However, despite its changing economic fortunes, its political system makes it vulnerable and its decline could have serious repercussions for the entire region. Nonetheless, it has enjoyed good relations with South Africa and has supported South African initiatives such as Nepad, while coordinating some of its positions at the AU with South Africa. The new state of South Sudan should be placed in Category 4 as it increasingly becomes the face of South African foreign policy success in conflict resolution and post-war reconstruction.

NORTH AFRICA

With the ongoing uncertainty in North Africa following the 'Arab spring', it is premature to evaluate countries since most countries in that region are facing varying levels of instability. However, South Africa's relations with Algeria since 1994 point to that country as a Category 2 anchor state owing to its historically strong ties with the African National Congress as well as its continued cooperation with South Africa in multilateral forums, the most notable being cooperation with South Africa and Nigeria to form Nepad. South Africa had a joint bilateral commission with Algeria in 1998 but this was elevated to a full presidential-level BNC in 2000 and by the middle of the last decade it was one of only two BNCs chaired at the presidential level.³⁵

Engagement between South Africa and Egypt needs to be more robust than it has been since 1994. Although South Africa has a joint bilateral commission with Egypt, the two countries have not been seen to coordinate their activities on African issues. With Nepad, for example, President Mubarak never attended meetings of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee and he did not regularly attend AU meetings. Given the historic role that Egypt has played in regional and global affairs, it would be a Category 1 anchor state.

However, there is nothing stopping South Africa from having more than one anchor state in a region. The countries of North Africa bring different strengths and it does not make long-term strategic sense to remain committed to only one partner when others are capable of yielding other benefits for the country. This is not to say that old allies ought to be discounted. After all, new allies would be looking at how South Africa treats its old allies in order to measure its trustworthiness. Nonetheless, South Africa can also

play the role of bridging gaps between countries in that region. Closeness to Algeria and sympathy for the cause of the Sahrawi people, for example, should not lock South Africa out of the potential that Morocco's economy could pose for South Africa.³⁶ This lesson became even more apparent when Morocco was elected to serve on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with South Africa and Togo as the three African non-permanent members for 2012. What is significant about this election is that despite an agreement by African countries at the AU Summit in Malabo in early 2011 that Mauritania and Togo would be the supported candidates, a number of African countries voted for Morocco, despite its not being a member of the AU. Moroccan diplomats attribute this to the expansive economic and cultural role that the country has played, and continues to play, in West and Central Africa.³⁷ South Africa can therefore not ignore this influence and should build its engagement with Morocco on the premise that differences over important issues should not undermine potential for pursuit of other national interests.

CENTRAL AFRICA

Central Africa does not have a Category 1 anchor state. Instead, the two anchor states in that region, the DRC and Rwanda, fall into Categories 4 and 3 respectively. Between Gabon and Cameroon, a Category 2 anchor state should be selected in order to minimise the element of francophone exclusivity. Gabon would have a stronger case, given its economic prospects and the continued influence of France, as indicated by the latter's maintaining its military base in Gabon (compared to the scaling down of France's military base in Senegal). An additional anchor state should be Burundi in Category 4, following South Africa's intervention and role in that country. Like Southern Sudan, Burundi's fragility can be destabilising for the region but it can also be an example of South Africa's foreign policy success in engaging the region, the AU and the international community to resolve a long-standing conflict, given the resources spent in the mediation effort which was led by President Zuma when he was deputy president of South Africa.

CONCLUSION

There can be no doubt that beyond the public declarations of relations between South Africa and any of these countries it is ultimately the government that is privy to the true nature and content of bilateral relations. It is of course possible for one country to fall under more than one category,

but this is where departmental assessments of countries and regions with the greatest needs will come into play. Prioritisation of countries will be determined by such needs. The configuration of anchor state categories in each region also signals to South Africa the different types of intervention required for the various regions.

For this reason, identifying and assessing relations with anchor states requires a dedicated team of analysts within DIRCO and the international relations cluster to ensure that investment in relations with a select group of countries does not stifle South Africa's ability to build alliances as and when its needs demand. These anchors are there to help the South African foreign policy ship stay afloat, not to moor and ground it permanently.

NOTES

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South Africa's foreign policy towards the global North

Gerrit Olivier

INTRODUCTION

South Africa's relations with the global North (North America and Europe) underwent a fundamental redefinition and reorientation after the country's regime change in 1994. For the first time in the country's 350-year modern history, an authentic African democratic government took charge, introducing a comprehensive foreign policy shift from the global North to the global South. Whereas the former regime identified South Africa intellectually, ideologically and strategically as a Western country and followed a Western-centric foreign policy, the new government's choice of identification and alignment was totally different.¹ Guided by its struggle history, the new government based its foreign policy on two fundamental tenets: pan-Africanism and South–South solidarity, meaning the primacy of the African continent and a commitment to South–South cooperation. As stated by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO): 'South Africa recognises itself as an integrated part of the African continent and therefore understands its national interest as intrinsically linked to Africa's stability, unity and prosperity. Likewise, the 1955 Bandung Conference shapes our understanding of South–South cooperation and opposition to colonialism as a natural extension of our national interest.'² This shift in preferred foreign policy identification and mode of alliance holds fundamental implications for the way in which the country assesses and formulates its national interests, chooses its international priorities, determines its strategies and also brings to the fore the role of ideological interests as juxtaposed to the role of pragmatic economic and strategic interests. Of particular importance is how the operative foreign policy interfaces with the imperatives of the domestic welfare and security of the nation.

THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATION AND IDENTIFICATION

The end of apartheid marked the beginning of a new era in South Africa's foreign relations, and the emergence of a new foreign policy. With the restrictions of internationally imposed sanctions and isolation out of the way, the country could turn over a new leaf, remove the shackles of the past, and normalise its foreign relations, bringing them in line with the national interests, values and ideological predilections of the new government. The new situation opened the way for choosing from a variety of options as South Africa suddenly found itself without enemies, with the whole world ready and waiting to engage with it in all fields of international interaction.

From the outset it was clear that the break with the past would be emphatic and substantial. The scene was set for the new South Africa to redefine its national interests, embark upon a new foreign policy ideology, and institutionalise a new doctrine to guide its future interaction with the rest of the world. Contrary to early expectations, bold, far-reaching foreign policy changes did not set in immediately after the new government took power in 1994. Under the presidency of Nelson Mandela, the new government acted prudently, feeling its way, with the result that the changes that did come about were not radical in any manner or by any means. The new foreign policy administration under the leadership of an inexperienced foreign minister, an old African National Congress (ANC) stalwart, Alfred Nzo, was finding its feet, trying to administer a smooth, predictable transformation, particularly careful not to disturb the very favourable world opinion of South Africa at the time, not to upset potential foreign investors in a fragile and sanctions-battered South African economy by introducing immediate radical changes of course, or elements of unpredictability, preferring a 'universalist' foreign policy rather than a radical ideological one. Apart from signalling South Africa's strong commitment towards Africa, non-alignment in global politics and supporting the causes of the global South in general, ideology was underplayed in favour of pragmatism; cooperation with all countries and international institutions in pursuit of national interests became the lodestar of the new foreign policy.³ This boiled down to the normalising of bilateral and multilateral relations, promoting an 'African agenda', identification with the political and diplomatic preferences of the global South,⁴ economic diplomacy, and complying with the dictates of universal morality.⁵

While for traditionalists and 'standpatters', particularly the remaining 'old guard' of the previous regime this was the preferred approach, it did not go far enough to satisfy the struggle ideologues of the ANC and was, therefore, unsustainable. The new realities of a changed South Africa and

the new dominant political culture in the land prescribed something different, something more assertive, even more radical.

All these shifts happened under the presidency of Mandela's immediate successor, Thabo Mbeki. His major preoccupation and special focus while in long exile was international relations, and foreign policy specifically. He took South Africa on a very different course, embarking on a revisionist, ideologically-inspired non-western foreign policy, replacing the generally conservative, generally neutral-pragmatic stance of the Mandela administration. While universalist norms and values formed a cornerstone of Mandela's foreign policy, thus reconfirming the moral principles that led to the final success of the international community in getting rid of apartheid, Mbeki had no compunction in flouting them where they clashed with his own ideological design and predilections for the South African post-apartheid foreign policy.

Not only had the South African domestic realities changed drastically between the ANC-in-struggle and the ANC-in-government periods – so had the global political scene. The new global order that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1991 forced the ANC to revise its traditional left-wing struggle philosophy and credentials. The feeble implosion of the Communist system and the instalment of a pro-Western and pro-market government in the Kremlin came as a major disappointment and setback to ANC ideologues, as the Soviet Union had for long been the movement's main ideological mentor and ally in its struggle against apartheid, in substance, succour and moral support. With the new world order which emerged after the Cold War and their main support base gone, the ANC's radical foreign policy philosophy and agenda was suddenly rendered obsolete.

Most pressing was the imperative of economic recovery and restructuring at home as sanctions and isolation, as well as a debilitating war in Angola and Namibia, had left South Africa on the brink of bankruptcy. Without Western support by way of development aid, increased trade and direct investment, the benefits of the new freedom would have been unsustainable. Being a pragmatic realist, Mandela recognised the obsolescence of Cold War politics and the immediate relevance of the new foreign policy parameters set by the changed national and international milieu. Hence his discarding of long-held Cold War stereotypes which saw the world divided in ideological camps, and his adopting of a pragmatic – what could be described as a 'universalist' – foreign policy.

'THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES' AS SOUTH AFRICA TURNS TRULY AFRICAN

Of course, four years is too short a time in which to formulate and implement an entirely new foreign policy, and when Mandela left the scene it

was very much a case of unfinished business, almost leaving his successor *carte blanche*.

When Mbeki took over the presidency in 1999, South African foreign policy was, therefore, still in its formative phase and, as it turned out, the country's foreign policy identity and identification were set for major changes. What Mandela succeeded in doing was to normalise South Africa's foreign relations, establishing a new foreign policy architecture, including world-wide bilateral diplomatic representation, and bringing South Africa back into the fold in multilateral Organizations like the United Nations (UN), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the European Union (EU) and specialised agencies, while imprinting on them his personal moral authority and that of the new democratic South Africa he represented in the global context.

Although the change on foreign policy matters from Mbeki to Mandela seemed seamless at the beginning, it developed into something quite profound. Mbeki had his own particular version of the 'new' South African identity, its preferred global alignment and foreign policy. Mbeki, no doubt, laid the intellectual, ideological and strategic foundations for South Africa's new foreign policy. It was a policy that, first and foremost, reflected South Africa's new African personality; its essential Afrocentric character and purpose; its role and destiny as a leading nation in Africa, a primary role-player in the global South; its preferred alignment or realignment with the Western and non-Western worlds respectively.⁶

Emerging as a different and new role-player (from the apartheid era), Mbeki's South Africa was keen to establish a niche for itself in various, albeit interrelated, contexts: African, South–South, South–North, developing world, non-alignment, and multilateral diplomacy. Mbeki refused to accept Western political and cultural hegemony, making strenuous efforts to mobilise the developing world, Africa in particular, to resist and reduce this hegemony by trying to reset the agenda, advocating more equity in world economic and trade policies, and advocating structural changes in the global financial architecture. For him, the 'struggle' continued. However, this time around, it was a struggle of a different kind: no longer an orthodox Marxist-Leninist kind of struggle, or a struggle against apartheid, but a new universal class struggle, pitted against the inequities in the world; between rich and poor, and against marginalisation, underdevelopment, unequal globalisation, Eurocentric cultural dominance, superpower hegemony and American unilateralism; a struggle, in particular, to give Africa a better place in the world and to erase the debilitating discrepancies of the status quo and level the playing field between the global South and the global North.

Aware that he was stepping into the shoes of an illustrious predecessor, and that Mandela was a hard act to follow, Mbeki chose to concentrate on

foreign policy, his field of specialisation over many years and where he felt he could make an impact. His style was intellectual, abstract, laid-back and aloof. He thought big, beyond the confines of his country, emphasising the bigger picture, and sought the company of the powerful and influential, particularly the international business elite. He seemed more at home at international conferences and summit meetings than before the South African Parliament or his own people. Even so, and much to his chagrin, he was never taken as seriously by his interlocutors as he had probably expected, as he remained in the shadow of Mandela's imposing political and moral legacy.

Initially the effect of Mbeki's new perceptions and new foreign policy, particularly insofar as they affected South Africa's alignment with the outside world, was more apparent than real. Relations with the West remained on the level of 'business as usual', cooperative and ostensibly amicable, albeit not 'close' or 'special'. Bilateral relations at all levels with key Western countries were maintained, even expanded, reciprocal high level official visits became routine, development programmes proliferated and so did cultural and scientific interaction.

Even so, particularly on the symbolic, rhetorical levels, a noticeable distance in the relationship with the West crept in and dichotomies like 'western-scepticism' versus Afrocentrism and North versus South became part of official South African foreign policy thinking. This was particularly obvious during the important negotiations (happening under the watchful eye of the then deputy president, Thabo Mbeki) with the EU to establish the Trade and Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA). The TDCA was only finalised after a long and arduous, sometimes acrimonious, negotiating process, stretching from June 1995 to March 1999. Although South African leaders and bureaucrats never proclaimed these sentiments from the rooftops, they were unmistakably 'atmospheric determinants' during South Africa's dealings with Europe and the West at large when Mbeki was in charge. To a large extent, they accounted for the growing sceptical, if not competitive, nature of the new relationship with the West, the protracted and difficult nature of the TDCA negotiating process and, more recently, the squabble about the introduction of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in the Southern African Development Community (SADC).⁷ In multilateral forums, the UN in particular, South Africa studiously sided with non-Western countries, voting with them, sharing their ideology, and echoing their rhetoric.⁸

The notion of 'Eurocentrism' became a pejorative notion in the lexicon of the Mbeki-dominated ANC foreign policy establishment, denoting something antithetical to Afrocentrism, a remnant of colonialism as well as a reminder of the erstwhile special relations with fellow Caucasians in Europe

when South Africa was under white rule. According to Landsberg, in his 'I am an African' speech of 8 May 1996 Mbeki attempted to 'rid South Africa from the contentious claims about its European origins, and to imprint in the country a sense of an African identity'.⁹ In 1995, Mbeki stated that 'South Africa should place itself in the context of the Southern African region and define its place on the continent of Africa and the world'.¹⁰ In 1999, assuming the presidency, Mbeki proclaimed that it was 'no longer possible to falsely define South Africa as a European outpost in Africa', describing South Africa as 'an African nation in the complex process simultaneously of formation and renewal'.¹¹

Under Mbeki's watch, replacing South Africa's European identity with an African identity became an ANC and government priority. Africanisation swept through the entire civil service, the national broadcaster, cultural institutions, and European/Afrikaans appellations of streets, cities, buildings and institutions were and are still being changed to new Africanised versions. This process is still in progress but there is little doubt that in a short period of time old white-dominated Eurocentric South Africa had metamorphosed into an African country, albeit with its unique African style and flavour, influenced by the confluence of European and African cultures, something which could perhaps be referred to as 'Euro-Africanism'.

Inevitably, this newly asserted African identity of the South African state also translated into scepticism about European attitudes. In particular, the ANC took umbrage at what it regarded as Europe's deliberate minimalist role in the struggle against apartheid, showing its displeasure at the slow, and in some cases apparent, unwillingness of the EU and some of its prominent member states to throw their weight behind the international campaign to end apartheid.¹² Probably as a demonstration of diplomatic pique, Mbeki delayed an official visit to the EU in Brussels, South Africa's biggest trading partner and aid donor at the time, only to make it late in his second term, reinforcing the notion of a rather cool, businesslike if not distant relationship.

The dictates of national interests, particularly economic and developmental interests, determine that South Africa cannot afford to alienate the global North. Indeed, posturing against Eurocentrism aside, there seems to be no innate desire to do so. The practical situation is that the transaction flow between South Africa and Europe and the US, particularly trade, intellectual, scientific and technical interaction, development aid and regular high profile visits by leaders, have increased steeply since 1994. Europe has also become a preferred destination of the new breed of South African politicians, bureaucrats and diplomats. At DIRCO, formerly known as the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), it is common knowledge that the new black diplomats prefer Europe to Africa for their postings abroad.

To allay any fears about South Africa turning away from the West, on the occasion of South Africa officially joining the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) summit in April 2011, President Jacob Zuma declared during a press interview that South Africa's relations with Europe and America would not be adversely affected by this step. Even so, his policy, like his predecessor's, is obviously not one of 'equal distance' between the global North and the global South. South Africa's membership of BRICS will embolden it further in its drift away from the global North. This 'opposition-to-the-West' posture was clearly demonstrated during South Africa's two recent stints as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), when Zuma upbraided the West for using Resolution 1973 to deploy North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aircraft over Libya, enforcing a successful regime change in the country.¹³ The country also voted in most cases against Western proposals affecting human rights abuses in countries of the developing non-Western world.

Mbeki made Africa the centrepiece of South Africa's foreign relations. He worked from the premise that without changes to the rules of North–South interaction and without the former's benevolence, Africa would remain marginalised. As a result, he actively engaged the rich industrialised nations of the North, bilaterally and multilaterally, with a view to redesigning the global economic and financial architecture, to negotiate debt relief, and to bring about fairer trade practices and more development aid. A notable achievement on his part was to make his African agenda part of the Group of 8 (G8) agenda, heightening the saliency, better understanding and greater commitment on the part of the rich nations of the North.

Also on the African continent he recorded notable achievements, particularly the reform of the OAU into the African Union (AU) and the launching of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad), and involving himself in African peace processes.¹⁴ Other initiatives like the African Renaissance, a centrepiece of his African agenda, remained in the domain of myth making. Successful democratisation and economic success stories of various African countries since the 1990s happened without South Africa's involvement. Although South Africa, in view of its level of development and modernisation, economic, technological and military prowess, was well positioned to play a leadership role in Africa, particularly Southern Africa, Mbeki's leadership also fell short of achieving this.

Mbeki created high expectations, setting ideals for Africa, making umpteen opening moves while neglecting his domestic base. South Africa's national interests hardly featured on his agenda as he was preoccupied with his bigger agenda for Africa and the South. His was very much a personal ideology, based on his obsession with race and his driving mission and ambition to take up a struggle against the inequities of this world,

particularly as they weighed down on Africa. However meritorious and noble these ideals were, and the prestige and access he enjoyed as Africa's super-salesman the world over, he failed to sway policies and change priorities, to be assuaged mostly with palliatives and unfulfilled promises. While he presented himself as Africa's *Überdiplomat* and even saviour, he ignored the timeworn adage that 'foreign policy starts at home',¹⁵ and in the end, he paid the price for it at the ANC's national conference in Polokwane in December 2007 when he was deposed by Jacob Zuma as the president of the party.

THE ZUMA PRESIDENCY: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

On the eve of assuming office, President Jacob Zuma stated that the country's 'foreign policy will not change. There will be continuity.'¹⁶ By 2012, as could have been expected, there were some changes in nuances, priorities and emphasis. In particular, the substantial ideological-intellectual overlay Mbeki introduced in foreign policy made way for pragmatism, boiling down to what seems to be a mixture of the Mandela and Mbeki policies, but lacking in the qualities such as leadership, depth, sophistication, clear-headedness, authority and resolve to be expected from a country like South Africa. Foreign policy was relegated to a lower position in national priorities, but as is usually the case with heads of state or government, over time, as they establish themselves, their involvement becomes greater. What did remain basically unchanged were the essential contours and basic tenets of South Africa's foreign policy, particularly as far as global and regional identification, alignment and orientation are concerned.

When Zuma became president, there were expectations that South Africa would return to Mandela's morally-based foreign policy. In 1993, Mandela stated in an article on South Africa's future foreign policy that 'human rights will be the light that guides our foreign affairs' and that 'only true democracy can guarantee [these] rights'.¹⁷ This commitment was echoed in DIRCO's Strategic Plan 2010–2013, stating that the 'commitment to the promotion of human rights' was one of the main principles underpinning South Africa's foreign policy.¹⁸ However, its voting behaviour as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and its relations with Zimbabwe and China, in particular, cast doubt on the seriousness, if not honesty, of this commitment. As these issues demonstrated, when Western interests came into play, even when it was morally wrong to oppose them, the ANC-government upped the ante. What could be deduced from this practical application of South Africa's foreign policy is: (a) that opposition

to the West, in multilateral forums in particular, overrides human rights concerns; and (b) that the country's policymakers might interpret human rights and international morality as applied in multilateral institutions as well as bilaterally, as embedded in Western culture, as being Western-oriented, as essentially a product of Western thought and an instrument of Western interests.

This shift in emphasis and alliance formation manifested most clearly in the way South Africa chose sides in regard to global and regional issues involving Western interests. Generally, except in the cases of Libya and Syria, it followed the lead of China and Russia.¹⁹ In regard to the Iraq War, the dispute with Iran concerning its nuclear programme, the Israel–Palestinian conflict; and UN sanctions against Zimbabwe, Myanmar and North Korea, South Africa took up a position against the West in its first term as non-permanent member of the UNSC from January 2007 to December 2008. It opposed a Western-sponsored UNSC resolution on rape as a political weapon, and in July 2008 it voted with Russia, China, Vietnam and Libya in opposition to a US-sponsored resolution on Zimbabwe. South Africa and the US also differed on Middle East issues before the UNSC. South Africa did not support a US-sponsored resolution to establish an international tribunal to investigate political killings in Lebanon and opposed UNSC resolutions on both Sudan and Iran, but altered its position later, offering a highly suspect technical explanation.²⁰

At first, the way South Africa voted in the UNSC Resolution 1973 against Libya indicated a change of direction, but qualifications and prevarications emerged afterwards, including criticism of Western nations for the way it was imposed, and the rather feeble and belated effort of the AU Delegation – of which Zuma was part – to negotiate a ceasefire between the Gaddafi government and the rebels conveyed a picture of diplomatic ineptitude, back-paddling, uncertainty, ambivalence, even confusion on the part of South African foreign policy-makers.²¹ In the UNSC resolution on Syria sponsored by the Arab League and calling for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down, vetoed by Russia and China, it abstained.²²

DIRCO'S STRATEGIC POSITIONING OF THE GLOBAL NORTH AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH

DIRCO's Strategic Plan 2010–2013,²³ *inter alia*, lists as elements of its 'principles underpinning South Africa's policy on international relations' a commitment to promote the African agenda in world affairs and to economic development through regional and international cooperation in an interdependent world. Under the heading 'Strategic Priorities', it singles out

the continued prioritisation of the African continent; strengthening South–South relations; and strengthening relations with strategic formations of the North.

South Africa regards the global North as an important element of its foreign policy landscape and architecture. The Strategic Plan 2010–2013 states that ‘South Africa will garner support from the developed countries of the North for South Africa’s national priorities ... furthermore, engagement with the North is aimed at advancing the development needs of the continent and the South ... maintain bilateral relations with relevant countries of the North to enhance cooperation with formations of the North’.²⁴ In practice, in addition to routine bilateral engagement, this implies engagement with the Western-dominated G8 and the Group of 20 (G20), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Customs Union (WCO), as well as with the EU in terms of the TDCA, the Africa-EU Action Plan and the South Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership.²⁵

More than on the bilateral level, where relations continue to remain correct and businesslike, South Africa’s multilateral interaction with countries of the North is particularly affected by its ideological predilections and its revisionist agenda. Overall, the country enjoys good access everywhere in the world. It is still in the fortunate position of being able to have the best of both worlds, the global South and the global North, in terms of foreign policy choices and options. The West responds as a willing, predictable partner in South Africa’s pursuance of economic diplomacy, while the global South, as well as Russia, China and India, reciprocate a close, special relationship. The country can rest assured that the West’s cooperation, particularly regarding economic, scientific, and developmental issues will be maintained. As such, the country can tap into the West’s large resources of particularly soft power without a premium or limitations of any kind to augment its own arsenal. But this is not necessarily a permanent situation, given the drift away from the West and the present volatility of global politics and economics which may induce some rearrangement of Western priorities.

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

Since 1992, South Africa has been among the leading Africa recipients of US aid, rising from an estimated US\$224 million in 2006 to US\$398 million in 2007. The Bush administration obligated an estimated US\$574 million for the 2008 congressional budget justification, and the State Department reported that ‘the US Government’s relationship with South Africa is transforming from that of donor to one of strategic partnership’, and accordingly

'activities in Peace and Security will continue to increase in importance while development programs will be phased out in the next couple of years'. The US assistance will continue to focus on fighting HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis and assisting the South African government to implement economic reforms and to improve its regional peace-keeping capacity. The programmes of USAID, the US government's aid agency, have supported efforts to promote sound governance, reduce unemployment and poverty, increase access to shelter and basic municipal services, and improve the quality of education and the country's health system. US assistance includes US\$850 000 in international military education and training (IMET) programmes in South Africa. The United States provides significant assistance to South Africa's fight against HIV/AIDS through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), having contributed over US\$1 447 million since the programme's inception in 2004. The Bush administration requested US\$557 million for 2009 through the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative. By the end of 2008, the PEPFAR programme had provided ARV therapy to 549 700 patients, transmission prevention treatment to over 462 400 women, and palliative and tuberculosis care for 1 852 700 South Africans.²⁶

Commenting on South Africa's second spell as non-permanent member of the UNSC, Ebrahim Ebrahim, the present South African deputy foreign minister, stated: 'South Africa has an independent foreign policy – we don't hesitate to criticise even the big powers. We aren't under any big power's control.'²⁷

Obviously Ebrahim's 'big powers' reference is aimed at the US, excluding other major powers, particularly China with which South Africa has sided on various occasions. The question which arises is whether South Africa is anti-American rather than anti-big power per se. Is its foreign policy truly independent as implied by this statement?

Anti-American scepticism as a characteristic of the ANC's foreign policy has come a long way and can be traced to a variety of factors which include

- the insistence of the Reagan administration on a policy of 'constructive engagement', prevaricating on application of UN sanctions, and choosing not to confront South Africa more head-on at the time of apartheid²⁸
- the humiliation of visa restrictions lingering on for members of the ANC (being treated as a terrorist Organization – including former presidents Mandela and Mbeki) until May 2008²⁹
- Mandela's criticism of the US because of the level of economic assistance it offered to help recover from apartheid; the 1991 indictment against Armscor which the Mandela government wanted removed and which only occurred in 1996

- Mandela's, and subsequently Mbeki's, emphasis on loyalty to Cuba, Libya and Iran, considered international outcasts by the US
- Pretoria's championing the ending of the US trade embargo against Cuba and forging several cooperation agreements with Iran, and going so far as to invite the American *bête noir* at the time, Muammar Gaddafi, on an official visit to South Africa in 1995

The fact that ideological interests hold sway over intrinsic national interests (particularly economic and strategic) in ANC policy-making is fairly evident from the empirical reality. The US took some important steps to expedite the fall of the apartheid regime. It is highly doubtful that externally induced change in South Africa to dismantle apartheid would ever have taken place in 1994 without the involvement and role of the US. Before joining the international community in 1986 in imposing comprehensive economic sanctions under the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) against South Africa, the US implemented a variety of its own measures such as an arms embargo (1964), blocking International Monetary Fund (IMF) credits to Pretoria (1983) and barring US exports to South African military and police forces.³⁰ The fact that the US, the mightiest nation on earth, turned its back on apartheid South Africa, in spite of the latter's being its strategic ally in Africa in the struggle against communism, having a pro-Western government and being a friendly nation of long standing, drove home the message that the writing was on the wall and to resist would be a futile exercise. Without the US's role, it is doubtful that the change of 1994 would have come at the time it did.

Even so, the ANC seems to be under the impression that the US was not fully on its side at the time of its struggle and that the honour must go to Cuba, Libya, the Soviet Union and China. In essence, however, proportionally and substantially, the US contributed more than any other single nation to the eventual fall of the apartheid state, more in any case than any of those states being accorded a special place in the ANC's pantheon of comrades-in-struggle.

The ANC's general disenchantment with the warmongering external policies of American President George W Bush has no doubt exacerbated its scepticism, although being anti-Bush ought not to be translated into being anti-American. Many countries, also in the West, sought to distance themselves from the Bush administration, but restored relations when Barack Obama assumed the presidency. However, in South Africa's case it seems that the sceptical attitude goes deeper and is more permanent than merely an anti-Bush manifestation.

Taking account of the multiplicity and substance of American involvement in South Africa – diplomatic, strategic, trade, investment, development

aid, culture, health, science and technology – and the regularity and density of bilateral transaction flows, more than with any other country,³¹ the relationship should qualify as a 'special' relationship which is not the case. Apparently, therefore, the frequency, density and volume of transactions are not necessarily a reflection of the quality, substance or closeness of the relationship.

As explained by Moeletsisi Mbeki:

The great majority of South Africans see the United States as a friend who was supportive in the hour of need ... The ANC government on the other hand has an ambivalent attitude towards the United States government and the United States in general and is thus prone to exaggerate and even search for areas of difference.³²

When Bill Clinton was American president he developed a personal relationship with President Mandela, while the unpopular president George W Bush made an official visit to South Africa, appointing Thabo Mbeki as his 'point man' on Zimbabwe, albeit to little or no avail. Early indications are that Jacob Zuma is amicable toward the White House, but that President Obama, despite his African roots and being a black man, remains somewhat less forthcoming, even aloof, turning out not to be the champion for African causes that many in South Africa and the rest of the continent had so eagerly expected. However, significantly, Zuma did not personally receive the American first lady, Michelle Obama, when she paid a visit to South Africa in June 2011.³³

As table 1 indicates, the US shows a deficit in its merchandise trade with South Africa. Nevertheless, South Africa is the largest market for American goods in Africa, with imports totalling over US\$5,5 billion in 2007. 'Leading US exports include transportation equipment, chemicals, and electronic products, while leading imports include minerals and metals, and transport equipment ... South Africa continues to enjoy major benefits from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) ... Through AGOA, South Africa exported US\$2,3 billion – making it the largest and most diversified supplier of non-fuel products under AGOA.'³⁴

Table 1 US merchandise Trade with South Africa (US\$ billions)

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Exports to SA	2,819	3,178	3,907	4,460	5,518
Imports from SA	4,624	5,945	5,886	7,501	9,075
Balance	-1,805	-2,766	-1,979	-3,039	-3,557


Source US Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division

Box 1

South–South trade stood on 50 per cent (US\$353 billion) in 2008. African trade with Asia has in the same period grown to equal the level of Western Europe (28%). It is too early to gauge the impact on Africa's future development and stability of this movement away from Europe, but some warning lights are already flashing. As pointed out in a 2010 United Nations report, China has a strategy to deal with Africa but Africa has no strategy to deal with China. In particular it seems that Africa is willy nilly moving towards a future of debt dependency which could probably be as damaging as neocolonial dependency. Adding to this rather grim scenario is that intra-African trade remained unchanged at 11 per cent between 1990 and 2008. By all accounts, intra-African trade should serve as a platform and primary growth point for regional integration, economic and industrial development. Undoubtedly, while this pattern persists, Africa will continue to remain a prisoner of dependency, underdevelopment and marginalisation in an increasingly competitive global environment.

Source C.Sidi Diarra, 2010

Figure 1 Trade movements



Source McKinsey Global Institute

DEPENDABLE EUROPE

For a major part of South Africa's modern history – almost 350 years – European influence held sway over its existence, as occupiers, exploiters, usurpers, colonial rulers, developers, kith and kin, diplomatic collaborator and partner and, towards the end, opponent of apartheid.

On cultural, intellectual, scientific and economic levels, Europe left a profound and lasting influence. South Africa developed and modernised

according to European economic and technological standards, adopted European cultural and behavioural patterns, and the English language became the local lingua franca as the country developed into the most powerful state in Africa. But all of this also came at a price. The socio-political legacy left by the European colonial powers in the nascent South Africa was that of a house divided under white minority rule. Racial and ethnic divisions were politicised and institutionalised and while a special privileged political and economic status accrued to the white population, their black compatriots were generally discriminated against; excluded from the national political and economic mainstream, not afforded the status and rights of full citizens of the country of their birth and origin. So, when everything is taken into account, a significant share of both the blame and the praise for the good and the bad of South Africa from 1652 to 1994 must be apportioned to the influence and legacy of European colonial rule and the economic and political practices it introduced and institutionalised.

An amazing part of 'Boer-Brit' history is how the pendulum swung from one extreme to the other. From being enemies in war, they developed a special relationship until the resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism in 1948, South Africa's introduction of legalised apartheid, becoming a republic, losing Commonwealth membership, and being subjected to isolation and sanctions by former friends and allies.

With the emergence of the post-apartheid South Africa, relations with erstwhile close allies in Western Europe, notably the UK, Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands were restored and expanded. The Scandinavian countries, aloof and utterly critical towards South Africa during most of the apartheid years, opened up to Pretoria, and normal relations followed. However, both the nature and quality of relations, particularly with the former group, 'old Europe', never returned to the earlier closeness. While the substance of these relations grew quite significantly, and while they remained amicable, they never developed into that 'special' category which South Africa reserved for partners of the global South.³⁵

Box 2 EU trade with South Africa

In 2009, South Africa was the EU-27's 14th largest trade partner and the second largest from Africa, close behind Algeria. EU-27 trade with South Africa changed dramatically from 2008 to 2009. Exports, which had fallen slightly in 2008, dropped by a further fifth in 2009; imports, which had risen steadily since 2003, fell by one-third. Germany was the largest EU trading partner with South Africa. German exports to South Africa fell by 20 per cent and imports by 26 per cent from 2008 to 2009, resulting in its total trade with South Africa falling by €2,6 billion.

The UK, South Africa's second largest EU trading partner, saw its total trade with South Africa fall by €3 billion, almost one-third, in the same time. In 2009, road vehicles and general industrial machinery were the most important EU-27 exports to South Africa.

The most important imports were coal, coke and briquettes and non-metallic mineral manufactured products. EU-27 trade with South Africa fell sharply in 2009, after a steady rise between 2000 and 2008. Between 2000 and 2008, the value of EU-27 trade with South Africa increased by 61 per cent from €26,5 billion in 2000 to €42,6 billion in 2008. Exports grew by 71 per cent and imports by 52 per cent over this period. From 2008 to 2009, the international economic crisis changed things dramatically, with EU-27 exports to South Africa falling by 20 per cent and imports by 33 per cent. These decreases were bigger than the decreases seen in total extra-EU exports (-16%) and imports (-23%). Despite its exports to South Africa falling by 20 per cent and its imports by 26 per cent in 2009, Germany was the largest EU trading partner and by far the largest exporter. Germany also had the largest positive trade balance with South Africa of all member states. By contrast, the UK, the second largest EU trading partner and the biggest importer of South African goods, recorded the largest trade deficit.

Source G. Gambini, Eurostat 42/2010

What placed South Africa's relations with Europe after apartheid on a new footing and a higher plateau was, of course, the conclusion of the TDCA with the EU in 2000. This agreement enabled the EU to become the country's biggest trading partner and biggest donor of foreign aid as well as its most important developing partner. However, in view of ideological bias on the SA side and self-interest on the EU side, the conclusion of the TDCA was, against initial expectations, a difficult process.³⁶

From a position of ambivalence and foot dragging lasting up to the mid-1980s, Europe (the European Community collectively and key individual member states) rather belatedly threw its full weight behind the international resolve to end apartheid. This slow response cast a shadow over EU–South African relations and no doubt hampered negotiations. But eventually the EU got its act together to become an important role player in the transformation to democracy in South Africa. Apart from applying comprehensive sanctions, it allocated substantial resources to help the victims of apartheid. One of the first actions of the newly elected South African government was to negotiate the TDCA with the EU; an important strategic partnership with the EU was also entered into in 2007.

In a statement of 29 June 2006, the South African government welcomed the proposed strategic partnership 'as a positive step in the process of elevating SA–EU relations ... both SA and the EU believe that intensified cooperation will be of mutual benefit ... a strategic partnership relationship will allow SA and the EU to engage in more intensive dialogue on political, economic, and developmental issues ...'. Since the strategic partnership was established and its joint plan of action adopted in May 2007, the two parties have decided to establish structured policy dialogues and cooperation in a variety of areas, although the outcome of these efforts is not yet visible in the practical domain.

It is obvious that the EU puts a high premium on the value of South Africa as a partner. It regards South Africa as important because of its

unique standing in the Southern African region, the African continent, the developing world in general and as a global player, and, therefore, as a country that could support it in its quest to play a more visible and important role in the global South in particular.

The strategic partnership seeks to further this process by bringing the EU member states and South Africa together in a single and coherent framework, with clearly and jointly defined objectives, covering all areas of cooperation and associating all stakeholders. The strategic partnership also seeks to move from political dialogue to strategic cooperation and shared objectives on regional, African and global issues. Finally, it seeks to enhance existing cooperation, developing stronger and sustainable economic cooperation, fully implementing the TDCA provisions on trade-related areas and extending cooperation to the social, cultural and environmental fields.³⁷

Great emphasis is placed by the EU and South Africa on shared values and common objectives. At the 8th Ministerial Troika Meeting on 16 January 2009 at Kleinmond in the Western Cape, it was declared that:

'A key element of the strategic partnership is the common commitment to promoting an agenda of liberty, peace, security and stability in the world, and in Africa in particular. South Africa and the EU share the understanding that security and development are interdependent, and that both parties play key global roles in this regard ... The strategic partnership shall be built on existing relations between the EU and South Africa, with the objective to bring added value to these relations while fully consistent with international human right obligations ...'.

However, in spite of these positive intentions and developments, and particularly because of EU self-interests and South African ideology, South African–EU relations cannot be depicted as 'close' or 'special'. The intense, even petty, squabbling about the introduction of an EPA in the SADC region is one particular example of this,³⁸ and earlier, during the protracted negotiations for the TDCA, similar acrimony was demonstrated. Over and above this, the ideological-philosophical gap between EU and South African worldviews, as demonstrated by conflicting approaches to international issues such as human rights and domestic and regional conflicts in various parts of the world, point to threatening fault lines in the relationship. Be that as it may, relations with Brussels serve Pretoria well and are probably the best answer to DIRCO's quest 'to garner support from the developed countries for South Africa's national priorities: education, health, rural development and land reform, creating decent work, and fighting crime ... advancing the development needs of the Continent and the South'.³⁹

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND EASTERN EUROPE

Isolation from one another, and the regarding of one another with enmity during the Cold War years, have meant that South Africa's new relations with Russia and the countries of Eastern Europe are still in the formative stages. Hostility has made way for friendly cooperation and diplomatic relations have been formalised, but apart from promises of cooperation, proliferation of symbolic agreements and protocols, and high-level official visits, the substance of interaction is yet to be added. With the exception of Russia, these states have historically had a limited interest in and exposure to Africa. Since some of them (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia) have joined the EU, this situation may change in view of the more prominent African agenda. Therefore, developing relations with them, particularly in the economic, technical and scientific fields, could benefit South Africa in future.

Relations with Russia are highly important from economic, diplomatic and strategic points of view. The country is a permanent member of the UNSC, a nuclear power, a member of the G8 and a regional hegemon in a strategically very important part of the world, a major energy producer, and the eighth biggest economy in the world. It is clearly on its way up in the international pecking order, recovering from the dark days of the failure and collapse of the Soviet Union.

While the somewhat frosty relations with the ANC during the 1990s have made way for amicable interaction, the relationship is still lagging behind expectations.⁴⁰ It is a relationship of good promise but disappointing substance, particularly in the field of trade, where Russia still only ranks about 50th on South Africa's list of trading partners. In spite of the number of reciprocal high-level visits, including by the respective presidents, the relationship has not blossomed by any means. Ideologically, Russia and South Africa are closer than is the case with most other countries in the global North. They see eye to eye on controversial issues such as Iran, Iraq, the Israel–Palestine conflict, Myanmar and Zimbabwe (this is possibly a manifestation of their opposition to Western/American influence). The South African–Russian relationship is not one that will develop simply or fortuitously. It needs to be energised by skilful diplomacy and a well-orchestrated strategy based on mutual interests. Deficiencies in bilateral diplomacy seem to prevail, preventing a warm or special relationship. The two countries are not fully *ad idem* regarding South Africa's quest to become a permanent member of the UNSC, preferring a collective African approach. When President Dmitry Medvedev visited Africa (Egypt, Angola and Namibia) in 2009, mainly to boost business, he conspicuously left South Africa out.

What irks the Russians in particular is that very few initiatives go beyond the pomp and circumstance of high-level opening moves. It is also still not clear how South Africa sees Russia's willingness (and intention) to step up its role in Africa, especially with China becoming more visible and assertive on the continent. As an important role player, it would seem to be in South Africa's interests to promote and cultivate a new Russian *presence* in Africa, something very different from the Cold War role of the Soviet Union, but a role that could promote development and stability in Africa by introducing more healthy competition, partnership, and greater responsibility among the major powers active on the continent.

Against this background, South Africa's foreign relations since 1994 can be explained in terms more of continuity than change. The basic determinants of the policy over these years were South Africa's intrinsic power base (hard and soft power), ideological predilections, economic necessity, strategic relevance and struggle politics and connections. On the basis of these distinctions, these relations, by way of summary, can be depicted as overlapping concentric circles denoting ideological affinity or closeness, and strategic and economic importance.

Ideological interests	Economic interests	Strategic interests
Africa		
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)		
Non-Western supporters of the struggle against apartheid		
Cuba	Africa	
European Union		
USA	Africa	
Europe		
USA		
China		
India		
Russia		
China	China	Brazil /South America
Australia		
Japan		
China		

Ideological interests	Economic interests	Strategic interests
Brazil		
The Arab World		
South East Asia		
Venezuela		
India		
The Arab World		
Cuba		
South East Asia		
Venezuela		
Russia	Germany	
The Arab World	United Kingdom	
Cuba	France	
Japan		
South East Asia	Italy	
Japan		
Venezuela		
India		
Brazil/South America		
Netherlands		
The Arab world		
Russia		
Canada		
Australia		

CONCLUSION

Since the ANC alliance took over government in 1994, the essential emphasis and focus of South Africa's foreign policy has shifted away from the global North to the global South, Africa in particular, including those countries that are Western sceptics (even anti-West), or former supporters of the struggle against apartheid. Against the background of South Africa's history and new realities, this was a predictable development. As a new BRICS member, South Africa may be tempted to turn even further away from the global North. However, if South Africa wants to remain the master

of its own fate and pursue an independent foreign policy, the wisdom of such a shift should be considered very carefully.

Managing multiple, complex and overlapping identities in a globalised, interdependent and interlinked world is a major challenge to contemporary foreign policy-making. As boundaries erode, the linkages between global issues and problems have reached a level where practically 'everything is related to everything else'. In spite of this reality, South Africa still tends to look at the world through a rather simplistic ideological prism, dealing with a world divided into segments, rather than a holistic interrelated entity, a latticework of interdependence. The country's foreign policy is dictated by these artificial segments, defined in terms of South Africa's ideological predilections, rather than its intrinsic national interests.

The two basic dimensions of the post-Cold War transition are a multipolar world and deepening, complex interdependence. According to Giovanni Grevi, '[a]ll the major powers are exposed to the unprecedented conjunction of the economic, energy and environmental crises and none of them can successfully confront these challenges on its own'.⁴¹ This is the type of world in which South Africa will need to position itself and maximise its national interests.

How South Africa plays the 'great game' of alliance formation in global politics is of the utmost importance and requires diplomacy of high quality, something that seems lacking.⁴² The government has obviously chosen alliance politics, ignoring the limitations that puts on its range of foreign policy options and manoeuvrability. What particularly needs careful orchestration and prudent diplomacy is the complex interplay between South Africa's welfare and security and economic dependence vulnerability on the one hand and its ideological pursuits in the context of directions of change in world politics on the other. Since 1994, South Africa has moved away from the West for ideological reasons; for pragmatic reasons, its policy became one based on the notion of 'not too near, but not too far' which was a relatively easy shift to make, although the long-term consequences are yet to be seen. What made it easy was the fact that there was never any demand from the rich and powerful countries of the North that, in exchange for productive and beneficial relations, South Africa should change its basic foreign policy posture in their favour. At the same time, South Africa was assured of continuity, predictability and reliability on the part of the North – still being the country's most important source of development support and welfare creation. For the present, at least, Pretoria need not be unduly concerned about any imminent changes in the West's commitment to cooperation, even if it is basically a one-way street. The West still treats South Africa as a favourite collaborator and even partner, always seeking to improve relations and being utterly careful not to cause umbrage

by being prescriptive or interfering in South African sovereign domain, in spite of issues that may very well warrant a more critical attitude from its side. According to DIRCO, 'South Africa's engagement with developed countries is premised on the notion of forging partnerships to bring about peace, security and development in the South and in Africa in particular ... South Africa will continue to pursue strategic partnerships with the North ... to mobilise support for Africa's development'.⁴³ How this policy will play out in a situation where South Africa operates in an alliance of opposition, the inevitable result of its current foreign policy choices, is another question.

It is clear that South Africa's present engagement with the global North emanates from necessity rather than preference. Hence, DIRCO speaks of 'consolidating' this engagement and not of 'strengthening' or 'expanding' it. It expects that the present global order of things will change, that the West will decline and fade away as a dominant factor. An important reason for aligning with the global South and, in particular, joining BRICS, is based on the latter assessment. DIRCO hypothesises about

'a world without the West', assuming that 'a group of large, populous, and increasingly wealthy countries are on the brink of great power status ... These countries will increasingly circumvent the West... build an alternative system ... that will be in neither conflict nor assimilation with the West ... cooperation among them will render western power increasingly, albeit not completely, irrelevant ... Interconnectivity within the developing world will deepen with increasing flows of trade, finances, innovations, and people that is largely independent of Western control, resulting in a new parallel international system with its own set of rules, institutions and instruments of power'.⁴⁴

Should this scenario become reality, it will coincide with government's preferred alignment. While this transformation is incomplete, South Africa's engagement with the developed countries of the global North is premised on forging partnerships, bilaterally and multilaterally, to enhance peace, security and development in the South, particularly in Africa. South Africa uses these partnerships to lobby for more debt relief and development assistance, better market access and technical support, essential for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.⁴⁵

Unfortunately, this scenario seems to be clouded by ideological prejudice, premature assumptions and wishful thinking, probably contrived to enhance and legitimise the basic assumptions of this apparently faulty scenario. Under the circumstances, South Africa would be well advised to act with circumspection regarding the above-mentioned thesis about the West's 'inevitable decline' and rather strive for foreign policy independence and manoeuvrability, perhaps even neutrality. It should be especially wary

of being manoeuvred into becoming a strategic captive of any country or alliance from either the global North or global South. While its dependence vulnerability vis-à-vis the West should be redressed, this should not simply be exchanged for a similar position vis-à-vis the powerful nations of the global South. These efforts should preferably emanate from a strategically defined, national interest based, leadership role perception, rather than an opposition posture against the global North – or being a captive ally of China, and others.

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South Africa and emerging powers

Francis Kornegay

INTRODUCTION

In appraising South Africa's foreign relations as they relate to the rise of emerging powers, this chapter sets out, first, to gain a conceptual handle on 'emerging powers', including South Africa's identity within this category. Secondly, it assesses South Africa's emerging power diplomacy – generally and in specific regard to differentiating between such alignments as the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) dialogue forum and the BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) forum which South Africa joined in 2011. Finally, the chapter takes a critical look at the institutional requirements of South Africa as an emerging power.¹ Here, the importance is stressed of Pretoria's developing a more coherently strategic national security strategy and architecture to enhance its competitiveness and credibility as a developmental state.

As a working definition, 'emerging powers' refers to mainly non-Western countries in the developing worlds of Asia, Latin America and Africa that have achieved at least a 'semi-developed', newly industrialising status among developing countries. In the main, they are countries that have embarked on a comparatively rapid economic growth trajectory within the past fifteen to twenty years. They tend to be 'pivotal' in their uniquely geostrategic positioning within their continents, and as such they are often considered 'regional powers' or 'pivotal states' in terms of their significance within the wider international system.² As regional powers of geopolitical and geoeconomic import, their pivotal importance enhances their role as state actors within an increasingly multipolar distribution of world power. The emergence of these states as major actors on the international scene definitionally and conceptually challenges an understanding of the new strategic landscape.

New conceptions of 'club governance' to describe the proliferating 'G' groupings have come into currency along with a trend toward diverse

'strategic triangles' and partnerships.³ The latter might be viewed as 'limited multilateral strategic partnerships' of countries that may either reflect 'like-mindedness' (as in the case of IBSA) or pragmatically strategic convergence (as with BRICS).⁴ Taken together with the traditional post-World War II United Nations Bretton Woods institutions, the growing significance of club governance and limited multilateral strategic (as opposed to bilateral) partnerships contributes to what some are inclined to characterise as a new 'plurilateralism' in international relations, a trend that may be further augmented by the regionalisation of multipolarity within which emerging powers tend to be embedded in their regional, continental and subcontinental neighbourhoods.⁵

In some cases, emerging powers are actually re-emerging or resurgent powers, countries that have regained a measure of great power momentum following a historical interregnum of stagnation, decline and internal turmoil and/or subjugation under external domination, from which they have managed to recover and regain stability and a sense of outward projection. Continent-sized civilisational states Russia, China and India fit this category. To some extent, post-Ottoman Turkey is another example of renewed regional power projection within transcontinental Eurasia.

Uniquely, post-unification Germany as a developed country in the heart of Europe could also qualify as a resurgent emerging power, one that is re-asserting its economic dominance over the European Union (EU). In tandem with a resurgent Russia, Germany's resurgence is restoring what has been a historically traditional power configuration at the eastern and western ends of central Europe. As the United States has shifted emphasis to the Asia-Pacific, something of the Anglo-French-German-Russian configuration has emerged, with Germany's economic hegemony accentuated by the ongoing Eurozone crisis. Interestingly, Germany's sense of identity with non-Western emerging powers has given rise to a 'GIBSA' configuration of academic discourse. This is, perhaps, motivated in part by Germany's G4 aspirational aim of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).⁶

South Africa, on the other hand, is unique. It has always been the most developed country on the African continent. But under white rule until the mid-1990s it never enjoyed legitimacy as major state actor in Africa. In comparative terms, it falls in the category of an 'emerging middle power', though this conceptualisation has been qualified as in need of drawing distinctions 'between an emerging power as a middle power in the international arena, and an emerging power as a regional power'.⁷ This proffered distinction captures South Africa's ambivalent position within the current geopolitical dynamics of emerging powers, given its smallish size and limited power potential compared to India and Brazil, as well as to China and

Russia and other aspirants to emerging power status such as Indonesia and, potentially, Nigeria.

In regional terms, another set of issues arises whereby South Africa, 'middle power' as it may be viewed globally, is an obvious incumbent (not emerging) regional power within the Southern African context and in continental terms, given the size of its economy. Indeed, South Africa is also exemplary of a geostrategically 'pivotal state' that is also a regional power situated astride the Cape sea lanes linking the Indian and South Atlantic oceans. These are attributes that Pretoria can build upon in its African diplomacy by prioritising regional integration as an embedded 'force multiplier' that could enhance its power within the continent and at least within the global South.

To the extent that emerging powers aspire to global or to greater power status, however, there is a major distinction to be made between South Africa on the one hand, and India, Brazil, China, Russia (and others) on the other as regionally-based 'emerging powers'. These are big state actors of continental scale that are manifestly aspirational in their quest for recognition as 'great powers'. Objectively, they are 'big powers'. South Africa, by contrast, though a subcontinental 'big power' within the regional parameters of Southern Africa, is dwarfed by comparison to the other BRICS countries. Furthermore, not only does it not – indeed cannot – aspire to 'great power' status globally, its post-apartheid anti-hegemonic reflexes make for an ambivalent relationship between it and the rest of Africa regarding its leadership role, regionally within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and at the continental level.

South Africa is the regional hegemon of Southern Africa. It is also the continent's economic hegemon even as, in political and diplomatic terms, its 'big power' status within SADC and on the continent is burdened with mutual ambivalence. The upshot is that South Africa has occupied a default leadership position on the continent. However, Pretoria – post-BRICS – has become more assertive in its inter-African diplomacy, albeit with mixed results in its less than satisfactory outcomes influencing crisis resolutions in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya. Its unsuccessful but continuing bid to have the minister of home affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, assume the chairmanship of the African Union (AU) Commission reinforced South Africa's bid to translate default leadership into a more decisive position commensurate with its emerging power-BRICS status.

SOUTH AFRICA: AFRICA'S DEFAULT LEADER

In defining South Africa's emerging power status, it is important to grasp the African dimension of the niche it occupies, one reflected in the concentric

circular paradigm of the country's strategic priorities governing foreign policy. Simply put, these are the following:

- Southern Africa, comprising SADC and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
- Africa, revolving around the AU and its affiliated structures and continental organs (the Nepad Development and Cooperation Agency, the AU Peace and Security Council, the Pan-African Parliament), as well as such institutions as the African Development Bank and the Africa Group within the United Nations system
- The global South and South–South cooperation involving committed membership of the more traditional ‘third-world’ structures like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Group of 77 plus China (G77+China) and newer alignments such IBSA, the New Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership (NAASP), the BASIC climate change coalition comprising Brazil-South Africa-India-China and the Group of 20 (G20) negotiating bloc within the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha ‘development round’ trade talks
- North–South ‘bridge building’, encompassing such strategic relationships as with the European Union (EU), including its Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) and priority bilateral links as with the United Kingdom, Germany and the US as well as its politico-diplomatic navigating between North and South – with an African focus – for the UN, the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) and on nuclear nonproliferation issues

Given the fact that South Africa is not a big power or aspiring ‘great power’ but is nevertheless the dominant economic power on the African continent and therefore a natural gravitational force for other international actors as ‘Africa’s leader’, Pretoria has consistently found itself in the proverbial middle in the political cross-currents it must navigate within the concentric strategic paradigm. Hence, South Africa is a middle power in more ways than is reflected in how it is conceptualised within international relations theory pertaining to middle powers as aptly surveyed by Schoeman.⁸

South Africa’s foreign policy identity and navigational challenges within the global political economy are complicated. This pertains even to its default leadership within Africa which forces it to have little choice but to ‘punch above its weight’ in the global arena. Why this is so has everything to do with the wide capacity gap between South Africa’s economic, governance and institutional capabilities and those of the rest of the continent, including those of Africa’s putatively premier governing body, the AU.

Compounding South Africa's leadership dilemmas are inhibitions within the post-apartheid ruling elite borne of the *ancien régime's* destabilisation project in greater Southern Africa. The ruling African National Congress (ANC) and its tripartite alliance, both in and outside government, having fought against the *ancien régime*, have, in essence, assumed the guilt of that regime's destabilisers. In the process, they have made themselves vulnerable to being browbeaten into bending over backwards in order not to be seen – by those envious of black South Africa's rise to power – to be dominating their neighbours.

Hence, there is a resistance to South Africa's leadership from non-South African Africans, even as they have depended on South Africa's capacity and resources while seeking in various and sundry ways to participate in, and benefit from, South Africa's mass consumer economy and urban industrial and post-industrial modernity. South African diplomacy, in turn, has been multilateralist to a fault in seeking to lead by consensus so as to avoid being seen as a 'neighbourhood bully', even as the country's multinationals have increasingly come under fire for what is seen as their tendency towards an exploitative approach to their northward expansion. However, Pretoria's controversial foray into the Côte d'Ivoire crisis against the grain of Nigeria's leadership within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was a noticeable departure from its erstwhile multilateralist caution in African diplomacy.

In spite of these complexities, South Africa's active conflict-mediating and peace-support role on the continent and the incorporation of its SACU partners in its trade strategies (post-TDCA) speaks much more of a 'good neighbour' policy in regional relationships than is the case with other regional powers. The leadership is also evident in the manner in which South Africa has engaged in the fledgling transformation of the institutional architecture of the inter-African system: the Organization of African Unity (OAU) transition into the AU; and the launching of Nepad and related initiatives such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

South Africa has, thus, by its own estimation, earned its seat at the diplomatic table of 'high politics' within such global elite groupings as the Group of 8 (G8) (through its erstwhile 'Outreach Five') and the G20, which has now overtaken the G8 as the more representative global economic directorate of developed and emerging developing economies. But this raises the question of whether South Africa's default leadership position within an expanded global governing regime incorporating emerging powers is such that it can deliver – for South Africa and Africa as a whole – a more empowering positioning within the world political economy. In this regard, the 'west-to-east' reconfiguring of the international system poses still more dilemmas for South Africa as Africa's emerging power advancing an African agenda.

THE EMERGING POWER DIPLOMACY OF AFRICA'S 'GREAT POWER'

South Africa's identity as an emerging power is paradoxical. It is the economic giant of the African continent but an economic 'pygmy' within the global economy. However, by dint of its default leadership position on the continent, it is Africa's 'great power', a status that has forced it to 'punch above its weight' diplomatically in the global arena. In this setting, however, South Africa is nowhere near assuming the global power potential or pretensions of India and Brazil, let alone China. Yet, given the disempowered circumstances of a fragmented Africa, it is compelled to ensure an 'African voice' lest the continent suffers marginalisation in the corridors of world power and decision-making. And although Pretoria cannot presume to articulate the 'African voice' as an African 'common position', and has no formal mandate to do so, the rest of Africa has tended, more or less, to acquiesce in South Africa's global role on behalf of Africa (although this may be changing as other African states, in other parts of the continent, some with faster growth rates than South Africa's, are likely to assume 'regional gateway' status for outside investors).

South Africa cannot command and, indeed, does not aspire to command, great power status within a global context. The transition from a G8 dominant global economic directorate, monopolised by predominantly Western developed countries, to a more representative G20 configuration of emerging and large developing countries (as well as those of the developed North) actually dilutes South Africa's presumptive 'African voice'. This is a situation that is hardly addressed by symbolic presences at summits of whoever is the rotational chair of the AU or the putative head of Nepad (now a development and cooperation agency within the AU).

Irrespective of South Africa's mandate from the rest of Africa, non-African interlocutors have tended to relate to South Africa as the continent's 'chief negotiator' at the diplomatic negotiating levels of global 'club governance'. In spite of general African ambivalence about South Africa, Pretoria's continental diplomacy has enabled it to assume this African leadership role at global level and to propel itself twice onto the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member. To Pretoria's credit, its virtual idealist 'African multilateral' tendencies have resulted in its pursuing a consultative approach within the AU and other key African states in carrying forth a pan-African agenda into the various forums in which it interacts with other powers.

Once again, however, the fallout from Pretoria's complicated stances in the case of Côte d'Ivoire and Libya, together with its controversial AU chairmanship bid for Dlamini-Zuma in 2012, may force some reassessments in this regard. Otherwise, as the lone voice of Africa within an expanded

global power structure, the special focus that has tended to be afforded Africa's developmental agenda vis-à-vis other world continental regions seems not as much a certainty as previously (that is, before America's first president of African descent, Barack Obama, pronounced the G20 as the successor to the G8 at Pittsburgh in 2009). Here, in fact, South Africa's 2011 accession to BRICS takes on added importance depending on how its BRICS membership enhances benefits for Africa at a time when the continent itself, overall, has joined the ranks of the emerging economies.

If club governance at the G20 level has somewhat diluted Pretoria's multilateral diplomacy, this may be offset by a diplomacy allowing South Africa to retain its African and international status as the continent's increasingly assertive default leader, pursuing limited multilateral strategic partnerships in IBSA and BRICS (the latter perceived as the emerging power 'caucus' within the G20 as a counterpoise to the G8). Indeed, President Jacob Zuma's successful BRICS diplomacy of 2010–2011, coupled with South Africa's successful campaign for a 'second coming' on the UNSC, has reinforced this status in spite of fractious and distracting internal domestic politics. At the same time, the feared eclipsing of IBSA, where South Africa's role is centrally strategic, by BRICS, has not occurred. IBSA has maintained its vitality as an effective South–South cooperation vehicle. The fact that South Africa, together with its IBSA partners, is back on the UNSC for a second term, is further affirmation of Pretoria's emerging power and diplomacy.

In Africa, however, the intersection between emerging power and inter-African diplomacy is increasingly highly competitive, given Africa's growing resource importance to the global economy. If South Africa is being viewed in world capitals as Africa's 'great power', in spite of its marginality within the global power sweepstakes, this means it is as much fair game as a competitor for market share in tapping Africa's resources as the capitals are among themselves. This all underlines South Africa's strengths and weaknesses as Africa's 'great power' within African and global diplomatic contexts, and the need for Pretoria to navigate a carefully balanced priority partnership strategy between North and South as well as within the global South and, specifically, the emerging power 'club' of which it is a certified member by dint of its status on the African continent.

GLOBAL SOUTH AND EMERGING POWER ALLIANCES

Overall, South Africa's emerging power diplomacy has to be examined against the backdrop of interplay between 'club governance' at various 'G' levels interacting within divergent and overlapping limited multilateral strategic partnerships such as IBSA, BRICS and BASIC (Brazil, South Africa,

India and China). Comparatively, unlike India and Brazil, South African diplomacy has been considerably more rooted in the traditional third-world alliances of the G77+China and the NAM. South Africa's joint bid with Indonesia to revive the spirit of the Bandung movement through the launching in 2005 of the New Asia Africa Strategic Partnership (NAASP) underlines Pretoria's comparatively strong global South bias in its global alignments. In the wake of IBSA's launch in Brasilia in 2003, the NAASP anticipated the gathering force of Asia's economic momentum in Africa, which had become a major feature of the continent's international relations by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century.

Perhaps, reflecting on how the G77-NAM alignment within the South has been overtaken by the ascendancy of Asia's major economies led by China and India (not to mention Japan), the NAASP has never been able to assume the status of China's Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) or Indo–African summitry and other unilateral Asian and Middle Eastern initiatives on the continent. Indeed, the NAASP has been paralysed, on the African side, by the unresolved Western Sahara stalemate which the AU recognises as the Sahrawi Republic.⁹ Therefore, the NAASP has never been able to function as a strategic platform enabling Africa, South Africa included, to manage the emerging power 'new scramble for Africa' to Africa's maximum benefit.

Neither has the counterpart South American–African summit managed to generate operational momentum. Taken together, the inability of newer generation South multilateralism on the scale of the G77 and the NAM to register major impacts on the manner in which Africa's economic diplomacy has unfolded over the past decade, bespeaks the marginalisation of such fora against the force of the developing world's leading big powers. This is a trend that became even more clear at the Copenhagen climate change talks in 2009, ultimately dominated by the emerging power BASIC coalition of Brazil, South Africa, India and China in tandem with the US, which also largely sidelined the EU.

What might be gleaned from these developments is that South Africa, as an emerging middle power on its own, is unable to project its default leadership of Africa sufficiently to empower South multilateralism where the continent's numbers might be expected to be decisive in balancing the influence of the 'big power league' among the emerging powers. This is no doubt due to Africa's fragmentation and lack of integration as a firm basis for leveraging Pretoria's leadership (which, in fact, seems to be jealously resisted even as it is accepted). Such limitations in fashioning a coherent and compelling pan-African multilateral diplomacy may be instructive in getting a better understanding of South Africa's emerging power capabilities and potential in relationship to the new coalitional alignments that have emerged since its partnering with India and Brazil in IBSA in 2003.

As regards IBSA, it could be that South Africa's emerging 'middle power' status as a relatively small economy, compared to the emerging 'great power' status of India and Brazil, makes for a certain incongruence in a limited multilateral strategic partnership based on different aspirations in spite of their apparent 'like-mindedness' as democratic regional powers of the global South. Indeed, this differential between South Africa on the one hand and India and Brazil on the other is demonstrable in the level of Brazil's 'bridging' role compared to South Africa's in, for example, the possibility of Brasília mediating an accommodation between Iran and the UNSC plus Germany on the stand-off over Teheran's nuclear agenda.¹⁰ Nonetheless, there is a geostrategic logic to IBSA revolving around South Africa's centrality astride the southern sea lanes linking the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans combined with its serving as the geoeconomic 'gateway' into the African continental market with its vast potential.

Whether and to what extent the trilateral logic of this sea lanes convergence can flesh out an expansive economic cooperation zone promised by the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), SACU, SACU–India and Indo–Brazil trade negotiations is an open question. On the Indian Ocean side, this potential is augmented by the Eastern and Southern African tripartite free trade area being negotiated between the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) and SADC, interacting with the North–South corridor infrastructural 'Cape to Cairo' initiative.¹¹

The fact that SADC member Mauritius, situated as it is in the Indian Ocean, already enjoys a close economic (if not yet ratified) preferential trade agreement with India lends further credence to a potential inter-regional economic zone linking Eastern and Southern Africa with the South Asian region and encompassing the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). This economic geography defines a major portion of what the Woodrow Wilson Center senior scholar Martin Walker considers the CHIMEA (China-India-Middle East-Africa) as the Indian Ocean geoeconomic nexus.¹² On the South Atlantic side, a potential triangular relationship between South Africa and Brazil with SADC member Angola, with which Brazil enjoys close Lusophone links, lends further logic to this trilateral economic geography as it links South America's 'southern cone' to Southern Africa and South Asia.

However much BRICS may reflect a revisionist emerging 'great power' coalition prioritising changes that must occur in the global economic and financial architecture via the G20, BRICS lacks IBSA's geostrategic logic. This is compounded by the very real political tensions and ambivalences within the Russia-India-China (RIC) triangle comprising the BRICS quartet. IBSA lacks the high profile global economic governance clout of BRICS. On

the other hand, what South Africa stands to gain from its BRICS membership is only gradually becoming discernible.

Pretoria has become co-opted into the priority BRICS agenda of disengaging from the dollar as the sole reserve currency in bilateral trade arrangements. This is especially high on China's agenda. It has come about through membership in the BRICS banking mechanism raising options concerning BRICS development financing and investment in Africa in addition to the prospects of internationalising BRICS currencies, especially the renminbi/yuan.

While IBSA could flesh out into a more compelling identity in the biennial IBSA maritime exercise IBSAMAR that might address these strategic concerns, in addition to its global governance and developmental agendas, the troika has so far shied away from defining a geostrategic agenda. IBSAMAR receives no mention in the 2010 IBSA communiqué coming out of the Brasília Summit although there was a special communiqué addressing the Middle East. Herein may lie a role for South Africa in initiating a dialogue leading to the joint defining of geostrategic convergences between itself, India and Brazil that might enhance IBSA's relevance in Brasília and New Delhi. However, engaging in such a dialogue may raise a number of issues pertaining to how South Africans perceive South Africa's strategic identity. This, in turn, would have to find expression in a compelling strategic vision. Here, the concentric circular paradigm may appear to come up short.

To be sure, Africa and the pan-African project are the foundation upon which a South African strategic vision has to rest. In this regard, the issue-specific limited BASIC partnership grouping South Africa with Brazil, India and China on climate change is instructive.¹⁵ As the vanguard emerging power bloc on climate change, BASIC, unlike IBSA and BRICS, is indicative of the recent global trend toward issue-specific and sector-specific ad hoc coalitions. BASIC, without Russia, essentially boils down to IBSA+China, very much in line with the kind of global South power alignment originally envisaged by Pretoria in the run-up to IBSA.

Unlike either IBSA or BRICS, BASIC has been tied to a broader G77+China agenda on climate change diplomacy and is thus more subject to being pressured by other coalitional groupings in the South such as the Venezuelan-led Bolivarian alliance. In all of these limited multilateral strategic partnership groupings, post-apartheid South African motivation has been driven by a desire to be part of countervailing alignments to the American-led Western global dominance of the North.

IBSA hints at such a global power rebalancing agenda. BRICS, however, has been a more definitive expression of such revisionist strivings, while BASIC more specifically addresses the national interest agendas of

emerging powers regarding the energy–environmental nexus relating to their economic growth and development strivings. Thus, whereas the BASIC powers felt compelled collectively to collaborate with the US in arriving at the ‘Copenhagen Accord’, the quartet reflected different degrees of political will as ‘major emitters’ over how strongly they would align themselves with their collective handiwork. India and China expressed the most reluctance in identifying with the accord, especially in regard to its verification implications.

South Africa and Brazil more readily aligned themselves with the accord. Further, South Africa was informed by wider pan-African interest in a climate agenda addressing Africa’s concerns than any of its BASIC partners seemed informed by similar concerns in their respective regions – although China, unlike India, showed much greater concern over how its Copenhagen posture (which included tacit support of the Copenhagen rejectionist ‘Bolivarian’ caucus led by Venezuela) went down among its G77 + China allies. Otherwise, Beijing and New Delhi were in virtual ‘lockstep’ throughout Copenhagen. They were reported to have placed pressure on South Africa regarding Pretoria’s receptivity toward Western overtures on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), an initiative of vital importance for Africa, South Africa included, given the latter’s emerging power limitations compared to mega states China and India.¹⁴

This apparent divergence in interests between South Africa on the one hand and China and India on the other, within the Copenhagen context, is indicative of the kind of independence Pretoria had to reflect in its hosting of the 17th Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), or COP17, the outcome of which breached the common but differentiated responsibilities which had bound BRICS to the lesser and least developed countries. The impact of Europe’s influence in this regard amounted to a comeback for the EU, in alliance with the Africa Group, which Pretoria had to accommodate at the expense of BASIC cohesion. Gone is the era of ‘third world’ tricontinental solidarity: the growing emphasis on South–South cooperation and trade accentuates ‘economic diplomacy’ and geoeconomic positioning. This means ever-growing competition among the emerging powers as well, with South Africa – far from being exempt – as one among several competitors on its own African continental geoeconomic turf.

The emergence of these new alignments and alliance dynamics coincides with the renewed global focus on Africa as the ‘new frontier’ in the global economy, and challenges South Africa’s strategic coherence in its navigation of this terrain. Post-apartheid South Africa has emerged as the largest foreign investor in sub-Saharan Africa, overtaking the UK, France and the US. This ascendancy has, however, hardly unfolded before South

Africa is having to contend with its fellow global South and emerging power partners, spearheaded by China, as they challenge South Africa's ascendancy over the West with their own economic agendas on the continent.

Again, as in how Pretoria navigates its diplomacy within the IBSA-BRICS-BASIC terrain and the overall global South landscape, the African economic diplomacies of emerging and traditional powers alike mean that South Africa cannot afford simply to 'club' with the emerging big powers of the South in the West-to-East power shift. It must also fashion its own 'national interest' informed pan-African road map advancing its own, and Africa's, interests in this new 'scramble'. Strategic autonomy and independence of vision as an African power with a pan-African vocation within the emerging South will need increasingly to define South Africa's emerging power status. But, for this to happen, some very urgent institutional issues of doctrine and decision-making policy architecture will need to be faced.

THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVES OF A COMPETITIVE TERRAIN

The urgency of Pretoria's developing an integrated foreign policy/national security and development framework remains. Moreover, this framework should centre not merely around DIRCO and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), but also on other critical departments such as Defence, Home Affairs and Intelligence with a balanced international as well as domestic state security and developmental state agenda. After all, whatever challenges Nigeria and other African states present to South African state security, such countries (Nigeria especially, in spite of recent bilateral tensions) are foundational to the substance of Pretoria's emerging power status globally. That status is inescapably anchored in Africa. The continent, therefore, must serve as the strategic point of reference. A South Africa–Nigeria – or Pretoria–Abuja – axis could form the backbone of a sub-Saharan continental consolidation strategy of networked relationships with other priority states such as Angola, Ghana and Senegal in the west; Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania in the east, and Mauritius and Mozambique (which could be a potential SACU member).

The foreign policy challenge for Pretoria, as DIRCO moves through its foreign policy White Paper process, is coming to terms with government at the highest level and within the ruling ANC and alliance of the institutional requirements for the kind of emerging power diplomacy demanded of South Africa. Foreign policy (and national security strategy) ultimately has to emanate from the executive, although foreign affairs ministries in any given country will have substantive input into the thrust and content of that policy. Iran has its Supreme National Security Council just as the US

has its National Security Council. Brazil's Cabinet Secretariat houses the think tank capacity of the Institute for Applied Economic Research in the Presidency (IPEA).

DIRCO, as with its counterparts in other countries, is there more to carry out policy than to serve as the institutional point of its derivation. The problem confronting South Africa as an aspirational developmental state pursuing a mainly aspirational economic diplomacy-focused foreign policy, is that there is no authoritative and comprehensively coordinating policy apparatus at the executive centre of government.

As the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services Unit (PCAS) was dismantled in the Presidency, the intra-ANC alliance politics surrounding the creation of the National Planning Commission (NPC) ensured that it was unlikely to structurally fill the vacuum created by the demise of PCAS as the 'super ministry' some had envisaged it to be. But such institutional mechanism with apex coordinating powers is what is required to make South Africa competitive with other emerging powers. Inadequate as PCAS was widely judged to be, at least it was an apparatus at the centre of executive power in the Union Buildings that could be built upon to become something more robust.

The planning function, after all, is only one component, central though that function may be, of the kind of elaborated policy formulating and co-ordinating mechanism required. Neither the NPC nor its Monitoring and Evaluation (M and E) complement constitute an alternative to PCAS, with M and E comprising an embedded policy/mandate implementation function organically addressing sectors, or clusters of sectors, of the PCAS.

In short, the South African Presidency is without a strategic policy apparatus (even with an 'international affairs advisor' and a 'national security advisor' along with reported deliberation over defining 'national interest' and 'national security'), a situation that obtains even as various arms of government are seized with the need to develop coordinating mechanisms to transcend the 'silo' tendency toward uncoordinated, fragmented decision-making, mandates and oversights in and across government. As a result, there remains very little content to South Africa as a 'developmental state' practising a foreign policy of 'economic diplomacy' informed by its emerging power challenges. Economic diplomacy, for example, cannot be limited to business delegations accompanying the president on state visits overseas. The training and capacitating of the diplomatic corps and aggressive business, investment and trade promotional outreach functions are in need of being ramped up.

Were South Africa to mobilise its institutional and human resources more competitively and on par with other emerging powers, an illustrative architecture centred in the Presidency might reflect a human security and

development council comprising the Cabinet and headed by the president's senior advisor for national security, development and planning. Such a council would comprise three commissions:

- An international cooperation, security and trade commission
- A social and economic development commission
- The already existing National Planning Commission

Each commission would be headed by senior deputy advisors, with the NPC serving as the interface between the international relations, peace and security cluster, and social and economic development. Each of these last two commissions would have M and E divisions linked to the ministries represented on each commission, with each ministry having its own M and E (or research, planning and evaluation) office. Such a council would operate as an interdepartmental, intersectoral coordinating mechanism and think tank which, like Brazil's IPEA, could be the role of the NPC (which in a sense it is already performing). Expert staff in each commission would be charged with generating priority 'strategic posture review' memoranda for Cabinet, under the guidance and leadership of the president and deputy president, to sign off on. An architecture of this nature should form the centrepiece of recommendations forthcoming in DIRCO's White Paper.

Because the incumbent liberation movement alliance regime in post-apartheid South Africa is effectively a party-state, the ANC and alliance partners should be ex officio members of this council balanced by a multi-party representational parliamentary forum, including the heads of parliamentary portfolio committees. If and when the South African government ceases being the liberation movement regime that it currently is, a party or alliance ex officio presence on a human security and development council might fall away, depending on the party in power.

At present, in the absence of the kind of architecture illustratively outlined here, South Africa's effective national security apparatus (in spite of the existence of the seemingly nominal state security-oriented National Security Council in the Presidency) seems to reflect an informal interplay between Cabinet and Luthuli House in terms of very active 'task force' structures of the ANC's international affairs subcommittee while the ANC's policy institute is yet to be activated. However, given the apparent absence of the international subcommittee's tie-in with the ANC's development policy agenda, this kind of integrated national security-development and domestic-international strategic focus remains absent.

Augmenting this proposed architecture, there must be a commitment to investing in the kind of heavy-duty nongovernmental or quasigovernmental

think tank machinery that other governments show a commitment to but which is lacking in South Africa. If Brazil's Itamaraty can invest in a Centre for South African Studies at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul in Porto Alegre, as well as other university-based regional or country-specific area studies programmes, why can't South Africa? This is where the science council format under the Department of Science and Technology is simply inadequate, as is the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA) and the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), neither of which are adequately geared toward backstopping the kind of foreign policy/national security studies needed to serve the demands of an emerging power.

What, for example, will be the ultimate future of the Centre for Indian Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand? There once existed a Centre for Latin American Studies at the University of South Africa. As for AISA, it should be revamped to become the umbrella for a series of priority policy research and analysis centres (an AISA centre for African policy studies, a centre for peace and security studies, and a centre for environmental security studies).

Meanwhile, the Centre for Africa's International Relations, also at Wits, which was producing master's and doctoral black South African and non-South African specialists and bringing in visiting fellows, has not been revived since the former head of the International Relations Department veered it off the rails of its original human resource capacity building mandate. The point is that South Africa is woefully under-capacitated in foreign policy research capacity, in and outside government – capacity urgently needed in order to sustain an ecosystem that steadily generates expertise for addressing the increasingly complex foreign affairs and international security terrain in which the country must survive.

CONCLUSION

Within the current international relations environment where emerging powers are increasingly setting the global agenda, South Africa finds itself at a crossroads. Despite South Africa's status as Africa's vanguard emerging power, it nevertheless faces multidimensional social and economic crises that should be addressed with a much greater sense of urgency than is currently reflected. Post-apartheid South Africa remains a country in which 'service delivery' for minorities largely resides in a capacitated urban-industrial/post-industrial private sector. In contrast, the majority of South Africans have to rely on a woefully incapacitated public sector. A dysfunctional education and human resource development system interacts with crisis levels of unemployment and a salary-wages income

system of remuneration that is out of synch with urgent developmental state imperatives, altogether constituting a multidimensional national security crisis in the making.

In short, national security and development are intimately intertwined in post-apartheid South Africa. Government, as the institutional arm of the party-state, is distracted by competitive resource-motivated factionalism at the expense of the professionalisation of governance – the next phase of transition upon which South Africa must embark. This, in admittedly truncated summary form, is the domestic challenge that South Africa's foreign policy must confront as a presumptive emerging power aspiring to BRIC status within a competitive multipolar environment shaped by other emerging powers.

NOTES

- 1 For an analysis of South Africa's ascension to what has now become BRICS, see the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) report on 2010 conference proceedings: Kornegay, F.A. and L. Masters (eds), 2011. *From BRIC to BRICS: Report on the Proceedings of the International Workshop on South Africa's Emerging Power Alliances: IBSA, BRIC, BASIC*, Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue, p. 122.
- 2 Here, the term 'pivotal' is used in reference to the regional geopolitical-strategic positioning of such states either within their regions or in terms of their intersection between different continents and regions. As such, reference to 'anchor states' may also be apropos for states serving as the geopolitical-economic 'anchor' in their regions and/or continents. The interchangeability of 'pivotal' and 'anchor' within a regional context is discussed in a paper presented by Miriam Prys, 'The variability of regional powers' at the Standing Group on International Relations (SGIR) 7th Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Stockholm, 9–11 September 2010.
- 3 See for example the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung discussion of 'Global Governance' in its Global Policy and Development brief, <http://www.fes.de/gpol/en/globalisation3.htm> [Accessed 3 April 2012].
- 4 Kornegay, F., 2011. Perspective: South Africa. In Kornegay, F.A. and L. Masters (eds), 2011. *From BRIC to BRICS: Report on the Proceedings of the International Workshop on South Africa's Emerging Power Alliances: IBSA, BRIC, BASIC*, Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue, p. 69.
- 5 See for example: 'Plurilateralism and the Global South,' by Kamal Mitra Chenoy, paper delivered at the 12–13 April 2010 IBSA Academic Forum, Brasília; also: 'Plurilateralism and the New World Order/East-West Instituted posted by W. Pal Sidhu, 4 January 2010.
- 6 See: The 2011 GIBSA Conference on the United Nations Security Council, 26 July 2011, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Situational Report.
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- 11 Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), 2009. From Cape to Cairo: Exploring the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite FTA. Proceedings of the Sixth Southern African Forum on Trade (SAFT) held in Pretoria, South Africa, 3–4 August.
- 12 Walker, M., 2008. Indian Ocean Nexus, *The Wilson Quarterly*. Spring, pp. 21–28.
- 13 Kornegay, F.A., 2010. Copenhagen's New Strategic Geography: 'Stormy Weather' on the road to 2011?. *Global Insight*, Institute for Global Dialogue, Issue 92/March.
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South Africa and East Asia

Missed opportunities

Garth Shelton

INTRODUCTION

Over the last three decades, the world has witnessed a major economic power shift towards East Asia, and the region is rapidly becoming the centre of global manufacturing and wealth creation. China has moved from being one of the poorest nations in the world to becoming second only to the United States. *The Economist* has argued that the ‘most momentous event’ in the last half of the twentieth century was the modernisation of East Asia. The spectacular economic growth of East Asia focusing first on Japan and then the Asian Tigers, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, followed by mainland China, was one of the defining events of the twentieth century.¹ If China maintains its current rate of growth, its economy will be larger than that of the US by 2025, or perhaps even before that date.²

The post-World War II Asian renaissance provides a useful model for African economic development and political evolution. As William McCord has suggested: ‘The Asian renaissance adds immeasurably to our store of knowledge concerning how and why countries develop.’³ The pragmatic and exceptionally successful model of development implemented by many of the East Asian countries following World War II offers a convincing alternative to laissez-faire capitalism, or planned economies. The Asian renaissance was not a culturally unique experience and thus holds many lessons for Africa as the continent embarks on its own rebirth.

Since World War II, a number of East Asian economies have achieved rapid and equitable growth. The relationship between the government, private sector and the market, together with activist public policies, provides an excellent model for other developing countries, especially South Africa. The various poverty alleviation and skills enhancement programmes, which have been implemented with great success in East Asia, provide

guidelines for similar activities in other parts of the developing world, South Africa included.

Presently, close to 40 per cent of South Africa's international trade is with Asia and economic links with this region are expected to expand rapidly as Asian development accelerates. Trade with traditional European partners is likely to be surpassed by new Asian opportunities within the next five to ten years. Moreover, as the centre of global economic leadership shifts from the Atlantic to the Pacific, South Africans will increasingly need to strengthen their ability to participate effectively in this process.⁴ Of South Africa's top 15 trade partners, five are in the broader East Asian region (Japan, China, Taiwan, South Korea and Australia). Moreover, recent years have seen a significant increase in trade with most East Asian countries, especially China. Post-1994, the challenge for South Africa has been to develop a mutually beneficial relationship with the dynamic and highly competitive East Asian economies. In reviewing South Africa's engagement with this region, this chapter will argue that South Africa has established constructive trade-based relationships, but has missed opportunities to attract investment and to build stronger economic partnerships.

SOUTH AFRICA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS

Despite interminable scholarly debate on defining 'national interest', the concept remains a valuable instrument to guide and assess foreign policy-making and implementation, and policy outcomes. Focusing on the promotion of South Africa's national interests in relations with key East Asian trade partners offers a useful framework for investigation and assessment.

Donald Nuechterlin's conceptualisation of the national interest provides a convincing instrument for foreign policy analysis. He defines national interests as the 'perceived need and desires of one sovereign state in relation to the sovereign states comprising its external environment'.⁵ The national interest relates to the external environment, while the 'public interest' best describes governmental policy-making and interaction with the domestic environment. The national interest implies the interests of the nation in its entirety, not just the interests of private groups (or individual policy-makers), bureaucratic entities, or political Organizations within the state. The objective in promoting the national interest is to advance the well-being and long-term prosperity of all citizens.

Policy-makers are guided in their decisions about international relations by basic values (usually outlined in a national constitution) that they and their people hold to be important to their national well-being. At the same time, states have more than one interest, and differing interests compete for

state resources and attention. The foreign policy decision-making system must balance resources, capacity and time in advancing competing national interests to produce a desired outcome. According to Nuechterlin, all the interests of a state may be subsumed under four basic groupings of interests:

- **Defence interests** – these include the protection of the nation-state and its citizens against the threat of physical violence directed from another state, or from a non-state actor. If the existence or physical integrity of the state is at risk, defence interests would receive urgent priority in foreign policy decision-making.
- **Economic interests** – encompasses the enhancement of the nation's economic well-being and the promotion of national economic development through interaction (trade and investment) with other sovereign states.
- **World-order interests** – these include the maintenance or promotion of an international (or regional) political and economic system in which the nation-state is secure and in which its citizens and commercial actors may operate peacefully and fairly outside its national borders.
- **Ideological interests** – these are the protection and furtherance of a set of values (democracy and human rights) that the citizens of a nation-state believe to be universally good.

Fortunately for South Africa in the post-1994 period, the country has faced no external threat of any significance and defence interests have therefore not required much attention in the foreign policy process. Accordingly, defence budgets have been contained and South Africa's military capacity has largely been prepared for border defence and peacekeeping activities. The central thrust of South Africa's post-1998 Mbeki-led foreign policy has been to advance world-order interests, intended to ameliorate South Africa's external environment and thereby advance the nation's long-term objectives. Guided by a pan-African, South-South and anti-imperialist perspective, South Africa has sought to restructure Africa through the African Renaissance, regional integration and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) while democratising global institutions such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Group of 7 (G7) to the Group of 20 (G20). Multilateral engagements such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Group of 77 (G77), the New Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership (NAASP), the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) and the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) formation have been the instruments through which like-minded states are

mobilised to advance a common global reform agenda. The driver of this process is the belief that a multipolar international system of competing great powers, rather than a unipolar system, along with a restructuring of the post-World War II political (UN) and economic (Bretton Woods) systems would benefit South Africa, Africa and the global South.

The general perception is that 'South Africa punches above its weight' in the context of building a new global order. It would be more accurate to suggest that South Africa is perceived as an emerging middle power and a bridge to Africa. This has afforded access to high-level global exchanges where South Africa has been able to use smart power to shape and influence agendas. It is clear that South Africa has achieved significant success on issues such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and climate change. Most recently, South Africa's participation in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has raised enormous expectations. In this heavyweight contest, South Africa's leaders have won prestige and acknowledgement, but the concrete results for South Africa as a whole are still to be determined. At the same time, any move by South Africa to de-link from traditional trade partners in the European Union (EU) and the post-industrialised economies of North America and Europe in favour of a South–South, or BRICS focus, would be a high risk and uncertain option.

In the context of advancing ideology (Chapter 2 of the South African Constitution, Act 108 of 1996), South Africa has been selective, inconsistent and disappointing. Under President Mandela's leadership (1994–98), the promotion of human rights was identified as South Africa's core national interest, but policy-makers were disappointed to learn that outspoken human rights advocacy would fail without the backing of hard power, or a clear capacity to punish transgressors. Thus, the promotion of South Africa's values has been largely neglected in favour of advancing South–South solidarity. South Africa is yet to work out a formula for engaging other states on human rights abuses without endangering political and economic cooperation. Friendly exchanges informed by South Africa's own struggle experience, and invitations to witness South Africa's vibrant democracy, may be the best options.

At the same time it is critical that South Africa should not be discouraged from advancing its values in the world. EH Carr contended that failing to advance the general interests of humankind does not serve the national interest, while Martin Luther King pointed out that 'injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere'.⁶ A new creative, subtle and less direct human rights advocacy strategy is urgently needed to advance former president Mandela's vision and the legacy of South Africa's struggle for democracy and freedom.

In August 2011, Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan announced a new 'national interest' to pursue a 7 per cent growth rate in the country's gross domestic product (GDP) for the next twenty years as the solution to addressing South Africa's poverty and unemployment problems. According to Gordhan, the country's official unemployment rate stands at over 25 per cent, income inequality has widened and there are serious health, education and infrastructural deficits. Millions of young people between the ages of 15 and 25 have little or no short-term job prospects. The government's New Growth Path (NGP) incorporates a range of fresh policy plans to advance economic growth, including improving the investment environment, boosting international business relations and increasing exports.⁷ A clear economic plan linked to expanding international commercial interaction, framed in terms of a core 'national interest', is long overdue. At the same time, it offers a clear objective for South Africa's future interaction with the East Asian region.

EAST ASIA AND SOUTH AFRICA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS

In the East Asian region (Japan, China, Taiwan, North and South Korea, more clearly defined as North East Asia), South Africa's core interests are located in terms of economic engagement for mutual benefit. South Africa has no direct defence interests in the region (no threat to South Africa from East Asia), while absolute neutrality is South Africa's best policy in the context of the region's competition, territorial disputes and historical animosity. The only exception would be where a regional state is in clear violation of UN sanctions, international regimes, norms and conventions.

With regard to world-order interests, Japan is a clear ally in reforming the UN Security Council, while China's P5 seat makes it a reluctant advocate of change. In broader terms, China's interest in reforming the global order in favour of a multipolar system offers South Africa an opportunity for cooperation with the rising power. BRICS offers the forum for advancing common interests, but the actual mechanisms for achieving mutually beneficial objectives are still to be crafted. Advancing South Africa's ideological interests in East Asia is a complex process, given the significant difference between South Africa's and China's value systems, but the importance of trade and similar long-term goals for world-order transformation remains the focus of bilateral interaction.

From the perspective of South Africa's national interests, the East Asian region should be viewed primarily as a region for economic and commercial engagement. The strength and vibrancy of regional economies (with the exception of North Korea) offer enormous opportunity for mutually beneficial

economic interaction. However, it will be argued that South Africa's engagement with the region since 1994 has not focused sufficiently on this, and thus the record is characterised primarily as one of 'missed opportunities'.

JAPANESE TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

Formal South Africa–Japan relations were initiated in 1910 with the appointment of Mr Julius Otto Jeppe as Japan's honorary consul. In 1918, Japan established a consulate in Cape Town primarily to oversee the visits of Japanese ships to South Africa. By 1926, a South Africa–Japan trade link via Durban to Kobe was established. Japan maintained consular relations with South Africa until the early 1990s.⁸ Between 1960 and 1991, South Africa–Japan relations were characterised by a strong emphasis on trade, and while Japan imposed sanctions on South Africa, enforcement was weak.⁹ South Africa–Japan trade was given a boost in 1961 with the establishment of a JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization) office in Johannesburg. JETRO further strengthened and consolidated the South Africa–Japan trade relationship, ensuring a continued supply of South African raw materials to Japanese industries.¹⁰ The central feature of the relationship during the 1960s was the establishment of Toyota South Africa, a South African-owned vehicle assembly plant based on technology transfer from Japan. The technology transfer allowed for job creation in vehicle assembly within South Africa, and Toyota remains the market leader in the country with an approximate 20 per cent market share of new vehicle sales annually. In 1991, when it became clear that South Africa was on the path to democratisation, Japan established an embassy in Pretoria.

Given that Japan has no historical interests in Africa and is largely Asia-focused in its own international relations, South Africa cannot expect a special relationship, despite the fact that Japanese diplomats regularly refer to the South Africa–Japan 'strategic partnership'. Japan's trade with South Africa constitutes less than 1 per cent of its global trade and its ODA (overseas development assistance) activities are minimal in South Africa.¹¹ Former president Mbeki was very active in TICAD (Tokyo International Conference on Africa's Development), but the TICAD process is largely focused on the poorer parts of Africa and has had little direct impact on South Africa–Japan bilateral relations.¹² The South Africa–Japan relationship is largely based on the sale of raw materials (without beneficiation) to the industries of Japan. Tokyo looks to South Africa primarily as a reliable supplier of commodities, especially platinum, to feed its auto and electronics industries.¹³ Japan's Africa policy as a whole is strongly influenced by the demands of Japanese business (the Keidanren Committees) which have

primarily sought improved relations with resource-rich African countries.¹⁴ At the same time, most of Japan's raw material requirements come from Australia, China, Indonesia, Chile, Brazil, Canada, Thailand and the US, with Africa as a whole supplying only a very small percentage¹⁵ – hence Japan's overall lack of interest in South Africa, and the African continent generally, in its foreign policy planning and decision-making.

From South Africa's perspective, the trade profile is important, with Japan usually placed as one of South Africa's top three trade partners annually. In 2008, two-way trade totalled R107 billion, with a R26 billion trade balance in South Africa's favour.¹⁶ Since 1994, South Africa has been a reliable supplier of commodities to Japan, but has done little to encourage Japan to beneficiate and create jobs in South Africa. With the exception of the export of fully-assembled BMW and Mercedes Benz automobiles to Japan, the South Africa–Japan trade relationship approximates a typical neocolonial commercial engagement.

In terms of investment the picture is disappointing, with only around 100 Japanese companies showing an interest in South Africa (see table 1). With a few exceptions, most of the Japanese companies in South Africa have small staff components and limited investment in infrastructure. Important recent Japanese investments include Nissan's expansion of its assembly plant; Suzuki Motor Corporation's new distribution network; a new investment from Hanwa; Nippon Steel's equity share deal; and the expansion of

Table 1 Recent direct investments by Japanese companies in South Africa

Company	Description	Date	Approximate value (US\$ million)
Kansai Paint	Acquisition of Freeworld Coatings Ltd	April 2011	260
Toyota	New part distribution warehouse	January 2011	52
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT)	Acquisition of Dimension Data	July 2010	3 000
Japan Tobacco International	Establishment of new cigarette plant in Wadeville	July 2010	Undisclosed
Toyota	Acquisition of locally owned shares of Toyota South Africa	August 2008	350
Nissan	Additional production investment in Rosslyn plant	July 2008	150
Sumitomo Corporation	Investment in mining company Assmang	June 2008, February 2008	500

Source: Embassy of Japan Fact Sheet 2011, Embassy of Japan, Pretoria

Mitsubishi's regional operations. However, South Africa has failed to attract significant job-creating investments from Japan which could build a sustainable economic relationship. During the 1990s, Japanese investments in the Malaysian electronics industry, for example, provided the skills and technology for significant employment and economic growth in that country.¹⁷ South Africa has been unable to attract similar enabling investments from Japan.

In the post-1994 period, the South Africa–Japan relationship has seen the establishment of a number of dialogue forums all intended to broaden and deepen relations. These include the Japan–South Africa Partnership Forum, Joint Trade Committee, Science and Technology Committee, Economic Cooperation Policy Committee, Energy Committee, Business Forum, University Forum, as well as regular discussions on TICAD.¹⁸ However, results from these numerous dialogue activities are not clear. Discussions with Japanese officials suggest that the key impediment to increased Japanese investment in South Africa remains domestic security concerns, growing social unrest linked to lack of service delivery, and the uncertainty relating to South Africa's long-term economic policies. Domestic challenges and contradictions appear to be undermining a more rewarding and positive relationship.

In terms of African and global affairs, South Africa and Japan have increased positive diplomatic interaction and space exists for more constructive cooperation. In Africa, South Africa and Japan share an interest in advancing development, hence a stronger effort to align TICAD and Nepad.¹⁹

Japan's financing of UN peacekeeping in Africa should be strongly welcomed, while the planned increase in peacekeeping training cooperation should be encouraged. Within the G8 and G20, South Africa and Japan have found some common positions, while it should not be forgotten that Japan took the lead in inviting South Africa to participate in the G8 process. Japan is a strong supporter of a permanent UN Security Council seat for South Africa, but South Africa's support for Japan has been less vocal.²⁰ Both favour UN reform, although the long-term vision may be different.²¹ On the question of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, South Africa and Japan have exhibited strong common positions and expanded diplomatic cooperation is expected in future. Climate change offers some opportunity for expanded future cooperation but, given different levels of economic development, perspectives and policies are likely to be diverse.

Post-1994, South Africa has missed the opportunity to attract new significant direct Japanese investments including technology transfers, skills transfers and job creation. According to Japanese perspectives, South Africa has been unable to create a sufficiently enabling environment to expand Japanese investment from automobile assembly (Toyota and Nissan) to

other sectors such as semiconductors and electronics.²² Toyota and Nissan offer the ideal for the South Africa–Japan relationship through which South Africa has direct technology and skills transfers along with job creation and domestic economic growth.²³

Japanese companies are showing a strong interest in South Africa's planned high speed train network as well as the nuclear power station project, but funding remains a problem. Priorities for the South Africa–Japan relationship include the following:

1. Beneficiation of South Africa's raw materials before export to Japan.
2. Increased exports to Japan outside the commodity basket. JETRO, headquartered in Sandton, provides guidance, advice and incentives for exports to Japan.
3. Focus on promoting increased Japanese investment in South Africa.
4. Human resource development – Japan offers a range of opportunities which is not fully exploited by South Africans.
5. Joint venture (JV) production of green technologies, especially for the African market, could provide a new avenue for long-term economic cooperation.
6. Increased Japanese tourism to South Africa – for every six tourists, one job is created in South Africa.

Since 1994, Japan and South Africa have developed a positive and constructive diplomatic relationship based on a range of common interests and growing economic cooperation. This provides an opportunity for South Africa to reposition its Japan policy to promote objectives which would more directly advance the country's job creation and GDP growth strategies. The recently established Centre for Japan Studies (CJS) at the Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) in Johannesburg could be mobilised to help develop a more mutually beneficial relationship in accordance with common interests and objectives.

SOUTH KOREA: A DEVELOPMENT MODEL FOR SOUTH AFRICA?

In July 1995, three years after the establishment of diplomatic relations, President Nelson Mandela visited South Korea (Republic of Korea or ROK) on a mission to strengthen links and consolidate South Africa's interests in the East Asian region. In 1998, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki visited the ROK to set an agenda for future cooperation. A system of bilateral consultative meetings was established, and since 2004 there have been regular high-level meetings to discuss issues of interest and to identify new areas

of cooperation. The South Africa–ROK dialogue has produced a number of agreements including protection of investment; avoidance of double taxation; scientific and technical cooperation; small business development, and information and telecommunications technology (ICT) cooperation. Other areas of cooperation include energy, mineral resources, nuclear energy, sports and recreation.²⁴ Since 1994 there has been progress in strengthening South Africa–ROK relations, but Korean diplomats complain that South Africa has been slow to take advantage of the economic synergies and commercial opportunities that are offered by closer exchanges.²⁵

A process of state-led industrialisation initiated in the early 1960s has made the ROK one of the world's leading exporters and created a prosperous society with high levels of economic freedom, one of the highest living standards in the world and a higher life expectancy than that of the US. South Korea is now an acknowledged world leader in electronics, merchant ship building, automobiles, petrochemicals and robotics. The ROK's high-tech and innovative economy has produced more patents than most industrialised nations. Many Korean corporations such as Samsung, Hyundai-Kia, LG Electronics and the SK Group dominate key sectors of the global economy. Samsung is now the largest manufacturer of electronic products in the world, while the Hyundai-Kia group produce more automobiles than Mercedes-Benz and BMW combined.²⁶

A central feature of South Korea's engagement with Africa is to promote the Korea development model as a guide for Africa's development and industrialisation. In the mid-1950s, Korea faced many of the same economic and political problems Africa now faces and managed to craft a development strategy which transformed an agrarian society into a wealthy and highly developed country.²⁷ Moreover, given the increased debate in South Africa on the issue of a 'developmental state', South Korea's economic experience is increasingly relevant. South Korea's experience provides an excellent model of state intervention to promote rapid and sustained economic development. It responded to massive unemployment with a labour-intensive manufacturing process aimed at export markets.

South Korea's economic success, the so-called 'Korean miracle', was grounded on government directed industrialisation which enabled selected industries to develop international trade profiles.²⁸ The government itself acted as an entrepreneur to encourage investment in selected economic sectors, while at the same time it provided financial support to guarantee profits until industries themselves were stable and profitable. Industrial policy was used to promote economic growth focus areas by stimulating the supply side of industrial activity by strengthening international competitiveness, modernising industries, promoting the growth of industries that had comparative advantages, and correcting market failures. The tools

used to promote rapid industrialisation included tax reductions and subsidies, credit rationing, licensing procedures and the establishment of public enterprises. Rapid growth through export was achieved in a short space of time, with a relatively equitable distribution of wealth.²⁹

The ROK has almost the same population as South Africa, while in terms of economic experience South Korea has in its recent history successfully overcome almost all of the developmental problems presently plaguing South Africa. From one of the world's poorest countries in 1950, the ROK is now the eleventh richest in the world, and standards of living continue to improve. At the same time, the ROK has democratised and built an open, free and politically engaged society. South Africa, however, has been slow to fully investigate and analyse the Korean experience. South Africa's diplomacy has also been slow to fully investigate the advantages which the ROK's innovative technologies could bring to raw materials beneficiation.

South Korean investors have shown interest in South Africa and are increasingly viewing it as the bridge to sub-Saharan Africa. Korean corporates active in South Africa now include Samsung, LG Electronics, Daewoo, Malesela Taihan Electric, Sinna, SIM Flex and Ceragem. Since 2003, Korean direct investment into South Africa has increased, with a total investment of over R700 million by 2008 (see table 2); however Korean diplomats confirm that the uncertain domestic environment, along with an absence of

Table 2 Principal Korean investors in South Africa

Corporation	Investment (US\$ 000)
Samsung Electronics	48 857
LG Electronics	42 407
Innoland Property	20 305
Daewoo Motors	18 255
Malesela Taihan Electronic Cable	14 100
Poschrome	10 050
Sinna Manufacturing	2 845
Sim Flex	2 249
Daewoo AMIC	2 327
ONSET Telecom	1 500
Ceragem	1 810

Source: Korean Exim Bank, 2009.

direct air links, continue to constrain increased foreign direct investment (FDI) in the South African economy. Seoul is seeking the conclusion of a 'major project' in South Africa (such as a nuclear power station, or a major construction project) as the key to invigorating relations. The ROK has also long been seeking the conclusion of a free trade agreement (FTA) with South Africa which would accelerate two-way trade and investment.³⁰

However, South Africa's apprehensive response to the challenge of an FTA with Korea (as well as with Japan and China) limits further potential commercial engagement and stifles South Africa's own development. According to World Bank studies, during the 1990s the per capita income of developing countries which were integrating with the global economy (via FTAs or other trade agreements) grew by 5 per cent per annum, while that of non-globalisers grew by just 1.4 per cent.³¹

As in the case of Japan, South Africa's hesitant engagement with the ROK since 1994 is also a story of missed opportunities. South Africa's diplomacy has not fully investigated the ROK's economic development process, or Korean economic opportunities, especially in the field of mineral beneficiation and processing. Other areas where South Africa–ROK relations could be strengthened for mutual benefit include the establishment of a South Korea–South Africa business forum to promote commercial networking and the identification of investment prospects. Secondly, high-tech JV manufacturing would help to create jobs in South Africa and make better use of South Africa as the bridge to Africa. Thirdly, a Korean-built ICT network for the entire Southern African region could be investigated with a view to strengthening regional communications. The fourth instance is a focus on attracting new Korean investments to South Africa by supporting business forums and dialogue. A fifth area is the development of skills enhancement programmes through which South Africans could complete advanced study at Korean technical institutions. Finally, an FTA with South Korea should be fully investigated.

The ROK has begun work on a new embassy in Pretoria and has confirmed its interest in advancing Korea–South Africa relations. The challenge is for South Africa to investigate and take advantage of the numerous opportunities offered by a fuller engagement with the 'Korean miracle'.

THE DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGE OF NORTH KOREA

In contrast to South Korea, the economic performance of North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK) over the last 30 years has been poor. An economic system characterised by state ownership of production, self-sufficiency (*Juche*), centralised economic planning and an

emphasis on military preparation has undermined the economic potential of the DPRK and prevented a repeat of the miracle witnessed in South Korea. Negative growth rates, withdrawal from the NPT and a reluctance to globalise its economy has limited economic prospects for the DPRK.³²

Since April 2003, Beijing has hosted the Six-Party Talks (US, China, Japan, Russia, South and North Korea) in an effort to return the DPRK to the NPT's safeguards framework. Following North Korea's nuclear weapons test in October 2006, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1718, requiring all UN members to participate in a range of punitive sanctions against the DPRK. South Africa's commitment to the NPT, and the severity of UN sanctions, hampered an expansion of South Africa–DPRK relations. Despite the DPRK's historical support for South Africa's liberation struggle and strong South–South solidarity, South Africa's diplomacy is constrained by UN restrictions and US determination to isolate Pyongyang.

A high-level Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) delegation visited the DPRK in 2005 to identify an agenda for long-term relations, but South Africa has not been diligent in identifying new avenues for cooperation. A promised agreement for regular high-level exchanges has not been concluded by South Africa, preventing the identification of constructive channels of interaction which could strengthen relations without violating UN sanctions. Discussions on a science and technology agreement as well as cultural and sports exchanges are also behind schedule. South Africa appears to be overcautious in pursuing a relationship with the DPRK. North Korean diplomats have encouraged South Africans to visit with a view to identifying investment opportunities and participating in new construction and mining projects.³³

Despite high levels of tension along the common border, the unification of Korea remains a common dream for both North and South Korea.³⁴ Expected political change within the DPRK in a post-Kim Jong Il era could hasten North Korea's economic reform, transforming the Korean peninsula into a centre of growth and opportunity for foreign investment and trade. A South African embassy in Pyongyang could position South Africa for participation in a future East Asian growth hub with the potential to transform political and economic relations within the entire region. Given that South Africa is able to engage diplomatically with both North and South Korea while maintaining good relations with the other members of the Six-Party Group, South Africa has an opportunity to play a meaningful role in advancing negotiated agreements on nuclear weapons and political differences. The diplomatic challenge for South Africa is to find a constructive way to contribute to regional peace without transgressing UN sanctions or frustrating existing negotiating initiatives. The recent passing of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il offers a new opportunity for constructive engagement and

for South Africa to make a positive contribution to promoting peace and stability in East Asia.³⁵

Meeting the North Korean diplomatic challenge should thus include:

- Opening an embassy in Pyongyang (the South African embassy in Beijing presently manages overseas relations with the DPRK)
- Finalising of the planned high-level dialogue agreement
- Fully investigating new investment and trade opportunities in the DPRK;
- Promoting and supporting a North-East Asian security system aimed at establishing lasting peace in the region
- Positioning South Africa to fully participate in the expected future regional growth
- Stepping up the provision of humanitarian aid to North Korea
- Helping to actively contribute to the DPRK's re-integration into the global community

South Africa is uniquely placed to pursue a constructive dialogue with the DPRK and to contribute more directly to maintaining peace and prosperity in the East Asian region. South Africa's own negotiated democratisation process may offer an incentive to finding the necessary compromises for lasting peace on the Korean peninsula.

CHINA: A PARTNER FOR GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT?

Since the start of South Africa's liberation struggle, China (People's Republic of China or the PRC) had been a supporter, regarding this process as an integral part of the drive for the national independence and political liberation of the African continent. ANC president Oliver Tambo visited Beijing in 1963, while South African Communist Party (SACP) members have maintained close links with the Communist Party of China (CPC) for many years.³⁶ The Sino-Soviet dispute hampered China's interaction with the ANC and the SACP, leading to increased Chinese support for the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), but Beijing's full support for the liberation of South Africa was never questioned.³⁷

In November 1996, the South African government decided to de-recognise Taiwan (Republic of China or ROC) in favour of China. The decision took effect at the end of 1997 and was preceded by intense debate within South Africa regarding relations with the ROC and the PRC.³⁸ Beijing provided the compromise by offering full diplomatic relations as well as no objection to full economic, but not political, relations with Taiwan. South

Africa's endorsement of the 'one China' principle thus opened the way for full diplomatic interaction with China, while maintaining, with the potential to expand, economic links with Taiwan.

However, South Africa has been hesitant in developing relations with Taiwan to their full potential. A limited diplomatic dialogue has restricted cooperation agendas and opportunities for commercial cooperation. Such an overcautious engagement with Taiwan has undermined a stronger trade and investment relationship, while science, technology and cultural exchanges have been largely neglected. Given that China–Taiwan relations have shown significant improvement in recent years and China has signed an economic partnership agreement with Taiwan, South Africa should promote a more active commercial agenda with Taiwan.

Opportunities for expanded cooperation with Taiwan include:

- Strengthened trade relations (Taiwan remains one of South Africa's key trading partners and the trade balance consistently favours South Africa)
- Concluding new science, technology, sports and cultural agreements
- Promotion of stronger NGO cooperation
- Investigating cooperation in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) development, a particular strength and job-creating feature of Taiwan's economy
- Strengthening educational exchanges. Taiwan has a particularly effective education system.

Formal diplomatic relations between China and South Africa were established on 1 January 1998, opening a new chapter in Sino–African relations and bringing South Africa in line with African diplomacy.³⁹ During Nelson Mandela's visit to China in May 1999, the first by a South African head of state, Mandela thanked China for its consistent support of South Africa, particularly in the struggle against apartheid.⁴⁰ Moreover, Mandela indicated his determination to promote the development of a mutually beneficial Sino–South African diplomatic partnership. Much to the surprise of the international community, Mandela did not raise the issue of human rights with his Chinese hosts – given his own global standing on the issue, observers had predicted that he could have made a dramatic impact in highlighting and advancing human rights issues in China. The DFA, rather, identified the 'promotion of bilateral trade and investment' as the focus of Mandela's visit, and stressed the need to improve two-way trade.⁴¹

In April 2000, President Jiang Zemin paid a state visit to South Africa where he signed the Pretoria Declaration on the Partnership between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa with his

counterpart, President Thabo Mbeki. The Pretoria Declaration committed both countries to a 'spirit of partnership and constructive dialogue' while uniting in the 'moral imperative for developing countries to strengthen capacity for cooperation and mutual support in the international system'.⁴² The most important outcome of the agreement was the establishment of a bi-national commission (BNC) which would meet regularly to guide and coordinate all government-to-government relations between China and South Africa, while providing an effective forum for consultation on matters of mutual interest in bilateral and multilateral affairs.⁴³ In addition, the Pretoria Declaration committed China and South Africa to a 'constructive dialogue', a concerted effort to expand economic links, and a joint initiative to advance peace, security and development on the African continent.⁴⁴

Besides the Pretoria Declaration, China and South Africa signed six agreements including police cooperation, maritime transport, preventing the spread of deadly pathogens, animal health and quarantine, arts and culture, and avoidance of double taxation. President Mbeki also emphasised the need for South Africa and other developing countries to seek closer cooperation in international affairs with the objective of restructuring the global economic architecture. In response, Jiang suggested that the constant expansion and deepening of Sino–South African relations fulfilled the 'long-term fundamental interests' of both countries, while supporting and advancing 'peace and global development'.⁴⁵ Jiang's visit to South Africa thus laid the foundation for Sino–South African cooperation and policy synchronisation on the issue of advancing the establishment of a new international economic order, which later culminated in South Africa's participation in the BRICS summit in April 2011.

During mid-December 2001, South African president Mbeki conducted a state visit to Beijing which included meetings with the senior Chinese leaders. The BNC was officially launched during his state visit to Beijing in December 2001. A range of discussions was held at ministerial and senior official level, including the ministries of foreign affairs, economics and trade, public security, judiciary, science and technology, energy and tourism.⁴⁶ The initial BNC meeting led to the establishment of four sectoral committees on foreign affairs, economy and trade, science and technology, and national defence. A number of other government departments from both countries subsequently established direct channels of communication and also maintained a regular and constructive dialogue.⁴⁷ The BNC provides a framework for the further development and enhancement of bilateral China–South African relations. The BNC agenda has been complemented and strengthened by a frequent exchange of high-level visits between the two countries. Mbeki's visit to Beijing focused on expanding relations to

include scientific and nuclear research, while the DFA confirmed that South Africa was looking to the PRC as a market and an investor.

President Mbeki stressed that the launching of the bilateral commission was a 'historic moment' in the development of China–South African links and initiated a new phase of positive and constructive relations with opportunities to work together in a wide variety of areas.⁴⁸ Building on the BNC dialogue, as well as numerous high-level visits and interactions, South Africa and China have to date signed over 40 agreements covering a wide range of political, social and economic issues.⁴⁹ A number of other government departments from both countries have subsequently established direct channels of communication and also maintain a regular and constructive dialogue.⁵⁰

In June 2006, President Mbeki and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao signed an agreement to help protect the South African textile industry from the ongoing influx of low-cost Chinese textiles. In so doing, Beijing signalled its willingness to assist a fellow country of the South to ameliorate the impact of globalisation. The agreement provided a breathing space for the recovery of South Africa's textile industry, giving local manufacturers an opportunity to modernise and restructure manufacturing processes. In addition, given the overall South Africa–China trade imbalance consistently and significantly in China's favour, China agreed in 2006 to establish a more equitable trade balance in seeking a constructive win–win trade relationship. The South Africa–China Partnership for Growth and Development (PGD) was concluded, with a focus on instituting a number of measures designed to ensure a long-term balance in South Africa–China trade. The key objective of the PGD is to shift the structure of trade towards increasing the value of South Africa's exports to China by focusing on mineral beneficiation and the export of manufactured and processed agricultural products to China. The PGD specifically commits China to support South Africa's mineral beneficiation strategy and to establish a balanced bilateral investment flow.

During September 2011, President Zuma travelled on a state visit to Beijing where an agreement to establish a 'comprehensive strategic partnership' between China and South Africa was signed. The agreement provides for a unique international association intended to cement relations between Africa's leading economy and Asia's economic superpower. However, the PGD does not feature in the comprehensive partnership, suggesting that China has backtracked on its diplomatic undertaking to promote beneficiation and job creation in South Africa.

In Beijing, President Zuma won China's endorsement of South Africa's membership of BRIC, opening the way for South Africa's participation in a new alliance which is expected to completely transform the global economic system.⁵¹ Other areas where China–South Africa common interests converge

are on advancing climate change negotiations to protect the economic potential of developing nations and re-engineering the G20 agenda to reflect the needs and priorities of the global South. While UN reform remains a complex and distant dream, South Africa continues to seek China's support for a permanent African seat on an expanded UN Security Council.

Chinese business leaders sought President Zuma's advice on identifying new investment options and streamlining investment procedures. South Africa has been slow to attract Chinese investors, despite a flood of Chinese FDI across the continent,⁵² whereas Angola, the DRC, Algeria, Nigeria and Zambia are set to experience a major boost in economic growth based on significant Chinese capital transfers.⁵³ Moreover, China is planning to establish a number of special economic zones (SEZs) across the continent, but regrettably South Africa has not sought participation in this process. Within China itself, SEZs have proved to be the key to driving economic growth and eradicating poverty.

President Zuma's evolving regional agenda should include mobilising China's support for the building of an extended and augmented Southern African Development Community (SADC) road and rail network as a foundation for accelerated regional integration. China's African experience, willingness and easy access to financing make it an ideal partner in building the regional infrastructure critical to advancing intra-regional SADC trade and investment. China's major construction projects across the continent are providing the essential infrastructure for the continent's economic development at both national and regional levels. China's African experience and capacity makes it a key partner for SADC's integration process in promoting regional economic growth and prosperity.

Given that South Africa exports mainly raw materials to China and China exports mainly manufactured goods to South Africa, a comparative advantage in terms of a classical Ricardian model does not exist. Moreover, a failure to add value to South African exports to China constitutes a fundamentally flawed export strategy, given that in the long-term South Africa will eventually deplete its raw material stockpiles without creating a sustainable economy. In an increasingly globalised economic system, internationally competitive economies clearly have the advantage in ensuring market access and market share. China's massive and dynamic economy, complemented by exceptionally low labour costs, stands in stark contrast to South Africa's comparatively small and less efficient economic system, and a successful FTA, from South Africa's perspective, will have to go further than merely facilitating participation in the highly competitive Chinese market. Rather, an FTA should provide preferential access to the Chinese domestic market along with related benefits in the form of improved investment options, increased tourism and other forms of mutually beneficial cooperation.

Any negotiations with China on a possible FTA should be informed by a clear analysis of South Africa's specific economic objectives, both domestic and international, as well as the carefully calculated expected impact on increased two-way trade. Importantly, an FTA should strengthen Chinese investments in South Africa. To date, Chinese investments in South Africa have been largely disappointing (see table 3). Specific objectives would need to be formulated in consultation with business leaders, commercial Organizations, trade unions and public interest groups. Those enterprises likely to be affected by an FTA (both negatively and positively) should be consulted, and encouraged to participate in the deliberations. While there are unquestionably enormous potential benefits from an FTA with China, the costs, risks and benefits of any agreement need to be thoroughly explored. Informed by a comprehensive investigation and scientific impact

Table 3 Chinese–South African investments

Date	Chinese company	SA company/ partners	Type of business	Value (US\$ million)
1996	Sinosteel	ASA metals	Ferrochrome mining	
October 2006	Minmetals	Palabora Mining	Iron ore mining	3 year off-take agreement 190
December 2006	Sinosteel	Samancor Chrome	Chrome mine and processing	200
September 2007	Minmetals	Mission Point-Vesatex	Chrome prospecting rights	6,5
July 2007	Jisco	International Ferro Metals	Ferrochrome producer	50% off-take agreement
February 2008	Industrial Commercial Bank of China	Standard Bank	Banking	5,5 billion
April 2009	Minmetals	Vizirama	Exploration rights	
May 2009	Shenzhen Media	Telkom media	Television broadcasting	
September 2009	China North Industries	Pietermaritzburg truck assembly plant (Super Group)	Automotive	
May 2010	Jinchuan	Wesizwe Platinum	Platinum mining	877
June 2010	Yingli Green Energy	Mulilo Energy	Solar farm joint venture	40

Source: Financial Mail, 9 July 2010, p. 34.

study, along with broad business and civil society support, a China–South Africa FTA would certainly be a major boost to economic growth and prosperity for both participating countries. The historic opportunity to expand trade with China should not be missed, but at the same time the process of economic engagement should be prudently and judiciously negotiated.

In the context of a partnership to advance a new global order, the common foreign policy objective identified by presidents Mbeki and Jiang in December 2001 and further strengthened by presidents Zuma and Hu in August 2010, South Africa looks to China for support in restructuring the UN, in line with the G77 and China's UN Programme for Reform (A/51/950), as well as the Declaration of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Ministerial Meeting of the G77, which would bring strong permanent African, and possibly South African, representation to the UN Security Council.⁵⁴ Another urgent priority now included in the BRICS agenda focuses on reform of the global trading system,⁵⁵ as outlined by the G77 and China in Geneva on 22 August 2003, aimed at improving the access of developing countries to the markets of the developed, industrialised economies and strengthening programmes to eradicate poverty, underdevelopment and economic vulnerability in the world's least developed countries (LDCs).⁵⁶

South Africa also looks to China for enhanced South–South cooperation in the spirit of the 1955 Bandung Conference's programme for African–Asian solidarity and collaboration to address global injustice, discrimination and the marginalisation of developing countries, as outlined in the New Africa–Asia Strategic Partnership.⁵⁷ China and South Africa have a common interest in an agreement on climate change that advances development in the developing world without penalising economic progress, while South Africa looks to China as a key partner in advancing the regeneration of Africa (investment, financing and infrastructure).⁵⁸

In the context of bilateral relations, South Africa should seek

- increased Chinese investment in South Africa – which would provide a major boost for local employment (assessing the incentives to attract greater Chinese investment is a priority)
- conclusion of an FTA to boost two-way trade for mutual benefit (assistance in accessing the Chinese market would be an enormous advantage for South African companies)
- establishment of Chinese SEZs in South Africa
- expanded cooperation in developing a SADC-based road and rail network to advance regional economic integration and growth
- full implementation of the PGD through which China can contribute to creating jobs in South Africa and adding value to South Africa's commodity exports.

CONCLUSION: A 'COMPREHENSIVE LOOK-EAST POLICY'

Reviewing South Africa's diplomatic engagement with East Asia within the framework of national interests suggests that economic opportunities, in terms of attracting more investment and of the expansion of trade through FTAs, have been missed. President Mandela's human rights emphasis in foreign policy found little resonance in East Asia, given that Asian cultures do not view human rights through the prism of the Washington Consensus. President Mbeki's African Renaissance and emphasis on African development failed to attract committed development partners in Asia. While China has engaged in infrastructure development across the continent, its main focus remains on bilateral and economically beneficial relationships. A greater emphasis on advancing the national interest in President Zuma's foreign policy shows promise of building stronger economic relationships with East Asia and has the potential to assist with job creation, skills enhancement and technology transfers. South Africa–China relations, within the context of BRICS, offers new opportunities for constructive engagements, but the focus should be on concrete results and mutually beneficial outcomes.

Since 1994, South Africa's foreign policy has been successful in opening new and constructive relationships in East Asia, and East Asian partners are now more aware than ever of the African development agenda along with the needs and aspirations of the African people. Japan's TICAD agenda and China's FOCAC have become more aligned with African needs, but much work remains to be done in mobilising Asian support for African developmental priorities. The Sino–South African comprehensive strategic partnership holds the promise of a much stronger relationship with China but, given the disparities in the size of economies, South Africa will need to manage relations carefully.

In the context of South Africa's engagement with East Asia since 1994, there has been good progress in building relations, but many economic opportunities have been missed. South Africa's interaction with East Asia should focus on an economic strategic pragmatism, seeking new economic opportunities to facilitate domestic economic development. The key national interest in East Asia is economic, rather than world-order or ideological interests. Thus the mechanism for engagement is focused and goal-driven economic diplomacy, while the long-term objective is to take advantage of the economic rise of East Asia, bringing tangible economic benefits to South Africa.

South Africa should advance a comprehensive look-east policy, based on an economic focus intended to boost South Africa's trade and investment profile and thus take full advantage of the commercial opportunities offered

in the region. To identify and promote economic synergies and comparative advantage, South Africa should step up efforts to engage East Asia and thereby take advantage of the dynamism which the Asian Tigers and China provide in an era of financial uncertainty but increased globalisation. Since 1994, South Africa has made good progress in building an East Asian engagement, but many opportunities for a more comprehensive relationship have been missed. South Africa requires a 'comprehensive look-east policy' to expand and strengthen relations with East Asia as a whole, taking full advantage of Asia's rise and the positive effects of globalisation. An increased effort to better understand the positive outcomes of a strengthened economic relationship with the region offers a rich agenda for new and rewarding opportunities.

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South Africa–North African relations

Revisiting the bridging of a continent

Iqbal Jhazbhay

INTRODUCTION

Some eight years have made a radical difference in the context of relations between South Africa and the North African Maghreb. In an earlier analysis of South Africa–North African relations, published in 2004, I showed that the regional backdrop in the north of the continent was a stable one characterised by long-established autocratic regimes.¹ These included the monarchy in Morocco, alienated from the rest of the African Union (AU) by contestation over the Western Sahara; an Egyptian regime under President Hosni Mubarak that was only nominally committed to Africa; the autocracies of Zine al-Abidine Ben-Ali in Tunisia; and the eccentric leadership of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi presiding over the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika made every possible effort to advance Algeria's Africa and Arab credentials.² Out of this constellation, South Africa's closest relations were – and continue to be – with Algeria, a country that had undergone a similar colonial-settler experience and liberation struggle and one which had, as a result, been at the forefront of supporting the liberation struggle in South and Southern Africa.

What most of these countries had in common in their ruling tendencies and Arab/Muslim affinity, from the Maghreb to the Levant in what is termed the MENA (the Middle East and North Africa), was the autocratic nature of their governments, governments that had experienced long-term stability under militarised and/or military-backed authoritarian security regimes. With democratic oppositional challengers and militant Islamists alike ruthlessly suppressed, the only challenges these regimes confronted post-9/11 were Al-Qaeda-affiliated insurgent groups advancing a global jihadist agenda. Post-9/11 jihadism only reinforced regime authoritarianism and repression throughout the MENA. What follows, in terms of a South

African foreign policy review audit, is an updated analysis of the situation in 2011 as it pertains to relations with North Africa.

The events of 2011 have introduced an entirely new landscape to the MENA expanse joining the Maghreb and the Levant. The jihadist challenge has been overtaken by a regional transnational democratic popular uprising beginning in Tunisia with the overthrow of Ben-Ali and followed by the fall of Mubarak in Egypt and the controversially NATO-backed ouster of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. North Africa, therefore, has been in the vanguard of the so-called 'Arab spring' or 'Arab awakening' (*sahwa/yaqza*) alongside still unfolding upheavals underway, at the time of writing, along the Red Sea of the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, across from Somalia and Eritrea, and in the Persian Gulf in Bahrain as well as in the MENA 'northern tier' in Syria.

If, in 2004, the narrative of South Africa–North African relations was one of how a newly liberated, post-apartheid government under the African National Congress (ANC) was going to build bridges of connectivity between the north and the south of Africa, the narrative eight years later is how these bridges can be *reconstructed* on a new terrain of incipient post-autocratic regimes in transition to elected governments representing mixed readings of secular and religious claimants to representative democracy.

This chapter will assess South African foreign policy under these radically different North African circumstances and attempt to examine how Pretoria has managed and is managing to adapt to this new Arab transnational oppositional dynamic in the north of the continent. This is happening, moreover, at a time when South Africa itself is under a different – its third – post-apartheid administration, that of President Jacob Zuma.

For purposes of continuity, it will be necessary to summarise what has transpired under the three presidencies as this pertains to foreign policy generally and to relations with North Africa in particular. To a large extent it entails revisiting the pattern of relations that prevailed and how these relations are changing under the rapidly unfolding panorama of the Arab awakening as South Africa – as do governments elsewhere, the world over – attempts to readjust policies to the new realities. This includes revisiting the 'Cape to Cairo' dimension of reconstructing bridges already built but taking on new meanings through an accelerating pace of interregional economic integration as the link between Africa south of the Zambezi and the Limpopo and the North-Northeast African Nile (Comesa-EAC-SADC).³

This terrain is being further reshaped by peripheral but important events in the Horn of Africa that are central to the extent of the geopolitical-geo-economic bridge building that can take place between South and Southern Africa and North Africa. These include the independence of South

Sudan and the continuing struggle to reshape the stateless Somali coastal region.⁴ This presents a picture considerably more challenging and complex than that of 2004.

BACKGROUND: CAPE TO CAIRO REVISITED

In 2004, reference was made to Cecil John Rhodes's dream of building a Cape to Cairo railway, a romantic and revolutionary concept running against the colonial tide, as building infrastructure to connect African countries was not high among the priorities of colonial governments once they had grabbed their pieces of real estate in the scramble for Africa. The infrastructural investment of imperial governments went into building road and rail links from the original resource pools to the coast – the quicker to get the spoils to colonial metropolitan markets. The Cape to Cairo railway was seen as still a distant pipe dream well into the post-colonial era, ten years after South Africa's transition in 1994. Yet things have changed radically since this observation was made.

With the 2009 launch of the tripartite initiative of the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC) to forge what is being billed as 'The Grand Free Trade Area' (GFTA), 'Cape to Cairo' is less and less of a pipe dream. Infrastructural investment has taken off as a major priority, reinforcing this tripartite initiative with the companion undertaking of what is called the North–South Corridor Infrastructure Initiative.

Development finance institutions such as the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) have combined with foreign investors, in particular those from emerging markets led by China, to make North–South transport communications connectivity a reality in driving African regional and continental integration. As Egypt is a major member of Comesa and South Africa is the leading economy in SADC, giving high policy priority to the GFTA/North–South Corridor, 'Cape to Cairo' should become less and less a pipe dream and increasingly an imperative on the African agenda.

Nevertheless, building relations between post-apartheid South Africa and North Africa continues to require a great deal of work, especially now that the upheavals all across the Maghreb and Levant are bringing into being a new geopolitical landscape that South Africa will have to factor into its foreign policy calculation. Bridging the Saharan divide between North Africa and the rest of the continent, and between this region and South Africa, takes on added importance.

Readjusting to the new circumstances of 2011 should be made all the easier as all the North African countries – Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia – have embassies in South Africa (including a mission of the Western Sahara's Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic). Tshwane (Pretoria) also has embassies in each of these five North African countries as well as a trade representative in Cairo.

The African National Congress (ANC)-led government's historical liberation experience has stood it in good stead in building these bilateral relationships.⁵ As pointed out previously, Nelson Mandela had been greatly influenced by the Algerian armed struggle during a trip across Africa in 1961. The close relations between South Africa and Algeria at opposite ends of the continent are a legacy of this contact. Algeria remains South Africa's strategic partner in North Africa.

However, the upheavals across the Maghreb in 2011 are making it all the more imperative that the divisions imposed by the colonial powers between North and sub-Saharan Africa be bridged. Apart from the fact that international institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), some UN agencies, and Western foreign offices continue entrenching this division, inter-continental relations between Africa and the European Union (EU) reflect this divide as well: an EU–Mediterranean partnership for the Maghreb; an EU–Africa strategic partnership for the rest of the continent. The recent Spanish Worker's Party's Progressive Africa Conference in July 2010 approached Africa in the same vein, in spite of ANC protests against such an incomplete approach.

This latter relationship between sub-Saharan Africa and Europe is, moreover, linked in turn to the economic Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) configuration which has caused so much havoc in Africa's integration agenda resulting from the EU's controversial economic partnership agreements (EPAs).⁶ Now, in light of the manner in which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) stretched and 'abused'⁷ the UN's no-fly zone mandate in Libya, bridging the divide between North and sub-Saharan Africa within the AU and with other parts of the world, takes on added urgency.

While African countries, at times, have themselves tended to make these same distinctions, the proximity of North African countries to Europe has naturally led them into developing close ties with that continent, particularly with the Mediterranean countries. Indeed, the connectivity of North Africa as the 'Southern Mediterranean' to both Latin Europe and sub-Saharan Africa cries out for rationalisation in a post-upheaval Maghreb rethinking of relations between Africa and Europe.

The fact that there has been a major sub-Saharan migrant worker presence in the Maghreb, and both sub-Saharan and North African migration into Europe, illustrates the shared north–south destiny of these two mega

regions of the continent. This interregional and trans-Mediterranean migratory phenomenon underlines the geostrategic spatial interdependencies between Europe and Africa transcending the North/sub-Saharan divide.

In an updated examining of South Africa's post-apartheid relations with North Africa it is useful to attempt an overview of how Pretoria's relationships have evolved over the three presidencies of Nelson Mandela (1994–99), Thabo Mbeki (1999–2007) and Jacob Zuma (2007 to the present). It should be stressed that the changes that have recently taken place in North Africa in 2011 also affect, or hold potential implications for, South Africa's relations in the Horn of Africa, although this examination will not include the country-by-country survey characterising the 2004 article.

NORTH AFRICA: MANDELA-MBEKI-ZUMA

The leitmotif of post-apartheid foreign policy has been an acknowledgement of governments that gave strong political and material support to South Africa's liberation struggle, the ANC especially. Irrespective of the kind of relations such governments had with the West, a post-struggle ANC in government was not about to abandon old allies. This is a tenet that has united all three administrations under Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. For one thing, such a posture is mandated by the ANC as party policy, although the texture of diplomacy has been coloured by the personalities and unique backgrounds of the three leaders. As president, Mandela was very aware of the debt that South Africa owed North African countries for their contribution to its liberation struggle.⁸

South Africa's relations with Libya best illustrated Mandela's combination of pragmatism and idealism.⁹ Although these ties were strongly criticised from within South Africa and by Western governments, including the US and Britain, Mandela not only held to a policy of cordial relations with Gaddafi but became a major interlocutor in striking Libya off the West's 'terrorist' pariah list by facilitating an accommodation on the Lockerbie charges under which Gaddafi and Libya laboured. Mandela's stubborn individualism paid off handsomely when, in cooperation with Saudi Arabia, he was able to use his 'good offices' to break the diplomatic logjam over the Lockerbie affair (which involved two Libyan nationals charged with the 1988 bombing of an American airliner over Scotland, killing 270 people).

Mbeki's yardstick for developing relations involved a more pragmatic measure of mutual economic benefit than Mandela had applied. Mbeki decided that, on this basis, the countries of North Africa warranted close and consistent attention from South Africa. Nevertheless, relations between South Africa and Libya under Mbeki's presidency were more ambivalent as

'Brother Leader' sought to counter Mbeki's African Renaissance offensive with his own bid to transform the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into a 'United States of Africa'.

In alliance with Nigeria's president, Olusegun Obasanjo, Mbeki was able to head Gaddafi off at the pass by stirring the OAU's transformation into the AU along with his championed economic blueprint, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad). On the other hand, while Mandela laid the basis for strong relations with Algeria during its turbulent democratic transition, relations between Pretoria and Algiers became much closer under Mbeki with Bouteflika becoming one of the continent's leading backers of Nepad as a member of its heads-of-state steering committee.

Even before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on Washington and New York, Mbeki raised sympathy for Algeria's struggle against its home-grown terrorist threat. He had identified the emerging oil-rich country as a strategic partner.¹⁰ In 2001, Mbeki noted during a state banquet in Tshwane for the visiting Algerian leader, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, that:

'Clearly, despite the physical distance imposed upon us [South Africa-Algeria] by geography, the relationship between our two countries is an intimate one, going back many decades to the struggle of the African peoples for national liberation and freedom from colonial rule. In particular, we must thank President Bouteflika, at the time as the president of the [UN] General Assembly, for the important role he played in the decision to isolate the racist government of South Africa.'¹¹

Relations between Libya and South Africa under President Zuma were less standoffish until South Africa took the charge against Gaddafi on the matter of Gaddafi's wish to extend his North African nomination as chair of the African Union.

In 2011, during the confrontation between Gaddafi and his opponents in what spiralled into civil war, Zuma supported punitive measures against Libya. The fact that these measures – UN resolutions 1970 and 1973 – came during South Africa's second tenure as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council emphasised the extent to which South Africa was willing to side with the people of Libya and to send a clear message to Gaddafi that, in the absence of credible Libyan institutions, South Africa would vote to protect the Libyan people from attacks by Gaddafi's forces. In this context, it should be noted that in my 2004 article I highlighted that Gaddafi had strong ties with the PAC and not with the ANC. ANC institutional–Gaddafi links did not exist. President Zuma stressed in a 2011 foreign policy speech that Gaddafi's approach to the AU led to many delays in the development and advancement of the AU.¹²

South Africa's relations with Morocco have been distant. Morocco's anti-AU stance on Western Sahara has stalemated relations with South Africa which have also been influenced, no doubt, by the tensions between Rabat and Algiers and Pretoria's good terms with the latter. South Africa's relations with Egypt were also distant until recently. Although Mandela made a state visit to Egypt (and to Morocco and Tunisia) in 1997, where he conferred on the Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak the 'Order of Good Hope' and himself received the 'Collar of the Nile', it was only shortly before Mbeki's presidency came to an end that Mubarak returned a state visit to South Africa.¹³

Mbeki visited Cairo in 2000. But that was to attend the Africa–EU summit. Mbeki's team had questioned with Cairo the commitment of Mubarak's Egypt to Africa. Mbeki had been irritated by Mubarak's first insisting on being named a key player in the Mbeki-inspired African socio-economic plan *Nepad*, but then not attending meetings of *Nepad*'s implementation steering committee. Diplomatic ties between Cairo and Pretoria tended, therefore, to be frosty. Now, post-Mubarak, relations appear to be thawing under Zuma with the 2010 state visit that he made to Cairo before Mubarak was ousted by the popular Tahrir uprising.¹⁴

EGYPT: WORKING WITH THE REGIONAL MILITARY GIANT POST-MUBARAK

How the post-Mubarak bilateral relationship between South Africa and Egypt evolves will be of major consequence not only for South Africa–North African relations but for inter-African relations as a whole. The thaw that shows signs of progressing under President Zuma builds on Hosni Mubarak's belated state visit to South Africa before President Thabo Mbeki was forced to step down and on President Zuma's return state visit in 2010 while Mubarak was still in power. Egypt's transition to an as yet ill-defined post-Mubarak democratic dispensation opens up new opportunities for Pretoria and Cairo to place the bilateral relationship on a new footing.

Under Mubarak, South Africa's relations with Egypt had been among the most complex and competitive in Africa. After the considerably more Africa-friendly regimes of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat, Egypt's status as an African country under Mubarak had been questioned at the highest level by many African presidents.¹⁵ Mubarak had not attended an OAU or AU summit for a decade (with the exception of Abuja in 2005 when Egypt was seeking an African seat in a restructured UN Security Council), after an attempt was made to assassinate him in Addis Ababa in 1995 while attending an OAU summit.

By insisting on Egypt being part of an enlarged Nepad steering committee and implementation group without attending meetings but attending summits of the G8 as part of specially invited African delegations, Mubarak tried to benefit from a nominal African affiliation while giving priority to the Middle East and a special relationship with Washington based on the Camp David accord. Egyptian representatives on the continent reacted angrily to South African suggestions¹⁶ that they were Africans only when it suited them, as in their bid for the 2010 football World Cup.

Much of the difficulty in this bilateral South Africa–Egypt relationship arose from Egypt's resentment at the multilateral role that post-apartheid South Africa assumed, eclipsing Cairo as a leading power on the continent.¹⁷ Yet Egypt and South Africa share similar views on the Palestinian question and other contentious international issues such as nuclear disarmament and dialogue with Eritrea in the context of its role in the Horn of Africa. However, both countries remain rivals for the role of African leader in international matters and this has been evident in the politics of a permanent African seat (or seats) on an expanded UN Security Council. It was also evident in Cairo's late and losing bid against South Africa to host the Pan-African Parliament in 2004.

These contradictions between Tshwane and Cairo explain why notions of a 'strategic triangle' between South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt as a basis for continental consolidation never gained any traction.¹⁸ Throughout the presidential tenures of Obasanjo and Mbeki, an Abuja–Tshwane axis of sorts did exist within the framework of Nepad. This axis never extended to Cairo although Egypt did want, for economic reasons, to join or establish a relationship with SADC which South Africa opposed. Now that a 'Cape to Cairo' vision has gained new currency under the Comesa-SADC-EAC tri-lateral mega-trade initiative, economic relations between Egypt and South and Southern Africa may yet achieve what Mubarak had wanted in gaining access to the continent's southern market. Another possible area of cooperation is that of South Africa and Egypt working together to engage fellow African states on Eritrea's role in stabilising eastern Sudan. Eritrea has demonstrated its intentions to rightfully take up its place in the AU and its application to return to the regional Horn of Africa body, IGAD.¹⁹

Relations between Cairo and Tshwane had also been complicated by the north–south civil war in the Sudan with the Mubarak regime having long supported Khartoum's war and diplomacy against south Sudan's self-determination. In this, a more fundamental factor in Egyptian Africa policy has been Cairo's wish to protect what it sees as its historical prerogatives to dominant – if not sole – access to Nile River Basin waters. For Egypt, this has been an overriding security imperative. But, as international attention began to focus on the north–south conflict in Sudan and Cairo began to join Khartoum

in becoming increasingly isolated in opposing south Sudanese aspirations, Cairo had increasingly to readjust its African diplomacy to accommodate the reality of southern independence and pressures against its Nile monopoly.

However the post-Mubarak transition unfolds in Egypt, the changes that the country is going through with South Sudan's independence, opens up opportunities for a more constructively strategic bilateral relationship. The fact that the Egyptian interim prime minister, Essam Sharaf, visited South Africa to participate in the Comesa-SADC-EAC summit may be suggestive of a new and more promising chapter in South African–Egyptian bilateral relations. Importantly, the delegation that accompanied Sharaf included the foreign, industry and foreign trade ministers.²⁰

South Africa is also well placed to share experiences with Egyptians as they navigate their transition toward a more democratic future. The political changes in Egypt may benefit a revisiting of a more strategic partnership between Cairo and Tshwane in advancing the African agenda. But much hinges on the outcome of Egypt's transition and the prospect of synergies emerging between it and South Africa and, perhaps, Nigeria as well. The 2012 recent appointment of President Morsi's new cabinet suggests that Egypt appears to be moving along the required reconciliatory South African trajectory of the Mandela era.²¹

TUNISIA: POST-BEN ALI

What has become widely dubbed the 'Arab spring' or 'Arab awakening' had its genesis in Tunisia. The Tunisian uprising set the tone and pattern for the Tahrir Square uprising in neighbouring Egypt and throughout the rest of the MENA realm, including Libya, to Tunisia's west. As with Egypt, the Tunisian uprising has affected bilateral relations between South Africa and Tunisia. At the outset of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign relations, those existing between Tshwane and Tunis had got off to a low-key but good start. Mandela attended his first OAU summit in Tunis in 1994, with Tunisian strongman Ben Ali making a state visit to South Africa in 1995 and addressing both houses of Parliament. These ties, however, remain more symbolic than substantive.²² Ben Ali literally ordered Tunisian businesses to establish ties with their South African counterparts but the response from the South Africans has been disappointing.

A bi-national commission has been established between Tshwane and Tunis, which had met three times by 2006. South Africa has expressed admiration for Ben Ali's poverty alleviation programmes and societal building projects. Tunisia's poverty alleviation efforts of establishing a national solidarity fund and fulfilling the UN Millennium Development Goals of

halving poverty by 2015 received attention during Mbeki's 2007 State of the Nation address.²³

This seemed to overshadow Tunisia's human rights situation. There was a tendency to rationalise Tunisia's oppressiveness on the basis of its being a small country sandwiched precariously between robust Libya and troubled Algeria, thereby having to take extraordinary security measures to safeguard its tourism industry (Tunisia is host to more than four million European tourists annually. However, the popular uprising of 2011 stripped away all these expediences. Otherwise, bilateral relations between Tunis and Tshwane have been unremarkable in spite of the bi-national commission, a joint military committee and shared peacekeeping interests in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), as well as interest in advancing Afro-Arab relations as a basis for building a strong Africa.

Ben Ali's ouster and the unfolding transition toward a more democratic regime should strengthen ties between South Africa and Tunisia. Why this is so has to do with the good relations that exist between South Africa and the formerly exiled Islamist reform leader of the An-Nahda party, Rachid Ghannouchi, who has been influenced by the manner of South Africa's democratic transition and the role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in confronting the traumas of South Africa's past. Ghannouchi is on record as advocating that a similar commission be established in post-Ben Ali Tunisia.²⁴ Ghanouchi was invited to South Africa, in spite of Ben Ali's protest, as a keynote speaker to the University of South Africa's 1994 Islam and Civil Society International Conference.

LIBYA: POST-GADDAFI

If it could be said that South Africa was ahead of the curve in its dealings with Libya in the 1990s, in a diplomacy that lifted Tripoli and Gaddafi out of isolation and pariah status, Gaddafi's ouster by NATO-backed rebels sanctioned by the UN Security Council appeared to place Tshwane's relations with the West under strain. In point of fact, however, the manner in which the UN Security Council, in particular, the P3 on the Council (the US, Britain and France) provoked NATO into implementing the 'no-fly zone' 1973 resolution that mutated into 'regime change,' has underlined major unresolved issues concerning the UNSC's relationship with regionally-based continental security organs, in this case, the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC). Essentially, the P3 played off the Arab League as the nominated representative of MENA against the AU, of which all Maghreb states except Morocco are members.

The P3 marginalised the AU and its PSC 'roadmap' initiative to defuse

hostilities in Libya by acknowledging the Arab League as the sole point of reference in legitimising the NATO ‘no-fly’ intervention. This intervention became the thin end of the wedge of a full-blown air campaign that eventually tipped the military balance in the National Transitional Council’s favour. With the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council (NTC) installed into power as a result of NATO’s air war, South Africa, as a leading member of the AU Ad Hoc Committee on Libya chose to stand on principle in asserting a defence of African sovereignty in refraining from recognising the NTC and in influencing the AU not to recognise the NTC.

If South Africa sought to redress its discomfort – as the sole member of BRICS to break with abstention and vote for 1973 – by now refusing to confer legitimacy on the NTC as a matter of principle, this posture was overtaken when Russia and China fell in line with much of the rest of the international community in recognising the NTC. On 21 September, South Africa and the AU gave provisional recognition pending the NTC’s establishing an ‘inclusive government’. While some considered this a ‘better late than never’ approach instead of outright recognition, a few days later South Africa and the AU conferred full recognition on the NTC even as it struggled to transform itself into an inclusive provisional government.²⁵

In any case, a rupture between the NTC and the AU leading to Libya’s joining Morocco in withdrawing from the continental body was averted, and Libya’s new leaders saw that it was in their interest to, in effect, pledge allegiance to it in agreeing to accommodate the body’s concerns. South Africa has started to engage with the NTC, as it has managed to do in the cases of post-Ben Ali Tunisia and post-Mubarak Egypt.²⁶

The manner in which South Africa had approached the insurgency-led popular uprising in Libya mistakenly suggested a pro-Gaddafi bias. This reflected no small amount of irony, given the bilateral ambivalence between South Africa and Libya, although this had started to clear up under Zuma. As earlier noted, relations between Mbeki and Gaddafi had been characterised by a struggle for the soul of the AU. Gaddafi was widely acknowledged as having been the father of the process of that led to transforming the OAU into the AU. This was agreed at a special summit in Sirte in 1999, though in reality the process emerged out of Nigeria’s Obasanjo joining Mbeki in diverting Gaddafi from his ‘US of Africa’ campaign.

Later, in 2002, Gaddafi would try to have the inaugural summit of the new body moved to Libya from South Africa. When he was unsuccessful, the Libyan leader upstaged Mbeki whenever he could during this landmark occasion in Durban. Mbeki, however, has been in the forefront of denouncing what he has seen as a Western campaign to marginalise ‘African solutions to African problems’ in sidelining the AU ‘roadmap’ on Libya.

South Africa, and many other states, had been trying to shift Libya, under

Gaddafi, away from what was seen as its counterproductive 'chequebook' diplomacy.²⁷ Now that Gaddafi has been ousted, this underwriting of the AU and the dues of many of its member states will no doubt come to an end. Although much energy has been expended between Tshwane and Tripoli in trying to manage a difficult relationship, this seems likely to continue pending the establishment of a better rapport between Libya's new rulers and South Africa. Perhaps, in this regard, the rapport that Tshwane has established with the new Tunisia and the new Egypt may benefit improved relations between South Africa and the new Libya, where experiences of transition, based on South Africa's transition experience, might be shared. Ultimately, there are many lessons learnt from the manner in which Libya's violent post-Gaddafi era has unfolded that are in need of unpacking. 'For South Africa, the Gaddafi lesson speaks to the foresight the founders of our modern nation held in order to keep those who desired a bloodfest at bay, as we moved from an oppressive regime to a democratically elected government.'²⁸

This is not simply for the benefit of improving bilateral relations between Libya and South Africa. It also applies to security relations between the EU and Africa in terms of how the West must be influenced in relating to resolving conflicts on the continent without the kind of 'regime change' intervention that happened in the Libyan case that pushed the AU into the background. The EU–Africa strategic partnership needs to be revisited.

ALGERIA AND MOROCCO REVISITED

Neither Algeria nor Morocco has been affected by the 'Arab spring/awakening' that has brought 'regime change' to Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. To be sure, there have been more or less tentative tremors of unrest that might portend contagion from those three countries. But the Algerians, who are deeply concerned about not repeating their devastating civil war and about pre-emptive reformism by the monarchy in Rabat, have, thus far, contained the 'winds of change'. Bilateral relations between South Africa and Algeria, on the one hand, and South Africa and Morocco on the other are not confronted by transitional adjustments. However, the status of Western Sahara, which is a flashpoint between Morocco and Algeria, remains an obstacle to closer relations between Tshwane and Rabat. Algeria, however, remains the lynchpin in South Africa's regional politico-diplomatic posture in the Maghreb. South Africa also draws from Algeria's experiences of engaging contentious Middle East issues.

During the South African liberation struggle, Algeria played host to Nelson Mandela and gave refuge and training to many cadres such as Mzwewu Henry Ntsele and Johannes Moopeloa from the ANC and the Pan

Africanist Congress (PAC) respectively.²⁹ Algeria was an outspoken opponent of apartheid. It played an active role in the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid and as president of the General Assembly in the 1970s. That function was performed by Algerian leader Abdelaziz Bouteflika, then Algeria's foreign minister who, in 1974, presided over the suspension of apartheid South Africa from the General Assembly. Bouteflika's erstwhile South African counterpart, Pik Botha, recalls that despite the acrimony and heat of debate over this unprecedented action Bouteflika never treated him with anything but the greatest courtesy and civility.³⁰ Bouteflika was in the founding 'troika' of African leaders – along with Mbeki and Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo – of the Nepad steering committee.

Morocco, by contrast, developed military and other ties with South Africa's apartheid regime. Arms bought from South Africa were used in Morocco's bid to crush the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara, a territory that Rabat has occupied since 1975 in defiance of the international community. Moreover, Morocco has figured centrally in France's francophone Afro-Arab strategy throughout the Maghreb and West Africa. Morocco's relationship with France has extended to a wider Western-oriented foreign policy coordinated with Washington as well. It had, under King Hassan II, long served as a reliable backstop to US and French strategies in sub-Saharan Africa, notably supporting Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire and Jonas Savimbi during Angola's civil war in tandem with the backing given to Savimbi by the apartheid regime and by China. Given the history of South Africa and Algeria, it is no surprise that post-apartheid relations with the country have been conducted at presidential level. An excellent chemistry and deep bond existed between Mbeki and Bouteflika. South Africa has also shared its experiences to help Algeria with internal political reconciliation, gender issues, multiculturalism and economic development, also offering Algeria assistance in its bid to accede to the WTO. There have been presidential commission meetings between South Africa and Algeria that have involved cabinet teams of unprecedented size relative to South Africa's dealings with other countries on the continent. There is no doubt that, at the politico-diplomatic level, the bilateral closeness between South Africa and Algiers will stand both in good stead as they jointly navigate the changing geopolitical landscape wrought by the upheavals in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya.

At the level of bilateral business and investment interaction, however, relations still do not match the level of the political ties, which appear to be motivated more by long-term bilateral and multilateral strategic goals than by hard cash. Every effort is being made, however, to remedy this situation, with South African businesses being encouraged to build stronger economic relations with Algeria.

The relationship with Algeria's rival, Morocco, could not be more different.

Both Morocco and Algeria are estranged over competing claims involving the Western Sahara. Since South Africa took the decision to join most of the rest of Africa in recognising the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) of the Polisario Front, relations between Tshwane and Rabat have been strained. After Morocco downgraded its diplomatic presence in South Africa from ambassadorial to charge d'affaire, South Africa nevertheless maintained an ambassador in Rabat. Morocco has expended much effort in trying to ensure that South Africa did not join other African nations in recognising the Polisario Front's SADR government-in-exile.³¹

Meanwhile, the stalemate over Western Sahara and Morocco's alienation from the AU remains an obstacle to the African continental integration blueprint. South Africa's position falls squarely within the SADC consensus on this issue (with the exception of Swaziland which, like Morocco, remains a monarchy). South African diplomats have argued that the lack of a resolution of the Western Sahara question among Maghreb states has impeded the development of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and also the goals of the AU towards continental integration.³² The AMU – one of the five sub-regional pillars of continental integration and of a African Standby Force (ASF) – has been largely moribund, and by 2006 its members had not met in over a decade. Perhaps recent political changes in North Africa may lend themselves to reviving the AMU.

In the absence of solid state-to-state bilaterals between Tshwane and Rabat, there are tentative indications that Morocco is keen to develop better party-to-party relations between the ANC and the Moroccan Socialist party, both of which are members of the Socialist International, which South Africa is hosting in 2012. Exchange visits of party delegations are reportedly on the cards. This could inspire cause for speculation down the road on accommodation in Western Sahara, if Morocco is affected by the Arab awakening virus. Whether South Africa could, at some point, be accepted as a mediator in trying to bridge the divide between Morocco on the one hand and Algeria and the SADR on the other remains to be seen.

If a revival of the AMU as North Africa's regional economic pillar of the AU could be dovetailed with resolving the Western Sahara stalemate as a regional integration issue, this could form the basis of an accommodation and might mean a special status for the SADR as an AMU 'autonomous republic' in a tripartite sovereignty arrangement between the SADR, Morocco and Algeria. Whether South Africa can arrive at a formula that finesses the contradictions between these three claimants to determining the future of the Western Sahara is an open question. Much may depend on whether preemptive reform in Morocco to stay ahead of 'Arab spring' contagion leads to a softening of Rabat's stance on Western Sahara and room for creative options that satisfy all stakeholders.

REVISITING THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE HORN OF AFRICA NEXUS

Because of the transnational democratic upheavals that continue in play throughout North Africa and the Middle East, South Africa's relations with the Maghreb and the Levant will remain in flux for a long time to come until the new geopolitical landscape in the making consolidates into a new regional order. For one thing, they will change the nature of the Arab League. This body will increasingly have to reflect the will of member governments that are more accountable to electorates than they were formerly. This, in turn, will determine how the Arab League and the AU interact. Adding further complexity are the unresolved tensions and conflicts in the north-eastern Horn of Africa. Arab governments have been heavily involved in the geopolitical dynamics of the Horn of Africa – ranging from the conflicts in the Sudan, to the hitherto failed attempts to reconstitute Somalia, to regional rivalry between Egypt and Ethiopia and the fate of the Nile River Basin.

Democratisation has been at the centre of conflicts around the Sudan between the north and its now independent southern region, the Republic of South Sudan, and the war-torn western province of Darfur. Perhaps the emergence of democratic regimes in the MENA realm will, over time, influence new democratising dynamics in Sudan and other troubled states within the Horn of Africa. If so, this would be in keeping with how South Africa perceives itself and its role in supporting progressive political trends in Africa as a whole.³³

NOTES

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 - 18 Kornegay, F., Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa: A stable balance of power in Africa, *SA Yearbook of International Affairs* 1999/2000, pp. 61–70. *SA Yearbook of International Affairs* 1999/2000, pp. 61–70.
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Chasing after shadows or strategic integration?

South Africa and global economic governance

Mzukisi Qobo

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to review South Africa's engagement in the global system of governance. The country's foreign policy gained a distinctive shape around 2000. This assessment focuses at the normative character of the country's approach to global governance and critiques it for its lack of sufficient grounding in domestic development priorities. It argues that, for the most part, South Africa has adopted an idealistic view of the world and pursued multilateralism for its own sake, a posture that does not make sense for a middle income economy with massive structural challenges of the magnitude with which South Africa contends.

Rather than undertaking a detailed evaluation of the country's role in specific institutions, the chapter concentrates mainly on South Africa's strategic position, especially in respect of two multilateral Organizations and groupings: the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations and the Group of 20 (G20).

The first section reviews the changing nature of global governance and the challenges confronting it. Here global governance is defined, underlining its importance as a framework for shaping rules and norms around which consensus might be achieved on how best to manage public goods. The section underscores the fact that such a framework is not insulated from the expression of interests. The section also includes a brief discussion of the historical evolution of multilateral institutions.

The second part forms the core of this chapter and critically evaluates South Africa's embrace of multilateralism, tracking South Africa's participation in the multilateral trade negotiations. In particular, the focus is on South Africa's negotiating approaches in the WTO's Doha Round of multilateral negotiations. The key focus is the extent to which the country's strategic posture reflects its domestic economic priorities. The third section

continues this theme of global economic governance, examining South Africa's ongoing participation in the G20. The chapter presents an argument that the country's failure to structure a strong link between its involvement in this process and its own development interests risks reducing it to the role of a crisis manager and system stabiliser at the behest of developed countries' interests.

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: SETTING THE SCENE

Global governance is a vast and complex terrain, politically and ideologically contested. Undoubtedly, it fulfils a critical role as an expression of a coordinating mechanism for decision-making on the management of public goods. It is, on the surface, concerned with creating a framework for mediating competing interests among different state actors and facilitating deliberations over a set of issues that may have far-reaching implications for a number of countries.¹ It is largely for this reason that South Africa identifies participation in the global system of governance as one of the five pillars of its foreign policy, parallel to the pursuit of South–South relations, North–South relations, African agenda, achieving global peace and security, and political and economic relations.

At a broader level, the set of issues that define the global governance agenda are varied, and include concerns such as development, trade and finance, energy, security, health, and the environment. In this sense, global governance is concerned with establishing what Robert Keohane refers to as regimes, or a set of rules around which actor expectations converge.² It is through international agreements and better coordination of action that major political, economic and environmental challenges can best be tackled. In some sense, the system of global governance is synonymous with multilateralism, especially where it is strongly underpinned by a rules-based institutional framework.

Some of the specific examples of institutions established for the purpose of managing public goods and setting rules around which actor interests converge include the WTO, which creates a framework for negotiating trade rules and deals with disputes arising from international trade practices; the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which is a standard-setting body for intellectual property; the G20, which has recently been designated as a premier forum for deliberating on and resolving financial and economic policy issues; and of course the United Nations, which is the overarching multilateral body dealing with issues affecting politics and security.

There are many other standard or norm-setting institutions that are pillars of global governance. Space does not permit this paper to explore South

Africa's positioning in all of them, and the main focus throughout will be on the country's expressed normative commitment and the issues it tends to prioritise, as well as the gaps in its engagements.

Multilateral cooperation, especially in a world that is becoming multipolar, characterised by a multiplicity of rising powers, is not without its own difficulties. It presents countries with problems of effective participation, especially to negotiate their interests in a space that is shaped by countries with divergent interests and beliefs.

HEGEMONIC SETTING

The system of global governance, characterised by a slew of multilateral Organizations, is largely a creation of the United States in the post-World War II era – a period in which the US was hegemonic both militarily and with respect to production. It had a technological lead which enabled it to enjoy dominance across a number of sectors that were both capital intensive and labour intensive; and it had high-tech pre-eminence in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, aerospace and electronics.³ This structural dominance was important for placing the US in the lead of the global system, and positioning it at the heart of designing the global governance architecture.

The US was at the centre of the creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1944 as well as laying out the principles that were to foster post-war recovery: price stability through fixed exchange rates; reducing barriers to international trade; and integration of markets with government planning.⁴ The multilateral system of international economic governance was thus essentially meant to address post-war problems, to avoid the depression of the 1930s, and to sustain world peace.

Multilateralism or, more descriptively, coordination, was seen as crucial if the conditions that led to the Great Depression and that precipitated World War II were to be avoided. The principles that underpinned it were also intended to shape the world along the interests of the dominant economic power – the US. Promotion of multilateralism was always undergirded by assertion of interests, whether economic or of geostrategic relevance in the context of the Cold War. The Cold War may have ended, but the basic reality of narrow interest promoted via multilateral process still prevails.

Those with economic and political power shape the core agenda of multilateral institutions. They are standard setters. Their norms and standards – formed out of iterations at the domestic level – are diffused into multilateral processes, establishing the core structure of the agenda. The US continues to set rules on financial regulation guided by domestic considerations and interest groups then enforced by the multilateral process. If anything, it

views itself as a standard setter of global rules and not the other way round. The main point here is that multilateral processes have never existed in unadulterated form. This is a reality that characterised much of the post-1945 period. Further, the historical context rooted in the 1929 Great Depression, World War II, and the geopolitical tensions between the US and the Soviet Union were what gave global governance and the system of multilateralism its character in the middle to later part of the twentieth century.

A raft of formal and informal institutions that emerged in the 1960s, including initial efforts towards a European integration project, regular consultations within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and regular meetings of the finance ministers, central governors and their deputies under the aegis of the Group of Ten in Paris, all helped to solidify a set of ideas that would establish the foundations for global governance.⁵

The creation of the Library Group, which was an informal gathering of leading economies, with the United Kingdom, West Germany, the US, France and Japan as initial members, played a huge role in placing liberal internationalist ideas at the centre and in framing global governance and multilateralism through the narrow prism of developed countries' interests.⁶ The key objective of this group was to define the intellectual discourse for global policy-making. Over time, and under the leadership of France, it evolved to become the Group of 7 (G7), with Canada and Italy joining later (and Russia becoming a member of the political G8 in the late 1990s, but excluded from the finance convocation).

With the decline in the leadership of the US and the rise of new powers such as Brazil, Russia, India and China (the BRIC formation) and the proliferation of environmental and security threats, the global system today can be said to be in a state of fluidity. The notion of multilateralism that was central to the post-war global governance architecture was very much linked to the liberal internationalism that prevailed in the West at the time and was also tied to specific interests of the dominant countries, in particular the US.

The US could underwrite the global governance mechanism as it was strong in all four pillars of power: financial power; military power; technological power; and intellectual power.⁷ This hegemonic role was not out of the benign bent of the US, but was very much necessitated by the geopolitical threats created by the Cold War, an environment in which the US wanted to be recognised as an undisputed global leader. Developing countries such as South Africa need to conceive of a new set of norms and to use the multilateral framework for the assertion of their developmental interests. Below we explore this by examining South Africa's role in multilateral trade negotiations.

Today's changing global order is, according to Robert Wade, characterised by three modes of cooperation or participation.⁸ The first is hegemonic incorporation of the rising powers, which presupposes inclusion, while the rules are essentially written by the core countries. The second mode is that of multilateral cooperation, which is based on compromises aimed at reaching agreements among members.

Accordingly, the substance and the shape of the final agreements reflect the interests of all members rather than that of the core group of countries. The third mode is what he calls Westphalian assertion, where countries view themselves as sovereign entities, focusing more on blocking the initiatives of others than advancing innovative thinking. This is the context that South Africa finds itself in as it negotiates its role in a changing global economic environment. All three modes seem to be evident in the evolving structure of global governance, with the likelihood that hegemonic incorporation represents a dominant strand.

SOUTH AFRICA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE SYSTEM OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

The idea of multilateralism has a very strong grip on South Africa's foreign policy, in particular the country's participation in the system of global governance. This section reviews two institutional processes in which South Africa has amply demonstrated its commitment to multilateralism. These are institutions focusing on global economic governance, in particular the global governance of trade and the G20 processes. In both processes, South Africa has positioned itself as a champion of multilateralism, with a view to bridging the interests of the developing South and the developed countries of the North.

South Africa views multilateralism as the best framework for limiting the dominance of bigger countries in shaping the outcomes of the agenda in their favour. This is a central principle in South Africa's participation in global governance processes. Government frames multilateralism as both a principle and, in its institutional expression, a platform for collectively managing public goods and responding to the challenges of globalisation.

Imbalances in bargaining capacities and asymmetries of capabilities in various intergovernmental institutions and processes lend a powerful rationale for South Africa's preference for multilateralism. Further, the dynamic shifts that have taken place in the world economy, characterised by the growing influence of emerging economies, necessitate that the system of global governance expresses the reality of multipolarity as well as affirms multilateralism as an organising principle for balancing competing interests in the system.

The importance of multilateralism as a principle and institutional mechanism is to reduce the extent to which, as a rule, decisions are taken purely on the account of power distribution rather than on the basis of commonly agreed-upon rules. Further, multilateralism works through a deliberative process that assumes all participants have an equal say and voice as a principle, even though this may not necessarily be the case in reality. The articulation of interests by different countries participating in the multilateral processes carries the force of material and institutional capabilities.

Most developed countries are likely to have significantly more institutional backing and negotiating resources than developing countries. Thus, the notion of multipolarity and multilateralism should be seen by developing countries such as South Africa as an important avenue for expressing their interests.

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF TRADE

South Africa has participated in multilateral trade negotiations since the closing days of the Uruguay Round when it acceded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1993 and became a founding member of the WTO on 1 September 1995. Since the establishment of the WTO, South Africa has actively championed the notion of multilateralism. South Africa's distinct approach to multilateral trade negotiations has been that of playing a bridge-building role, presenting itself as a responsible international actor that seeks the best negotiated outcomes in WTO negotiations and highlights what it considers the core interests of the developing countries in general, and of Africa in particular.

The imbalances of the Uruguay outcomes lay in the fact that the North–South bargaining that was a feature of the Uruguay Round saw developing countries making concessions in new areas that were of economic interest to developed countries – intellectual property, trade-related investment measures (TRIMS), and services – in return for what they hoped would be substantial liberalisation in agriculture and textiles.⁹ As Baldwin suggests, the gains made by developing countries in these two sectors were not comparable to those made by developed countries in trade in services and TRIPS agreements.¹⁰ By ignoring the importance of the African countries at Uruguay, developed countries had created a relentless backlash to the multilateral trading system.

Secondly, although the Agreement on Agriculture brought agriculture into international trade negotiations, it also made provisions for the continuation of subsidies for developed countries.¹¹ The agreement contained a provision for the gradual erosion of subsidies in the future, while developing

countries that had no such subsidies in the first place were prohibited from introducing them. In the Uruguay Round, 61 out of 71 developing countries notified that they offered no domestic support that was subject to reduction commitments; and this notification restricted these countries' use of support measures in the future.¹² This precluded the use of subsidies by developing countries to support industries for developmental purposes.

If a need were to arise in the future they would be allowed to provide price support measures or direct income support measures within the threshold (*de minimis* percentage) of 10 per cent of the value of the production concerned.¹³ As the Uruguay Round legal text notes, where no support already exists, 'the member shall not provide support to agricultural producers in excess of the relevant *de minimis* level set'.¹⁴ Developed countries, on the other hand, were unencumbered by such strictures.

Developed countries are believed to have inflated their reports on the values of their domestic support, allowing them more space to maintain up to 80 per cent of their domestic support.¹⁵ Similarly, with export subsidies, those countries that reported large export subsidies – and these are to be found mostly in OECD countries – were allowed greater latitude; but countries that reported zero subsidies – mostly developing countries – had a limited scope to manoeuvre.¹⁶ A decade after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, rich countries still continue to offer subsidies to their domestic farmers.

The Agreement on Agriculture also made broad assertions in its various articles on standards, especially technical barriers to trade, and sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) measures; the need for special and differential treatment for developing countries; and attention to be paid to the special concerns of least developed and net-food importing developing countries which were likely to suffer as a result of reforms in agriculture.¹⁷

When South Africa actively championed the launch of the Doha Round in November 2001, it was with a view to contributing solutions that may eventually generate developmental outcomes, even though the developmental benefits of multilateral trade openings are questionable.¹⁸ The Doha Round was launched as a development round predicated on the commitment to prioritise further liberalisation of agricultural trade. It is an agenda around which South Africa mobilised alliances both in the North (as part of the Cairns Group of agriculture producing countries led by Australia) and the South (with the G20 trade led by South Africa, India and Brazil).

South Africa's approach to multilateral trade negotiations has always been to work closely with its partners in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), with like-minded partners in the developing world, and to have an open dialogue with significant economies such as the European Union (EU) and the US. Mike Moore, the former WTO director general, was

effusive in his praise of South Africa in his book that recounted his years in the WTO leading up to the launch of the Doha Round. He remarked that:

Developing countries like South Africa are in the forefront of countries defining the parameters of the WTO's future work programme – their ministers, ambassadors and officials are among the most effective and influential trade-policy practitioners in the world today.¹⁹

Accordingly, prior to the launch of the Doha Round, the South African government held several consultations with major developing countries such as Egypt, India and Brazil and with SADC ministers of trade, in an attempt to evolve a common position towards the WTO negotiations.

Since the early phase of its participation in multilateral processes, especially after the failure of the Seattle Ministerial to launch a new round of trade negotiations in 1999, South Africa defined its positions in very broad generalities: pushing for market access, and mainly targeting subsidies and tariff peaks in the countries of the developed North, and Europe in particular; granting of special and differential treatment for developing countries, especially to formally recognise the principle of 'less than full reciprocity' in undertaking obligations; and pressing for policy space and flexibility to enable developing countries to take policy actions that may deviate from the convention for developmental purposes.

South Africa's positive contribution in the multilateral trade negotiations before and after the launch of the Doha Round is widely acknowledged. It has never showed signs of acting unilaterally or threatening to block deliberations. It has worked across a diverse range of alliances from the Cairns Group to the G20 Trade to the Africa Group. Couching its negotiating approach within the rubric of a bridge-builder has created ambiguity about the precise objectives that South Africa sought to achieve from the negotiations. It is difficult, for example, to measure outcomes related to bridging the divide between the North and the South, if these are not underpinned by a well laid out domestic developmental programme. This is important, as multilateral trade negotiations are essentially about interests.

It was only after a national industrial policy framework was adopted in 2007 that more clarity was gained on South Africa's interests in the WTO. Trade policy was subjected to the logic of national industrial policy, which was to ensure that South Africa builds domestic industrial capacities and defends this policy space at the WTO by strongly insisting on far-reaching liberalisation on agriculture by the developed North. This is a position that could best be characterised as strategic trade policy: economic development is a rule, and international trade negotiations serve as instruments to achieve such developmental outcomes.

GLOBAL INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IMPERATIVES

South Africa's engagement in the system of global governance is tightly linked to outcomes set out in its development framework, in particular the Industrial Policy Action Programme (IPAP 2) and the government's New Growth Path (NGP). What is more important beyond these plans is a credible stakeholder engagement process of arriving at policy positions and the kind of interests to be pursued in multilateral negotiations. When foreign economic policy is insulated from the domestic socio-political context it runs a real risk of capture by transnational consensus building that is a vehicle for asserting the interests of dominant powers. This is often couched as multilateralism.

Multilateral economic relations can no longer just be based on an elusive ideal of promoting multilateralism for its own sake, the meaningless notion of balancing the interests of the North and the South, and the more ambiguous notion of engaging externally as part of pursuing the 'African agenda'. They should, more directly, be driven by South Africa's clearly defined interests.

There is no doubt that the path to pursuing domestic economic objectives through a multilateral process is a treacherous one, since all countries are, in different ways and with different intensities of passion, seeking to achieve the same objectives. What should be of the utmost importance for the South African government is to assert the primacy of its domestic economic framework in shaping negotiating objectives in various multilateral institutions. This requires, in the first instance, an exercise that is aimed at refining conceptual thinking about development, and that also identifies developmental indicators against which to measure resource commitments to multilateral processes. This should apply both to trade and G20 processes, which are discussed below.

THE G20: PURSUING AN ELUSIVE DEVELOPMENTAL AGENDA

The theme of leadership and multilateralism in global economic governance acquired prominence with the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, when the US under President George W Bush initiated a G20 leaders' summit in Washington in November of that year. This was followed by a G20 leaders' summit in London in 2009, and a major leaders' summit hosted by President Barack Obama in Pittsburgh in September 2009.

As the Doha Round of multilateral negotiations was launched under the cloud of crisis, in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US, so the G20 Heads of States/Governments summit was put in place in the wake

of a major financial crisis that originated in the US. In both instances, this has meant that the system of global governance has been defined by crisis and a sense of anxiety from the outset. In the case of the G20, in particular, there is very little forward-looking thinking, as leaders are more preoccupied with the immediate challenges of stimulating global recovery and fighting yet more fires of persisting sovereign debt crises in the Eurozone. Born in a time of crisis, the G20 took on a role as a crisis management committee of the global economy.

South Africa was one of only seven developing countries to participate in the inaugural meeting of the G20. It is one of the nine non-OECD countries that are part of the G20. The others are Brazil, Russia, India, China, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Argentina and Turkey. These countries participate alongside OECD countries such as the US, UK, Mexico, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Germany, France, Canada and Australia. Given the crisis origins of the G20, much of its effort is aimed primarily at stabilising the global economy in order to create a strong basis for sustained growth.

One of the major decisions of the Pittsburgh summit was the reordering of the G8 and the G20, with the former assigned a role as a forum for consultations on political and security issues, while the G20 was elevated to a premier forum for managing the global economy. In reality, though, the G8, or more appropriately the G7, defines much of the G20 agenda. Made up of advanced industrial countries such as the US, the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Canada and Japan, the G7 established a consensual normative platform for managing the international economic order according to liberal internationalist values.

The G7 has been meeting at heads of government level as well as at the ministry of finance level. Russia joined in 1997, but is only participating at the heads of government summit. Given the massive amount of effort invested in the work of the G8, its institutional character (or regularity of its processes) and the set of ideas that brought these countries together, it was clearly an illusion that the G8 would somehow disappear behind the shadows of the G20 in the wake of the global financial crisis.

So the G7 continues to be active and to generate ideas on managing the global economy. It holds sway over major institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank that have the authority and resources to make major decisions on financial crisis, stabilisation and growth. Perhaps the important change is that China has become an important voice that cannot be ignored. In some sense, China and the US are the leading forces for defining the key features of future global economic governance architecture, more so since Europe is on the back foot as a result of the Eurozone crisis.

Before locating South Africa's participation in the G20 process, it may be apposite to examine what exactly the G20's agenda is. At the basic level

it can be characterised as a crisis management committee that seeks to regulate the global economy, in particular setting a broad framework for regulating the behaviour of financial markets; encouraging stronger risk management instruments; stimulating growth and sustaining demand in the global economy; proposing solutions to global imbalances; and intensifying international cooperation, especially with respect to global macroeconomic coordination.²⁰

Beyond these sets of objectives, which appear in various G20 communiqués, lending weight to the reform of global economic governance, especially to provide greater voice and representation to developing countries in the IMF and the World Bank, is one of its key objectives. Since its establishment, the G20 has indeed pushed for agreement or debate on some major policy decisions. These relate to cooling the effects of the crisis and stabilising the global financial markets through a decision to replenish IMF resources towards oiling global economic activities, easing credit markets, and stimulating demand.

In 2009, for example, the G20 agreed to treble IMF resources to US\$750 billion to support new special drawing rights at US\$250 billion, with another US\$250 billion allocated to trade finance and another US\$100 billion directed at support for conditional lending by multilateral development banks. Further, it agreed on the use of additional resources from IMF gold sales to be harvested for concessional finance for poor countries. These were mostly stabilising measures, with the intention to ignite economic activity and restore confidence in the global economy.

The second area has had to do with reforms aimed at increasing the quota of emerging economies in the IMF. The third area has had to do with addressing global imbalances. The fourth, which presents itself as an afterthought, is a developmental agenda. It was in 2008 that the IMF executive board agreed to a package of reforms aimed at putting in place a regime on a new quota formula that would ensure an increase in developing countries quotas in the IMF.

As the board put it, the reform package would 'realign quota and voting shares of countries with their relative weight and role in the global economy, and thus the participation and voice of emerging and low income countries in the 185 IMF'.²¹ Indeed, in March 2010 the G20 finance ministers confirmed the decision to shift about 6 per cent of the voting shares to major developing countries. This approach to reform only touches on the margins and does not go deep enough to tackle acute asymmetries in decision-making processes and poor representation of developing countries in major policy decisions. Even the latest quota increases will generally favour emerging economies such as Brazil, India and China.

The emergence of the G20 fits with South Africa's foreign policy thrust, which is aimed at promoting multilateralism. It is also the initial expression of efforts to reform global governance institutions. It can be argued that it is a realisation of Robert Axelrod's vision of cooperation that transcends tensions between countries. He argued that cooperation is not merely limited to friendship but, under suitable conditions, can also take root between antagonists.²²

In the complex and fluid global system we live in today, nurturing conditions for cooperation is vital for constructing a different global order where power is more diffused and responsibilities shared. The evolving contours of global change suggest that there is more likelihood for cooperative behaviour than an urge towards conflict between different countries or blocs of countries – certainly between the BRICS bloc and the traditional powers of the G7.

While the G20 embodies the spirit of cooperation, its member countries have not always stayed true to the promise. In 2010, the US introduced quantitative easing measures (see below) without consulting its G20 partners. Various countries in Asia introduced capital controls. Brazil has vowed to keep its currency artificially low to mirror China's, in order to give its manufacturing companies a competitive edge. Amid all of this, South Africa's policy-makers have preferred to tie their hands and South Africa's multilateralist stance in the G20, very much like earlier WTO positions, remains void of clearly articulated domestic economic interests.

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE G20 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

It is only recently that the G20 has had a dedicated focus on development issues. Much of the G20's agenda remains dominated by the interests of major economies, both advanced and emerging. It is still very much a crisis management committee, with no serious authority. In its summit held in Seoul in November 2010, the G20 developed a policy document, Development Consensus for Shared Growth, and set out to put 'jobs at the heart of the recovery, to provide social protection, decent work, and ensure accelerated growth of low income countries'.²³ These are all objectives that should resonate with South Africa's own structural challenges. It is in this area that the country should take a lead.

More specifically, a Multi-year Action Plan on Development was agreed upon, which has nine pillars: infrastructure, and with an emphasis on improving energy, transport, communication, water and regional infrastructure so as to unlock growth; human resource development, focusing on aspects related to skills for employment as well as identifying constraints

in the education system; enhancing trade capacity building and access to markets, with aid for trade and duty-free, quota-free market access for low income countries as dominant features; supporting value-adding private investment and job creation; food security, with increased investment and financial support for agriculture development; promoting growth with resilience, mainly stressing social protection systems; ensuring financial inclusion, with the small and medium enterprises as key sectors of focus; and knowledge-sharing.

Much of this work depends heavily on action by other multilateral institutions, for example the aid-for-trade agenda and market access issues are part of the WTO agenda. Progress on the implementation of some of these nine focal points also depends on the quality of cooperation between various multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the regional banks, the OECD, and the International Labour Organization (ILO). Most of these are really old commitments in restated fashion, and already part of the bilateral development cooperation agenda of major economies.

The broad generalities of these aspirations also render it impossible to have any measurable and concrete outcomes any time soon. Perhaps an important area that could yet yield some positive outcome is that of infrastructure development which has a high-level panel of experts already constituted.

The main task of the panel is that of reviewing work to be done by multilateral development banks and commenting on policy frameworks and action plans. Nonetheless, as a developing country member of the G20 and a co-chair with France and South Korea of the Development Working Group, South Africa has played some role in shaping this development framework, although there is no evidence that the country really leads in this effort. Since South Africa is on the margins of issues related to financial regulation and macroeconomic coordination, it should pick up the issues of Africa's development and infrastructure plan as the centerpiece of its strategy in the G20. Further, it needs to create linkages between its domestic development programmes – the New Growth Path and the National Development Plan: Vision for 2030 – and its engagements in the G20, as both make a meaningful contribution and derive concrete benefits.

The work of the G20 is still probably too new to provide much space for a thorough assessment of South Africa's overall contribution in this multilateral institution. Although South Africa has sought to play a positive role in designing the architecture of global economic governance it is not always good at pursuing its own distinct interests. Its default position is always that of burnishing its multilateralist commitments, which can ring hollow in the face of massive development challenges in the country and the amount of resources that go towards servicing multilateral engagements and commitments.

South Africa's reluctance to act in its own interests was evident in the wake of the effects of the second round of quantitative easing introduced by the US Federal Reserve Bank in November 2010, which was a unilateral monetary stimulus action in response to structural challenges in the US economy. This entailed bond purchase to the tune of US\$600 billion, and was aimed at preventing the economy from getting into deflation, given the worryingly low rates of inflation at the time.

This monetary stimulus was also borne out in the reduction in interest rates in the US and the boosting of prices for stocks and other financial assets. This was with a view to stimulating more economic activity and job growth. The unintended consequence of these measures was to chase capital to emerging economies with the effect of inflating the exchange rates and eroding emerging economies' export competitiveness. The US did not coordinate this action at the multilateral level, but acted purely on the basis of what it considered to be its interests, despite the disruptive effects this would have on emerging economies.

Countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, Taiwan and Thailand took preventative action including introducing capital controls to shield their financial markets from the spurt of capital inflows. South Africa viewed such measures unfavourably, instead preferring no action, pinning its hopes on the rationale of global coordination, which is imperfect and without any authority to enforce standards of good behaviour. This is despite the fact that the IMF encourages countries to implement capital controls as part of a toolkit that includes macroeconomic adjustments.²⁴

For South Africa, the imperative to manage its global integration in a more strategic way is greatest, given the huge challenges of growth and unemployment. The objectives set out in the NGP need to be the core elements of the equation in South Africa's multilateral thinking. If the country is serious about building manufactured export capacity, creating labour-intensive employment and competing in the global economy on that basis, it will have to boldly defend its economic interests.

There are a few other gaps of a general nature that are not only unique to South Africa's approach to multilateralism but also applicable to the emerging powers that are playing a role in multilateral processes such as the G20. One crucial gap is failure to evolve a clear conceptual view of development that is established on the basis of shared understanding among emerging economies. This should transcend specific projects such as, for example, infrastructure promotion, to obtain a more comprehensive view of development that would be a pillar of G20 work.

For much of its existence, the G20 has been driven by the interests of major economies partly owing to the lack of normative cohesiveness among the developing countries that are part of this group. Even the development

agenda of the G20 is largely on the shoulders of France and the US, and both countries use this tactically to advance their interests in sustaining development cooperation with poor countries in the face of competition from emerging development partners such as China, India and Brazil.

The US is keen to use the infrastructure pillar of the G20 to resuscitate its Millennium Challenge Account in a different incarnation. Advanced industrial countries are quite clear about their interests. This does not, however, seem to be the case with South, with its preoccupation with pursuing multilateralism without the nuance of interest projection.

CONCLUSION

Participation in the system of global governance is one of the pillars of South Africa's foreign policy. This chapter focused mainly on examining South Africa's involvement in global economic governance, concentrating on its approaches to the WTO and the G20. Rather than looking at very specific positions and tracking every detail of negotiations, this chapter has deliberately privileged broader strategic questions.

There is no doubt that South Africa has stretched its resources to make an important contribution to the system of global governance. Since the early phases of its democratic transition and global integration it has proved itself an honest broker that commands the respect of its peers. It has always deployed the best of its talents in multilateral negotiations, especially in the realms of trade and finance; and it has been a genuine disciple of multilateralism, at times proving to be more of a purist than advanced industrial countries.

It is important, though, to underline the fact that multilateralism as we know it has its lineage in a system where decision-making power was concentrated among a few countries. It is still very much a canvas upon which countries' interests are first scripted before concerns about coordination are seriously entertained. As such it has never really transcended dominant interest preferences: advanced industrial countries have always placed primacy on their domestic economic interests and used the multilateral system either to confirm such interests or to tilt the balance in favour of their priorities.

This system of global governance not only needs to be rethought, which is a long-term process, but developing countries such as South Africa need to recast their integration into the system of global governance, primarily on the basis of their development interests. While South Africa and its peers in the South have somewhat mastered the language of 'development' and reform of global governance, they have not evolved a substantive counter-narrative to existing ideas. This is a challenge to which they will need to

rise up. This does not necessarily suggest radical shifts, but the kind of reformist agenda that introduces noticeable changes on the margins and that is far more aware of their development concerns. More specifically for South Africa, there is a greater need to move beyond generalisation and rhetoric towards grounding external engagement concretely in domestic development priorities, a task that requires extensive interaction with business, and intense reflection among various government departments and agencies that play a role in both foreign policy and economic policy-making. Failure to do this early on will deepen South Africa's socialisation into a crisis management role, the outcomes of which will generate very limited value for the country.

NOTES

- 1 Higgott, R., 2005. The theory and practice of global and regional governance: Accommodating American exceptionalism and European pluralism, *Garnet Working Paper No 01/05*. Coventry: University of Warwick, p. 4.
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Reflections on South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy and preliminary comments on future foreign policy

Jo-Ansie van Wyk

INTRODUCTION

Post-apartheid South Africa's reintegration into the international community resulted in the reorientation and development of the country's foreign policy. In particular, the role of the African National Congress (ANC) in winning the country's first ever democratic elections in 1994 as the new governing party, and thus a key foreign policy actor, has underpinned these developments. The focus on the ANC as a post-apartheid foreign policy actor is deliberate, owing to the party's historical role in the country's liberation struggle and the implications thereof for the international relations of apartheid South Africa; the party's victories in successive elections and its majority in the post-apartheid parliament.¹ During its period in exile, the ANC established extensive international relations with individual states and intergovernmental Organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). A second implication of South Africa's reintegration into the international community was that the foreign policy objectives of the ANC-led government were implemented. The post-apartheid South African government remains unequivocal about the main objective of its foreign policy:

National priorities informs the vision of South Africa's foreign policy in creating a better South Africa, a better Africa and a better world and aims to counter threats that impact on global political and economic stability. South Africa's foreign policy therefore recognises that in order to achieve a better life for all, development and security are best addressed through adequate attention to all global threats facing humanity.²

A final implication of South Africa's reintegration has been that the ANC-led government established relations with its liberation partners, so that

historical relations were aligned with the party's foreign policy, reflecting change and continuity.

The purpose of the first *South African Foreign Policy Review* is to analyse and assess South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy by focusing on several pertinent areas such as foreign policy decision-making; the country's international position; and its relations with Africa, the industrialised North and the developing South. In addition to this, the *Review* highlights South Africa's changing role and position within the wider international milieu.

This chapter, therefore, reflects on some of the conclusions drawn by contributors to the first *South African Foreign Policy Review*, as well as considering the practical implications of contributors' conclusions for the future evolution or development of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy. Finally, the chapter considers the study of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy and presents recommendations for future research in this area.

REVIEWING SOUTH AFRICA'S POST-APARTHEID FOREIGN POLICY

As Chris Landsberg has indicated in chapter 1, various earlier attempts, at annual or biennial reviews of South African foreign policy have occurred since 1994. In 1996, the country's oldest foreign policy think tank, the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), published its first annual *South African Yearbook of International Affairs* which focused on the country's new foreign policy and its new relations. Typically, subsequent editions of the *South African Yearbook of International Affairs* include chapters on South African foreign policy, its bilateral and multilateral relations, and a selection of global issues.

Apart from the *South African Yearbook of International Affairs*, the University of South Africa (Unisa) VerLoren van Themaat Centre for Public Law Studies has, since 1975, published an annual review, the *South African Yearbook of International Law*, on the development of international law in South Africa, and on aspects of South Africa's foreign policy and international relations.⁵

The South African government's annual *South Africa Yearbook* contains a chapter on South Africa's international relations and often follows the structure of the annual report of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and, since 2009, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). The South African government regards the *South Africa Yearbook* as the 'official authoritative reference' on the country.⁴

Since 2003, the state-sponsored research institute, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), has published the *State of the Nation*. Its

inaugural edition included chapters on South Africa as a middle power and the country's expansion into Africa.⁵ Subsequent editions included chapters on South Africa's relations with Nigeria and its diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe (2005); South Africa's trade strategy, its relations with China and its energy-based relations with African countries (2006); and South Africa in Africa, its relations with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Zimbabwean community in South Africa (2007).⁶

Notwithstanding the contribution of each of these reviews and year-books, none of the publications is specifically dedicated to South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy. Moreover, owing to the high frequency (annual or biennial) of publication and the type of contributors, some of these reviews lack in-depth theoretical analyses. More in-depth theoretical analyses were made by individual publications on South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy which differentiated between foreign policy, foreign policy actors, foreign policy actions, and the results thereof.

THE STUDY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S POST-APARTHEID FOREIGN POLICY

South Africa's democratic transition coincided with similar transitions elsewhere in the wake of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this regard, the study of South Africa's democratic foreign policy shares similarities with countries in this position: namely the dominance of certain narratives including consideration of the new foreign policy decision-makers; the features and results of the new foreign policy; and a consideration of the new bilateral and multilateral relations established.

Several narratives dominate analyses of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy. Some of these narratives focus on the ideas, interests, identity and strategies of South Africa's foreign policy since the incumbent ruling party, the ANC, took office in 1994. These narratives focus on various elements of South Africa's identity (prodigal son, regional and continental leader and middle power), role (bridge-builder, human rights champion, voice of the South and peacemaker) and interests (to terminate global apartheid, to advance the socio-economic development of South Africans).⁷

Some of the legacies of South Africa's racial past continue to affect the study of foreign policy in the country. The pre-1994 National Party (NP) government's 'Bantu education' policy resulted in separate universities such as the University of the Western Cape, and the Universities of Venda and Fort Hare, today called HDIs (historically disadvantaged institutions). Since the ANC came to power, various experiments with national education policies and institutional engineering have resulted in increasingly poor primary and secondary school education, and the merger of HDIs

with traditional 'white' universities. Some of these mergers have resulted in the re-engineering of courses, including courses on the study of South African foreign policy to reflect the post-apartheid government's new foreign policy agenda.⁸

Compared with the scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s on the country's international isolation, scholarship in the early 1990s was characteristically on the elite settlement pertaining to South Africa's transition, and the role of the international community in bringing about this change. The Mandela era was predominantly characterised by an idealistic foreign policy. In response, scholarship focused on debates on the new foreign policy machinery and democratic participation in the foreign policy process. The acid test for this period of idealism came in the form of the Nigerian human rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa's death penalty in 1995. President Mandela's efforts to influence the Nigerian government's decision at that year's Commonwealth Heads of States and Governments meeting in New Zealand was met with fierce reaction by African and other delegations. Mandela received a dressing down from his peers. Despite efforts to prevent it, Saro-Wiwa was executed. A second acid test was the South African government's decision to terminate its diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favour of mainland China. Despite earlier indications that South Africa would adopt a two-China policy, in 1997 the Mandela government cut its relations with Taiwan in favour of a one-China policy. Added to this were concerns about South Africa's silence on China's poor human rights record – a capstone in South Africa's foreign policy.

South African foreign scholars predominantly evaluated the Mandela presidency as a period of foreign policy-making, the establishment of new relations and the continuation of old relations. In short, the period of the return of the proverbial prodigal son. Unlike his predecessor, President Thabo Mbeki had extensive diplomatic experience as the ANC's international relations head. Mbeki's tenure as South African president (1999–2008) sharpened the focus of South Africa's international relations. Activist, ambitious and reformist, Mbeki instituted a foreign policy and diplomatic practice that took a multilateralist turn. Domestically it took a centralist turn with Mbeki becoming the country's *Über* diplomat, sidelining the line department, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and Parliament. Within a few years of his inauguration, Mbeki's Grand Idea of the African Renaissance was formulated, sold to, and adopted by other African leaders. This culminated in the transformation of the OAU into the African Union (AU). Mbeki's pledge for a new partnership for Africa's development culminated in the AU's adoption of *Nepad*.

Notwithstanding the Grand Idea of an African Renaissance, Africa was experiencing some of its bloodiest periods since the end of the Cold

War. In the wake of the release of the UN secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace in 1995 on international peacekeeping, peacemaking and preventative diplomacy, South Africa adopted a new military posture – from a defensive posture to that of peacemaking and peacekeeping.⁹ One of post-apartheid South Africa's first excursions into this was President Mandela's deployment of the *SAS Drakensberg* of the South African Navy to the coast of the former Zaire in the final stages of the reign of Mobutu Sese Seko. Subsequently, South Africa increasingly played a role as the continental peace broker in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia and Kenya. Varying levels of success resulted in scholarship questioning the South African government's motives, abilities and resources to maintain its peace diplomacy on the continent. Parallel to this were Mbeki's international safaris to meetings of groupings of the rich industrialised North such as the Group of 8 (G8) and the World Economic Forum (WEF).

South Africa's idea-driven post-1994 foreign policy has acted as a social force in the South, as well as in the relations between the North and South. Moreover, South Africa's historical experience of, for example, apartheid, or exclusion, has contributed to the country's efforts to end global apartheid and the exclusion of the South through South Africa's activism pertaining to, for example, the reform and transformation of major global multilateral institutions such as the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

MAIN FINDINGS OF THE REVIEW

THE CENTRALISATION OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING AND THE NEED FOR DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING

Lesley Masters has presented a *tour d'horizon* of foreign policy actors and decision-makers in South Africa. Her analysis of the 'black box' includes vertical or hierarchical formal state-based decision-makers in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996), and horizontal decision-makers such as civil society and think tanks. What Masters's chapter clearly indicates is that despite the proliferation of foreign policy actors, they do not exert a sustained influence on foreign policy-making. While the president maintains his predominance at the centre of foreign policy decision-making, other actors may be drawn into the process. It is not a case of static concentric circles where those on the periphery will always be on the periphery, but a case where stakeholders may be drawn into the centre depending on their resources, expertise and interests. Masters

concludes that presidential pre-eminence in South African foreign policy has dominated the period under review, a situation that is contrary to the ruling party's ideal of a democratic foreign policy.

Constitutionally, the president's foreign policy role is limited to receiving and recognising foreign diplomatic and consular representatives; appointing ambassadors, plenipotentiaries and consular representatives; and negotiating and signing international agreements as the national executive.¹⁰ Compared to the president's powers, Parliament has to consider and approve these agreements; hold the national executive accountable; and maintain oversight of the exercise of national executive authority and any organ of the state.¹¹ Parliament's reactive rather than proactive foreign policy role has often been criticised. However, Parliament's role in this has been superseded by that of Luthuli House (the ANC headquarters in Johannesburg) as an *Über* Parliament. This situation is recognised by the ANC. In March 2012 it released an International Relations Policy Discussion Document explaining the ANC's historical position on, and participation in, international relations.¹² In its reflection on parliamentary diplomacy, the ANC calls for an 'activist' parliament in foreign policy matters in recognition of Parliament's 'scant involvement in international relations'.¹³

The implications of presidential pre-eminence in foreign policy are wide-ranging. It centralises decision-making, often goes unaccounted in Parliament, and downgrades the ministry of foreign affairs and cooperation to reactive functionaries whose creativity is stymied. The appointment of presidential foreign policy advisors further downgrades the ministry by not using its expertise. This centralises certain niche diplomatic areas in the Presidency; limits the development of diplomats; create mistrust between organs of the state; and limits bureaucratic power and influence in advancing national interests.

Efforts are undertaken to bridge the gap between policy-makers and the public, but the South African citizenry remains alienated and isolated from foreign policy debates and decisions. On a practical level, efforts to undo this situation should rest with Parliament, as constitutionally prescribed, and with the citizenry.


On an analytical and theoretical level, the elitist nature of South African foreign policy decision-making opens various avenues for future empirical research on public opinion on foreign policy; the role and influence of presidential foreign policy advisers; the psychological and societal milieu of foreign policy decision-making; and the role of the ANC as a foreign policy decision-maker. Masters refers to the foreign policy role of the ANC as the post-1994 ruling party and to its establishment of a subcommittee on international relations of the National Executive Committee and an International Relations Rapid Response Task Team. In fact, the ANC's

2012 International Relations Policy Discussion Document elaborates on the party's foreign policy and international relations. Focusing on the ANC's relations with other liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; and 'solidarity efforts' in Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Swaziland, Madagascar, Somalia, Haiti, Palestine, Western Sahara, Cuba, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sri Lanka. The ANC also identifies four international campaigns: Africa Day, Mandela Day, the African Diaspora and the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM).¹⁴ The significance of the 2012 International Relations Policy Discussion Document is that it illustrates the foreign policy priorities within the ruling party, which is a good indication of future government policy on these issues.

DIPLOMACY IS THE PREFERRED INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY

Prior to the implementation of foreign policy, decision-makers should ideally first determine whether the state has the capabilities (armed forces; industrial and technology skills; reputation and prestige; gross domestic product (GDP); quality of civil service; strength of currency; agricultural productivity and vigorous civil society) to achieve its foreign policy objectives, which is typically done through the application of several instruments which fall into four main categories: political, military, economic

Figure 1 The ascending scale of foreign policy instruments



Source E. Brighi and C. Hill, 2012

and cultural/ideological.¹⁵ The actual instruments to exert pressure and influence are summarised in the ascending scale in figure 1.

A major feature of the 1996 constitutional dispensation in South Africa is the three spheres of government: national, provincial and local. Whereas the South African Constitution is clear on the role of Parliament and the president in foreign policy matters, it is silent on the role of the other spheres of government. Notwithstanding this, some local and provincial governments have embarked on ambitious international relations and established international relations portfolios in their offices of the premier or of the executive mayor.

Siphamandla Zondi's contribution focuses on paradiplomacy as an instrument of South Africa's foreign policy. Constitutionally limited in their foreign policy role, sub-national governments such as provinces and local governments (the second and third tiers of government in South Africa) have nevertheless crafted a foreign policy role for themselves since 1994 for which there are several reasons, including ambitious premiers and mayors; international borders; undocumented international migration; and the attraction of much-needed foreign investment and development aid. On a practical level, Zondi's chapter highlights the need for a developmental foreign policy in alignment with the government's idea of a developmental state, in order to achieve socio-economic advancement in the country. Zondi's contribution also indicates that decision-makers should pay more attention to the constitutional principles of cooperative governance and exclusive and concurrent powers. In this way, the International Relations Policy Discussion Document's call for the improvement of coordination between national and provincial governments on international relations can be achieved.¹⁶ At the ANC's National Policy Conference (NPC) in June 2012, one of the main discussions focused on the so-called 'second transition' document: *The Second Transition? Building a national democratic society and the balance of forces in 2012*.¹⁷ The document is explicit in referring to the ANC's eighteen years in power as the 'first phase of the transition', with the second transition establishing a democratic developmental state in South Africa through economic and social transformation. The second transition's link with South Africa's foreign policy is that the document outlines the role of the ANC as the governing party in achieving the transition. This is addressed under the heading 'International Work' and alludes to the ANC-in-government's role in Africa, the South, the Group of 77 (G77) and the Group of 20 (G20).¹⁸

SKILFUL APPLICATION OF SOFT POWER TO ENHANCE NATIONAL INTERESTS

In her contribution, Karen Smith focuses on South Africa's use of soft power since 1994 as well as the factors that have underlined the country's soft

power. Despite its manifestations and achievements, soft power remains a form of power. For post-apartheid South Africa, it is very important not to be accused of wielding any form of power in Africa, in particular, as the apartheid government often flexed its muscles on the continent. In some instances, soft power has been linked to public diplomacy, a type of diplomacy which is increasingly receiving attention in the South African foreign policy establishment. Smith's chapter, therefore, opens various avenues for future empirical research on public diplomacy as soft power; on South Africa's conduct of public diplomacy; and South Africa's perception of its power.

POWER, LEADERSHIP AND FOLLOWERSHIP

Among South African scholars, debates about South Africa's emergent middle power status has centred on issues such as the definition and characteristics of an emergent middle power; the status (formality or informality) of the regional groupings with which South Africa has associated itself; the geographical scope of the grouping (North–South, or South–South); South Africa's leadership (or not) in the grouping; the types of power (hard, soft, moral) wielded by South Africa; the regional and international impact of regional groups; and the perceived threats posed by these groupings.

Like their counterparts elsewhere, regional (power) grouping such as the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) wield material and/or immaterial power, or in Nye's terminology, hard and/or soft power.¹⁹ As the major power in their neighbourhoods, these states have the responsibility – or the obligation – to take up positions of leadership in their neighbourhoods when stability in one country is threatening to destabilise a whole region. Consequently, regional powers often have followers, or smaller or weaker states, in their neighbourhoods.

As regional powers, India, Brazil and South Africa, for example, exert considerable international influence as leading states in the NAM, the largest grouping in the UN General Assembly. This international influence is more symbolic than material. In the hierarchy of states, each of these states occupies a position of middle powership based on their democratic credentials, political stability, relative socio-economic development, diplomatic niches, normative entrepreneurship, leadership, and good global citizenship.

South Africa's *pas de deux* with multilateralism reached new heights in April 2011 when China invited the country to join BRIC. For South Africa, joining BRIC is an important event as two members of BRIC, namely Russia and China, are permanent members of the UN Security Council and therefore wield considerable global influence. In his chapter, Francis Kornegay argues that South Africa's activist past is continued through its efforts to

restructure multilateral institutions dominated by the North, and North–South relations. However, the sustainability of South African ‘southernism’ and its ideational foreign policy is questioned. Some of Kornegay’s other conclusions are mentioned below.

THE AFRICAN AGENDA REMAINS A CONSTANT FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVE

Engaging with Africa has been a constant theme in post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy. It has been elevated to become the African agenda, manifested in strong bilateral and multilateral relations with the continent.

In her chapter, Nomfundo Ngwenya focuses on South Africa’s engagement with African anchor states. Although the South African government does not have a policy on anchor states, as Ngwenya indicates, it maintains good bilateral relations with them. Diplomatically, these relations are conducted through special instruments such as joint bilateral commissions and bi-national commissions. However, South Africa competes with other states in its relations with these states, and Ngwenya’s contribution raises a key practical question: What have been the tangible achievements of the African agenda? Is the idea of maintaining bilateral rather than multilateral relations not working against the idea of continental integration?

David Monyae’s contribution addresses South Africa’s multilateral relations in Africa as a realist and pluralist middle power. South Africa’s involvement in the restructuring of regional Organizations such as SADC and the transformation of the OAU to the AU are two of the country’s main achievements on the continent. At the time of writing, July 2012, South Africa’s candidate for the position of AU chairperson, its former minister of foreign affairs, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, was elected to head the AU. The election process revealed some continental opposition to South Africa. But for South Africa, Dlamini-Zuma’s successful election falls into the scope of the global ‘cadre deployment policy’ akin to the ANC’s domestic deployment policy, Policy on the Nomination and Election of Candidates to International Organizations, which Cabinet approved in 2010 to promote South African and developing countries’ interests.²⁰

In his chapter on peace diplomacy, Anthoni van Nieuwkerk highlights the link between foreign policy and peace diplomacy (as an instrument of foreign policy) by, *inter alia*, examining the role of South African presidents as foreign policy actors *and* peacemakers. Van Nieuwkerk’s chapter pre-dates the release of the government’s 2012 Defence Review which is important for the country’s future peace diplomacy.²¹ Against the background of Van Nieuwkerk’s chapter future research on South Africa’s peace diplomacy should take the recently released Defence Review as a policy and capabilities statement into account.

Iqbal Jhazbhay's chapter focuses on South Africa's relations with the Arab Maghreb and the Middle East-North Africa region (MENA). Personal and historical ties cemented post-apartheid South Africa's relations with these regions. In the wake of 9/11 and some anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiments, South Africa maintained its relations with these countries despite Western pressure to take a harder stance. Jhazbhay's chapter creates avenues for research on neglected aspects of South Africa's foreign policy: the role of religion and values in South African foreign policy.

INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

Brendan Vickers's review of South Africa's post-1994 multilateral economic diplomacy refers to its efforts to consolidate historical economic relations while also establishing new economic relations with a country such as China. Vickers alludes to some successes of South Africa's economic diplomacy, stymied by the current global financial crisis, a crisis which coincides with renewed South African efforts to stimulate industrial and infrastructural development through, for example, foreign direct investment. South Africa's contribution of US\$2 million to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) firewall fund was questioned by opposition parties in Parliament, business Organizations and civil society.²²

The 2012 International Relations Policy Discussion Document, in a departure from previous documents such as the 1996 South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document and the positions adopted at the ANC's 52nd National Conference in Polokwane in December 2007, focuses on three specific types of diplomacy: parliamentary diplomacy, economic diplomacy and paradiplomacy. With regard to economic diplomacy in the party's 'strategic role towards a better world', it indicates that the country should enhance its 'international relations and domestic interests through economic diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy'.²³ This will go a long way in achieving the objectives of post-apartheid South Africa's economic diplomacy to expand trade and investment in Africa and advance regional integration in Southern and Eastern Africa; to consolidate relations with traditional trade and investment partners in the North; to strengthen relations with the emerging economies of the South; and to recalibrate global trade regimes in favour of developing countries through the WTO Doha Round negotiations.²⁴

INCREASED ALIGNMENT WITH THE DEVELOPMENTAL AGENDAS OF EMERGING POWER CONSTELLATIONS WHILST MAINTAINING TIES WITH THE NORTH

Kornegay's focus on South Africa's role in the emerging power constellations the New Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership (NAASP), NAM, IBSA and BRICS

is complemented by an analysis of the relations between Africa's 'great powers' such as South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Libya and Senegal. He concludes that South Africa is recognised as an equal and important power by other major regional powers of the South but that South Africa is spreading itself too thinly. Kornegay therefore argues the case for bureaucratic reform to strengthen South Africa's foreign policy and outputs in the competitive terrain of emerging power constellations. Unlike Masters, who analyses the existing foreign policy 'black box', Kornegay proposes the establishment of institutions akin to the United States National Security Council to enhance South Africa's success in emerging power constellations.

Like Vickers and Kornegay, Garth Shelton analyses elements of South Africa's economic diplomacy in the context of South Africa's relations with East Asia. He concludes that South Africa has established constructive trade-based relationships but has missed opportunities to attract investment and to build stronger economic partnerships. Shelton makes the case for a South African comprehensive look-east policy to improve its economic diplomacy with the region and to advance its national interests.

In reviewing South Africa's relations with the global North (including Europe, North America and Eastern Europe), Gerrit Oliver concludes that it 'emanates from necessity rather than preference' as South Africa's focus shifted to the global South and that these relations (South Africa's relations with the North) should also be receiving South Africa's attention.

As do Vickers and Kornegay, Mzukisi Qobo reviews post-apartheid South Africa's engagement with institutions of global governance, in particular in the context of the WTO and the G20. He refers to South Africa's reformist and developmental agenda in these settings in order to improve conditions in South Africa and the global South.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE REVIEW

IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY

This *Review* shows that norms matter in a state's foreign policy, its foreign policy decision-making, and the results thereof. Settled or generally recognised international norms constrain foreign policy behaviour but also *constitute* foreign policy behaviour.²⁵ Diplomacy as a settled norm constrains a state's foreign policy behaviour. A state, therefore, is obliged to follow the norms pertaining to the practice of diplomacy. Diplomacy constitutes a state's foreign policy behaviour. Diplomacy as a settled norm requires a state to react to any domestic or international non-compliance of this norm. Therefore, South Africa's foreign policy objective to be a 'good international

citizen' and to contribute to international peace has resulted in its compliance with settled norms such as state, sovereignty, international law, diplomacy and human rights.²⁷ In response to these foreign policy objectives, South Africa has contributed to strengthening states' compliance with these norms through its involvement in the Kimberley Process Verification Scheme (KPVS) which outlaws so-called 'blood diamonds', and the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1995. In this regard, South Africa's foreign policy behaviour has been described as akin to that of a norm entrepreneur which contributes to the establishment of new settled norms.²⁷

ONTOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE *REVIEW*

Ontologically, the *Review* engaged with three dimensions of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy: inter-subjectivity, context and power. With regard to intersubjectivity, the *Review* emphasised South Africa's interactions between structures and agents. Foreign policy agents' intersubjective understandings of cooperation, partnership and reform of international institutions, for example, constructed the country's identity, interests, role and meanings, and vice versa, resulting in the mutual constitution of agents and structures.

Context is the second ontological dimension dealt with in this *Review*. For the purposes of this *Review*, South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy is contextually linked to the Cold War (historical context), the country's transformed domestic policies (social context) and its perception of itself as an African, developing, and a country from the South (spatial context).

A third ontological dimension addressed in this *Review* is that of power, in particular soft power. For decades one of the dominant intersubjective understandings of South Africa has been a country with internationally unacceptable human rights policies and an isolated state. For apartheid South Africa, power derived from a material rather than an immaterial base. Once the country democratised in 1994, it was able to construct a new conception of its power and identity owing to the changed nature of its interests. This new identity undid international perceptions of South Africa and bestowed the country with significant normative power in terms of its nature as a middle power state.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE *REVIEW*

The *Review* provides insights into state behaviour; especially behaviour relating to a previously isolated state and its integration into the

international community. In this regard, the *Review* concludes that post-apartheid South Africa has constructed and is constructing a new identity, power and interests. The study also contributes to insights in diplomacy emanating from the state's foreign policy. In addition to this, it contributes to an understanding of middle power behaviour, especially as it relates to a middle power from the developing world.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS OF THE REVIEW

The main findings of the *Review* have several implications. The *Review* raises further ontological and epistemological questions, especially about the implications of agency, identities and interests. If norms and identities are constructed, they can be reconstructed, giving rise to their fluid nature. For this *Review*, this raises questions about the fluidity of post-apartheid South Africa's roles, norms and identities.

A second implication of the *Review*'s findings relates to the conduct, content and scope of South Africa's post-apartheid diplomacy. South Africa's post-apartheid conduct in international relations indicates that diplomacy, as an instrument of foreign policy, can be an instrument of power, authority and influence.

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This *Review* went to press after the ANC's NPC in June 2012. A precursor to the party's National Conference every five years in December 2012, the NPC provided early indications of the foreign policy thinking in the party and its post-2014 election agenda. As was the case in the period preceding the ANC's 52nd National Conference in December 2007 in Polokwane, the run-up to the 53rd National Conference in Mangaung in December 2012 has some of the hallmarks of political remission with reported internal divisions in the party and in government, which in the past disabled good governance in certain state institutions and negatively affected South Africa's international image.

The full extent of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy cannot be addressed in a publication with limited scope such as the *Review*. Therefore, it is recommended that the *South African Foreign Policy Review* will become a South African institution in years to come. In this way, the *Review* can make a valuable and regular contribution to the study of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy akin to, for example, *Keesing's Contemporary Archive* and *Africa Contemporary Record* as the authoritative source on South

Africa's foreign policy. In this regard, recommendations for Volume 2 of the *Review* are offered. Ideally, future research will include in-depth conceptual and theoretical studies on the underlying aspects of South Africa's foreign policy such as national interests, national security and national identity. Secondly, future research could also assess President Zuma's foreign policy in greater detail as his term progresses. The Zuma government introduced its first Grand Idea in 2011 with the notion of South Africa's 'diplomacy of ubuntu', which remains conceptually unclear and therefore warrants further exploration. In the third instance, future research could focus on South Africa's foreign policy apparatus; bureaucracy; policy advisers; the structure of DIRCO; and the training and appointment of diplomats, which according to the ANC 'necessitates that the ANC deploy carefully selected competent comrades into the diplomatic service'.²⁸ In the fourth instance, it is recommended that future research could focus on South Africa's foreign policy in terms of its status as a middle power. Finally, research is required to improve the democratisation of South Africa's foreign policy and a more proactive and influential foreign policy role for Parliament. It is envisaged that the first volume of the *Review* will provide a solid analytical, theoretical and practical foundation for future research on South Africa's dynamic foreign policy.

NOTES

- 1 See, for example, *The United Nations and Apartheid, 1948–1994*, New York: United Nations, 1994.
- 2 Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), 2011. *Strategic Plan 2011–2015*. Pretoria: DIRCO, p. 21.
- 3 University of South Africa VerLoren van Themaat Centre for Public Law Studies, 2012. *South African Yearbook of International Law 2012*. Available at: <http://www.unisa.ac.za/default.asp?Cmd=ViewContent&ContentID=13699> [Accessed 9 July 2012].
- 4 Government Communications and Information Service (GCIS), *South Africa Yearbook*, 2012. Available at: www.gcis.gov.za [Accessed 9 July 2012].
- 5 Daniel, J., A. Habib and R. Southall (eds), 2003. *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003–2004*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
- 6 Daniel, J., R. Southall and J. Lutchman (eds), 2004. *State of the Nation: South Africa 2004–2005*. Cape Town: HSRC Press; S. Buhlungu, S., J. Daniel and R. Southall (eds), 2006. *State of the Nation: South Africa 2005–2006*. Cape Town: HSRC Press; Buhlungu, S., J. Daniel, R. Southall and J. Lutchman (eds), 2007. *State of the Nation: South Africa 2007*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
- 7 See, for example, Barber, J., 2004. *Mandela's World: The International Dimension of South Africa's Revolution 1990–99*. Cape Town: David Philip; Landsberg, C., G. le Pere and A. van Nieuwkerk (eds), 1995. *Mission Imperfect: Redirecting South Africa's Foreign Policy*. Johannesburg: Foundation for Global Dialogue and Centre for Policy Studies; Schoeman, M., 2003. South Africa as an emerging middle power: 1994–2003. In Daniel, J., A. Habib

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- 8 For more on these changes, see Susan Booyesen & Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, Political Studies in South Africa: An assessment of the discipline and the profession, *Politikon*, 1998, 25(1), pp. 3–29; Ian Taylor, Rethinking the study of International Relations in South Africa, *Politikon*, 2000, 27(2), pp. 207–220; Maxi Schoeman, 2009, South Africa: Between history and a hard place, in Arlene B Tickner and Ole Wæver (eds), 2009. *International Relations Scholarship Around the World*, New York: Routledge.
 - 9 See B. Boutros-Ghali, 1995. *An Agenda for Peace*. New York: United Nations.
 - 10 See s 84(2)(h) and (i); and s 231(1).
 - 11 See s 55 and s 231.
 - 12 African National Congress (ANC), International Relations Policy Discussion Document, March 2012. Available at: <http://www.anc.org.za/docs/discus/2012/internationalb.pdf> [Accessed 5 July 2012].
 - 13 Ibid.
 - 14 Ibid.
 - 15 Elisabetta Brighi and Christopher Hill, Implementation and behaviour. In Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne (eds), 2012. *Foreign Policy. Theories, Actors, Cases*, second edition, pp. 158 and 163. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 - 16 Op. cit., p. 26.
 - 17 ANC, The Second Transition? Building a national democratic society and the balance of forces in 2012, 27 February 2012. Available at: <http://www.anc.org.za/docs/discus/2012/transition.pdf> [Accessed 5 July 2012].
 - 18 Ibid.
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 - 21 Department of Defence, Defence Review, 2012. Available at: <http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=163572> [Accessed 5 July 2012].
 - 22 Government Communications and Information System, Presidency clarifies \$2bn IMF commitment, 20 June 2012. Available at: <http://www.sanews.gov.za/news/12/12062010451003> [Accessed 5 July 2012].
 - 23 African National Congress, International Relations Policy Discussion Document, March 2012, p. 26. Available at: <http://www.anc.org.za/docs/discus/2012/internationalb.pdf> [Accessed 5 July 2012].
 - 24 Department of Trade and Industry, 2010. South African Trade Policy and Strategy Framework, Pretoria: DTI.

- 25 See Frost, M., 1996. *Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 See D. Geldenhuys, 2006. South Africa's role as international norm entrepreneur. In Carlsnaes, W. and P. Nel (eds) *In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy After Apartheid*. Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue.
- 28 African National Congress, International Relations Policy Discussion Document, March 2012, pp. 24–35. Available at: <http://www.anc.org.za/docs/discus/2012/internationalb.pdf> [Accessed 5 July 2012].

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW

The richness of public and academic discourses on the past, present and future direction of South Africa's role in Africa and the world suggests that as a sub-discipline of politics, South African foreign policy is ready for a systematic and regular appraisal in the form of a series of publications that the Institute for Global Dialogue will call South African Foreign Policy Review. This is also because constant changes in international and domestic circumstances impinge on the management and analysis of South Africa's foreign policy. This, the first review provides an important opportunity to build on existing foreign policy works in order to take stock of the road already travelled in the past decade or so. This is crucial in laying some basis for anticipating the country's future role, and considering the opportunities and challenges, which future volumes of the review will consider. This volume provides a wide-ranging appraisal of the relationship between stated foreign policy goals and actual outputs and outcomes, an assessment of how foreign policy has actually been operationalized and implemented. To this end, common themes in South African foreign policy provide the framework for the first review. These include foreign policy decision-making; soft power dynamics in the foreign policy's strategic calculus; diplomatic tools used – economic diplomacy, peace diplomacy and paradiplomacy; South Africa's relations with key states in Africa, in the global south and in the global north; South Africa's approach to Africa multilateral, global multilateralism/governance. The review hopes to stimulate further discussion and thinking on the challenges confronted, and the future shape and direction of South Africa's foreign policy.

'This review of South Africa's foreign policy will prove invaluable to scholars and students, and anyone with an interest in understanding the international journey of South Africa over the past two decades. Here we have an in-depth analysis of this journey. The achievements, and the shortcomings and challenges of the country's foreign policy as played out against the backdrop of a turbulent geopolitical order are explored and assessed, providing the reader with a comprehensive review and understanding of South Africa's foreign policy agenda and conduct.'

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'*South African Foreign Policy Volume I* will undoubtedly provide the impetus for more informed discussions on South African foreign policy since 1999. It must also lay the foundations for other volumes to further develop these themes and continuously assess developments in these areas.'

Aziz Pahad

Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in South Africa, 1994-2008

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